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In a separation of powers system, delicately calibrated to defend against the destabilizing effect 
of concentrating power in any one branch, why then does each branch seek to increase its level 
of power relative to the other branches?  The answer to this question lies in our understanding of 
these institutional powers, the formal and informal tools either unilaterally controlled or shared 
with the other independent branches of government, which constitute what is known as 
institutional capacity.  However, institutional capacity is a complex, multidimensional concept, 
which is not easily observed nor easily understood (e.g. Gargan 1981).  My dissertation focuses 
on exploring the concept of institutional capacity within three salient American state government 
topics, to show that institutional capacity affords political actors the ability to pursue their 
various electoral, institutional, and policy goals, and thus each branch endeavors to increase its 
level of capacity relative to the other branches.  The high level of variation across political 
institutions in the American states provides varying degrees of institutional power sharing and 
power dominance which offer important implications for our broader understanding of 
democratic theory a separation of powers as expressed by Madison.  I show that the ability of 
political actors in the American states is constrained by the historical changes in the institutional 
capacity of both governors and state legislatures, and despite the historical dominance of 
 v 
governors in the policy-making and budgetary arena, state legislatures possess the capacity to 
undermine governors under certain conditions, particularly in budgetary realms and under 
periods of divided partisan control of the state government.  These findings offer support for the 
professionalism movement in the American states which drove much of this institutional change 
and altered the (im)balance of power between the branches, and echo the claim that it is easy to 
“invent a government and devise a strong executive” yet it is much harder “to devise a strong 
legislature that can survive transfers of power and shifts of party control” (Loftus 1994: 63). 
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that in the event of a budget agreement failing to be reached I should not report to work until the 
stalemate was concluded and a new budget for the next fiscal year was in place.  During the 
resulting one-day furlough, I and about 24,000 state workers, questioned why the impasse was 
happening and how long it would last.  With the more extreme budget impasses that followed in 
the subsequent years, I wondered why Pennsylvania continued to have such difficulty in 
performing this annual task, especially when compared to many other states which had very little 
difficulty each year.  My career at the University of Pittsburgh, and ultimately this dissertation, 
afforded me the opportunity to examine these and other similarly related questions – research 
topics I look forward to continuing in my future research. 
This research, including all of the coursework, reading, writing which led to its 
conclusion, would not have been possible without the support of numerous individuals in my 
life.  First, I would like to acknowledge my dissertation committee, comprised of George Krause, 
Kristin Kanthak, Jonathan Woon, and Justin Phillips. The guidance, advice, and commentary 
received from my committee members was invaluable and helped to strengthen and refine this 
final product.  Any errors which remain are my own.  I would like to especially thank George 
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Krause for not only serving as the chair of my dissertation committee, but for being my 
professor, graduate advisor, coauthor, and friend.  His guidance at every step of my graduate 
career has helped to shape me into the scholar I am today.  
I would like to thank Amanda Jones, Daniel Tingley, Danielle Rago, Nicholas Weltz, and 
Ryan Golen for serving as my student research assistants during the Spring 2013 term.  Their 
efforts in collecting and coding individual state legislative biographical information was 
invaluable. Specials thanks to George Krause and Kristin Kanthak for working to organize this 
opportunity.  I hope that other graduate students will be as fortunate as I was to have the help of 
a “fleet of RAs” at my disposal for the collecting and coding of a large portion of the data used in 
this dissertation work.  
Most importantly, from the bottom of my heart, I want to thank the people who have 
helped me most in reaching my goals in life, my friends and family.  By supporting me, they 
have endured me having to miss family events and spend vacations reading, coding, and writing 
in pursuit of my goals.  Last, but always the most important to me, through everything, the 
person who has walked every step of this process with me is my wife.  In the times even when I 
doubted myself, Tina has never lapsed in her support and faith in my ability to complete this 
difficult journey. From the long hours we spent collecting and coding data together, discussing 
my research during date nights, and often putting our life on hold to allow me to pursue this 
dream - thank you for everything. 
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1.0 Introduction 
“It is agreed on all sides, that the powers properly belonging to one of the departments ought not 
to be directly and completely administered by either of the other departments. It is equally 
evident, that none of them ought to possess, directly or indirectly, an overruling influence over 
the others, in the administration of their respective powers. It will not be denied, that power is of 
an encroaching nature, and that it ought to be effectually restrained from passing the limits 
assigned to it.”  
~ James Madison: Federalist Paper 48 
In a separation of powers system, the partition of the legislative, executive, and judicial power is 
essential to provide the necessary checks and balances to avoid the usurpation and tyranny by 
any one holder of these powers.  This system avoids a gradual concentration of power in the 
same branch by “giving to those who administer each department the necessary constitutional 
means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others” (Federalist 51).  As Madison 
later goes on to argue in Federalist 51, “ambition must be made to counteract ambition” where 
“such devices should be necessary to control the abuses of government.”  Yet, throughout time, 
these branches have attempted to increase their own level of power, either proactively or in 
response to another branch, desiring to place themselves in a position of enhanced strength and 
influence relative to the other branches.  As Neustadt (1960, 33) argued, rather than creating a 
government of separated powers, the Constitution established “a government of separated 
institutions sharing powers.”  The American states are no exception to this power struggle, with 
governors and state legislatures competing for a position of leverage over the other in many of 
their shared functions (e.g. Durning 1995; Squire 2007; Briffault 2010).  However, while the 
 2 
 
federal arena is delicately calibrated to defend against the destabilizing effect of concentrating 
power in any one branch, the high level of variation across political institutions in the American 
states yields varying degrees of institutional power sharing and power dominance which offer 
important implications for our broader understanding of democratic theory as expressed by 
Madison. 
Given the role that the separation of powers system provides and the inherent dangers of 
concentrating power in any one branch of government, why do these branches seek to increase 
their level of power relative to the other branches?  Engaged in this continual power struggle, 
each branch benefits from, to varying degrees, certain institutional powers.  These institutional 
powers, formal and informal tools either unilaterally controlled or shared with the other 
independent branches of government, constitute what is known as institutional capacity.  The 
central theme of this dissertation’s constituent essays is that political actors and institutions 
utilizes the institutional power at their disposal in pursuit of their various electoral, institutional, 
and policy goals.  These institutional powers, their institutional capacity, afford them the ability 
to enrich their electoral prospects by engaging in actions and pursuing policies favorable to their 
constituents, but which may not always be in the best long-run interest of the state.  Further, they 
serve to constrain the actions of the other independent branches of government.  Thus, each 
branch endeavors to increase its level of institutional capacity as it provides that branch greater 
ability to control policy output in pursuit of enhancing its electoral fortunes.  This process of 
increasing a branch’s institutional capacity, otherwise known as capacity building, is a broadly 
encompassing concept concerning activities that are aimed at increasing the ability of citizens 
and their governments to produce more responsive and efficient public goods and services via 
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the selection and development of both political and administrative institutional arrangements 
(Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) (1985). 
For purposes of this dissertation, a working definition of institutional capacity is 
necessary.  However, ‘institutional capacity” varies greatly in its application to both the different 
levels and various branches of government.  Whether its used in terms of capacity, capability, 
authority or power, there often is a lack of precision as to its meaning (e.g. Gargan 1981).  
Typically, capacity can be thought of as the resources available to the institution or actor which 
can be utilized to pursue the goals of that institution or actor.  These resources can include 
staffing and spending factors (e.g. Bowman and Kearney 1988), leadership and vision, 
management and planning, fiscal planning and practice, operational support (e.g. Frederickson 
and London 2000), and grantsmanship (e.g. Hondale 1981).  Further, institutional capacity 
should be defined relative to its application such that its meaning will vary depending on which 
institution or actor is examined (e.g. Bowman and Kearney 1988).  Thus, a definition of capacity 
then needs to include three activities which are highly salient for state governments: 1) to 
respond effectively to change, 2) to make decisions efficiently, effectively, and responsibility, 
and 3) to manage conflict (e.g. Bowman and Kearney 1988).  This dissertation which examines 
the unique variation across the American states operates under this umbrella of a definition 
whereby the institutional capacity varies based upon the institution/actor under examination as 
well as the context under which its examined. 
Yet, capacity does not remain stagnant, varying across time, as the overall level is 
influenced by the social, economic, and political conditions present, as well as how it is viewed 
by the office holders and the constituents (e.g. Gargan 1981).  Further, the constituent elements 
of capacity do not operate in a vacuum, isolated from one another, but rather functioning relative 
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to each other and in support of the institution/actor (e.g. Frederickson and London 2000).  As 
such, institutional capacity is a complex, multidimensional concept, which is not easily observed 
nor easily understood by the constituents served by those institutions/actors (e.g. Gargan 1981).  
Yet, the performance and success of a political system weighs heavily on institutional capacity 
(e.g. Bowman and Kearney 1988), and greater capacity can lead to overall better governance 
(e.g. Hall 2002). 
Conceptually, the capacity of a governmental institution/actor translates into its ability to 
influence political outcomes.  It can be viewed as the ability of the institution/actor to bring 
about change to the status quo through the development of policy, implementation of programs, 
development and procurement of additional resources, and anticipation of the future (e.g. 
Honadle 1981).  As such, “high-capacity” political actors are better equipped to effectively 
perform their respective functions, contend with the other relevant political actors, and influence 
the direction of the policymaking process (e.g. Huber and Shipan 2002).   
Capacity has been extensively examined in the extant literature, focusing on its various 
forms, as well as causes and consequences, such as: financial management capacity (e.g. Gargan 
1987), fiscal capacity (e.g. Tannenwald 1999), tax capacity (Hy, Boland, Hopper, and Sims 
1993), and management capacity (e.g. Donahue, Selden, and Ingraham 2000).  Similarly, this 
concept of institutional capacity has been applied differently at various levels of government 
including in the study of comparative politics where institutional capacity has referred to certain 
attributes of national governments including their scope, effectiveness, innovation, and their 
ability to management of conflict (e.g. Heady 1984), and the ability of a political system to 
respond to emerging demands placed upon it (e.g. Eisenstadt 1963; Almond 1965; Jaguaribe 
1973), among other applications.  In studies examining the U.S. federal government, institutional 
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capacity has referred to the formal institutional innovation and development of the branches and 
their respective powers (e.g. Neustadt 1960; Polsby 1968; Schickler 2001).  Further, it has been 
applied to the attempts by the federal government to increase the executive management capacity of 
local governments through helping them to develop the necessary policy and resource 
management skills required to better implement federally funded programs (e.g. Burgess 1975; 
Healey 1998). 
Within the American state politics literature, institutional capacity too has received much 
attention.  Since the 1960’s American state governments have undertaken a multitude of 
constitutional and statutory reforms with the goal of improving their institutional performance to 
respond to socioeconomic changes, federal government mandates, and the needs of local 
governments (Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) 1985).1  Across all 
three branches, the institutions experienced growth in their capacity to perform their 
constitutional responsibilities, as well as compete with one another in the policymaking and 
budgetary arenas: with the formal powers of governors being strengthened, the state 
bureaucracies becoming more professional, the legislatures similarly becoming more 
professional and institutionalized, and the courts modernizing (e.g. Bowman and Kearney 1988). 
Much like their Presidential counterparts, over the years, governors have worked to 
increase and concentrate power in their office.  For governors, their formal powers have been 
enhanced and they have been afforded a larger role in setting state priorities.  Further, the 
functions of the bureaucracies have been centralized as they have become more professional in 
attempting to meet the increased demands placed upon them by the evolving state (e.g. Clynch 
                                                           
1
 See Crittenden (1967) for one of the first studies on institutional capacity concerning state government 
modernization. 
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and Lauth 1991; Hedge 1998; Rosenthal 1998).  Much ink has been spilled in an attempt to 
understand how both the formal (e.g. Dometrius 1979; Sigelman and Smith 1981) and informal 
(e.g. Bernick 1979) powers of governors have changed overtime.  Attempts have been made to 
systematically measure these powers, beginning with Schlesinger’s (1965) comparative state 
index which examines four specific powers of governors: budget, appointment, tenure, and veto. 
Since this attempt, scholars have attempted to refine and replace it in an effort to accurately 
measure gubernatorial capacity (e.g. Beyle 1968; Dometrius 1979; Krupnikov and Shipan 2012). 
Similarly, scholars have examined how state legislatures have changed overtime to adapt 
to the changing political, social, and economic environment. These legislatures have become 
better equipped to compete with the governor as they have experienced a certain measure of 
professionalization (e.g. Pound 1992), referring to the “enhancement of the legislature’s capacity 
to perform its role in the policy-making process with an expertise, seriousness, and effort 
comparable to other actors in that process” (Mooney 1995, 48-49), through increases in salary 
and benefits for its members, increased time demands of service including the move from part-
time to full-time service, and increases in staff and resources (e.g. Squire 1988a, 1992, 1993, 
1997, 2007).  The earliest attempt to examine legislative capacity evaluated it on five 
characteristics (functionality, accountability, informedness, independence, and 
representativeness) by examining levels of staffing, compensation, time, committee structure, 
facilities, leadership, rules and procedures, size, and ethics (Citizens Conference on State 
Legislatures (CCSL) 1971).  In the years since this study, scholars have developed numerous 
indexes, typically including measures of salary, time on the job, and staff,  to capture changes in 
the professionalism of the American state legislatures (e.g. Grumm 1971; Mooney 1995; Squire 
2007). 
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  Thus for purposes of examining institutional capacity, the American states provide an 
excellent arena for theory testing given the significant variation in their social, cultural, political, 
and economic environments with differing people, geography, economic, and politics context.  
As Madison notes above, while the federal system is set up in such a way to avoid conditions of 
concentrated power, the institutions in many states initially were set up with a purposeful 
imbalance of power between the branches, and further, the changes in the levels of power 
overtime experienced by these state governments have not been consistent.  Thus, this 
institutional variation provides analytical leverage in testing theories that is often unavailable at 
the national level which can help us to “arrive at truly general theories of political processes that 
are not bound by time or place” (Brace and Jewett 1995, 665).  However, like all prior state 
politics research, akin to filling old skins with new wine, merely taking theories developed at the 
national level and empirically testing them using the American states is theoretically unsatisfying 
(e.g. Krause and Woods 2014).   As such, this dissertation endeavors to shine new light on our 
understanding of institutional capacity more generally and yield important implications for our 
broader understanding of democratic theory as expressed by Madison. 
Three key lessons can be derived from this dissertation’s investigation into institutional 
capacity in the American states.  First, a governmental system composed of “separate institutions 
sharing powers” (Neustadt 1960, 33) is necessary to ensuring that a singular branch with 
sufficient unchecked authority cannot engage in shortsighted and potentially harmful 
opportunistic behavior.  While this system may not always be the most efficient, it however can 
yield responsible policymaking (e.g. Krause and Melusky 2012), though concentrated authority 
may be necessary when gridlock strangles the system.  As such, because executives and 
legislatures are expected to both influence the budgetary and policymaking arenas in this delicate 
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calibrated system of shared powers, power grabbing by either institutional actor must be limited 
or at least offset by enhancing the capacity of the institutional counterpart.  
Second and similarly related, a robust state legislature can provide a powerful constraint 
on opportunistic behavior by governors.  Despite the varied critiques leveled at the 
professionalization movement, the associated changes which began in the late 1960’s and spread 
across the American states in the interim years did increase the capacity of the state legislatures 
to better compete with governors in both their budgetary and policymaking tasks.  Today the 
institutions are capable of constraining governors and resisting further encroachment upon their 
formal jurisdiction by their gubernatorial counterparts.  Yet, a relatively robust governor must 
also be part of the institutional balance of powers equation to prevent the particularistic behavior 
that legislators themselves, due to their strong electoral incentives, are thought to engage in (e.g. 
Fitts and Inman 1992; Hallerberg and Marier 2004).  As such, to prevent a return to the 
gubernatorial tyranny of the 1900’s, state attempts in the name of budgetary savings to return 
their legislative bodies to prior levels of professionalism via reductions in legislative salary or 
membership size, must be avoided.   
Third, as noted above, capacity is a very difficult concept to both define and 
operationalize.  This examination of the various manifestations of executive and legislative 
capacity across a variety of salient state government realms undertaken by this dissertation 
upholds our prior understanding that institutional capacity is a complex and multidimensional.  
While, capacity may enhance the ability of a governmental institution/actor to influence political 
outcomes, it may not always work in a predictable manner, especially since capacity varies 
across time and is influenced by a multitude of social, economic, and political conditions.  
Ultimately, any effort to examine the institutional capacity of executives and legislatures must 
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attempt to consider their levels of capacity relative to the other, as a change in the level of one 
actor’s institutional capacity is associated with a change in the other’s.  
To advance our understanding of institutional capacity and how it varies based upon 
context, this dissertation is arrayed in three separate but theoretically connected essays.  Each 
essay seeks to address a topic of both contemporary importance and theoretical relevance, and 
how these topics interact in important ways with key differences in American state institutional 
features.  Throughout the essays a common theme emerges: the institutional capacity of the 
political actors in each state government affords the holder (governors or state legislatures) the 
ability to shape policy outcomes and ultimately determine who wins in the Madisonian 
separation of powers struggles with the other independent branches of government.  Taken 
together these essays examine the importance of the relative institutional power levels between 
the executive and legislative branches in the separation of powers system in the American states.  
Further, they shall speak to the importance of this separation of powers system, and the 
consequences which emerge when this system is destabilized.  This dissertation thus proceeds 
accordingly. 
Essay 1 of this dissertation, titled “Budget Impasses in the American States – Competing 
Actors in Inter-branch Bargaining,” examines the unique political phenomena which occurs 
when state governments fail to adopt a budget by the start of the next fiscal year.  Because the 
norm is for a state to pass a budget by the start of the next fiscal year and avoid the consequences 
associated with failing to pass a budget in a timely manner, this essay seeks to answer 1) when 
are we more likely to observe a late budget, and 2) how long will these impasses last when they 
do occur?  Through examination of both the occurrences of budget impasses and the number of 
days beyond the current fiscal year that a state was late in adopting its next fiscal year budget in 
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the American states from 1986-2006, this essay investigates how both the budgetary control held 
by governors and legislatures and conditions of divided government influence this phenomena.  
For purposes of this essay, institutional capacity is defined as the formal authority vested to each 
branch which affords it an ability to both control the budgetary agenda (positive power) and 
serve as a veto player in blocking the policy movement away from the status quo toward the 
other actor’s most preferred outcome (negative power), manifesting as a political actor’s budget 
formulation authority, official revenue forecast authority, line-item veto authority, and legislative 
professionalism.  It is expected that possessing greater formal institutional capacity should 
decrease the likelihood of a budget impasse occurring and decrease the duration of a budget 
impasse should it occur, with these effects being greater during periods of divided government 
compared to periods of unified government.  As acknowledged above that institutional capacity 
varies depending on context, this essay reveals a differing effect concerning institutional capacity 
conditioned by divided government, with increased institutional capacity during both periods of 
unified and divided partisan legislature government, contrary to theoretical expectations, 
increasing the likelihood of the state experiencing a late budget.  However, when budget 
negotiations break down, and the start of the fiscal year passes without a new budget in place, 
increased budgetary capacity decreases the length of the ensuing impasse. These effects are 
robust under a variety of specifications, and even when controlling for incentive-based 
explanations of legislative behavior, ultimately shows how the institutional capacity of these 
budgetary actors allows the stronger budgetary actors to circumvent institutional logjams and 
succeed in securing the passage of the state’s budget. 
Along a similar budgetary theme, Essay 2 of this dissertation, titled “Giving Away the 
Store – Gubernatorial Control of State Economic Development,” examines the interplay between 
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a governor’s institutional capacity to direct and implement economic development policies and 
the electoral constraints they face.  This dissertation essay attempts to show that governors with 
both the motivation (electoral) and the means (institutional capacity) to pursue their political and 
electoral goals will engage in behavior which supports and advances these goals.  In this essay, 
the governor’s formal institutional capacity is considered their authority over the state’s 
economic development entity, specifically their ability to exert control over an agency by 
resisting external influences on that agency via controlling the appointment of the agency head, 
and controlling the policy direction for economic development programs by serving as the head 
of their state’s economic development board/commission/council.  This relationship between 
institutional capacity and electoral constraints is considered by examining budgetary data, the 
total real allocations per capita provided to the state economic development agency in a given 
fiscal year, collected for state economic development entities in the American states FY 2001-
2010.  It is expected that states where governors possess the formal institutional capacity for 
controlling economic development efforts, will experience greater growth in their state economic 
development entity allocations compared to states where governors lack this authority.  
However, this effect should be less pronounced when governors are secure in their electoral 
prospects and thus have less of a need and desire to grow their state’s economic development 
entity budget necessary for engaging in the manipulation of the state’s economy.  This essay 
finds tepid results which suggests that a governor’s control of the state economic development 
efforts matters in the growth of the state economic development agency’s budget, and when 
examined within the lens of electoral vulnerability, the results suggest a more nuanced 
understanding of economic development allocations.  These results cautiously suggest that the 
budgetary process, specifically regarding economic development funding, is a battle of 
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institutional wills, with the legislature providing an institutional check on the ability of the 
governor to extract greater funds for their particularistic goals.  Given the contemporary 
economic climate whereby governors are held accountable for the health of their state’s 
economy, while faced with decreased financial resources to attempt to stimulate growth, this 
essay offers insight into the differences in the behavior of governors who possess both the means 
and motivation to spur economic growth and job creation. 
While the prior two essays reveal the influence of institutional capacity at the aggregate 
level, the final essay in this dissertation shows that institutional features have a significant 
influence on individual behavior.  Essay 3 of this dissertation, titled “Legislative Pay in the 
American States and Individual Retirement Decisions,” through the lens of legislative 
institutional capacity, seeks to provide new answers to the much researched question of why 
legislators retire from office.  In this essay, institutional capacity is examined within the context 
of a well studied indicator of state legislative capacity, the compensation provided to the 
membership, and the role that it plays in a state legislator’s individual decision-making calculus 
for whether they should remain in office or pursue a variety of exit alternatives.  Using a unique 
dataset of individual retirement decisions of all state legislators from 2000 through 2010, this 
essay examines how retirement behavior is influenced by meager levels of legislative 
compensation and compensation which often lags behind other state wages (e.g. poor legislative 
salary compared to higher real median house income).  It is expected that legislators in states 
which provide higher levels of compensation to their membership, as well as those states where 
salary is higher relative to the state’s median household income, should be more likely to remain 
in office rather than pursue other exit alternatives.  This essay finds that contrary to theoretical 
expectations, the level of compensation a member receives increases the likelihood that a state 
 13 
 
legislator will choose any of the alternative exit options compared to the status quo of remaining 
in office, whereas, consistent with theoretical expectations, the relative difference in pay 
decreases the likelihood of choosing an alternative exit option compared to remaining in office.  
The findings from this essay highlight the disparity in legislative pay that exists from one state to 
the next, offering insight into the consequences of declining legislative compensation which 
often fails to keep pace with other state wages, including the deterioration of the institutional 
maintenance mechanism necessary for maintaining a caliber of membership capable of providing 
the policy-making and constituent services demanded by the state electorate. 
The findings associated with these three essays highlight the simple fact that institutional 
capacity is of both normative and substantive importance to citizens and policymakers alike, 
regardless of what level of government is considered.  This is especially true given Madison’s 
warning of the encroaching nature of power, since it affords political actors the ability to enrich 
their political and electoral prospects by engaging in actions and pursuing policies favorable to 
their constituents, but which may not always be in the best long-run interest of the government 
and its people.  This role of institutional capacity is of particular importance for the American 
states, given the vast degree of variation both historically and today in the level of institutional 
capacity of governors and legislatures, which can result in drastically different results for the 
same issues.  As such, all three essays together seek to advance our knowledge of how the 
capacity of an institution/actor interacts in unique and interesting ways with social, economic, 
political, and personal factors to produce a multitude of politically salient and important 
outcomes.  Ultimately, the conclusions from this dissertation will breath new life into the 
democratic ideal of a separation of powers system maintained through institutional checks and 
balances, as espoused by the founding fathers at the writing of the Constitution. 
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2.0 BUDGET IMPASSES IN THE AMERICAN STATES  
                   – COMPETING ACTORS IN INTER-BRANCH BARGAINING 
 
 
 
In the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, protracted budget battles between the Governor and the 
General Assembly have become a commonplace occurrence.  Pennsylvania’s fiscal year begins 
July 1st of each year, and the Pennsylvania state constitution requires that a budget for the state 
must be adopted by midnight on June 30th of each year.  However, each attempt to pass a budget 
from 2003-2009 resulted in failure to agree upon a budget by this deadline, forcing the state into 
a period of budget impasse.  Without a budget in place, the Commonwealth only had the legal 
authority to pay employees who provided critical health, safety, and welfare services to citizens.  
Without the ability to authorize new spending, the state was mandated to partially shutdown 
government services until a budget for the next fiscal year was put in place.   
In 2007, when the state failed to pass a budget by the start of the next fiscal year, nearly 
24,000 government employees (more than a quarter of the state work force), whose jobs were 
deemed non-essential, were furloughed for one day, disrupting state government services.  As 
this impasse occurred at the height of tourist season, Pennsylvania’s state parks and state-run 
museums were closed to the public. Campers in these state parks were forced to abandon their 
campsites and cabins.  Additionally, driver-license offices and other non-essential government 
offices were closed for the day.   
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Similarly, in 2009 the state again failed to pass a budget by the start of the next fiscal 
year, leaving the state without a budget for 101 days.  Resulting from a recent state Supreme 
Court decision, in which the Commonwealth interpreted as being unable to furlough its 
employees but retaining the authority to order state employees to work without pay during an 
impasse, the state’s nearly 77,000 employees opened their first paycheck in July to read the 
words “Budget Impasse Leave without Pay” for the time worked during the impasse.  Without a 
budget in place, services in Pennsylvania reliant on state funding were disrupted as certain 
daycare centers were closed, many food banks and public libraries curtailed hours of operation, 
and some struggling school districts were forced to take out large bank loans for which they 
would later never be compensated for the interest accrued on those loans.  As the 101 day budget 
impasse stretched on, the state employees spent the summer months without a paycheck, 
draining their savings accounts to remain solvent.  For those less affluent employees, who lived 
paycheck-to-paycheck, the state released a “Budget Impasse Employee FAQ” (as displayed in 
Figure 2.1) recommending those employees who could not make ends meet should apply for 
mortgage and utility assistance, low-dollar short-term loans, and even visit Pennsylvania food 
banks: 
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Source: Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. 2009. 
 
Figure 2.1: 2009 Budget Impasse Employee FAQ 
 
 
During these reoccurring years of budget impasse in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 
the government operated under varying forms of divided government.  From 2003-2006, the 
government was split between a Democratic governor and a Republican controlled legislature 
(split branch government).  Similarly, from 2007-2009 the government remained divided, 
however as a result of numerous Democratic pick-ups in the 2006 state legislative election, the 
government was now split between an allied Democratic governor and Democratic controlled 
state house (the first time since 1994) and a Republican controlled state senate (split legislature 
government).  Budget deliberations during these politically contentious times were exacerbated 
by the fact that these budgetary actors were similar equipped to engage in budget negotiations to 
secure their most desired budget agenda items, since in Pennsylvania the governor is 
constitutionally strong by most conventional indicators of gubernatorial authority and he faces a 
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highly professional legislature.  Given these conditions, it is understandable that each year, as the 
June 30th fiscal year end deadline looms, the residents of the Commonwealth turn their eyes to 
the capitol expectant of another protracted budget battle. 
 While this anecdote is illustrative of the impact of budget impasses in the American 
states, the situation presented in this case is not exclusive to Pennsylvania.  Each year the 
majority of the American states begin the long process of developing and passing a budget for 
the next fiscal year.2  Usually this process ends with the enactment of a new budget by the end of 
the current fiscal year.  On occasion however, the budget process stalls and the start of the new 
fiscal year comes and goes without a new budget in place.  When this occurs, those states 
without a budget experience a range of consequences from incurring additional costs for 
maintaining government operation to a partial government shutdown.  Given that the norm is for 
a state to pass a budget by the start of the next fiscal year and avoid the consequences associated 
with failing to pass a budget in a timely manner, this essay seeks to answer 1) when are we more 
likely to observe a late budget, and 2) how long will these impasses last when they do occur?   
Developing the budget for the next fiscal year represents a central activity in all state 
governments.  This process determines how much funding will be available for state spending as 
well as how and where state revenue shall be directed (e.g. Hutchinson and James 1988; Clynch 
and Lauth 1991).  Additionally, state budgeting includes reviews for current state programs, 
plans for the fiscal future of the state, accounts for past expenses, and places controls on planned 
spending.  This multifunctional role of the budgeting process is thus conflictual in nature, leading 
to it being viewed as unsatisfactory to observers and participants, and flawed in its outcomes 
                                                           
2
 Over the last 70 years, the American state governments have slowly abandoned the process of biennially passing 
a budget for the state. While 44 states enacted biennial budgets in 1940, currently only 19 states continue to 
biennially budget [CT, HI, IN, KY, ME, MN, MT, NE, NC, ND, NH, NV, OH, OR, TX, VA, WA, WI, WY] (Snell 2011). 
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(National Conference of State Legislatures 1995).  Due to the separation of powers principle 
which divides policymaking between the executive and legislative branches, this conflict is 
evident when governors and legislatures share responsibility in formulating and enacting a 
budget.  This conflict is further complicated given that legislators are beholden to more local 
geographic constituencies, and governors, who are rewarded for providing statewide benefits, 
must appeal to statewide constituencies (e.g. Schlesinger 1971; Crain and Miller 1990; 
Schlesinger 1994).  Thus governors and legislatures are concerned with both the size and 
composition of the final passage of their state’s appropriations bill, as the enacted bill confers 
certain benefits to the above constituencies who will reward these electorally dependent political 
actors.  As such, the extant literature has shown that fiscal policymaking plays an important role 
in understanding the performance of incumbent state politicians and electoral control (e.g. Alt 
and Lowry 1994; Lowry, Alt, and Ferree 1998; Alt and Lowry 2000; and Alt, Lassen, and Rose 
2006), and fiscal policy effects have been shown to appear in American state gubernatorial and 
legislative elections (e.g. Lowry, Alt, Ferree 1998).   
The budget process in the American states plays a very important role as by determining 
how and to where state revenue shall be directed (Hutchinson and James 1988) it ultimately 
determines the size and role of the government.  Because of this importance, political actors use 
whatever options are at their disposal to give them an advantage in this process to secure a final 
spending bill which more closely mirrors the preferences of that actor which allows them to 
advance their agenda and ultimately enhance their electoral fortunes.  Consistent with the 
overarching theme of this dissertation, this essay examines the role that the institutional capacity 
of these political actors serves in the budgetary deliberations.  For purposes of this essay, 
institutional capacity is defined as the formal authority vested to each branch which affords it an 
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ability to both control the budgetary agenda (positive power) and serve as a veto player in 
blocking the policy movement away from the status quo toward the other actors most preferred 
outcome (negative power).  This essay thus seeks to show how the budgetary influence of 
governors and legislatures, their institutional capacity, influences both the occurrence and 
duration of budget impasses in the American states from 1986-2006.  Specifically, governors and 
state legislatures use their institutional capacity to compete with one another over budget 
negotiations, and when an actor has greater power at their disposal, we should expect that the 
stronger budgetary actor should be able to circumvent institutional logjams caused by 
institutional gridlock and avoid delay in passage of the state’s budget.  Further, given that 
institutional capacity varies depending on context, this effect should be more pronounced during 
periods of divided government when the powers of a political actor are more necessary to 
navigate budgetary gridlock than during periods of unified government when the interests of the 
various political actors are more closely aligned.  Making use of the inherent variation across and 
within the states, the essay seeks to advance our understanding of how the institutional design 
and the sources of both gubernatorial and legislative capacity affect budgetary outcomes (e.g. Alt 
and Lowry 1994; Gordon and Huber 2007; Huber and Shipan 2002; Lax and Phillips 2009, 2012; 
Wright and Schaffner 2002). 
This essay departs from the previous scholarly work concerning the causes and 
consequences of budget impasses in the American states (e.g. Kousser and Phillips 2009; 
Andersen, Lassen, and Nielsen 2012; Klarner, Phillips, and Muckler 2012; and Kousser and 
Phillips 2012) in that it 1) does not assume that governors are uniform in their budgetary powers 
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(e.g. Sharkansky 1968; Mowery, Kamlet, and Crecine 1980; Garand 1985; Gosling 1994)3, and 
2) considers the governor’s and legislature’s institutional capacity relative to each other, given 
that most measures of legislative and gubernatorial strength covary positively and that the 
literature has acknowledged that gubernatorial power should be measured relative to that of the 
legislature (e.g. Dometrius 1987; Mueller 1985; Gross 1989). 
Overall this essay reveals a differing effect concerning institutional capacity conditioned 
by divided government.  Increased institutional capacity during both periods of unified and 
divided partisan legislature government, contrary to theoretical expectations, increases the 
likelihood of the state experiencing a late budget.  However, when budget negotiations break 
down, and the start of the fiscal year passes without a new budget in place, increased budgetary 
capacity decreases the length of the ensuing impasse. These effects are robust under a variety of 
specifications and even when controlling for incentive-based explanations of legislative 
behavior.  
The following sections thus examine the budget processes in the American states, the 
causes and consequences of budget impasses both at the federal and state levels, and the role that 
both divided government and institutional capacity play in the budget process and the failing of a 
state to pass a budget in a timely manner.  The hypotheses derived from these prior sections are 
then empirically examined, and the results and broader implications from this analysis are finally 
discussed. 
 
 
                                                           
3
 The recent works concerning the causes and consequences of budget impasses all consider the institutional 
capacity of governors in the American states to be fixed. As the following sections will show, the budgetary 
authority of governors varies both between states and in time, and this variations has important implications for 
both the occurrence and duration of budget impasses in the American states.  
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2.1  Budget Processes in the American States 
Developing and enacting a budget is one of the most important processes managed by state 
governments.  The budget process in the American states very closely mirrors the practice for 
revenue bills at the federal level.  The budget process begins in the executive branch in almost 
every state.  After receiving budget requests from the various departments and agencies in the 
state, the governor prepares a budget proposal.  This proposal includes revenue projections 
which provide a revenue ceiling and can set the framework under which the budgetary 
deliberations shall take place.  This proposal is submitted to the state legislature which refers it to 
an appropriations committee in each house where it may or may not be used in the budgetary 
process.  After numerous committee hearings, debates, markup sessions and votes, the budget 
bill is sent to the floor of the chamber, where it is ultimately voted on.  If approved, the bill is 
sent to the governor who may sign the bill, veto the entire bill, or in some states sign it with a 
line-item veto (Wallin 1999).   
This process is essential to state government operation as it determines how state revenue 
is allocated for the next fiscal period (Hutchinson and James 1988).  These budgets must include 
reviews for current state programs, plan for the fiscal future of the state, account for past 
expenses, and place controls on planned spending.  Because the budget serves so many 
functions, the process of writing one is conflictual in nature, leading to it being viewed as 
unsatisfactory to observers and participants, and flawed in its outcomes (National Conference of 
State Legislatures 1995).  Further, modern state budgeting suffers from surpluses and shortfalls 
in state revenue.  The presence of a surplus raises the issue of where to allocate the additional 
funds, while a revenue shortfall raise the issue of where to cut funds to compensate for the 
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deficiency (Wildavsky 1986).  As a result, formulating and enacting a budget is arguably the 
most difficult and time-consuming task a state government must undertake.   
This process however differs in several important ways from that at the federal level. 
While governors typically refer their budget proposal to one “appropriations” committee in each 
state legislative chamber, a president’s budget proposal must undergo a labyrinth-like process 
through the Congress where each chamber’s budget committee, 13 authorization committees, 
and an appropriations committee with related subcommittees, engage in lengthy hearings, 
debates, markup sessions, and votes, prior to the budget bill being sent to the floor of the whole 
chamber, where it may be amended and is ultimately voted on.  The budgets passed at the state 
level are fundamentally different given that nearly all of the states have balanced-budget 
requirements with differing relative stringency requirements, while the lack of a similar 
requirement at the federal level allows for the possibility of deficit spending.  Further, presidents 
lack the extraordinary powers afforded to governors to impound funds and make other 
adjustments to maintain fiscal balance.  Within the budget process, unlike presidents, governors 
typically submit a budget in balance making it more difficult for the legislature to change, they 
have informational and staff advantage over their state legislative counterparts and in many 
states face an amateur legislature (characterized by low legislative pay, staff resources, and 
minimal time spent in session), and many governors have a line-item veto which is generally 
stronger than that afforded the president which gives a governor more power than the president 
has traditionally had.   
These federal-state differences have meaningful implications for budgeting success. 
Though this necessary process is performed each year across the various levels of government, 
this process at times fails to produce a budget in a timely manner.  The main objective of the 
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president and the majority party in Congress is the enactment of a budget plan which fulfills their 
own priorities (e.g. Williams and Jubb 1996).  A natural divergence of preferences of the 
included budgetary actors, can breakdown and stall the passage of a new budget, ultimately 
resulting in an impasse.  Taken together, Klarner, Phillips, and Muckler (2012) show that the 
federal level is a perfect storm of budget impasses where from 1961-2006, 81% of all federal 
appropriations bills were late, whereas during this same time period 15% of state appropriates 
were late among the American states.  Further the average duration of a budget impasse at the 
federal level lasted 73 days compared to the 30 day average delay at the state level.  Americans 
as such are no strangers to budget impasses resulting from budget battles gone sour, and budget 
impasses at the federal level provide both a salient and motivating case for our understanding of 
the American states examined in this essay. 
2.2  Lessons From Budget Impasses at the Federal Level 
Article I, section 9, clause 7 of the Constitution forbids any expenditure without an appropriation 
made by law.  Thus, when federal agencies and programs lack appropriated funding, they must 
cease operations resulting in a government shutdown.  When a shutdown occurs, the immediate 
and critical effect is the furloughing of federal employees; the placement of uniformed military 
personnel and federal employees rated essential to performing duties vital to national defense, 
public health and safety, or other crucial operations into a temporary, non-duty, non-pay status.  
During these shutdown periods, essential employees are required to continue working while all 
other non-essential employees are “sent home” until an appropriations bill has been enacted 
(Kosar 2004).  
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While the federal government has shut down several times historically, most recently 
shutdowns occurred during the Clinton administration in 1995 and the Obama administration in 
2013.  For purposes here, the following discussion of the 1995 federal shutdowns serves to 
illustrate the tangible consequences of budget impasses, and because of  the condition of 
comparable institutional capacity, offers unique insight for our understanding of budget impasses 
in the American states. 
The Congressional midterm election of 1994 resulted in the Republican takeover of 
Congress for the first time since 1952 (e.g. Williams and Jubb 1996: 476-477).  When President 
Clinton proposed his first budget in 1993, he enjoyed a period of unified Democratic party 
control.  With the Republican’s midterm victory, President Clinton now faced a hostile Congress 
unified under the “Contract with America” and the leadership of Speaker Newt Gingrich.  In 
1995, this new Republican majority repeatedly battled with President Clinton over plans to 
balance the budget.  During these negotiations, President Clinton’s priorities were to protect 
funding for Medicare, Medicaid, environmental protection, education, and the continued 
reduction of the budget deficit, while the Republican majority sought to balance the budget by 
sharply reducing funding for educational and environmental protection and cutting taxes 
(Williams and Jubb 1996). 
As the preferences of these budgetary actors clashed, the end of previous fiscal year 
passed on September 30, 1995 without a budget for the next fiscal year in place.  To prevent a 
federal government shutdown, the government operated on a continuing resolution which 
authorized interim funding until a new budget was agreed upon.  This continuing resolution 
however expired on November 13th at midnight when the Republican and Democratic leadership 
failed to reach an agreement. 
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From November 14th - 19th, 1995 major portions of the federal government shut down 
when President Clinton vetoed a second continuing resolution and a debt limit extension.  An 
estimated 800,000 federal employees were told to not come into work.  This 6 day shutdown 
briefly ended when President Clinton agreed to a temporary spending bill.  However, the 
underlying disagreements remained unresolved, and a second government shutdown was trigger 
on December 16th.  From the 16th through January 7, 1996, many federal agencies shuttered their 
“non-essential” activities because they lacked appropriated funding to continue operations 
(Meyers 1997: 27).  This shutdown lasted 21 days, the longest in the federal government’s 
history, and an estimated 260,000 federal employees were furloughed with an additional 475,000 
essential employees forced to work in non-pay status.   
 Throughout these budget negotiations, President Clinton garnered high levels of public 
support by blocking the Republican majority’s budget demands for spending reductions.  
However, by the end of the 2nd government shutdown, public opinion shifted such that both 
President Clinton and the Republican majority in Congress were blamed for the government 
shutdowns and the continued budget crisis.  In a plea to the American people, President Clinton 
deemed the government shutdown a Republican strategy to force their way on the budget and tax 
issues.  In this plea, he highlighted the main consequence of the government shutdown; that 
certain federal programs including Medicare and Meals on Wheels were going to run out of 
funding which would ultimately harm senior citizens.  Without additional federal funding, ten 
states would be unable to sustain their unemployment insurance programs, with an estimated 15 
more states on the verge of such a situation.  He even went so far as to claim that the budget 
impasse was threatening the national security of the country and harming the global image of the 
U.S.  Ultimately, the two shutdowns were estimated to have cost the federal government $1.5 
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billion, almost $200 million per day (Williams and Jubb 1996: 480).  Affected employees were 
prevented from working between 2 percent and 10 percent of their annual work year (Meyers 
1997: 27). 
 In addition to these consequences the Congressional Research Service highlighted several 
public areas affected by the fiscal year 1996 budget impasse.  In the area of health, new patients 
were not accepted into clinical research at the National Institute of Health Clinical Center, the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention stopped disease surveillance, and toxic waste 
cleanup at 609 sites was ceased resulting in more than 2400 workers being sent home without 
pay.  In the area of law enforcement and public safety, the recruitment and testing of federal law-
enforcement officials was cancelled and about 3500 bankruptcy cases and delinquent child-
support cases were suspended.  In the area of parks, museums, and monuments, 368 National 
Park Service sites were closed impacting more than 7 million visitors and resulting in a $14.2 
million per day loss in tourism revenues.  In the area of visas and passports, an estimated 20,000-
30,000 applications by foreigners for visas went unprocessed each day and over 200,000 U.S. 
applications for passports went unprocessed resulting in a loss of millions of dollars by U.S. 
tourism industries and airlines (Kosar 2004).  The National Science Foundation left more than 
2300 proposals unprocessed, cancelled or postponed up to 43 review panels, and delayed over 
400 continuing increments (Qian 1996).  Finally, the budget impasse left the Judiciary without 
funding. On December 23, 1995 the Chief Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the 6th 
Circuit argued that the country’s constitutional order would be on the verge of a breakdown 
unless it received an appropriation by the first week of January (Hershey 1995).  If the Judiciary 
were to shutdown, people could not be arrested for federal crimes because they could not be 
brought to court. 
 27 
 
Even after a budget was finally enacted, the government dealt with several lingering 
consequences of the impasse.  In the aftermath of the impasse, the efficiency of the federal 
government was greatly reduced as it had to manage a backlog of work created by the budget 
impasse (Brass 2008).  Further, the government was required to pay late fees for services 
rendered by federal contractors and reimbursement to the contractors for costs incurred as a 
result of the shutdown (Trowbridge 1997).   
 As revealed in this discussion of federal level budget impasses, failure to pass a budget in 
a timely manner results in costly tangible consequences for a numerous actors beyond just 
politicians and government employees.  Given the consequences highlighted above, tourists, the 
recipients of government aid, and those relying on the smooth conduct of government operations 
for a variety of resources and services, all are negatively impacted in the event of a budget 
impasse.  Given the similarities in budgeting procedures employed in the American states, the 
occurrences of budget impasses at the federal level offer unique insight into the breakdown of 
budget negotiations.  As such, the next section discusses the possible consequences of an 
American state failing to pass a budget by the start of the next fiscal year. 
2.3  Budget Impasses in the American States 
Operating under similar budget procedures, the American states experience the same inherent 
difficulty in enacting a budget.  As such, a state may fail to pass a budget by the end of the fiscal 
year, entering the state into a period of budget impasse.  According to officials at the National 
Conference of State Legislatures (2008), in the event of a budget impasse a state usually pursues 
one or more of the following actions.  The legislature can adopt a continuing resolution, which 
serves as a temporary appropriations bill and continues funding government programs and 
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services at the same level as the previous fiscal year for a set period of time.  Eleven states 
currently can utilize temporary appropriations bills to maintain government operation during a 
budget impasse.4  Other states have constitutional provisions or procedures which ensure the 
continuous operation of the government during a budget impasse.  Currently, thirteen states have 
various provisions that allow for continuous payment of funds for agencies and services without 
a budget for the new fiscal year.5  Finally, as the result of a budgetary negotiations stalemate, 22 
states direct the government to shutdown until an appropriations bill is enacted (Pulsipher 2004).  
This is the least preferable opinion given that it involves furloughing non-essential state 
employees and stopping certain government functions and services until a new budget is enacted.  
Table 2.1 provides a complete listing of the states within each category described above: 
 
Table 2.1: Procedures When the Appropriations Act Is Not Passed by  
the Beginning of the Fiscal Year 
 
 Legislature Passes a 
Temporary Budget 
Payments Are 
Continuous 
Other Provisions or 
Procedures 
Government 
Shuts Down 
Totals 11 13 7 22 
States CT, MA, MI, NH, NY, NC, OH, OR, PA, SC, TN 
AZ, CA, GA, 
HI, IL, IN, KY, 
MN, MO, MT, 
OK, PA, RI 
AR, CA, IL, MD, 
NJ, WV, WI 
AL, AK, AZ, CO, GA, HI, 
ID, IL, IN, IA, KS, ME, 
MN, MS, MT, NJ, NM, 
ND, OK, TX, VT, WY 
Source: National Conference of State Legislatures (2008) 
 
 
While budget impasses can last only a few hours like Michigan in 2007 to as many as 
101 days into the next fiscal year like Pennsylvania in 2009, as was highlighted in the review of 
                                                           
4
 In New Hampshire and Pennsylvania the legislature can unilaterally pass these authorizations without requiring 
the governor’s signature, while in New York the temporary appropriation must be submitted by the governor or 
the legislature cannot act. 
5
 Typically these provisions are automatically enacted when a new budget is not in place by the end of the current 
fiscal year. 
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the fiscal year 1996 federal government shutdown, failure to pass a budget in a timely manner 
does have tangible consequences.  The first of these consequences are the additional monetary 
costs resulting from the impasse.  Extending the regular session or calling special sessions 
increases operational costs (Pulsipher 2004).  In California, every day the legislature is in 
session, members of the State Assembly and State Senate receive a per diem of $173 per day 
(Davis 2009).  Likewise, in Pennsylvania lawmakers can collect $163 a day for food and lodging 
costs when they are at the state capitol (Bumsted 2009).  These per diems are payments that the 
state taxpayers would not have had to pay had the lawmakers passed a budget by the end of the 
fiscal year.  Additionally, during a budget impasse a state is unable to authorize payments into 
the next fiscal year, and is subject to late fees and other penalties from vendors under state 
contract (Erickson 2009; Niquette 2009) resulting in much larger financial costs to the state.  In 
2007, California incurred more than $8 million in late payment fees as a result of the budget 
impasse (Quach 2009). 
States may be subject to legal action from employees or citizens because of lost wages 
(Pulsipher 2004).  In California, several taxpayer groups sued in 2003 to prevent state employees 
from being paid in the absence of a budget.  The California Supreme Court ruled that the Federal 
Fair Labor Standards Act maintains that when state employees work during a budget impasse, 
they are assured of full salary for work performed once funds are appropriated (White v. Davis 
2003).  Further, in 2007 the state had an estimated $4.7 billion in lawsuits filed against it for state 
actions taken during that year’s budget impasse (Quach 2009).  In October 2009, the California 
Medical Association filed a lawsuit in the state Superior Court seeking to end furloughs for the 
staff of the California medical Board.  The furloughs created licensure, investigative and 
enforcement delays costing the board an estimated 5,100 work hours and almost $6 million in 
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board funding (California Medical Association 2009).  On August 18, 2009 a federal judge 
struck down a furlough plan in Prince George’s county, Maryland, holding that the plan violated 
the U.S. Constitution by unilaterally cutting wages guaranteed through collective bargaining.  
Similarly, on July 29, 2009 a state judge in Hawaii ruled that furloughing state employees 
violated the state constitution (Baldas 2009).  In 2008 three state workers’ unions sued the 
Pennsylvania state government to block the furlough of as many as 25,000 non-essential state 
employees (Patton 2008).  
Consistently failing to pass a budget in a timely manner can affect a state’s credit rating.  
A low credit rating lowers bond ratings and increases interest rates paid by states when 
borrowing (e.g. Las Vegas Sun 2003; Pulsipher 2004) by drawing the market’s attention to the 
state’s fiscal problems and creating a causal link from a late budget to state borrowing costs 
(Andersen, Lassen, and Nielsen 2014), which can decrease the value of investments for current 
bondholders who may want to sell (Buchanan 2009).  While these changes provide voters with a 
rationale for holding their elected politicians accountable for a budget impasse, especially during 
periods of fiscal distress and during election years, it is difficult to ascribe blame given that states 
with sufficient liquidity in the form of large reserves face limited cost from late budgets 
(Andersen, Lassen, and Nielsen 2014).  New York, which has failed for the last 17 years to pass 
a budget on time, has a consistently low credit rating.  Upgrading the credit rating by one rating 
would have saved the state an estimated $158 million (New York Office of the State Comptroller 
1997).  In 2009, California’s bond rating was decreased from a score of A+ to A, as a result of 
the budget impasse.  This change affects the state’s $46 billion in general obligation bond debt 
and will make it more expensive for the state to borrow money.  Further, it decreases the value of 
investments for current bondholders who may want to sell (Buchanan 2009).  Most recently 
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Minnesota’s triple-A rating was downgraded to AA-plus in response to recent difficulties in 
passing a budget on time, ultimately affecting $5.7 billion in general obligation bonds (Gralla 
and Barnett 2011).  Together, these cases reveal that the changes to state credit ratings and 
resulting implications for bond ratings are the result of state budget impasses and are not merely 
circumstantial. 
Yet, the state government does not solely incur the costs of a late budget.  Without 
appropriation details, local governments and nonprofit organizations are unable to budget, plan, 
or deal effectively with their contractual obligations (Pulsipher 2004).  In 2009, California 
Jewish Family Service programs were forced to close down programs that work to keep indigent 
elderly and disabled clients out of institutions and another that gives shelter to victims of 
domestic abuse (Fax 2009).  In 2009, Pennsylvania nonprofit groups were forced to either close 
their doors or take out loans to maintain operations.  These loans resulted in as much as $10 
million in interest costs, and many of these groups were already financially struggling as a result 
of the 2008-2009 economic downturn (Murphy 2009).  Further, the lack of a state budget has 
negative consequences for child protection services, given that without state funds, county 
agencies are unable to place at-risk children in protective care (Cunningham 2009; Wetzel 2009).  
When a budget is late, people dependent on local health and welfare programs, businesses that 
have contracts with the state, anyone due a state income-tax refund, and college students 
expecting state grants are all left waiting until a new budget is enacted (Sweeney 2009). 
Similarly, school districts are impacted when a state fails to pass it’s budget in a timely 
manner.  In New York, with the exception of the state’s five large cities, school districts must 
submit their operating budgets for voter approval each year.  Developing a school district budget 
is a difficult task, one made all the more difficult by a lack of information as a result of a late 
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state budget.  Given that the voter approval process is restricted by a set of deadlines that districts 
must follow, school districts do not have the flexibility to postpone decisions until better 
information is available (New York Council of School Superintendents 2003).  Further, if the 
budget is not enacted by mid-August, school districts will have to finalize tax levies without 
knowing how much aid they will be receiving, resulting in school tax bills which are too high 
and investments in programs like pre-kindergarten being postponed (McCall 1999).     
Being furloughed and without a regular paycheck, many state workers suffer financial 
hardship, being forced to draw upon their personal savings.  Many furloughed employees have 
been forced to seek out food pantries in response to prolonged budget impasses (Commonwealth 
of Pennsylvania 2009; Creamer 2009).  Credit unions within affected states have opened up lines 
of credit with no or low interest rates for state employees, however employees with poor credit 
have been unable to take advantage of these loans (e.g. Credit Union Journal 2005; Castelli 
2007; Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 2009).  In 2006, when New Jersey shutdown its 
government after failing to adopt a budget by the end of the fiscal year, 45,000 state employees 
were immediately furloughed, 36,000 were transferred into non-pay work status, roadwork 
projects were brought to a halt, and the state’s parks, beaches, and historic sites were closed 
(Hester 2006).  Likewise in 2007, when Pennsylvania failed to pass its budget, roughly 24,000 
state employees were furloughed.  During this time, the employees were not paid for the time 
they were off, with their wages totaling $3.5 million per day.  Additionally, fifteen welcome 
centers and 177 state parks and historic sites were closed at the height of the tourist season, as 
were 71 driver’s license centers (Urbina 2007). 
However, an important distinction concerning budget impasses needs to be addressed.  A 
state budget which is late by a matter of hours is substantively different from a budget impasse 
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which extends weeks or months into the next fiscal year.  As such, the above consequences and 
their impact are differentially felt depending on the length of the budgetary delay.  Thus for 
budgetary actors it is not only important for them to reach agreement and pass the state’s budget 
by the beginning of the next fiscal year, but should a budget impasse occur, it is important for 
them to reach agreement sooner rather than later, else the state incur many of the above 
consequence.  These tangible consequences in turn ultimately can translate into decreases in the 
approval ratings of these electorally dependent political actors.  States pay the cost of declining 
public confidence in their elected officials and damage to the state’s image (Pulsipher 2004).  
Public polls in states that experienced budget impasses reveal sharp drops in approval as well as 
a willingness to vote out incumbents (for example see Caruso (2004) who examines the 2004 
New York late budget).  In 2009, the public approval ratings of both Pennsylvania’s governor 
and legislature fell to all time lows in the wake of the 101 day budget impasse (The Patriot-News 
Editorial Board 2009).   
As illustrated above, the American states are just as susceptible (if not even more so) as 
their federal counterpart to numerous tangible consequences when they fail to pass their budget 
in a timely manner.  It is thus the intent of this essay to determine what factors influences both 
the occurrence and duration of budget impasses in the American states. 
2.4  The Budget Process and the Breakdown of Bargaining 
As discussed above, the budget itself play a very important role by determining how state 
revenue shall be directed (Hutchinson and James 1988).  For political actors, securing a final 
spending bill which more closely mirrors their preferences, allows that actor to better advance 
their political agenda and ultimately enhance their electoral fortunes.  As such these budgetary 
 34 
 
deliberations are extremely political, and are best thought of in terms of bargaining between 
institutional actors negotiating with one another toward a favorable budget outcome.  This 
bargaining process consists of each actor presenting an offer to the other actors for how and 
where the state’s revenue should be directed.  These receiving actors have the option to either 
accepted or reject the offer from their institutional counterpart, with acceptance ending in 
passage of the budget and rejection resulting in a continuation of the negotiations, driving the 
state closer toward the end of the fiscal year.  This process can be thought of as a standard 
alternating offers bargaining model (e.g. Rubinstein 1982) whereby 2 actors must reach an 
agreement on how to divide a pie the size of 1, with each actor in turn making a proposal as to 
how it should be divided, and the other actor deciding to accept the offer or reject it and return to 
the bargaining condition.  Yet, public budgeting is both political and technical, resulting in a 
multitude of factors which influence this process. This complex process consists of routine parts 
as well as unpredictable non-routine parts, yet all parts are open to the environment and are thus 
affected by the economy, public opinion, the other levels of government, interest groups, the 
media, and politicians (Rubin 1992). 
Present in this process are two distinct factors which can either facilitate or hinder the 
breakdown of this process: A) information and B) formal features.  Information in the budgetary 
bargaining is crucial for understanding both the behavior of the actors as well as the 
success(failure) of the process.  Yet, the type of information used for budget decision making is 
highly variable and can include the revenue projects, information about programs, agency 
requests, the concern of the institutional actors involved, and even the budget format itself 
(Rubin 1992).  Our understanding of information can be further divided into technical 
information and political information, with technical information concerning the effects of policy 
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in changing the status quo should it be agreed upon and enacted, and political information 
concerning the preferences and activities of other members (e.g. Woon 2009).  This technical 
information provides a basis for what are potentially feasible outcomes, and involves a variety of 
features intrinsic to the budget process including the budgets from prior years, the state’s revenue 
projections, the availability of surplus funds, as well as political factors such as partisan control 
of the various branches of the state government and the timing of election events in the state (e.g. 
Wildavsky 1978; Pelzman 1987; Poterba 1994, 1995).   
Political information in particular concerns the preferences of the institutional actors and 
includes what is their most preferred outcome as well as what range of outcomes they will accept 
(e.g. their propensity to accept or reject a proposal).  However, a level of uncertainty results in 
bilateral bargaining models because the bargainers possess incomplete information about each of 
the other’s preferences about accepting vs. rejecting an offer (e.g. Chatterjee and Samuelson 
1987; Watson 1998; Woon and Anderson 2012). Ultimately, uncertainty over whether the chance 
of the proposal being accepted can make pursuing a budgetary impasse rational and can 
influence the delay in bargaining (e.g. Gul and Sonnenschein 1988; Sákovics 1993; Woon and 
Anderson 2012).  Because of this uncertainty, these budget negotiations in the American states 
could be considered a war of attrition, whereby the political actors can decide whether to accept, 
reject, or propose their own budgetary offers, and this process can allow political actors to learn 
the other’s preferences concerning pursuing a budgetary stalemate or backing down and 
accepting an offer (e.g. Fearon 1994). A tough offer by a political actor can increase the benefits 
to proposer but increases the likelihood of failure to reach a deal, whereas an actor making 
concessions to the other actor is viewed as sacrificing benefits for the increased likelihood that as 
deal is reached (e.g. Fearon 1994).  Given the political costs associated with a budgetary 
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shutdown, political actors should simply tell each other what they are and are not willing to 
accept in order to avoid an impasse, however, these actors can have strong incentives to 
misrepresent their preferences to obtain a better deal (e.g. Fearon 1994). 
The literature is replete with research formally modeling the bargaining process. When 
considering the preferences of these institutional actors, many of these approaches use a spatial 
models  (e.g. Kiewiet and McCubbins 1988; Alt and Lowry 1994, 2000; McCarty and Poole 
1995) which assumes that these preferences can be arrayed along a unidimensional spectrum, 
with each actor preferring their winning proposal to the status quo.  In these models, the outcome 
of bargaining between the institutional actors is a function of the distribution of their preferences, 
the order of interactions, and the location of status quo policy (e.g. Romer and Rosenthal 1978). 
Because preferences across chambers of the legislature and the branches often diverge, 
successful bargaining requires not only agreement from the median legislator but also from the 
executive or the veto override pivot in both chambers. Resistance along any point of this process 
can force the actors to re-pass a bill closer to the ideal point of the other actors.  However, as 
mentioned above, a natural divergence of preferences of the included budgetary actors, can 
breakdown and stall the passage of a new budget, ultimately resulting in an impasse. 
Yet these approaches may not be the most appropriate simplification of budgetary 
bargaining in the American states given that they often fail to properly consider the strength of 
governors in this process (Kousser and Phillips 2009).  In attempting to consider budget 
impasses in the American states within a formal model, previous work by Kousser and Phillips 
(2009) considered the clash of preferences between governors and legislatures during budgetary 
negotiations which treats the outcome of interbranch bargaining as a function of the institutional 
capacities and constraints upon the legislature. This staring match between the institutional 
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actors considers the political and personal costs of a budget impasse. Consistent with much of the 
above literature, the authors use a standard alternating offers approach between the governor and 
the legislature when considering how to divide the budget (pie/dollar).  Similarly, Andersen, 
Lassen, and Nielsen (2012) attempt to explain the duration of budget negotiations in the 
American states. They model the budget impasse period as a “winner-takes-all” game in which 
the state legislature and the governor engage in a war of attrition, during which the budget 
adoption is delayed. The game ends when either player concedes, allowing the other player to 
choose whatever composition of government spending they prefer. While these models do 
consider the political and personal costs associated with budget delays, they fails to account for 
the strengths of both the governor and legislature. 
What thus emerges from the above discussions is that the preferences of the institutional 
actors, and their likely divergence, can have clear implications for budgetary delay in the 
American states. Often the bargaining process is made more difficult because of the natural 
divergence in preferences between the two major parties. Within the literature, gubernatorial and 
legislative preferences have assumed that Democrats prefer and pursue the expansion of policies 
which expand the government and target a larger share of the states incomes for the public 
budget (with Republicans preferring the opposite).  It is because of this divergence in preferences 
between the two major parties that the majority of policy disagreements results (e.g. Dye 1984; 
Garand 1988; Alt and Lowry 2000; Smith 1997).   
But beyond information, the formal features of the budget process too can facilitate or 
hinder the breakdown of this process.  The outcomes of this process are very sensitive to the 
formal procedures used (e.g. Banks 1990) and budgetary rules can constraint institutional actors 
into making certain budget choices (Schick 2007).  These formal procedural rules can include 
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deficit carry-over restrictions (e.g. Alt and Lowry 1994), supermajority requirements (e.g. Knight 
2000), expenditure limitations (e.g. Poterba and Rueben 1999), and balanced budget rules (e.g. 
Inman 1996).  Further, in cases of budget impasses in the American states, often these 
procedures concern an automatic partial government shutdown triggered when a state fails to 
pass a budget by the start of the next fiscal year.  These formal procedural rules, as well as much 
of the technical information discussed above, is exogenous to the bargaining process and is 
known prior to these negotiations by the political actors engaged in this process.  As such, they 
shape both how and when a budgetary actor’s institutional capacity is employed during the 
budgetary negotiations.  Ultimately, these procedures can make it unlikely that a governor would 
prefer a government shutdown to higher(lower) levels of government spending (Klarner, 
Phillips, and Muckler 2012). Taken together, formal procedural rules can influence the 
bargaining process.  The following section delves deeper into formal authority vested to the 
institutional actors which further influence and can undermine this process. 
2.5  Institutional Capacity and Budgets in the American States 
A gloomy picture of budgetary deliberations in the American states emerges from the discussion 
above, which portrays the state capitols at the end of each fiscal year as battlefields where 
adversarial budgetary combatants engage one another in an attempt to secure the passage of their 
most preferred final appropriations bill.  However, for an appropriations bill to be passed and the 
above consequences above be avoided, the budgetary process requires the continued interaction 
between the legislative and executive branches.  This process thus concerns the institutional 
capability of the competing branches.  For purposes of this essay, institutional capacity is defined 
as the formal authority vested to each branch which affords it an ability to both control the 
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budgetary agenda (positive power) and serve as a veto player in blocking the policy movement 
away from the status quo toward the other actors most preferred outcome (negative power). 
Traditionally, governors have been viewed as the director of the budgetary process in 
their states, resulting from both their personal characteristics or political circumstances but also 
from the formal powers their state constitutions grant them (e.g. Beyle 1968; Morehouse 1981; 
Sabato 1983; Brace 1994).  Compared to their federal counterpart, governors are better equipped 
to exert influence over the state budgetary process.  As discussed above, the budgetary process 
begins in the executive branch, allowing the governor to set the stage for the budgetary 
deliberations.  The revenue projections which governors submit with their budget proposal frame 
the budgetary debate by setting a revenue ceiling under which the state government will operate 
in the next fiscal year.  These revenue projections are differentially valued, especially in states 
where the governor’s projection serves as the state’s official revenue projection, and further 
where this forecast binds the state’s budget.  Additionally, the budget proposals that governors 
submit are usually in balance which makes it difficult for the legislature to change them, given 
that all but a few states have a constitutional balanced budget requirement.6  Taken together, 
unilateral control over both revenue forecast and budget formulation, provide governors 
powerful fiscal policymaking tools (Krause and Melusky 2012). 
In terms of executive institutional capacity, governors have an informational and staff 
resource advantage over the legislature.  While a legislature’s attention is divided between 
formulating and passing a budget as well as enacting new policy legislation, the governor is able 
                                                           
6
 All state governments, with the exception of Vermont, confront some type of balanced budget legal requirement, 
whereby “state budget allocations must be balanced by revenue, and the forecast constrains or binds the total 
appropriations’’ (Voorhees 2004, 656). U.S. state governments markedly experience these costs as they are 
constrained in their capacity to incur long-term deficits due to these balanced budget restrictions (Poterba 1994; 
Primo 2007). 
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to devote more time and resources to the budgetary process.  This advantage of time and focus is 
most evident in states with part-time legislatures which must pass a budget and pursue the policy 
goals of its members under a reduced session period.  When governors are institutionally strong 
across the entire budget process, they are capable of dominating budgetary agendas, however 
they are subject to heightened information costs (e.g. Breunig and Koski 2009).  Further, these 
governors are capable of blocking legislative alternatives, yet they incur transaction costs which 
can hinder fiscal policy adjustments (e.g. Breunig and Koski 2009).  Ultimately, those who have 
greater control over the budget process will attempt to use these powers to deliver a higher 
proportion of policies that confer benefits to statewide versus more localized constituencies 
(Barrilleaux and Berkman 2003), since governors must appeal to statewide constituencies, as 
providing statewide benefits best rewards governors (Schlesinger 1994). 
This institutional capacity that allows a governor to exploit their position as an influential 
unitary actor in the budget process is not uniform across states (e.g. Sharkansky 1968; Mowery, 
Kamlet, and Crecine 1980; Garand 1985).7  All governors are afforded the ability to control the 
initial phases of setting the budget agenda, however the governors vary in their ability with some 
governors being solely responsible for producing the initial budget submitted to the legislature 
while others serve on a budget formulation committee comprised of individuals appointed or 
elected by other actors.  “The rules that govern the budgetary process are contested and biased, 
and the governor has greater power over the process in some states than others (Gosling 1994).” 
In recent decades, governors, as a group, have not declined in budgetary influence, although 
some have gained and others lost (Dometrius and Wright 2010).   
                                                           
7
 Some survey based studies have suggested that certain “informal” powers controlled by governors  are more 
important to gubernatorial success than are the formal, constitutional ones (e.g. Bernick 1979). However, these 
“informal” powers are notoriously difficult to operationalize and are not widely available. 
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Further, the ability of governors to pursue their budgetary agenda is a function of their 
ability to block alternative legislative proposals. The gubernatorial influence on budget outcomes 
is derived from the availability of different veto power tools ranging from blanket vetoes to the 
often controversial line-item veto found in 43 states which affords governors the ability to veto 
portions of the budget passed by the legislature (e.g. Abney and Lauth 1985; Bowman and 
Kearney 1988; Holtz-Eakin 1988; Nice 1988; Dearden and Husted 1993; Wallin 1999).  
Historically, these tools have allowed the governor to act as a tyrant in the budgetary process 
given that having the ability to veto an act of their legislative counterpart enhances the capacity 
of executives in the budgetary process (e.g. McCarty and Poole 1995; Cameron 2000). 
While the executive veto was originally intended as a safeguard to encroachment in the 
separation of powers system, the trend in the American states throughout the twentieth century 
has been to strengthen this tool, redesigning it such that governors could achieve positive as well 
as negative purposes through its use (e.g. Morey 1966).  In the traditional negative context, an 
executive having the ability to veto legislation, especially when conditions make it difficult for 
the legislature to override that veto, provide the executive with greater control over the 
legislation and the process surround it (e.g. Mainwaring 1997; Cameron 2000).  Yet, the veto 
also serves the shape the legislature’s beliefs concerning the desires of the executive, causing the 
legislature to respond to veto threats, and allowing the executive to extract policy concessions 
(e.g. Abney and Lauth 1997; Cameron 2000; McCarty 2000; Groseclose and McCarty 2001).   
Yet, when faced with the prospect of gubernatorial veto (or more often the threat of one) 
state legislatures are provided the option of overriding the objections of that governor.  However, 
override requirements vary substantially across the American states, with states requiring either a 
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simple majority, 3/5, or 2/3 override requirements.8  Ultimately these thresholds required to 
override a gubernatorial veto work to structure the dynamics of the budgetary bargaining process 
by compelling legislatures to build coalitions when the branches disagree to enact their preferred 
policy over a veto (or veto threat) (e.g. McGrath, Rogowski, and Ryan 2014a, 2014b). 
Considering the negative power of the veto in this context, these larger override thresholds 
provide the executive with greater control over the budget and budget process.  When 
considering the positive powers in this context, in the absence of veto authority a simple majority 
coalition is capable of passing whatever policy it desires regardless of the objections of relatively 
helpless giant.  Functionally, the larger the threshold increases the difficulty for a legislature to 
assemble a large enough coalition to override a veto, thus resulting in budget outcomes closer to 
those of the executive’s preferences (McGrath, Rogowski, and Ryan 2014b).  Taken together, 
governors tend to be substantially more successful (operationalized as the difference between a 
governors proposed budget and the enacted budget9) in states with either 3/5 or 2/3 override 
requirements than simple majority (50%+1) override requirements (McGrath, Rogowski, and 
Ryan 2014b), thus making the veto a powerful tool at a governor’s disposal. 
While these formal budgetary powers of governors are generally strong, and governors 
have tended to dominate the executive-legislative branch relationship in budgetary matters, 
legislatures are not without influence (e.g. Abney and Lauth 1989, 1998).  Over the last twenty-
five years, state legislatures have become better equipped to compete with the governor as they 
have experienced a certain measure of professionalization (e.g. Pound 1992).  Professionalization 
                                                           
8
 Most states employ a 2/3 veto override requirement. Alabama, Arkansas, Tennessee, Indiana, Kentucky, and 
West Virginia employ a simple 50%+1 override requirement, whereas, Illinois, Maryland, Nebraska, North Carolina 
(which did not provide a gubernatorial veto until 1997), and Ohio employ a 3/5 override requirement. 
9
 This is well accepted in the literature as a measure of executive budgetary success, see for example Canes-
Wrone, Howell, and Lewis 2008; Howell and Jackman 2013; Kiewiet and McCubbins 1988 
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refers to increasing the legislature’s ability to perform its policy-making role “with an expertise, 
seriousness, and effort comparable to other actors” in this process (Mooney 1995, 48-49).  
Measures of state legislative professionalization include increases in salary and benefits for its 
members, increased time demands of service including the move from part-time to full-time 
service, and increases in staff and resources (e.g. Squire 1988a, 1992, 1993, 1997, 2007).  These 
factors increase the ability of the legislature to contend with the governor in the appropriations 
process (e.g. Abney and Lauth 1987) by allowing them to engage in protracted budget 
deliberations (e.g. Kousser and Phillips 2009).  This institutional capacity provides legislatures 
the means to secure greater appropriations for their local geographic constituencies (e.g. Crain 
and Miller 1990). 
Prior to this professionalization, these time and information scarce legislatures lacked the 
professional capability to make informed judgments in budgetary matters, and therefore relied on 
the governor’s recommendations (e.g. Sharkansky 1968).  While almost all of the state 
legislatures have experienced some degree of professionalization, this change has not been 
uniform with disparities existing between state legislatures (e.g. King 2000).  Regardless, state 
legislatures come to their budgetary tasks far better prepared now (Rosenthal 1981), which 
ultimately can serve to derail the budgetary process and lead to a budget failing to be passed by 
the start of the next fiscal year. 
Stemming from this discussion it is expected that:  
 
Hypothesis 1a: Budgets impasses are less likely to occur when budgetary actors have 
greater institutional control over the budget process. 
Hypothesis 1b: The length of a budget impasses should be shorter in duration when 
budgetary actors have greater institutional control over the budget process. 
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I expect the above hypotheses given that formal institutional capacity provides the holder 
(governors or state legislatures) with the ability to both control the budgetary agenda and serve 
as a veto player in blocking the policy movement away from the status quo toward the other 
actors most preferred outcome.  Possessing greater institutional control over the budgetary 
process thus allows the holder to reduce gridlock over changes to the status quo decreasing the 
likelihood of observing a budget impasse and shortening the duration of an impasse should one 
occur. 
2.6  The Influence of Divided Government  
The budgetary process increases rather than resolves partisan competition (National Conference 
of State Legislatures 1995).  During times of divided government, the dynamic between the 
governor and the legislature is very different than under periods of unified government (Clark 
1998).  During these periods, the governor faces either a unified legislature controlled by the 
opposition party (Unified Partisan Legislature Government) or a split legislature where the 
governor faces opposition from only one chamber of the legislature (Divided Partisan Legislature 
Government).10  It is during these periods that the budgetary process becomes more difficult, 
with each branch/party seeking to pursue a budget in line with its ideological and policy goals.  
Bowling and Ferguson (2001) find that when a governor is faced by a unified legislature during 
times of divided government, the passage of conflictual policy was made more difficult.   
As discussed above, the budget process is inherently conflictual.  This conflict results in 
part from the constituencies and interests that each branch serves, with the governor representing 
the interests of the state as a whole with his own policy objectives and the state legislators 
                                                           
10
 See Huber, Shipan, and Pfahler (2001) for a discussion concerning these different configurations of partisan 
control of government. 
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seeking to please their constituents by bringing benefits back to their districts or by using the 
budget to reward special interest groups (Wallin 1999).  This is only exacerbated during times of 
divided government when the most fundamental interests shared by the governor and the 
legislature during unified government now run counter.  During periods of divided government 
the size of agency budget requests varies with the agency requests made by agency heads of the 
governor’s political party receiving greater budget support than those made by the minority party 
agency heads (Clark 1997).  Further, Democrats tend to target a larger share of the states income 
for the public budget than Republicans, with Republicans reacting more strongly to budget 
surpluses by reducing revenues than Democrats (Alt and Lowry 2000).  Additionally, divided 
governments are less able to react quickly to exogenous shocks (Alt and Lowry 1994; Poterba 
1994), making it more difficult for a state government to determine how to handle revenue 
shortfalls when developing a budget.   
As discussed above, the tangible consequences resulting from a budget impasse can 
translate into decreased approval ratings for the budgetary actors.  Public polls in those states that 
experienced a budget impasse reveal that budget impasses during periods of divided government 
can lead to both branches being faulted equally (see Albuquerque Journal 2000 for example 
which revealed that the New Mexico electorate almost equally blamed the Republican governor 
and unified Democratic legislature for the 2000 budget impasse).  To avoid this blame, 
institutional powers are brought to task during periods of divided government to shepherd a 
budget bill through and avoid an impasse. 
It is well documented that budgetary actors are more likely to utilize their formal powers 
under periods of divided government as compared to periods of unified government.  During 
periods of unified government the executive benefits from ideologically proximate and policy 
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allies in control of the legislature as opposed to periods of divided government when the 
executive faces either a hostile branch or chamber.11  As such, the use of a political actor’s 
powers is more necessary under periods of divided government when policy and budgetary goals 
of the various political actors diverge.  At the national level, Congress makes full use of its 
investigative authority, however while investigations of executive activity may always serve 
Congressional institutional goals, majorities rarely act against their electoral interests.  Congress 
thus makes use of its investigative hearing authority more frequently and intensely under periods 
of divided, rather than unified, government (e.g. Campbell 1991; Mondak and McCurley 1994; 
Kriner and Schwartz 2008).  Presidential use of formal authority varies depending on the 
political balance of power across the branches. A president is are more likely to employ their 
veto authority under periods of divided government compared to periods of unified government 
(e.g. Cameron 2000).  Further, beyond the actual use of a veto, under periods of divided 
government, veto threats occur with greater frequency and are efficacious in extracting 
concessions (e.g. Cameron 2000).  Finally, presidents employ signing statements more under 
periods of divided government than under periods of unified (e.g. Kelley and Marshall 2008).  
As viewed together, political actors utilize the powers at their disposal more often under periods 
of divided government as opposed to unified government.12  Thus these budgetary actors are 
expected to utilize the available budgetary powers at their disposal to shepherd through a budget 
bill and avoid a budget stalemate. 
                                                           
11
 Similar to the ally principle in theories of delegation, see for example Bendor, Glazer, and Hammond (2001) and 
Bendor and Meirowitz (2004). 
12
 Howell (2003) shows that presidents utilize their ability to unilaterally act during periods of unified government 
contrary to expectations of presidents employing these powers during periods of divided government. Budgets 
however pose a situation where Presidents cannot easily “go it alone” and must interact with the Congress in 
order to pass a budget. 
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Stemming from this discussion it is expected that:  
 
Hypothesis 1c: The effect of greater institutional control over the budget process on the 
decreased likelihood of observing a budget impasse should be greater during periods of 
divided government than under periods of unified government. 
Hypothesis 1d: The effect of greater institutional control over the budget process on the 
decreased duration of a budget impasse should be greater during periods of divided 
government than under periods of unified government. 
I expect the above hypotheses given that partisan competition during periods of divided 
government makes the budgetary process more conflictual and fundamentally changes the 
dynamics between  institutional actors during the budgetary process (e.g. National Conference of 
State Legislatures 1995; Clark 1998).  Because periods of divided government necessitate the use 
of formal institutional capacity when policy and budgetary goals of the various political actors 
diverge compared to during periods of unified government when the governor and legislature 
benefit from ideologically proximity, the effect on decreasing the likelihood and duration of 
budget impasses should be greater under these political conditions.   
2.7  Data and Methods 
To examine the influence of the institutional capacity of the state political actors on both the 
probability of a state’s budget failing to be passed by the start of the next fiscal year and the 
duration of budget impasses which do occur, this analysis considers the occurrences of late 
budgets in the American states from 1986 to 2006.  Late Budget, is a measure for whether a 
state’s budget was late in the given year. This dichotomous variable is measured 1 if the budget 
was late (passed after the start of the state’s next fiscal year) and 0 if the state’s budget was on 
time (passed prior to the start of the next fiscal year).13  Within these data, 17.07% of the cases 
                                                           
13
 Data for this variable was provided by Justin Phillips from Kousser and Phillips (2012). These data include 48 
states, excluding Nebraska because of its non-partisan legislature and Alaska because of its budget relies heavily on 
severance taxes on natural resources.  Further, states only appear in their dataset for years in which a budget is 
required to be adopted with states that budget biennially appearing only every other year. 
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(140 of 820) were years in which the budget in the state was passed after the end of the state’s 
fiscal year.  Figure 2.2 provides a graphical representation of the occurrences of budget impasses 
in the American states 1986-2006 as a percentage of their total budgets states (e.g. percentage of 
budgets which were late): 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Late Budgets in the American States (1986-2006) 
 
 
Days Budget Late, is a measure for the number of days beyond the current fiscal year 
that a state was late in adopting its next fiscal year budget.  Of the 140 occurrences of late 
budgets within this sample period which occurred in 23 states, a budget impasse lasted on 
average 35.5 days beyond the end of the current fiscal year.  These impasses lasted from as little 
as 1 day late like in Delaware 1987 to as many as 269 days late in Kentucky 2002 (with a sample 
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standard deviation of 45.5 days).14,15  Figure 2.3 provides an account of the duration of budget 
impasses by state/year observation: 
 
 
Figure 2.3: Duration of Budget Impasses (1986-2006) 
 
 
To examine the occurrence and duration of a late budget, the following variables shall be 
considered.  As discussed above, this essay departs from the previous scholarly work concerning 
the causes and consequences of budget impasses in the American states (e.g. Kousser and 
                                                           
14
 Tests for both skewness and kurtosis reveal that Days Budget Late is not normally distributed, exhibiting both a 
positive skew with a leptokurtic distribution, with the majority (80% = 112 observations) of the observed budget 
impasses lasting between 1 and 51 days after the end of the current fiscal year. 
15
 An alternative specification of this dependent variable was additionally consider, where instead of using this 
censored indicator for days late where budgets passed on time were excluded, I include these on time or early 
passage budgets (alternatively coded as negative values).  The results of this analysis are found in Table A.1 in 
Appendix A. The random-effects regression analysis for cross-sectional time-series dataset reveals results which 
are an amalgamation of the main empirical analysis found in Tables 2.2 and 2.3 below.  While this analysis is 
interesting,  it pools together to different aspects of the bargaining process, e.g. bargaining prior to the end of the 
fiscal year and bargaining during an impasse when the tangible costs of the actors are increasing, and effectively 
tempers variation unique to these time frames.  To illustrate this point concerning an asymmetric bargaining 
process, further supplemental analysis splits the sample into those observations occurring prior to the end of the 
fiscal year [on time budgets] (found in Table A.2 in Appendix A) and those occurring after the end of the fiscal year 
[late budgets] (found in Table A.3 in Appendix A).  The findings from this supplemental analysis support the 
findings in the main empirical analysis which suggest that institutional capacity has a differing effect, either 
increasing the likelihood of a budget occurring or shortening a budget impasse should one occur. 
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Phillips 2009; Andersen, Lassen, and Nielsen 2012; Klarner, Phillips, and Muckler 2012; and 
Kouser and Phillips 2012) in that it 1) does not assume that governors are uniform in their 
budgetary powers (e.g. Sharkansky 1968; Mowery, Kamlet, and Crecine 1980; Garand 1985; 
Gosling 1994), and 2) considers the governor’s and legislature’s institutional capacity relative to 
each other, given that most measures of legislative and gubernatorial strength covary positively 
and literature has acknowledged that gubernatorial power should be measured relative to that of 
the legislature (e.g. Dometrius 1987; Mueller 1985; Gross 1989).  However, much ink has been 
spilled in an attempt to understand and define the institutional capacity of governors and state 
legislatures. Numerous measures of both executive capacity (e.q. Schlesinger 1971; Beyle 2010) 
and legislative capacity (e.g. Squire 2007) have emerged, and though widely used, are not 
without criticism.16  To examine the impact of institutional capacity on budget impasses, this 
essay must carefully consider the operationalization of the institutional capacity of both 
governors and state legislatures over the budgetary process.  As such, to understand how 
institutional capacity is used by the political actors in pursuit of their preferred budget, the 
budget process must be conceived of as just that, a process.  At each step of the process, the 
formal and informal powers of the political actors, unilateral or shared, are brought to bear in an 
effort to secure the most preferred budget.17,18 
                                                           
16
 For example, the debate surrounding Beyle's index of budgetary powers highlights the fact that it does not 
assign varying weights to its constituent components and is not validated against an external criterion (e.g. 
Sigelman and Dometrius 1988).  Further, the index is computed on an irregular basis for my sample period (1988, 
1994, 1998, 2001, 2007).  Krause and Melusky (2012) identify misclassifications between Byle’s index and the 
source material taken from “The Governors: Powers—Budget Making Power” Table in The Book of the States (See 
page 6 of their online Supplementary Appendix for these misclassifications: 
http://www.pitt.edu/~gkrause/concentrated powers.krause&melusky.may 2012.jop online appendix.pdf) 
17
 Initial attempts to model the relative institutional capacity of state governors and legislatures involved the 
development of a weighted index of institutional capacity.  Exploratory factor analysis in MPLUS version 6.1 
revealed that the individual factors of institutional capacity examined in this essay do not load together in any 
meaningful manner. As such, an index of relative institutional capacity, as originally conceptualized, is not 
appropriate for this analysis and thus these individual factors, discussed below, are examined individually in the 
regression equation.  However, for investigative purposes, additive indexes of the following institutional capacity 
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As discussed above, the budgetary process begins with the development of the initial 
budget proposal which serves as the starting point for budgetary negotiations.  Given the 
discussion above concerning the importance of both budget and revenue forecast formulation 
(e.g. Krause and Melusky 2012), Budget Formulation Authority(-)19 in each state is coded 1 if 
the governor has sole authority and 0 otherwise.20  Along with this budget proposal, a revenue 
forecast for the coming fiscal year is formulated which provides estimates as to the extent to 
which state taxing and spending will result in budget deficits(surpluses) and ultimately affect 
resource allocations for government programs (NASBO 2010).  In the American states, all 
governors formulate a revenue forecast, however only 20% of these forecasts constitute the 
state’s official revenue forecast projection.  Beyond governors, many state legislatures and 
consensus groups are responsible for formulating these forecasts.  When these official 
projections legally bind the state’s budget, they provide a revenue ceiling which can set the 
framework under which the budgetary deliberations shall take place.  As such, control over 
providing this binding official revenue forecast provides that actor with a powerful tool in the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
indicators were created (Governor Capacity Additive Index, Legislature Capacity Additive Index, and a difference 
between the two [Institutional Index]).  For the legislature’s session length indicator to be included in this index, 
the average session length across the included states was determined and those states above this average were 
coded as 1, 0 otherwise. The main analysis found below was reestimated with the inclusion of these indexes, the 
results of which are found in Tables A.4 and A.5 in Appendix A. The results should be taken with a certain degree 
of caution because of the nature of these indexes, given that they are additive and indiscriminately weigh each 
component equally. 
18
 Krupnikov and Shipan (2012) reconsider Beyle’s commonly used Formal Powers Index (FPI), and develop a new 
approach which deals with the measurement error issues found in the FPI. Supplemental analysis utilizes their 
indicators of budgetary power taken from the NASBO survey: whether the governor can spend unanticipated 
federal funds without legislative approval; whether the governor has line-item veto power as related to the 
budget; whether the governor has the power to reorganize departments related to the budget without legislative 
approval; whether the governor reduce the budget without legislative approval; and the governor’s level of 
preparation authority over the budget. The main analysis found below was reestimated with the substitution of 
these indicators, the results of which are found in Tables A.6 and A.7 in Appendix A.  Further, an additive index of 
these indicators was additionally created, the results of which are found in Tables A.8 and A.9 in Appendix A. 
Though the indicators are not identical to those used in this study, the results still point to a similar though 
complex trend in institutional capacity. 
19
 The parenthesis (-) or (+) following each covariate reflects the direction of the hypothesized relationship. 
20
 Data for this component comes from the Book of the States (various years), Table “The Governors: Powers.” 
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budgetary negotiations.  The following covariates account for whether the official revenue 
forecast binds the budget conditioned by which entity is responsible that revenue forecast21: 
Governor Possesses Official Revenue Forecast – Binds Budget (-) coded 1 when the governor 
of the given state has official revenue forecast authority and the forecast serves to bind the 
budget in the state and 0 otherwise (N=72, 8.78%); Governor Possesses Official Revenue 
Forecast – Does Not Bind Budget (-) coded 1 when the governor of the given state has official 
revenue forecast authority but this forecast does not bind the budget in the state and 0 otherwise 
(N=77, 9.39%); Legislature Possesses Official Revenue Forecast – Binds Budget   (-) coded 1 
when the legislature of the given state has official revenue forecast authority and this forecast 
serves to bind the budget in the state and 0 otherwise (N=42, 5.12%); and Legislature Possesses 
Official Revenue Forecast – Does Not Bind Budget (-) coded 1 when the legislature of the 
given state has official revenue forecast authority but the forecast it formulates does not bind the 
budget in the state and 0 otherwise (N=239, 29.15%).22 
With the budget proposal and official revenue forecast formulated, the legislature then 
reacts to these initial documents and the back and forth deliberations between the political actors 
over the state’s budget begins.  During these negotiations, the traditionally informational and 
staff resource rich governors (e.g. Beyle 1968; Morehouse 1981; Sabato 1983; Brace 1994) 
compete against the variable institutional capacity of their legislative counterparts (e.g. Pound 
1992).  The increases in professionalization experienced by the state legislatures (e.g. Squire 
1988a, 1992, 1993, 1997, 2007) increase the ability of the legislature to contend with the 
governor in the appropriations process (e.g. Abney and Lauth 1987) and allowing them to engage 
in protracted budget deliberations (e.g. Kousser and Phillips 2009).  Thus Legislature Session 
                                                           
21
 Consensus group revenue projections (binding and nonbinding) serve as the omitted category for this analysis. 
22
 Data for these variables are taken from Krause and Douglas (2011). Revenue forecasts formulated by consensus 
groups serve as the baseline group for comparison.  
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Length (-) is coded as the number of days a state legislature is in session in a given year (min = 
19 days [Wyoming 1994], max = 260 [New York 2004-2006], SD= 35.43, Mean = 70.61).23,24 
  As the budgetary negotiations progress towards a culmination in a final budget bill, 
certain governor’s are presented with an opportunity to strike select provisions from a budget bill 
that crosses their desk.  The line-item veto provides governors with a powerful tool in the 
budgetary process as discussed above. Thus Governor Possesses Line Item Veto (-) is coded 1 
if the governor has the ability strike certain provisions from the appropriations bill passed by the 
legislature, and 0 otherwise (N= 708, 86.34%).25 
 Given the conflictual nature of the budget process which increases rather than resolves 
partisan competition (National Conference of State Legislatures 1995) making the passage of 
conflictual policy more difficult (e.g. Bowling and Ferguson 2001), two measures of divided 
government are included: where Split Partisan Legislature Government (+) is coded 1 for if 
the control of the chambers of the state legislature were divided between the two major political 
parties and 0 otherwise; and Unified Partisan Legislature Government (+) is coded 1 for if the 
branches of the government were divided between the two major political parties and 0 
                                                           
23
 Squire’s measure of legislative professionalization is calculated at uneven intervals, and lacks the yearly 
observations necessitated by this study. The number of days in session provides an accurate reflection of both the 
time a legislature is able to devote to budgetary negotiations, as well as their level of patience in these 
negotiations (Kousser and Phillips 2009). Data for this variable was taken from “Bill and Resolution Introductions 
and Enactments” Table in The Book of the States (various years). Missing data was resolved through the use of 
state legislative session calendars. Information unable to be resolved through these means was imputed in STATA. 
Given that state legislative session lengths do not vary much from one year to the next, this method is appropriate. 
In some states, the Book of the States lists different session lengths for each legislative chamber. As such, the 
primary analysis in this essay employs the lower session length of the two chambers listed for that state, to avoid 
overestimating the session length of the state legislature. This measure of session length highly correlates (.63) 
with Squire’s measure of legislative professionalism.  However, to examine the robustness of this indicator, the 
models were reestimated with the inclusion of Squire’s legislative professionalism index in place of the session 
length indicator, the results of which are found in Tables A.10 and A.11 in Appendix A.  Given the similarity in the 
findings and the theoretical justifications for the use of session length as noted above, the main analysis utilizes 
the session length indicator over Squire’s legislative professionalism index.  
24
 Alternative measures of legislative professionalism often employ only state legislative salary. Real average state 
legislative salary correlates with legislative session length (.50), and when substituted for session length in reveals 
results similar to that from the primary analysis. 
25
 Data for this variable is taken from the Book of the States (various years), Table “The Governors: Powers.” 
 54 
 
otherwise.26  To examine the conditional relationship between institutional capacity and divided 
government, interactions between these measures of divided government and the above measures 
of institutional capacity are included. 
Several other variables which are thought to influence the occurrence and duration of a 
budget impasse are considered.  Since politicians are single-minded seekers of reelection and this 
affects their behavior while in office (e.g. Mayhew 1974; concerning state political actors in 
particular, e.g. Besley and Case 1995; Lowry, Alt, and Ferree 1998), especially when they could 
be ascribed blame for a budget impasse (Kousser and Phillips 2012), an electoral control is 
included.  The variable Legislative Election Year (-)  is a measure for whether state legislative 
elections were to take place in the given year. This dichotomous variable is coded 1 if a 
legislative election will take place in the given year and 0 otherwise (N=330, 40.24%).27  
Further, governors are concerned with the legacy they will leave at the end of their tenure 
in office.  Legacy years are those years in which the governor is negotiating their final budget 
prior to leaving office (e.g. final year of a lame duck term).  During these years the governor is 
very patient and more willing to endure a budget impasse given that while they no longer fear the 
electoral consequences of their behavior and they are however concerned with their legacy 
                                                           
26
 Data for this variable was taken from Carl Klarner’s “State Partisan Balance Data” located at 
http://www.indstate.edu/polisci/klarnerpolitics.htm. Unified government serves as the omitted category for 
baseline comparison.  Supplemental analysis utilizing a simple divided government indicator (naïve approach – 
coded 1 if any part of the government was controlled by a different political party, 0 otherwise) was conducted. 
The findings from this supplemental analysis are found in Tables A.12 and A.13 found in Appendix A. Though the 
findings are similar to the main analysis, this approach omits meaningful variation under periods of split legislative 
control (Divided Partisan Legislature Government). 
27
 Data for this variable was taken from Scammon and McGillivray’s America Votes series (various years). A 
measure of gubernatorial election years highly correlates with legislative election years (.66).  Given the significant 
overlap between the occurrence of gubernatorial elections concurrent with state legislative elections, this measure 
of state legislative election years is employed. 
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(Kousser and Phillips 2012).  Governor Legacy Year (+) is coded 1 if the governor is in his/her 
legacy year and 0 otherwise (N=41, 5.0%).28 
Officials at the National Conference of State Legislatures suggest that certain legislative 
rules and procedures can increase the likelihood that a state will fail to pass its budget in a timely 
manner (Eckl 1998; Pulsipher 2004).  Further, the National Conference of State Legislatures 
officials suggest that supermajority requirements to pass an appropriations bill can also affect the 
likelihood that a bill is passed in a timely manner (Pulsipher 2004; Cain and Snell 2007; 
Sunnucks 2009).  The variable Supermajority Requirement (+) is a measure for whether the 
state has a supermajority requirement for passage of an appropriations bill, coded 1 if the state 
has a supermajority requirement and 0 if the state does not have a supermajority requirement 
(N=52, 6.34%).29  
The complexity of a state’s budget can make the budget process more difficult (Klarner, 
Phillips, and Muckler 2012).  The budgets in states with sizable public sectors burden lawmakers 
with a significantly larger workload when formulating their appropriations bills.  Like the 
aforementioned scholars, I include three variables to test whether the complexity of budgeting 
affect the likelihood that a budget fails to be passed by the start of the next fiscal year: the Real 
                                                           
28
 Several electoral factors were additionally considered as alternative influences which strengthen or weaken a 
governor’s bargaining position.  Given that gubernatorial public approval numbers are not widely available for all 
states nor are they systematically collected, a governor’s previous electoral vote share is therefore considered. 
Further, their electoral eligibility (e.g. term limited or not) and whether they harbor progressive ambition (if the 
governor ever sought election to higher office after serving as governor) are additionally examined.  These 
indicators are included in the supplementary analysis which reestimates the main empirical models, the results of 
which are found in Appendix A (Electoral Eligibility: Tables A.14 and A.15; Previous Electoral Vote Share: Tables 
A.16 and A.17; and Progressive Ambition: Tables A.18 and A.19).  Given that the inclusion of these variables only 
has a minimal impact upon the main findings while yielding null findings themselves, in the interest of using a more 
parsimonious model, these findings remain supplementary. 
29
 Data for this variable was taken from The Book of the States (various years). 
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General Expenditures (+),30 operationalized as the state’s total real expenditures in a given year 
(Mean=$1,6000,000, SD=$18,400,000); whether the state operates under a Biennial Budget (+), 
coded 1 if the state budgets biennially and 0 otherwise (N=225, 27.44%); and the month in which 
the state fiscal year or biennium begins (Year Begins (+)).31 
Additionally, the budget proposals that governors submit are usually in balance which 
makes it difficult for the legislature to change them, given that all but a few states have a 
constitutional balanced budget requirement.  However, in circumstances when a budget was 
expected to be in balance, states which do not allow deficits to be carried over from one fiscal 
year to the next must either cut spending or increase revenues to balance the budget 
(McGranahan 2002).  Deficit carryover provisions thus provide teeth to the state balanced budget 
requirements.  No Balance Budget Requirement (-) is a measure for whether the state lacks 
both the requirement that a balanced budget be enacted nor that deficits cannot be carried over 
into the next fiscal year. This dichotomous variable is thus coded 1 if the states does not require a 
balanced budget nor have provisions prohibiting deficit carryover and 0 otherwise (N=449, 
54.76%).32 
The fiscal health of the state can influence the passage of a state’s budget given that when 
the state and its citizens are enjoying relative financial prosperity, with increased revenues, 
divergence in the budgetary process over spending priorities is more easily accommodated 
(Klarner, Phillips, and Muckler 2012). The variable Surplus (-) is included to capture these 
periods of state prosperity.  It is measured as the difference between total expenditures and 
                                                           
30
 Data for this variable comes from The Book of the States, Table “State Expenditure, By Character and Object and 
By State’’ (various years). 
31
 Data for these variables were taken from The Book of the States (various years). 
32 These data come from Balanced Budget Requirements: State Experiences and Implications for the Federal 
Government. Briefing Report to the Chairman, Committee on the Budget, House of Representatives (March 1993). 
Washington DC: United States General Accounting Office. 
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revenues, with negative values indicating a budget deficit, lagged one period (t-1) (Mean=7.54, 
SD=8.95).33  I additionally include the Change in Annual Per Capita Personal Income (total 
personal income divided by total midyear population) (-) (Mean=2.02, SD=2.15).34,35  
To model the factors which influence the likelihood of a given state failing to adopt it’s 
budget in a timely manner, I account for both unobserved heterogeneity across states and 
dependence within states by estimating a random-effects logit model for cross-sectional time-
series data.  This statistical approach allows for the inclusion of several theoretically important 
time-invariant variables discussed above, thus providing empirical leverage over a fixed-effects 
approach which necessitates the omission of these variables.  Finally, to model the factors which 
influence the duration of a budget impasse in state-years when they do occur, I fit a Cox 
proportional hazards model.36  This semiparametric model has an advantage over fully 
parametric models, such as the exponential or Weibull models, in that it makes no assumptions 
about the shape of the baseline hazard (the form of duration dependence), but however requires a 
proportional hazards assumption that the baseline hazard does not vary across observations.37 
                                                           
33
 Data for this variable was provided by Justin Phillips from Klarner, Phillips, and Muckler (2012) 
34
 Data for variable are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis 
35
 Descriptive statistics for the above indicators are included in Table A.20  in Appendix A and show that most 
variation in the included independent variables naturally occurs between states as opposed to within states.  
Further, many variables experience little or no change over time, further warranting the use of a random effects 
approach. 
36
 See Figure A.1 in Appendix A for the baseline hazard rate of budgetary delay which indicates that the hazard 
rate does not follow a functional form better suited to a parametric duration model.  A key assumption of the Cox 
model is that the hazard rates for two observations are proportional to one another and that proportionality is 
maintained over time. Visual examination of the plotted survival function vs time as well as tests of residuals 
indicate that there is no violation of this key assumption.  However, given the smoothness of the baseline hazard 
rate of budgetary delay, supplemental analysis was conducted with a fully parametric survival model with a 
Weibull distribution. See Table A.21 in Appendix A for these results. 
37
 For a comparison of parametric and proportional hazard rate models, see Box-Steffensmeier and Jones (1997) 
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Failure is specified as when a state adopts its budget for the next fiscal year bringing the budget 
impasse to an end.38  
The following section presents and discussed the results from these analysis examining 
both the likelihood of occurrence as well as duration of budget impasses in the American states. 
2.8  Statistical Findings 
The results of the regression analysis examining the likelihood of observing a budget impasse are 
presented in Table 2.2 below: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
38
 While these sophisticated methodological approaches are used in the main empirical analysis to overcome 
several issues discussed above, readers are encouraged to examine the supplemental results from the less 
statistically sophisticated models presented in Tables A.22 and A.23 (the main institutional capacity covariates), as 
well as Tables A.24 and A.25 (additive institutional indexes covariates from the prior supplemental robustness 
checks), found in Appendix A. While the results are fairly robust across these alternative specifications, 
comparison across the models should be taken with some caution given that these models could suffer from the 
issues as addressed above.  
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Table 2.2: Predicting the Likelihood of Observing a Budget Impasse  
in the American States (1986 – 2006) 
 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Gubernatorial Institutional Powers     
    Governor Possesses Budget Formulation  
    Authority (-) 
0.013  
(0.478) – 
1.361+  
(0.945) 
1.307+  
(0.936) 
    Governor Budget Formulation Authority x   
    Divided Partisan Leg (-) – – 
–2.723** 
(1.188) 
–2.713** 
(1.178) 
    Governor Budget Formulation Authority x   
    Unified Partisan Leg (-) – – 
–0.665  
(1.071) 
–0.727  
(1.060) 
    Governor Possesses Official Revenue  
    Forecast Authority – Binds Budget (-) 
0.795  
(1.306) – 
–1.382  
(1.776) 
–1.309  
(1.775) 
    Governor Binding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Divided Partisan Leg (-) – – 
2.271+  
(1.609) 
2.196+  
(1.581) 
    Governor Binding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Unified Partisan Leg (-) – – 
3.671**  
(1.538) 
3.713** 
(1.536) 
    Governor Possesses Official Revenue  
    Forecast Authority – Does Not Bind  
    Budget (-) 
–0.688 
(0.865) – 
–0.161  
(1.375) – 
    Governor Nonbinding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Divided Partisan Leg (-) – – 
0.338  
(2.258) – 
    Governor Nonbinding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Unified Partisan Leg (-) – – 
–1.221  
(1.748) – 
    Governor Possesses Line Item Veto (-) –0.489  (0.831) – 
–2.021*  
(1.176) 
–2.093* 
(1.164) 
    Governor Line Item Veto x Divided  
    Partisan Leg (-) – – 
3.678**  
(1.719) 
3.749** 
(1.716) 
    Governor Line Item Veto x Unified  
    Partisan Leg (-) – – 
0.220  
(1.162) 
0.426  
(1.144) 
Legislature’s Institutional Powers     
    Legislature Possesses Official Revenue  
    Forecast Authority – Binds Budget (-) 
3.750** 
(1.738) 
3.807** 
(1.741) 
3.866*  
(1.990) 
3.947** 
(1.988) 
    Legislature Binding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Divided Partisan Leg (-) – – 
–0.192  
(1.541) 
–0.268  
(1.504) 
    Legislature Binding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Unified Partisan Leg (-) – – 
0.235  
(1.592) 
0.356  
(1.584) 
    Legislature Possesses Official Revenue   
    Forecast Authority – Does Not Bind  
    Budget (-) 
0.260  
(0.691) – 
–0.755  
(0.990) 
–0.718  
(0.969) 
    Legislature Nonbinding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Divided Partisan Leg (-) – – 
1.796+  
(1.172) 
1.749+  
(1.134) 
    Legislature Nonbinding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Unified Partisan Leg (-) – – 
1.208  
(0.987) 
1.342+  
(0.980) 
    Legislature Session Length (-) 0.014** (0.007) 
0.013** 
(0.007) 
0.023**  
(0.012) 
0.023** 
(0.012) 
    Legislature Session Length x Divided  
    Partisan Leg (-) – – 
–0.016  
(0.013) 
–0.016  
(0.013) 
    Legislature Session Length x Unified  
    Partisan Leg (-) – – 
–0.003  
(0.013) 
–0.004  
(0.013) 
Divided Partisan Legislature Government (+) 0.650
+
  
(0.429) 
0.687+ 
(0.428) 
0.153  
(2.263) 
0.162  
(2.218) 
Split Branch Government (+) 0.913***  (0.364) 
0.925*** 
(0.361) 
0.825  
(1.483) 
0.717  
(1.466) 
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Table 2.2 Continued 
Governor Legacy Year (+) –0.633  (0.778) 
–0.664 
(0.774) 
–0.790  
(0.813) 
–0.759  
(0.812) 
Legislative Election Year (-) 0.151  (0.332) 
0.151  
(0.332) 
0.116  
(0.347) 
0.102  
(0.347) 
Real General Expenditures (+) 6.23E-09 (1.40E–08) 
6.20E-09 
(1.39E–08) 
1.33E-08 
(1.53E–08) 
1.44E-08 
(1.53E–08) 
Biennial (+) 0.576  (0.765) 
0.624  
(0.755) 
0.516  
(0.813) 
0.419  
(0.805) 
No Balanced Budget Restriction (-) –1.652** (0.735) 
–1.689** 
(0.734) 
–1.719** 
(0.773) 
–1.735** 
(0.778) 
Surplus (-) –0.033* (0.017) 
–0.034** 
(0.017) 
–0.039** 
(0.018) 
–0.040** 
(0.018) 
Pct ∆ Real Per Capita Income (-) –0.153** (0.067) 
–0.158** 
(0.067) 
–0.171** 
(0.073) 
–0.176** 
(0.073) 
Supermajority Requirement (+) 2.105
+
  
(1.557) 
2.069+ 
(1.504) 
2.088  
(1.649) 
1.863  
(1.636) 
Fiscal Year Begins (-) –0.784
+
 
(0.498) 
–0.774+ 
(0.502) 
–0.725+  
(0.515) 
–0.713+ 
(0.520) 
Constant 2.026  (3.712) 
1.642  
(3.712) 
1.483  
(4.006) 
1.505  
(4.034) 
N × T (Effective Sample Size) 820 820 820 820 
Number of States 48 48 48 48 
AIC 452.614 444.254 451.734 447.215 
BIC 546.800 514.894 611.850 593.203 
Panel-Level Variance 1.503  (0.427) 
1.550  
(0.416) 
1.531  
(0.438) 
1.560  
(0.430) 
SD of Random Effects 2.120  (0.453) 
2.171  
(0.452) 
2.150  
(0.471) 
2.182 
(0.470) 
Proportion of Total Variance Contributed by 
Panel-Level Variance  
0.577  
(0.104) 
0.589  
(0.101) 
0.584 
(0.106) 
0.591 
(0.104) 
Notes: Estimates for random-effects logit model for cross-sectional time-series dataset. Dependent variable – Late 
Budget:  Late Budget  = 1 if the state passed budget after start of next fiscal year, 0 otherwise. Standard errors in 
parentheses.    *** p ≤ 0.01; ** p  ≤ 0.05; * p ≤ 0.10; +significant at the 0.10 level (one-tailed test) 
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The Model 1 and Model 2 specifications do not control for the conditional relationship 
between institutional capacity and divided government which is examined in the Model 3 and 
Model 4 specifications.  Model 2 and Model 4 omit the insignificant indicators of institutional 
capacity to test the robustness of those significant indicators.39  A more sophisticated picture of 
institutional capacity in the American states and its influence in the budgeting process emerges 
from these results.   
Model 1 reveals that both forms of divided government (Divided Partisan Legislature 
Government and Unified Partisan Legislature Government) matter in significantly increasing the 
likelihood that we will observe budget impasse in the American states.  However, when 
examining the various measures of relative institutional capacity, contrary to theoretical 
expectations, most measures of institutional capacity are found to increase the occurrences of 
budget impasses in the American states (with the exception of when governors have official 
revenue forecast authority which does not bind the states budget and when governors have line 
item veto authority, although both measures fail to obtain a level of statistical significance).  Of 
these measures, only two of the indicators controlled by a state legislature are found to 
significantly increase the likelihood of observing a budget impasse (when legislatures have 
official revenue forecast authority which binds the states budget and the number of days a 
legislature is in session). 
                                                           
39
 Measures of model fit (Akaike information criterion and Bayesian information criterion) across the 4 models 
reveal that, as expected, Model 2 and Model 4 have lower values indicating that the more parsimonious models 
(those which include only the significant institutional capacity indicators and interactions) are better at explaining 
the occurrence of budget impasses in the American states.  
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As hypothesized, the ancillary control variables reveal several intriguing patterns 
consistent with the prior literature.40  The more complex a state’s budget (Biennial and Real 
General Expenditures, though both fail to obtain a level of statistical significance) and the more 
restrictive institutional rules a state has concerning the budget process (Supermajority 
Requirement), the greater the likelihood of observing a budget impasse.  Further, the less 
stringent the intuitional rules concerning the passage of a state’s budget (No Balanced Budget 
Restriction and Fiscal Year Begins) and the greater the state’s fiscal prosperity (Surplus and Pct 
∆ Real Per Capita Income), the less likely a state is in failing to pass its budget by the start of the 
next fiscal year.  The political costs surrounding the budgetary actors revealed results contrary to 
theoretical expectations (Governor Legacy Year and Legislative Election Year), though neither 
indicator obtained a level of statistical significance.  
While the results in Model 1 (and confirmed in Model 2) reveal a moderate effect of 
institutional capacity on the likelihood of a state failing to pass its budget in a timely manner, 
however when I account for the conditional effect between the various measures of institutional 
capacity and divided government, the results in Model 3 provide a more accurate picture of 
budgeting in the American states.41  During periods of unified government, when both branches 
are controlled by the same political party, when the governor has binding official revenue 
forecast authority (Governor Possesses Official Revenue Forecast Authority – Binds Budget) [-
                                                           
40
 Both the magnitude and level of statistical significance of these results are similar across all four models. The 
measures of divided government (Divided Partisan Legislature Government and Unified Partisan Legislature 
Government), which were marginally significant and significant at p < .01  in Model 1 and Model 2, lose statistical 
significance when the conditional relationship is considered in Model 3 and Model 4. Additionally, the measure for 
state supermajority rules (Supermajority Requirement), which was only marginally statistically significant in Model 
1 and Model 2, fails to obtain a level of statistical significance in Model 3 and Model 4.  
41
 The percentage in brackets found after each variable reflects the marginal effect of each key independent 
variable. For binary indicators this reflects a discrete change as the binary independent variable changes from 0 to 
1. For the only continuous indicator, Legislature Session Length the value indicates the instantaneous rate of 
change. 
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1.62%], when either the governor or the state legislature have nonbinding official revenue 
forecast (Governor Possesses Official Revenue Forecast Authority – Does Not Bind Budget [-
0.29%] and Legislature Possesses Official Revenue Forecast Authority – Does Not Bind Budget 
[-1.26%]), and when a governor can strike certain provisions from the budget document 
(Governor Line Item Veto) [-8.69%], all indicators decreases the likelihood of observing a 
budget impasse, yet only the indicator for the governor’s line item veto authority is found have a 
significant effect.  Of the remaining indicators of relative institutional authority, when the 
governor has budget formulation authority (Governor Possesses Budget Formulation Authority) 
[1.86%], when the legislature has binding revenue official forecast authority (Legislature 
Possesses Official Revenue Forecast Authority – Binds Budget) [42.06%], and the session length 
of the state legislature (Legislature Session Length) [0.04%] all significantly increase the 
likelihood of observing a budget impasse.  From these results, under periods of unified 
government, more legislative budget authority indicators significantly influence the likelihood of 
a budget impasse than gubernatorial budget authority indicators.  When legislatures are equipped 
with greater budgetary authority during periods of unified government, a state is more likely to 
experience a late budget than a state in which the legislature lacks those budgetary tools.   In 
particular, there is a sizeable 42.06% increase in the probability of observing a budget impasse 
when a state moves from not having a legislative formulated official revenue forecast which 
binds the budget to one which does (a 0 to 1 change).  During periods of unified government, 
with both branches controlled by the same political party, we should expect little need for the 
budgetary actors to need to utilize their institutional capacity when negotiating with their partisan 
allies.  As such, wielding these indicators of increased budgetary authority appear to work to the 
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disadvantage of the wielder, increasing budgetary conflict and pushing a state closer to failing to 
pass its budget by the start of the next fiscal year. 
 When examining institutional capacity conditional on divided partisan legislature 
government, when the governor has a political ally in control of one chamber of the state 
legislature, a similar effect is observed.  During this condition, governors with sole authority to 
formulate the states budget proposal (Governor Budget Formulation Authority x Divided 
Partisan Legislature Government) [-0.07%], the legislature has binding official revenue forecast 
authority (Legislature Binding Revenue Forecast Authority x Divided Partisan Legislature 
Government) [54.05%], and the session length of the state legislature (Legislature Session 
Length x Divided Partisan Legislature Government) [0.02%] all decreases the likelihood of 
observing a budget impasse, though only the governors budget formulation authority reaches a 
level of statistical significance. However, if governors have either the binding or nonbinding 
official revenue forecast authority (Governor Binding Revenue Forecast Authority x Divided 
Partisan Legislature Government [4.81%] and Governor Nonbinding Revenue Forecast 
Authority x Divided Partisan Legislature Government) [0.72%], when governors have line item 
veto authority (Governor Line Item Veto x Divided Partisan Legislature Government) [3.93%], 
and a state legislature having nonbinding official revenue forecast authority (Legislature 
Nonbinding Revenue Forecast Authority x Divided Partisan Legislature Government) [4.97%], 
with the exception of nonbinding gubernatorial official revenue forecast authority, significantly 
increases the likelihood that a state fails to pass its budget in a timely manner.  Though contrary 
to expectations, during these periods of divided partisan legislature government increased 
gubernatorial budget authority (Governor Binding Revenue Forecast Authority, Governor 
Nonbinding Revenue Forecast Authority, and Governor Line Item Veto) increases the probability 
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of a late budget.  When governors have greater institutional capacity and have a partisan ally 
controlling one chamber of the legislature, it is understandable that a response of the minority in 
control of a singular chamber of the legislature would be to generate resistance in the budgetary 
negotiations and increase the likelihood of a state experiencing a late budget.  
 Similarly, this effect is observed during periods of unified partisan legislature 
government, when the governor faces a hostile legislature controlled by the opposite political 
party. Although failing to obtain a level of statistical significance, when a governor can 
formulate the budget proposal for the state (Governor Budget Formulation Authority x Unified 
Partisan Legislature Government) [2.47%] when the governor has nonbinding official revenue 
forecast authority (Governor Nonbinding Revenue Forecast Authority x Unified Partisan 
Legislature Government) [-3.71%], and the length of the legislative session (Legislature Session 
Length x Unified Partisan Legislature Government) [0.09%] all decreases the likelihood of 
observing a budget impasse.  Though when either governors and state legislatures have binding 
official revenue forecast authority (Governor Binding Revenue Forecast Authority x Unified 
Partisan Legislature Government [23.60%] and Legislature Binding Revenue Forecast Authority 
x Unified Partisan Legislature Government) [65.83%], when state legislatures have nonbinding 
official revenue forecast authority (Legislature Nonbinding Revenue Forecast Authority x 
Unified Partisan Legislature Government) [2.11%], and when the governor has line item veto 
authority (Governor Line Item Veto x Unified Partisan Legislature Government) [-14.53%] all 
indicators increases the likelihood of observing a budget impasse, though only the governor’s 
binding official revenue forecast authority is found to significantly increase this likelihood.42  As 
observed from these results, under periods of unified partisan legislature government, increased 
                                                           
42
 The above findings from Model 3 are consistent and confirmed in Model 4. 
 66 
 
budgetary authority yielded several substantively sizeable effects on the likelihood of observing 
a late budget, however these effects failed to attain similar levels of statistical significance as 
during periods of either unified government or divided partisan legislature government.  Though 
estimated with greater imprecision, the majority of the indicators of budgetary authority (2 
gubernatorial and 2 legislative) increase the likelihood of state failing to pass its budget by the 
start of the next fiscal year, consistent when the effects during periods of divided partisan 
legislature government.   
 As the above results reveal, an interesting picture concerning the influence of institutional 
capacity conditioned by divided government emerges, such that contrary to theoretical 
expectations, increased budgetary authority increases the probability that a state will fail to pass 
its budget on time plunging the state into a budget impasse.  In this game of budgetary chicken 
ending with “who blinks first” (Kousser and Phillips 2011), these budgetary actors bring 
whatever advantages they have at their disposal to the budgetary negotiations to secure their 
most preferred budget.  When faced with these institutional powers, the weaker actors may have 
little recourse than to dig their feet into the sand, recalcitrant to the efforts of the stronger 
budgetary actor, leading to a late budget. 
To examine when these budget impasses do occur, a Cox proportional hazards model is 
employed, examining how the institutional capacity of governors and state legislatures, 
conditioned by divided government, affects the duration of a budget impasse.  Values listed are 
hazard ratios, with values greater than 1 imply the hazard rate is increasing; hence, the survival 
time is shortened (i.e. the presence of the variable increases the probability that the budget 
impasse will come to an end), while coefficients smaller than 1 imply the hazard rate is 
decreasing; hence, the survival time is lengthened (i.e. the presence of the variable decreases the 
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probability that the budget impasse will come to an end).  The results of the regression analysis 
examining the duration of a budget impasse are presented in Table 2.3 below: 
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Table 2.3: Duration of Budget Impasse in the American States (1986 – 2006) 
 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Gubernatorial Institutional Powers     
    Governor Possesses Budget Formulation  
    Authority (-) 
0.897  
(0.282) – 
0.660  
(0.462) – 
    Governor Budget Formulation Authority x   
    Divided Partisan Leg (-) – – 
2.269  
(1.742) – 
    Governor Budget Formulation Authority x  
    Unified Partisan Leg (-) – – 
1.099  
(0.856) – 
    Governor Possesses Official Revenue  
    Forecast Authority – Binds Budget (-) 
1.798+  
(0.653) 
1.614+ 
(0.564) 
35.978*** 
(43.300) 
29.969*** 
(34.738) 
    Governor Binding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Divided Partisan Leg (-) – – 
0.041**  
(0.0566) 
0.043** 
(0.054) 
    Governor Binding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Unified Partisan Leg (-) – – 
0.055**  
(0.073) 
0.074** 
(0.094) 
    Governor Possesses Official Revenue  
    Forecast Authority – Does Not Bind  
    Budget (-) 
0.493  
(0.344) – 
0.089**  
(0.101) 
0.107** 
(0.117) 
    Governor Nonbinding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Divided Partisan Leg (-) – – 
162.320*** 
(263.264) 
77.139*** 
(117.886) 
    Governor Nonbinding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Unified Partisan Leg (-) – – 
273.332*** 
(489.781) 
227.018*** 
(397.355) 
    Governor Possesses Line Item Veto (-) 0.820 
 (0.345) – 
1.377  
(0.903) 
1.405  
(0.743) 
    Governor Line Item Veto x Divided  
    Partisan Leg (-) – – 
0.158+  
(0.202) 
0.163+  
(0.188) 
    Governor Line Item Veto x Unified  
    Partisan Leg (-) – – 
1.548  
(1.468) 
1.556  
(1.180) 
Legislature’s Institutional Powers     
    Legislature Possesses Official Revenue  
    Forecast Authority – Binds Budget (-) 
1.991+  
(0.983) 
2.143* 
(0.878) 
3.439+  
(2.895) 
3.454*  
(2.209) 
    Legislature Binding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Divided Partisan Leg (-) – – 
0.1755+  
(0.206) 
0.151** 
(0.139) 
    Legislature Binding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Unified Partisan Leg (-) – – 
2.687  
(2.600) 
2.477  
(2.120) 
    Legislature Possesses Official Revenue  
    Forecast Authority – Does Not Bind  
    Budget (-) 
1.362  
(0.433) – 
0.772  
(0.508) – 
    Legislature Nonbinding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Divided Partisan Leg (-) – – 
2.060  
(1.780) – 
    Legislature Nonbinding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Unified Partisan Leg (-) – – 
2.841  
(2.330) – 
    Legislature Session Length (-) 0.998  (0.003) – 
0.998  
(0.005) – 
    Legislature Session Length x Divided  
    Partisan Leg (-) – – 
1.002  
(0.007) – 
    Legislature Session Length x Unified  
    Partisan Leg (-) – – 
0.992  
(0.006) – 
Divided Partisan Legislature Government (+) 0.702  (0.232) 
0.733  
(0.224) 
1.692  
(2.551) 
5.079+  
(5.906) 
Unified Partisan Legislature Government (+) 0.887  (0.228) 
0.902  
(0.216) 
0.687  
(0.652) 
0.449  
(0.340) 
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Table 2.3 Continued 
Governor Legacy Year (+) 0.956  (0.534) 
1.001  
(0.555) 
0.736  
(0.416) 
0.842  
(0.474) 
Legislative Election Year (-) 1.076  (0.222) 
1.042  
(0.207) 
1.250  
(0.277) 
1.278  
(0.264) 
Real General Expenditures (+) 1.000  (6.88E–09) 
1.000* 
(5.80E–09) 
1.000+  
(1.07E–08) 
1.000  
(8.04E–09) 
Biennial (+) 0.219*** (0.083) 
0.295*** 
(0.086) 
0.138*** 
(0.062) 
0.177*** 
(0.061) 
No Balanced Budget Restriction (-) 0.940  (0.331) 
0.713  
(0.212) 
0.983  
(0.411) 
0.822  
(0.274) 
Surplus (-) 1.040*** (0.011) 
1.036*** 
(0.010) 
1.041*** 
(0.013) 
1.047*** 
(0.012) 
Pct ∆ Real Per Capita Income (-) 0.976  (0.037) 
0.962  
(0.034) 
0.992  
(0.042) 
0.970  
(0.035) 
Supermajority  Requirement (+) 0.707  (0.395) 
1.108  
(0.400) 
0.957  
(0.817) 
1.609  
(0.824) 
Fiscal Year Begins (-) 1.221  (0.226) 
1.205+ 
(0.153) 
1.217  
(0.268) 
1.252+  
(0.182) 
N × T (Effective Sample Size) 140 140 140 140 
Number of States 23 23 23 23 
AIC 1102.188 1096.398 1103.102 1094.820 
BIC 1155.138 1134.640 1197.235 1162.478 
Notes: Estimates for Cox proportional hazards survival analysis.  Failure = when a state adopts its budget for the 
next fiscal year bringing the budget impasse to an end. Coefficients are hazard ratios, followed by standard errors in 
parentheses.    *** p ≤ 0.01; ** p  ≤ 0.05; * p ≤ 0.10; +significant at the 0.10 level (one-tailed test) 
 
A similarly complex pattern emerges from the above results when each of the indicators 
of institutional capacity is examined.  When the governor has budget formulation authority under 
periods of unified government (Governor Possesses Budget Formulation Authority) the hazard 
rate is decreased by 34%,43 increasing the amount of time a state must endure a budget impasse. 
However under periods of divided partisan legislature government (Governor Budget 
Formulation Authority x Divided Partisan Legislature Government) the hazard rate is increased 
by 126.9%, and under periods of unified partisan legislature government (Governor Budget 
Formulation Authority x Unified Partisan Legislature Government) the hazard rate is increased 
9.9%, both shortening the time until a budget is passed after the end of the current fiscal year.  
However, none of the indicators achieve a level of statistical significance.  
                                                           
43
 Changes in hazard rate computed as: (1 - Hazard Ratio)*100, with positive values indicating increases in the 
hazard rate and negative values indicates decreases in the hazard rate.  
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When the governor has official revenue forecast formulation authority which binds the 
state’s budget under periods of unified government (Governor Possesses Official Revenue 
Forecast Authority – Binds Budget) the hazard rate is increased by 3497.8%, significantly 
decreasing the length of a budget impasse. Yet, under periods of divided partisan legislature 
government (Governor Binding Revenue Forecast Authority x Divided Partisan Legislature 
Government) the hazard rate is decreased by 95.9%, and under periods of unified partisan 
legislature government (Governor Binding Revenue Forecast Authority x Unified Partisan 
Legislature Government) the hazard rate is decreased 94.5%, both significantly increasing how 
long a state endures a budget impasse.  However, when the governor has official revenue 
forecast formulation authority which does not bind the state’s budget under periods of unified 
government (Governor Possesses Official Revenue Forecast Authority – Does Not Bind Budget) 
the hazard rate is decreased by 91.1%, significantly lengthening a budget impasse. Yet, under 
periods of divided partisan legislature government (Governor Nonbinding Revenue Forecast 
Authority x Divided Partisan Legislature Government) the hazard rate is increased by 16132%, 
and under periods of unified partisan legislature government (Governor Nonbinding Revenue 
Forecast Authority x Unified Partisan Legislature Government) the hazard rate is increased 
27233.2%, both significantly shortening the length of time until failure occurs and a state passes 
its new budget.44  
Examining the final formal authority afforded certain governors, when the governor has 
the authority to strike certain provisions from the state’s budget, under periods of unified 
government (Governor Possesses Line Item Veto) the hazard rate is increased by 37.7%, though 
                                                           
44
 These extreme values should be taken with some caution given that of the 140 observations of late budgets, 
there are 8 Governor Nonbinding Revenue Forecast Authority x Divided Partisan Legislature Government 
observations, though 23 Governor Nonbinding Revenue Forecast Authority x Unified Partisan Legislature 
Government observations. 
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failing to obtain a level of statistical significance. Under periods of divided partisan legislature 
government (Governor Line Item Veto x Divided Partisan Legislature Government) the hazard 
rate is decreased by 84.2% (obtain a level of only marginal statistical significance), and under 
periods of unified partisan legislature government (Governor Line Item Veto x Unified Partisan 
Legislature Government) the hazard rate is increased 54.8%. 
Taken together, of the governor’s forms of budgetary authority, official revenue forecasts 
formulated by the governor (both binding and nonbinding) significantly influence the duration of 
a budget impasse. Under periods of unified government, binding official revenue forecasts 
shorten budgetary delays while nonbinding forecasts only exacerbate the problem lengthening 
these delays.  However when divided government is accounted, for an opposite effect is 
observed. I would surmise that under periods of unified government, when the governor has 
partisan allies controlling both chambers of the state legislatures, the governor’s official revenue 
forecast sets a ceiling for the budget negotiations under which the 2 budgetary actors are initially 
closer on the budgetary outcomes than when the governor faces either a unified or divided 
partisan legislature, in effect shortening the length of time until a state adopts a new budget.  Yet, 
when the government is divided against the governor, the ceiling these binding official forecasts 
sets only serve to complicate the negotiations, extending the budgetary delays. 
For those powers afford to state legislatures, when state legislature has official revenue 
forecast formulation authority which binds the state’s budget under periods of unified 
government (Legislature Possesses Official Revenue Forecast Authority – Binds Budget) the 
hazard rate is increased by 243.9%, significantly shortening a budget impasse period. While 
under periods of divided partisan legislature government (Legislature Binding Revenue Forecast 
Authority x Divided Partisan Legislature Government) the hazard rate is decreased by 82.5% 
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(significantly lengthening these periods), and under periods of unified partisan legislature 
government (Legislature Binding Revenue Forecast Authority x Unified Partisan Legislature 
Government) the hazard rate is increased 168.7%, though this indicator fails to achieve a level of 
statistical significance.  Yet, when the legislature has official revenue forecast formulation 
authority which does not bind the state’s budget under periods of unified government 
(Legislature Possesses Official Revenue Forecast Authority – Does Not Bind Budget) the hazard 
rate is decreased by 22.8%. While under periods of divided partisan legislature government 
(Legislature Nonbinding Revenue Forecast Authority x Divided Partisan Legislature 
Government) the hazard rate is increased by 106%, and under periods of unified partisan 
legislature government (Legislature Nonbinding Revenue Forecast Authority x Unified Partisan 
Legislature Government) the hazard rate is increased 184.1%.  However, all of these indicators 
fail to achieve a level of statistical significance. 
Finally, for each additional day the legislature is in session under periods of divided 
government (Legislature Session Length) the hazard rate is decreased by 0.2%, increasing the 
length of a budget impasse. Under periods of divided partisan legislature government 
(Legislature Session Length x Split Divided Partisan Legislature Government) the hazard rate is 
increased by 0.2%, and under periods of unified partisan legislature government (Legislature 
Session Length x Unified Partisan Legislature Government) the hazard rate is decreased by 
0.8%.  However, all of these indicators fail to achieve a level of statistical significance. 
From the above analysis, it can be seen that when accounting for divided government 
(either divided or unified partisan legislature government) a fairly consistent picture emerges 
concerning the influence of budgetary authority on the length of delay. During periods of unified 
partisan legislature government, the majority of the budgetary authority measures (both for 
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governors and legislatures) serve to shorten the length of budget impasses. A similar pattern 
occurs during periods of divided partisan legislature government. Examining these effects, 
despite being estimated rather imprecisely, most indicators of budgetary authority reveal a 
sizeable impact on shortening the length of the budgetary delay. From a practical standpoint, 
these budgetary powers, when held by governors or legislatures, allow the wielder to resolve 
interbranch conflict by circumventing institutional logjams.  Increased budgetary authority can 
be viewed as a method to conflict resolution, by allowing for one actor to dominate the 
budgetary process and obtain the passage of the state’s budget document. 
 Taken together, these effects comport with the explanation advanced in this manuscript 
where budgetary success (passage of a state’s budget in a timely manner) is a result of power 
imbalances among state budgetary actors, with the stronger actor being able to advance the 
budgetary despite the resistance of the other budgetary actors (Institutional Capacity 
Explanation).  However, could these actors of limited institutional capacity perhaps be relenting 
to the demands of the stronger actor because they lack the incentive to fight back and engaged in 
protracted budgetary negotiations compared to more higher capacity actors (Incentives 
Explanation). As such, this alternative explanation for both budgetary impasse occurrence and 
delay is examined.   
Previous Congressional research has shown that the more experienced politicians behave 
more strategically than amateur politicians (e.g. Banks and Keiwiet 1989; Canon 1990; Krasno 
and Green 1988). A similar trend in behavior has been observed in the American state legislative 
chambers between the professional and citizen legislatures (e.g. Squire 1988b). The 
characteristics of the state legislature serve to attract members with similar career ambitions, 
with more professional legislatures placing greater valuation on their legislative seat and 
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attracting career oriented, long-term politicians compared to their amateur counterparts in less 
professional legislatures (e.g. Squire 1988a, 1988a; Berkman 1994; Maestas 2003).  For these 
amateur legislatures, many of the members of which are only serving out of a civic duty and in 
part-time service, what incentive is there to fight with the governor risking protracted budget 
negotiations which 1) could result in additional time away from their full-time professions, or 2) 
could result in electoral sanctioning for budgetary delay increasing the cost to retain a lower 
valued seat?  As such a rough proxy measure for the valuation attached to a states legislative seat 
was computed using the State Legislative Election Returns Data, 1967-2010 (Klarner, Berry, 
Carsey, Jewell, Niemi, Powell, and Snyder 2013).  With the understanding that more 
professional legislatures more highly value their seats and desire to retain that seat for longer 
periods of time, Average Legislative Terms – Both Chambers is a measure for the average 
number of terms served by the seated membership each session (averaged across chambers).45 To 
examine differences between state legislative chambers, the separate chamber term averages by 
session are included (Average Legislative Terms – Upper Chamber and Average Legislative 
Terms – Lower Chamber).  It is expected that as the seat is more highly valued, it is less likely 
that the legislature is willing to relent to the demands of the governor, thus increasing the 
likelihood of observing a budget impasse and increasing the duration should an impasse occur.46  
However some states artificially alter the behavior of their legislators and devalue their 
legislative seats through the imposition of term limits. The value of a political office depends on 
what the holder can achieve while controlling it and how long the property rights are to it, thus 
                                                           
45
 As Nebraska is excluded from the primary analysis, there is no concern for a differing effect of a unicameral 
legislature included in this variable. 
46
 The valuation of a legislative seat has been associated with state legislative professionalism (see for example 
Maestas 2003). As addressed above, this manuscript’s supplemental analysis examined the traditional measure of 
legislative professionalism, legislative salary (which is correlated with legislative session length).  As such, to 
examine this alternative incentives based explanation, this measure of the valuation of a state legislative seat is 
computed and included. 
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the longer the term in office the more time, effort, and money will be spent to maintain 
ownership (e.g. Crain and Tollison 1977; Lott 2000).  Further, legislative term limits have been 
found to influence state legislative behavior decreasing the time legislators devote to securing 
pork for their constituencies (e.g. Carey, Niemi, and Powell 1998)  and undermining legislator 
responsiveness to their electing constituency (e.g. Zupan 1990; Carey 1994). Thus to control for 
this effect, I included State Term Limits which is coded 1 for is the state has legislative term 
limits and 0 otherwise.47 
 I re-estimate Model 3 from both the random-effects logit model for cross-sectional time-
series data (Table 2.2) and the Cox proportional hazards model (Table 2.3). The Model 3a and 
Model 3b specifications in each table control only for the valuation attached to a legislative seat, 
examining it across chambers (Model 3a) then by legislative chamber (Model 3b).  The Model 
3c and Model 3d specifications control for the effect that state legislative term limits may have 
upon seat valuation, examining it first across chambers (Model 3c) then by legislative chamber 
(Model 3d).  The results of the regression analysis examining the likelihood of observing a 
budget impasse and the duration of a budget impasse while controlling for the incentives based 
alternative explanation are presented in Tables 2.4 and 2.5 below: 
 
 
 
                                                           
47 Since their enactment, 6 states (either by legislative repeal [2 states] or were found unconstitutional by the 
courts [4 states]) have repealed their legislative term limits: Idaho (2002), Massachusetts (1997), Oregon (2002), 
Utah (2003), Washington (1998), Wyoming (2004). Data are from http://www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-
legislatures/chart-of-term-limits-states.aspx, first accessed in November 2013. 
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Table 2.4:  Predicting the Likelihood of Observing a Budget Impasse in the  
American States (1986 – 2006) – Seat Valuation 
 
Variables Model 3(a) Model 3(b) Model 3(c) Model 3(d) 
Gubernatorial Institutional Powers     
    Governor Possesses Budget Formulation  
    Authority (-) 
1.339+  
(0.940) 
1.341+  
(0.939) 
1.382+  
(0.957) 
1.385+  
(0.955) 
    Governor Budget Formulation Authority x   
    Divided Partisan Leg (-) 
–2.686** 
(1.186) 
–2.683** 
(1.186) 
–2.874** 
(1.201) 
–2.870** 
(1.200) 
    Governor Budget Formulation Authority x  
    Unified Partisan Leg (-) 
–0.5991 
(1.076) 
–0.612  
(1.079) 
–0.751  
(1.091) 
–0.766  
(1.094) 
    Governor Possesses Official Revenue  
    Forecast Authority – Binds Budget (-) 
–1.452  
(1.773) 
–1.491  
(1.796) 
–1.823  
(1.829) 
–1.870  
(1.852) 
    Governor Binding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Divided Partisan Leg (-) 
2.432+  
(1.645) 
2.484+  
(1.690) 
2.577+  
(1.675) 
2.639+  
(1.721) 
    Governor Binding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Unified Partisan Leg (-) 
3.661** 
(1.539) 
3.672** 
(1.542) 
3.891** 
(1.570) 
3.909** 
(1.577) 
    Governor Possesses Official Revenue  
    Forecast Authority – Does Not Bind  
    Budget (-) 
–0.194  
(1.387) 
–0.217  
(1.400) 
–0.215  
(1.406) 
–0.241  
(1.418) 
    Governor Nonbinding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Divided Partisan Leg (-) 
0.354  
(2.247) 
0.385  
(2.254) 
0.195  
(2.304) 
0.232  
(2.311) 
    Governor Nonbinding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Unified Partisan Leg (-) 
–1.115  
(1.762) 
–1.110  
(1.764) 
–1.364  
(1.808) 
–1.360  
(1.810) 
    Governor Possesses Line Item Veto (-) –2.021* (1.173) 
–2.031* 
(1.174) 
–2.022* 
(1.201) 
–2.036* 
(1.202) 
    Governor Line Item Veto x Divided  
    Partisan Leg (-) 
3.652** 
(1.726) 
3.646** 
(1.726) 
3.623** 
(1.758) 
3.618** 
(1.758) 
    Governor Line Item Veto x Unified  
    Partisan Leg (-) 
0.283  
(1.168) 
0.271  
(1.170) 
0.369  
(1.180) 
0.355  
(1.183) 
Legislature’s Institutional Powers     
    Legislature Possesses Official Revenue  
    Forecast Authority – Binds Budget (-) 
3.726*  
(1.995) 
3.730*  
(1.991) 
3.541*  
(2.051) 
3.546*  
(2.048) 
    Legislature Binding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Divided Partisan Leg (-) 
–0.091  
(1.561) 
–0.074  
(1.565) 
–0.101  
(1.585) 
–0.080  
(1.589) 
    Legislature Binding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Unified Partisan Leg (-) 
0.343  
(1.605) 
0.350  
(1.605) 
0.192  
(1.617) 
0.200  
(1.617) 
    Legislature Possesses Official Revenue  
    Forecast Authority – Does Not Bind  
    Budget (-) 
–0.707  
(0.990) 
–0.719  
(0.994) 
–0.835  
(1.007) 
–0.848  
(1.011) 
    Legislature Nonbinding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Divided Partisan Leg (-) 
1.820+  
(1.173) 
1.843+  
(1.185) 
1.812+  
(1.197) 
1.838+  
(1.207) 
    Legislature Nonbinding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Unified Partisan Leg (-) 
1.118  
(1.002) 
1.130  
(1.00) 
1.012    
(1.020) 
1.026  
(1.024) 
    Legislature Session Length (-) 0.024** (0.012) 
0.024** 
(0.012) 
0.024** 
(0.012) 
0.024** 
(0.012) 
    Legislature Session Length x Divided  
    Partisan Leg (-) 
–0.017  
(0.013) 
–0.017+ 
(0.013) 
–0.019+ 
(0.014) 
–0.019+ 
(0.014) 
    Legislature Session Length x Unified  
    Partisan Leg (-) 
–0.003  
(0.013) 
–0.003  
(0.013) 
–0.004  
(0.013) 
–0.004  
(0.013) 
Divided Partisan Legislature Government (+) 0.133  (2.261) 
0.116  
(2.262) 
0.418  
(2.309) 
0.397  
(2.310) 
Unified Partisan Legislature Government (+) 0.719  (1.496) 
0.733  
(1.499) 
1.007  
(1.518) 
1.024  
(1.521) 
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Table 2.4 Continued 
Average Legislature Terms - Both Chambers 0.131  (0.268) – 
–0.016  
(0.286) – 
Average Legislature Terms - Upper Chamber – 0.027  (0.317) – 
–0.054  
(0.322) 
Average Legislature Terms - Lower 
Chamber – 
0.101  
(0.295) – 
0.034  
(0.302) 
State Term Limits – – –0.941* (0.545) 
–0.941* 
(0.544) 
Governor Legacy Year (+) –0.771  (0.814) 
–0.767  
(0.814) 
–0.722  
(0.806) 
–0.718  
(0.806) 
Legislative Election Year (-) 0.119  (0.348) 
0.119  
(0.348) 
0.117  
(0.351) 
0.116  
(0.350) 
Real General Expenditures (+) 1.42E–08 (1.54E–08) 
1.44E–08 
(1.54E–08) 
2.07E–08 
(1.63E–08) 
2.09E–08 
(1.64E–08) 
Biennial (+) 0.554  (0.814) 
0.547  
(0.814) 
0.652  
(0.836) 
0.644  
(0.836) 
No Balanced Budget Restriction (-) –1.652** (0.779) 
–1.658** 
(0.779) 
–1.676** 
(0.806) 
–1.683** 
(0.806) 
Surplus (-) –0.038** (0.019) 
–0.039** 
(0.019) 
–0.039** 
(0.019) 
–0.039** 
(0.019) 
Pct ∆ Real Per Capita Income (-) –0.167** (0.073) 
–0.167** 
(0.073) 
–0.163** 
(0.073) 
–0.163** 
(0.073) 
Supermajority  Requirement (+) 2.054  (1.634) 
2.049  
(1.631) 
2.146  
(1.702) 
2.136  
(1.700) 
Fiscal Year Begins (-) –0.671
+
 
(0.520) 
–0.682+ 
(0.526) 
–0.655  
(0.533) 
–0.667  
(0.539) 
Constant 0.616  (4.334) 
0.688  
(4.363) 
0.971  
(4.444) 
1.053  
(4.471) 
N × T (Effective Sample Size) 819 819 819 819 
Number of States 48 48 48 48 
AIC 453.490 455.472 452.393 454.368 
BIC 618.273 624.963 621.884 628.567 
Panel-Level Variance 1.508  (0.440) 
1.503  
(0.441) 
1.577  
(0.442) 
1.573  
(0.443) 
SD of Random Effects 2.125  (0.467) 
2.121  
(0.467) 
2.200  
(0.487) 
2.196  
(0.486) 
Proportion of Total Variance Contributed by 
Panel-Level Variance  
0.578  
(0.107) 
0.577  
(0.107) 
0.595  
(0.107) 
0.594  
(0.107) 
Notes: Estimates for random-effects logit model for cross-sectional time-series dataset. Dependent variable – Late 
Budget:  = 1 if the state passed budget after start of next fiscal year, 0 otherwise. Standard errors in parentheses.    
*** p ≤ 0.01; ** p  ≤ 0.05; * p ≤ 0.10; +significant at the 0.10 level (one-tailed) 
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Table 2.5:  Duration of Budget Impasse in the American States (1986 – 2006)  
– Seat Valuation 
 
Variables Model 3(a) Model 3(b) Model 3(c) Model 3(d) 
Gubernatorial Institutional Powers     
    Governor Possesses Budget Formulation  
    Authority (-) 
0.641  
(0.452) 
0.538  
(0.381) 
0.591  
(0.424) 
0.503  
(0.363) 
    Governor Budget Formulation Authority x   
    Divided Partisan Leg (-) 
2.284  
(1.761) 
2.918+  
(2.296) 
3.454+  
(2.734) 
4.298*  
(3.451) 
    Governor Budget Formulation Authority x  
    Unified Partisan Leg (-) 
1.128  
(0.878) 
1.383  
(1.090) 
1.689  
(1.367) 
2.110  
(1.741) 
    Governor Possesses Official Revenue  
    Forecast Authority – Binds Budget (-) 
40.434*** 
(48.967) 
65.180*** 
(81.499) 
57.314*** 
(69.451) 
89.998*** 
(112.395) 
    Governor Binding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Divided Partisan Leg (-) 
0.031** 
(0.043) 
0.019*** 
(0.027) 
0.018*** 
(0.026) 
0.012*** 
(0.017) 
    Governor Binding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Unified Partisan Leg (-) 
0.064** 
(0.086) 
0.063** 
(0.083) 
0.055** 
(0.073) 
0.051** 
(0.067) 
    Governor Possesses Official Revenue  
    Forecast Authority – Does Not Bind  
    Budget (-) 
0.077** 
(0.088) 
0.091** 
(0.105) 
0.079** 
(0.091) 
0.092** 
(0.106) 
    Governor Nonbinding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Divided Partisan Leg (-) 
207.736*** 
(341.020) 
152.407*** 
(251.703) 
247.109*** 
(408.333) 
188.440*** 
(312.891) 
    Governor Nonbinding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Unified Partisan Leg (-) 
252.3167***   
(453.867) 
241.593***   
(434.439) 
172.1949***   
(312.283) 
165.4859***   
(299.698) 
    Governor Possesses Line Item Veto (-) 1.187  (0.791) 
0.600  
(1.096) 
0.131  
(0.770) 
1.529  
(1.073) 
    Governor Line Item Veto x Divided  
    Partisan Leg (-) 
0.183+  
(0.236) 
0.170+  
(0.218) 
0.192  
(0.248) 
0.173+  
(0.224) 
    Governor Line Item Veto x Unified  
    Partisan Leg (-) 
1.167  
(1.148) 
1.356  
(1.343) 
0.733  
(0.737) 
0.822  
(0.836) 
Legislature’s Institutional Powers     
    Legislature Possesses Official Revenue  
    Forecast Authority – Binds Budget (-) 
4.628*  
(4.179) 
5.604* 
(5.019) 
5.415*  
(4.803) 
6.399** 
(5.613) 
    Legislature Binding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Divided Partisan Leg (-) 
0.144+  
(0.173) 
0.093** 
(0.113) 
0.100*  
(0.121) 
0.068** 
(0.083) 
    Legislature Binding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Unified Partisan Leg (-) 
1.740  
(1.838) 
1.703  
(1.822) 
1.158  
(1.247) 
1.140  
(1.242) 
    Legislature Possesses Official Revenue  
    Forecast Authority – Does Not Bind  
    Budget (-) 
0.859  
(0.579) 
1.156  
(0.807) 
1.126  
(0.779) 
1.429  
(1.010) 
    Legislature Nonbinding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Divided Partisan Leg (-) 
1.735  
(1.539) 
1.270  
(1.138) 
1.264  
(1.127) 
1.002  
(0.896) 
    Legislature Nonbinding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Unified Partisan Leg (-) 
3.007+  
(2.470) 
2.713  
(2.212) 
3.644+  
(3.001) 
3.433+  
(2.814) 
    Legislature Session Length (-) 1.000  (0.005) 
0.999  
(0.005) 
1.000  
(0.005) 
0.999  
(0.005) 
    Legislature Session Length x Divided  
    Partisan Leg (-) 
1.001  
(0.007) 
1.000  
(0.007) 
1.000  
(0.007) 
1.000  
(0.007) 
    Legislature Session Length x Unified  
    Partisan Leg (-) 
0.991+  
(0.006) 
0.991+  
(0.006) 
0.992  
(0.006) 
0.992  
(0.006) 
Divided Partisan Legislature Government (+) 2.109  (3.214) 
2.851  
(4.364) 
2.128  
(3.248) 
2.734  
(4.191) 
Unified Partisan Legislature Government (+) 0.968  (0.973) 
0.839  
(0.858) 
0.992  
(1.015) 
0.836  
(0.872) 
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Table 2.5 Continued 
Average Legislature Terms - Both Chambers 0.826  (0.149) – 
0.895  
(0.161) – 
Average Legislature Terms - Upper Chamber – 1.277  (0.291) – 
1.308  
(0.292) 
Average Legislature Terms - Lower Chamber – 0.703** (0.126) – 
0.746*  
(0.129) 
State Term Limits – – 2.638*** (0.997) 
2.661** 
(1.025) 
Governor Legacy Year (+) 0.600  (0.360) 
0.620  
(0.371) 
0.513  
(0.304) 
0.528  
(0.313) 
Legislative Election Year (-) 1.327  (0.302) 
1.289  
(0.294) 
1.427+  
(0.329) 
1.385+  
(0.319) 
Real General Expenditures (+) 1.00
+
  
(1.11E–08) 
1.00*  
(1.08E–08) 
1.00** 
(1.14E–08) 
1.00** 
(1.11E–08) 
Biennial (+) 0.115*** (0.055) 
0.123*** 
(0.058) 
0.094*** 
(0.046) 
0.100*** 
(0.048) 
No Balanced Budget Restriction (-) 0.890  (0.383) 
0.897  
(0.386) 
1.103  
(0.458) 1.113 (0.466) 
Surplus (-) 1.037*** (0.013) 
1.039*** 
(0.014) 
1.031** 
(0.013) 
1.033** 
(0.014) 
Pct ∆ Real Per Capita Income (-) 0.991  (0.042) 
0.979  
(0.042) 
1.018  
(0.044) 
1.007  
(0.044) 
Supermajority  Requirement (+) 0.795  (0.698) 
0.864  
(0.742) 
0.590  
(0.529) 
0.651  
(0.571) 
Fiscal Year Begins (-) 1.130  (0.265) 
1.343  
(0.321) 
1.000  
(0.231) 
1.186  
(0.282) 
N × T (Effective Sample Size) 140 140 140 140 
Number of States 23 23 23 23 
AIC 1103.996 1103.445  1099.794 1099.360 
BIC 1201.070 1203.461 1199.810 1202.317 
Notes: Estimates for Cox proportional hazards survival analysis. Failure = when a state adopts its budget for the next 
fiscal year bringing the budget impasse to an end. Coefficients are hazard ratios, followed by standard errors in 
parentheses. *** p ≤ 0.01; ** p  ≤ 0.05; * p ≤ 0.10; +significant at the 0.10 level (one-tailed test) 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 80 
 
Across each model in both sets of analysis, there is very little change in magnitude of the 
coefficients nor attenuation in significance resulting from the inclusion of these variables, 
providing further support for the Institutional Capacity explanation of both budget impasse 
occurrence and duration advanced in this manuscript. The results from this analysis do provide 
some telling results, especially concerning the influence of term limits. By itself, the value 
attached to a legislative seat does influence the duration of a budget impasse, but interestingly 
does have an effect only for the lower chambers of state legislatures. For these lower chambers, 
the valuation of a legislative seat decreased the hazard rate by 29.7%, increasing the amount of 
time a state must endure a budget impasse. When controlling for term limits, similarly, the 
hazard rate is decreased by 25.4%. For lower chambers as the average number of terms served by 
the membership increases, consistent with expectations, the value attached to a legislative seat 
does increase the duration of a budget impasse. Surprisingly, I do not observe a similar effect for 
the upper chambers of state legislatures.  The hazard ratio (though statistically indistinguishable 
from 0) does indicate that the value of a seat in the upper chambers of state legislatures decreases 
the duration of a budget impasse. I would surmise that the inherent prestige associated with 
upper vs. lower chamber seats (similar to Senate vs. House seats in the U.S. Congress) as well as 
differences between chambers in the number of seats allocated to each chamber, intrinsically 
increases upper chamber seat valuations. 
 Yet when additionally controlling for the effect of term limits, a consistent pattern 
emerges across both analysis and model specification.  Term limits significantly decrease the 
likelihood of observing a budget impasse (Table 2.4, Models 3c and 3d).  Further, term limits 
significantly increase the hazard rate by 163.8% and 166.1% (Table 2.5, Model 3c and 3d 
respectively) decreasing the amount of time a state must endure a budget impasse. I would 
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surmise that in states which have imposed legislative term limits, consistent with previous 
findings that legislators are less local geographic district-oriented in their concerns (e.g. Carey, 
Niemi, and Powell 1998), these legislators are more willing to relent to a governor’s demands 
which usually are focused on the greater statewide constituency (e.g. Schlesinger 1971; Crain 
and Miller 1990; Schlesinger 1994).   
 Similarly, as addressed above, the preferences of the budgetary actors play an important 
role in the success or failure of the budgetary process (Preferences Explanation).  The main 
objective of these budgetary actors is the enactment of a budget plan which fulfills their own 
priorities (e.g. Williams and Jubb 1996).  The bargaining process is made more difficult, often 
breaking down and stalling the passage of a new budget, because of the natural divergence in 
preferences between the two major parties e.g. Dye 1984; Garand 1988; Alt and Lowry 2000; 
Smith 1997. It is well assumed that Democrats prefer and pursue the expansion of policies which 
expand the government and target a larger share of the states incomes for the public budget  
whereas Republicans governors should prefer to reduce government spending and operate under 
the principle of smaller government.  When considered in the context of periods of divided 
government, delay should be greater during periods of divided government when there is a 
Republican, as the governor should naturally prefer lower levels of spending and the threat of the 
executives veto should constrain the legislature. Thus to control for this effect, I included 
Republican Governor which is coded 1 for is the governor in office is a Republican and 0 
otherwise, as well is its interaction with the 2 indicators for divided government.48  
                                                           
48
 Data for this variable was taken from Scammon and McGillivray’s America Votes series (various years) 
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I again re-estimate the random-effects logit model for cross-sectional time-series data and 
the Cox proportional hazards model while controlling for the partisan preferences based 
alternative explanation presented in Tables 2.6 and 2.7 below: 
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Table 2.6: Predicting the Likelihood of Observing a Budget Impasse in the American States 
(1986 – 2006) – Partisan Preferences 
 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Gubernatorial Institutional Powers     
    Governor Possesses Budget Formulation  
    Authority (-) 
0.004  
(0.479) – 
1.592+  
(0.982) 
1.567+  
(0.976) 
    Governor Budget Formulation Authority x   
    Divided Partisan Leg (-) – – 
–3.493*** 
(1.244) 
–3.524*** 
(1.239) 
    Governor Budget Formulation Authority x   
    Unified Partisan Leg (-) – – 
–0.886  
(1.106) 
–0.991  
(1.096) 
    Governor Possesses Official Revenue  
    Forecast Authority – Binds Budget (-) 
0.817  
(1.303) – 
–1.675  
(1.938) 
–1.550  
(1.939) 
    Governor Binding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Divided Partisan Leg (-) – – 
3.386*  
(1.828) 
3.308*  
(1.811) 
    Governor Binding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Unified Partisan Leg (-) – – 
4.585**  
(1.813) 
4.582** 
(1.808) 
    Governor Possesses Official Revenue  
    Forecast Authority – Does Not Bind  
    Budget (-) 
–0.687  
(0.866) – 
–0.430  
(1.393) – 
    Governor Nonbinding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Divided Partisan Leg (-) – – 
0.427  
(2.341) – 
    Governor Nonbinding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Unified Partisan Leg (-) – – 
–1.075  
(1.805) – 
    Governor Possesses Line Item Veto (-) –0.474  (0.832) – 
–2.018+  
(1.273) 
–2.081* 
(1.267) 
    Governor Line Item Veto x Divided  
    Partisan Leg (-) – – 
3.022*  
(1.836) 
3.100* 
(1.839) 
    Governor Line Item Veto x Unified  
    Partisan Leg (-) – – 
0.260  
(1.234) 
0.552  
(1.216) 
Legislature’s Institutional Powers     
    Legislature Possesses Official Revenue  
    Forecast Authority – Binds Budget (-) 
3.774** 
(1.736) 
3.819** 
(1.738) 
3.720*  
(2.103) 
3.859*  
(2.102) 
    Legislature Binding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Divided Partisan Leg (-) – – 
0.795  
(1.618) 
0.697  
(1.581) 
    Legislature Binding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x  Unified Partisan Leg (-) – – 
0.840  
(1.918) 
0.957  
(1.897) 
    Legislature Possesses Official Revenue  
    Forecast Authority – Does Not Bind  
    Budget (-) 
0.276  
(0.694) – 
–0.157  
(1.049) 
–0.087  
(1.033) 
    Legislature Nonbinding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Divided Partisan Leg (-) – – 
1.732+  
(1.219) 
1.674+  
(1.184) 
    Legislature Nonbinding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Unified Partisan Leg (-) – – 
1.131  
(1.073) 
1.244  
(1.070) 
    Legislature Session Length (-) 0.014** (0.007) 
0.013** 
(0.007) 
0.023*  
(0.012) 
0.023*  
(0.012) 
    Legislature Session Length x  Divided  
    Partisan Leg (-) – – 
–0.019+  
(0.014) 
–0.020+ 
(0.014) 
    Legislature Session Length x  Unified  
    Partisan Leg (-) – – 
–0.001  
(0.013) 
–0.003  
(0.013) 
Divided Partisan Legislature Government (+) 0.630
+
  
(0.433) 
0.666+ 
(0.433) 
–0.292  
(2.381) 
–0.212  
(2.328) 
Unified Partisan Legislature Government (+) 0.864** (0.395) 
0.877** 
(0.395) 
–1.239  
(1.733) 
–1.300  
(1.722) 
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Table 2.6 Continued 
    Republican Governor 0.108  (0.339) 
0.099  
(0.339) 
–2.047** 
(1.008) 
–2.031** 
(1.010) 
    Republican Gov x Divided Partisan  
    Legislature Government – – 
4.136*** 
(1.544) 
4.090*** 
(1.543) 
    Republican Gov x  Unified Partisan  
    Legislature Government – – 
3.523*** 
(1.301) 
3.530*** 
(1.306) 
Governor Legacy Year (+) –0.654  (0.782) 
–0.682 
(0.776) 
–1.187+  
(0.835) 
–1.163+ 
(0.835) 
Legislative Election Year (-) 0.153  (0.332) 
0.153  
(0.332) 
0.156  
(0.356) 
0.141  
(0.355) 
Real General Expenditures (+) 6.14E–09 (1.40E–08) 
6.15E–09 
(1.39E–08) 
1.54E–08 
(1.61E–08) 
1.67E–08 
(1.60E–08) 
Biennial (+) 0.579  (0.764) 
0.629  
(0.755) 
0.701  
(0.848) 
0.578  
(0.839) 
No Balanced Budget Restriction (-) –1.653** (0.733) 
–1.694** 
(0.733) 
–1.828** 
(0.817) 
–1.850** 
(0.821) 
Surplus (-) –0.033* (0.017) 
–0.034** 
(0.017) 
–0.046** 
(0.020) 
–0.047** 
(0.020) 
Pct ∆ Real Per Capita Income (-) –0.155** (0.067) 
–0.159** 
(0.068) 
–0.179** 
(0.076) 
–0.186** 
(0.076) 
Supermajority Requirement (+) 2.093
+
  
(1.554) 
2.056+ 
(1.503) 
1.379  
(1.750) 
1.149  
(1.732) 
Fiscal Year Begins (-) –0.786
+
 
(0.497) 
–0.777+ 
(0.501) 
–0.760+  
(0.532) 
–0.750+ 
(0.537) 
Constant 1.998  (3.701) 
1.637  
(3.703) 
2.109  
(4.145) 
2.050  
(4.176) 
N × T (Effective Sample Size) 820 820 820 820 
Number of States 48 48 48 48 
AIC 454.514 446.169 445.375 441.025 
BIC 553.410 521.518 619.619 601.141 
Panel-Level Variance 1.496  (0.428) 
1.546  
(0.417) 
1.630  
(0.457) 
1.658  
(0.445) 
SD of Random Effects 2.113  (0.452) 
2.166  
(0.451) 
2.259  
(0.516) 
2.291 
(0.510) 
Proportion of Total Variance Contributed by 
Panel-Level Variance  
0.576  
(0.104) 
0.588  
(0.101) 
0.608  
(0.109) 
0.615  
(0.105)  
Notes: Estimates for random-effects logit model for cross-sectional time-series dataset. Dependent variable – Late 
Budget:  Late Budget  = 1 if the state passed budget after start of next fiscal year, 0 otherwise. Standard errors in 
parentheses.    *** p ≤ 0.01; ** p  ≤ 0.05; * p ≤ 0.10; +significant at the 0.10 level (one-tailed test) 
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Table 2.7: Duration of Budget Impasse in the American States (1986 – 2006) –   Preferences 
 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Gubernatorial Institutional Powers     
    Governor Possesses Budget Formulation  
    Authority (-) 
0.897  
(2.284) – 
0.541  
(0.423) 
0.701  
(0.479) 
    Governor Budget Formulation Authority x   
    Divided Partisan Leg (-) – – 
3.859+  
(3.394) 
3.098+  
(2.376) 
    Governor Budget Formulation Authority x  
    Unified Partisan Leg (-) – – 
1.697  
(1.464) 
1.445  
(1.102) 
    Governor Possesses Official Revenue  
    Forecast Authority – Binds Budget (-) 
1.785  
(0.922) – 
45.779*** 
(55.660) 
39.363*** 
(46.863) 
    Governor Binding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Divided Partisan Leg (-) – – 
0.015*** 
(0.024) 
0.015*** 
(0.021) 
    Governor Binding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Unified Partisan Leg (-) – – 
0.012*** 
(0.019) 
0.010*** 
(0.014) 
    Governor Possesses Official Revenue  
    Forecast Authority – Does Not Bind  
    Budget (-) 
0.493  
(0.344) – 
0.085**  
(0.097) 
0.082** 
(0.091) 
    Governor Nonbinding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Divided Partisan Leg (-) – – 
206.400*** 
(335.562) 
201.092*** 
(318.993) 
    Governor Nonbinding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Unified Partisan Leg (-) – – 
503.672*** 
(922.815) 
601.637*** 
(1088.993) 
    Governor Possesses Line Item Veto (-) 0.817  (0.393) – 
2.054  
(1.410) 
1.865  
(1.139) 
    Governor Line Item Veto x Divided  
    Partisan Leg (-) – – 
0.099*  
(0.128) 
0.106*  
(0.126) 
    Governor Line Item Veto x Unified  
    Partisan Leg (-) – – 
1.383 
 (1.354) 
1.484  
(1.192) 
Legislature’s Institutional Powers     
    Legislature Possesses Official Revenue  
    Forecast Authority – Binds Budget (-) 
1.978  
(1.185) – 
5.354**  
(4.524) 
4.880** 
(3.592) 
    Legislature Binding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Divided Partisan Leg (-) – – 
0.045**  
(0.068) 
0.040*** 
(0.043) 
    Legislature Binding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Unified Partisan Leg (-) – – 
2.668  
(2.666) 
  2.870  
(2.761) 
    Legislature Possesses Official Revenue  
    Forecast Authority – Does Not Bind  
    Budget (-) 
1.361  
(0.441) – 
0.630  
(0.459) – 
    Legislature Nonbinding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Divided Partisan Leg (-) – – 
1.688  
(1.629) – 
    Legislature Nonbinding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Unified Partisan Leg (-) – – 
2.524  
(2.280) – 
    Legislature Session Length (-) 0.998  (0.003) – 
0.997  
(0.004) – 
    Legislature Session Length x Divided  
    Partisan Leg (-) – – 
1.002  
(0.007) – 
    Legislature Session Length x Unified  
    Partisan Leg (-) – – 
0.993  
(0.006) – 
Divided Partisan Legislature Government (+) 0.705  (0.276) 
0.786  
(0.239) 
4.200  
(6.956) 
6.988+  
(9.159) 
Unified Partisan Legislature Government (+) 0.891  (0.337) 
1.108  
(0.310) 
2.064  
(2.310) 
2.278  
(2.240) 
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Table 2.7 Continued 
    Republican Governor 0.993  (0.359) 
0.751  
(0.176) 
2.941  
(2.703) 
2.476  
(2.029) 
    Republican Gov x Divided Partisan  
    Legislature Government – – 
0.081**  
(0.102) 
0.055** 
(0.066) 
    Republican Gov x Unified Partisan  
    Legislature Government – – 
0.189+  
(0.203) 
0.213*  
(0.195) 
Governor Legacy Year (+) 0.957  (0.536) 
1.012  
(0.563) 
0.729  
(0.414) 
0.807  
(0.462) 
Legislative Election Year (-) 1.075  (0.224) 
  1.039 
(0.199) 
1.312  
(0.299) 
1.368+  
(0.303) 
Real General Expenditures (+) 1.000  (7.27E–09) 
  1.000 
(5.04E–09) 
1.000*  
(1.03E–08) 
1.000** 
(8.08E–09) 
Biennial (+) 0.220*** (0.085) 
0.370*** 
(0.094) 
0.119*** 
(0.056) 
0.114*** 
(0.044) 
No Balanced Budget Restriction (-) 0.939  (0.331) 
0.933  
(0.222) 
0.955  
(0.419) 
1.056  
(0.379) 
Surplus (-) 1.040*** (0.012) 
1.037*** 
(0.010)  
1.049*** 
(0.014) 
1.055*** 
(0.013) 
Pct ∆ Real Per Capita Income (-) 0.976  (0.037) 
0.978  
(0.034) 
0.993  
(0.043) 
0.979  
(0.038) 
Supermajority Requirement (+) 0.706  (0.400) 
0.894  
(0.305) 
1.561  
(1.361) 
1.787  
(1.127) 
Fiscal Year Begins (-) 1.222  (0.238) 
1.260* 
(0.154)  
1.210  
(0.244) 
1.209  
(0.202) 
N × T (Effective Sample Size) 140 140 140 140 
Number of States 23 23 23 23 
AIC 1104.188   1097.59 1104.45 1097.149 
BIC 1160.079 1132.89 1207.408 1182.456 
Notes: Estimates for Cox proportional hazards survival analysis.  Failure = when a state adopts its budget for the 
next fiscal year bringing the budget impasse to an end. Coefficients are hazard ratios, followed by standard errors in 
parentheses.    *** p ≤ 0.01; ** p  ≤ 0.05; * p ≤ 0.10; +significant at the 0.10 level (one-tailed test) 
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Across each model in both sets of analysis, there again is very little change in magnitude 
of the coefficients nor attenuation in significance resulting from the inclusion of these variables, 
providing further support for the Institutional Capacity explanation of both budget impasse 
occurrence and duration advanced in this manuscript. The results from these alternative 
explanatory variables do provide some interesting results.  As expected, the likelihood of a state 
experiencing a budget impasse is significantly greater during periods of divided government 
when there is a Republican governor (and conversely significantly less likely during periods of 
unified government when the Republican governor and his partisan allies in the legislatures can 
pursue the partisan principle of smaller government and less government spending).  Yet after an 
impasse has occurred, Republican governors have significantly shorter impasses during periods 
of divided government.  I would surmise because Republican governors are punished for 
increases in the size of a state’s budget (e.g. Lowry, Alt, and Ferree 1998) and the attention that 
impasses draw to a generally mundane budget, Republican governors would prefer a shorter 
budget impasse to avoid drawing attention to natural budgetary concessions made to the 
Democratic opposition to resolve the impasse and pass the budget. 
In considering this natural divergence of preferences between the major parties, I further 
consider the composition of the membership in the legislature and its ability to overcome a 
governor’s veto (and resist the constraint of threats when necessary).  During the budgetary 
bargaining, a governor negotiating with a legislature located closer to them on the ideological 
spectrum may have greater success in the budgetary process (e.g. Kousser and Phillips 2012).  I 
thus consider the % of Legislature Controlled by Governor’s Party, which is coded as the seat 
margin held by the governor’s party averaged across both chambers, with larger values reflecting 
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greater ideological proximity.49 It is expected that the larger the margin of the governor’s party in 
the legislature, the less likely that the state will experience a budget impasse.  However, when 
the legislature possesses a majority of the membership capable of overriding a gubernatorial 
veto, it is afforded a position of power in this bargaining process.  As such, I consider if the 
Legislature Possesses Numbers to Override Veto, coded 1 if the governor faces a veto proof 
majority in both chambers and 0 otherwise.50  It is expected that, irrespective of which party is in 
control of the legislature, being able to overcome a governor’s veto(threat) will decrease the 
likelihood of a budget impasse.  An interaction effect between these indicators is additionally 
included to examine how shared partisan preferences influence these effects. 
I again re-estimate the random-effects logit model for cross-sectional time-series data and 
the Cox proportional hazards model while controlling for the above partisan preferences based 
alternative explanations presented in Tables 2.8 and 2.9 below: 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
49
 Data for this variable was taken from Carl Klarner’s State Partisan Balance Data 
(http://www.indstate.edu/polisci/klarnerpolitics.htm). It should be noted that this indicator correlates with the 
indicator for Unified Partisan Legislature Government at -0.74. As such, because of potential for multicollinearity, 
results in the subsequent analysis should be taken with some degree of caution.  
50
 Data for this component is taken from Klarner’s State Partisan Balance Data 
(http://www.indstate.edu/polisci/klarnerpolitics.htm) and the Book of the States (various years), Table “The 
Governors: Powers.” 
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Table 2.8: Predicting the Likelihood of Observing a Budget Impasse in the American States 
(1986 – 2006) – Partisan Size and Veto Override 
 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Gubernatorial Institutional Powers     
    Governor Possesses Budget Formulation  
    Authority (-) 
0.003    
(0.479) – 
1.440+ 
(0.976) 
  1.370+ 
(0.965) 
    Governor Budget Formulation Authority x   
    Divided Partisan Leg (-) – – 
–2.793** 
(1.221) 
–2.777** 
(1.210) 
    Governor Budget Formulation Authority x   
    Unified Partisan Leg (-) – – 
–0.832 
(1.115) 
–0.868 
(1.102) 
    Governor Possesses Official Revenue  
    Forecast Authority – Binds Budget (-) 
0.744    
(1.321) – 
–1.128 
(1.792) 
–1.086 
(1.801) 
    Governor Binding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Divided Partisan Leg (-) – – 
2.056 
(1.641) 
2.001 
(1.617) 
    Governor Binding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Unified Partisan Leg (-) – – 
3.199** 
(1.632) 
3.323** 
(1.631) 
    Governor Possesses Official Revenue  
    Forecast Authority – Does Not Bind  
    Budget (-) 
–0.847 
(0.877) – 
–0.239 
(1.414) – 
    Governor Nonbinding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Divided Partisan Leg (-) – – 
0.530 
(2.259) – 
    Governor Nonbinding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Unified Partisan Leg (-) – – 
–1.264 
(1.780) – 
    Governor Possesses Line Item Veto (-) –0.568 (0.841) – 
–1.945+ 
(1.188) 
–2.027* 
(1.172) 
    Governor Line Item Veto x Divided  
    Partisan Leg (-) – – 
3.528** 
(1.725) 
3.633** 
(1.718) 
    Governor Line Item Veto x Unified  
    Partisan Leg (-) – – 
0.080 
(1.183) 
0.307 
(1.165) 
Legislature’s Institutional Powers     
    Legislature Possesses Official Revenue  
    Forecast Authority – Binds Budget (-) 
3.792** 
(1.758) 
3.930** 
(1.767) 
3.916**   
(1.985) 
3.997**   
(1.994) 
    Legislature Binding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Divided Partisan Leg (-) – – 
–0.355    
(1.574) 
–0.423 
(1.538) 
    Legislature Binding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Unified Partisan Leg (-) – – 
0.179    
(1.718) 
0.353 
(1.717) 
    Legislature Possesses Official Revenue  
    Forecast Authority – Does Not Bind  
    Budget (-) 
0.131 
(0.705) – 
–0.620    
(1.014) 
–0.595   
(1.002) 
    Legislature Nonbinding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Divided Partisan Leg (-) – – 
1.582+    
(1.208) 
1.551+   
(1.174) 
    Legislature Nonbinding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Unified Partisan Leg (-) – – 
0.841 
(1.123) 
1.033    
(1.117) 
    Legislature Session Length (-) 0.013* (0.007) 
0.012* 
(0.007) 
0.023*  
(0.012) 
0.022*   
(0.012) 
    Legislature Session Length x  Divided  
    Partisan Leg (-) – – 
–0.015 
(0.013) 
–0.016 
(0.013) 
    Legislature Session Length x  Unified  
    Partisan Leg (-) – – 
–0.002 
(0.013) 
–0.003 
(0.013) 
Divided Partisan Legislature Government (+) 1.191**   (0.526) 
1.210** 
(0.527) 
0.657 
(2.423) 
0.593    
(2.379) 
Split Branch Government (+) 2.042***   (0.675) 
2.016***   
(0.677) 
1.841 
(1.878) 
1.543    
(1.860) 
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Table 2.8 Continued 
    % of Legislature Controlled by  
    Governor’s Party 
0.031**   
(0.016) 
0.030*   
(0.015) 
0.018 
(0.019) 
0.015    
(0.019) 
    Legislature Possesses Numbers to  
    Override Veto 
0.014    
(0.513) 
0.032    
(0.503) 
–0.023 
(1.398) 
0.055 
(1.407) 
    % Controlled x Faced Veto Override – – 0.003 (0.025) 
0.002 
(0.025) 
Governor Legacy Year (+) –0.631 (0.783) 
–0.664   
(0.780) 
–0.815 
(0.819) 
–0.780 
(0.819) 
Legislative Election Year (-) 0.143 (0.335) 
0.143   
(0.334) 
0.133 
(0.349) 
0.117 
(0.349) 
Real General Expenditures (+) 9.61E–09   (1.44E–08) 
9.29E–09   
(1.43E–08) 
1.43E–08   
(1.55E–08) 
1.52E–08   
(1.55E–08) 
Biennial (+) 0.662    (0.774) 
0.676 
(0.762) 
0.558    
(0.806) 
0.442 
(0.799) 
No Balanced Budget Restriction (-) –1.713**   (0.745) 
–1.731**   
(0.745) 
–1.700**   
(0.770) 
–1.716**   
(0.777) 
Surplus (-) –0.031*   (0.017) 
–0.032*    
(0.017) 
–0.038**   
(0.019) 
–0.039**   
(0.018) 
Pct ∆ Real Per Capita Income (-) –0.148**   (0.067) 
–0.153**   
(0.067) 
–0.164**    
(0.073) 
–0.171**   
(0.073) 
Supermajority Requirement (+) 2.154
+
   
(1.578) 
2.112+   
(1.536) 
2.099    
(1.645) 
1.891    
(1.641) 
Fiscal Year Begins (-) –0.796
+
   
(0.505) 
–0.781+   
(0.509) 
–0.719+   
(0.513) 
–0.706+   
(0.519) 
Constant 0.068    (3.889) 
–0.411 
(3.915) 
–0.068    
(4.354) 
0.160    
(4.393) 
N × T (Effective Sample Size) 820 820 820 820 
Number of States 48 48 48 48 
AIC 452.358 444.333 456.749 452.515 
BIC 555.963 524.391 630.993 612.632 
Panel-Level Variance 1.524 (0.428) 
1.576 
(0.417) 
1.510    
(0.441) 
1.545    
(0.431) 
SD of Random Effects 2.142 (0.458) 
2.199   
(0.458)  
2.128    
(0.469) 
2.165    
(0.467) 
Proportion of Total Variance Contributed by 
Panel-Level Variance  
0.582    
(0.104) 
0.595   
(0.100) 
0.579    
(0.107) 
0.588 
(0.104) 
Notes: Estimates for random-effects logit model for cross-sectional time-series dataset. Dependent variable – Late 
Budget:  Late Budget  = 1 if the state passed budget after start of next fiscal year, 0 otherwise. Standard errors in 
parentheses.    *** p ≤ 0.01; ** p  ≤ 0.05; * p ≤ 0.10; +significant at the 0.10 level (one-tailed test) 
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Table 2.9: Duration of Budget Impasse in the American States (1986 – 2006)  
– Partisan Size and Veto Override 
 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Gubernatorial Institutional Powers     
    Governor Possesses Budget Formulation  
    Authority (-) 
0.892 
(0.281) – 
0.749 
(0.542) – 
    Governor Budget Formulation Authority x   
    Divided Partisan Leg (-) – – 
1.872 
(1.454) – 
    Governor Budget Formulation Authority x  
    Unified Partisan Leg (-) – – 
0.820 
(0.668) – 
    Governor Possesses Official Revenue  
    Forecast Authority – Binds Budget (-) 
1.841+ 
(0.725) 
1.629+ 
(0.592) 
41.453*** 
(53.799) 
48.814***   
(58.730) 
    Governor Binding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Divided Partisan Leg (-) – – 
0.041** 
(0.060) 
0.031***   
(0.041) 
    Governor Binding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Unified Partisan Leg (-) – – 
0.076* 
(0.118) 
0.036**   
(0.049) 
    Governor Possesses Official Revenue  
    Forecast Authority – Does Not Bind  
    Budget (-) 
0.461 
(0.353) – 
0.072** 
(0.083) 
0.104**   
(0.117) 
    Governor Nonbinding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Divided Partisan Leg (-) – – 
200.597***   
(327.840) 
76.815***   
(118.327) 
    Governor Nonbinding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Unified Partisan Leg (-) – – 
568.440***     
(1168.300) 
92.515***   
(146.254) 
    Governor Possesses Line Item Veto (-) 0.832 (0.371) – 
1.181    
(0.790) – 
    Governor Line Item Veto x Divided  
    Partisan Leg (-) – – 
0.224 
(0.289) – 
    Governor Line Item Veto x Unified  
    Partisan Leg (-) – – 
2.409 
(2.818) – 
Legislature’s Institutional Powers     
    Legislature Possesses Official Revenue  
    Forecast Authority – Binds Budget (-) 
1.983+ 
(0.985) 
2.145*   
(0.897) 
3.350+    
(3.152) 
3.599**   
(2.309) 
    Legislature Binding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Divided Partisan Leg (-) – – 
0.240 
(0.300) 
0.304+    
(0.228) 
    Legislature Binding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Unified Partisan Leg (-) – – 
3.645 
(4.531) 
1.498    
(1.062) 
    Legislature Possesses Official Revenue  
    Forecast Authority – Does Not Bind  
    Budget (-) 
1.415 
(0.486) – 
1.092    
(0.905) – 
    Legislature Nonbinding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Divided Partisan Leg (-) – – 
1.822 
(1.828) – 
    Legislature Nonbinding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Unified Partisan Leg (-) – – 
2.444 
(2.406) – 
    Legislature Session Length (-) 0.998 (0.003) – 
0.999 
(0.005) 
0.998 
(0.004) 
    Legislature Session Length x  Divided  
    Partisan Leg (-) – – 
1.000 
(0.007) 
0.996 
(0.006) 
    Legislature Session Length x  Unified  
    Partisan Leg (-) – – 
0.989+    
(0.007) 
0.994 
(0.006) 
Divided Partisan Legislature Government (+) 0.718 (0.295) 
0.661 
(0.257) 
1.218 
(2.043) 
1.040 
(0.714) 
Unified Partisan Legislature Government (+) 0.893 (0.426) 
0.803   
(0.363) 
0.285 
(0.405) 
0.863 
(0.746) 
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Table 2.9 Continued 
    % of Legislature Controlled by   
    Governor’s Party 
1.000 
(0.010) 
0.997 
(0.009) 
0.987 
(0.015) 
1.001 
(0.011) 
    Legislature Possesses Numbers to  
    Override Veto 
0.907 
(0.297) 
1.149   
(0.332) 
3.619+    
(3.550) 
7.125**   
(5.621) 
    % Controlled x Faced Veto Override – – 0.966*    (0.017) 
0.959***   
(0.015) 
Governor Legacy Year (+) 0.977    (0.558) 
0.982 
(0.554) 
0.860     
(0.495) 
0.820 
(0.463) 
Legislative Election Year (-) 1.062 (0.223) 
1.074   
(0.222) 
1.135    
(0.270) 
1.162 
(0.249) 
Real General Expenditures (+)   1.000   (7.32E–09) 
1.000*   
(6.50E–09) 
1.000 
(1.11E–08) 
1.000+   
(6.85E–09) 
Biennial (+)   0.221***   (0.085)  
0.280***   
(0.087) 
0.115***   
(0.056) 
0.177***   
(0.060) 
No Balanced Budget Restriction (-) 0.965    (0.350) 
0.722   
(0.216) 
1.204    
(0.538) 
0.728 
(0.262) 
Surplus (-) 1.040***   (0.012) 
1.036***   
(0.011) 
1.050***   
(0.014) 
1.049***   
(0.012) 
Pct ∆ Real Per Capita Income (-) 0.972 (0.039) 
0.968   
(0.037) 
0.980    
(0.048) 
0.985 
(0.045) 
Supermajority  Requirement (+) 0.681 (0.396) 
1.130   
(0.412) 
0.817 
(0.712) 
1.147 
(0.449) 
Fiscal Year Begins (-) 1.226 (0.234) 
1.196+   
(0.153) 
1.235 
(0.282) 
1.213    
(0.203) 
N × T (Effective Sample Size) 140 140 140 140 
Number of States 23 23 23 23 
AIC 1106.098 1100.097 1103.435 1093.219 
BIC 1164.931 1144.221 1206.392 1169.702 
Notes: Estimates for Cox proportional hazards survival analysis.  Failure = when a state adopts its budget for the 
next fiscal year bringing the budget impasse to an end. Coefficients are hazard ratios, followed by standard errors in 
parentheses.    *** p ≤ 0.01; ** p  ≤ 0.05; * p ≤ 0.10; +significant at the 0.10 level (one-tailed test) 
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Similar to the previous model specifications, there was only nominal change in 
magnitude of the coefficients and attenuation in significance resulting from the inclusion of these 
variables. Examining the results from these alternative explanatory variables, again I observe 
several interesting patterns.  Contrary to theoretical expectations, the share of the seats which are 
held by the governor’s party work to hinder the budget process, though none of these effects 
obtain a level of statistical significance.  Yet, the legislatures ability to overcome a gubernatorial 
veto does help to ensure that a budget is passed in a timely manner, though again failing to 
obtain a level of statistical significance. When both of these factors are considered does an 
interesting effect emerge, such that budget impasses are more likely.  These effects are similarly 
observed when considering the duration of an impasse should one occur.   Taken together, these 
results signals that a legislatures ability to overcome a governor’s veto serves to mitigate any 
benefit that the governor could gain from having a greater presence of partisan allies in the 
legislature.  This serves as a natural check on the governor’s influence in the separation of 
powers environment. 
Finally, as addressed above, the formal features of the budget process can facilitate or 
hinder the breakdown of this process.  In the event of a state failing to pass its budget by the 
beginning of the next fiscal year, a shutdown of nonessential government services can draw the 
ire of the electorate and invite a wide variety of tangible political consequences for both branches 
of government (e.g. Andersen, Lassen, Nielsen 2012; Kousser and Phillips 2012).  This formal 
procedural rule, exogenous to the bargaining process and known prior to the budgetary 
negotiations by the political actors engaged in this process, can influence both how and when a 
budgetary actor’s institutional capacity is employed during the budgetary negotiations.  
Ultimately, government shutdown procedures should make it unlikely that a budgetary actor 
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would prefer a government shutdown to higher(lower) levels of government spending (Klarner, 
Phillips, and Muckler 2012).  Further, because of the consequences associated with government 
shutdowns, which increase over time compared to other impasse outcomes, the budgetary actors 
should desire shorter impasses under this outcome.  It is thus expected that the presence of this 
least preferable option, captured by the dichotomous variable Shutdown Provision (-) which is 
coded 1 if the state’s law mandates a government shutdown in the event of a budget impasse and 
0 otherwise (N=357, 43.54%), will make it less likely that the state will experience a budget 
impasse and will shorten the duration of an impasse should one occur.51   
I again re-estimate the random-effects logit model for cross-sectional time-series data and 
the Cox proportional hazards model while controlling for the above government shutdown 
outcome based alternative explanation presented in Tables 2.10 and 2.11 below: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
51
 Data for this variable were originally collected by Andersen, Lassen, Neilsen (2012). 
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Table 2.10: Predicting the Likelihood of Observing a Budget Impasse  
in the American States (1986 – 2006) – Government Shutdown 
 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Gubernatorial Institutional Powers     
    Governor Possesses Budget Formulation  
    Authority (-) 
0.010    
(0.468) – 
1.295+    
(0.914) 
1.223+   
(0.907) 
    Governor Budget Formulation Authority x   
    Divided Partisan Leg (-) – – 
–2.629**   
(1.157) 
–2.603**   
(1.148) 
    Governor Budget Formulation Authority x   
    Unified Partisan Leg (-) – – 
–0.589    
(1.043) 
–0.643   
(1.034) 
    Governor Possesses Official Revenue  
    Forecast Authority – Binds Budget (-) 
0.545    
(1.205) – 
–1.705    
(1.676) 
–1.669   
(1.675) 
    Governor Binding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Divided Partisan Leg (-) – – 
2.597+    
(1.617) 
2.413+   
(1.582) 
    Governor Binding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Unified Partisan Leg (-) – – 
3.597**   
(1.530) 
3.641**  
(1.527) 
    Governor Possesses Official Revenue  
    Forecast Authority – Does Not Bind  
    Budget (-) 
–0.499   
(0.848) – 
–0.041    
(1.350) – 
    Governor Nonbinding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Divided Partisan Leg (-) – – 
1.265    
(2.149) – 
    Governor Nonbinding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Unified Partisan Leg (-) – – 
–1.265    
(1.711) – 
    Governor Possesses Line Item Veto (-) –0.434   (0.809) – 
–1.903*   
(1.130) 
–1.956*   
(1.110) 
    Governor Line Item Veto x Divided  
    Partisan Leg (-) – – 
3.700**   
(1.731) 
3.775**    
(1.716) 
    Governor Line Item Veto x Unified  
    Partisan Leg (-) – – 
0.045    
(1.149) 
0.225    
(1.129) 
Legislature’s Institutional Powers     
    Legislature Possesses Official Revenue  
    Forecast Authority – Binds Budget (-) 
3.707**   
(1.569) 
3.743**   
(1.559) 
3.795**   
(1.804) 
3.816**   
(1.799) 
    Legislature Binding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Divided Partisan Leg (-) – – 
0.068     
(1.574) 
–0.121    
(1.529) 
    Legislature Binding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Unified Partisan Leg (-) – – 
0.102    
(1.622) 
0.235    
(1.612) 
    Legislature Possesses Official Revenue   
    Forecast Authority – Does Not Bind  
    Budget (-) 
0.331    
(0.659) – 
–0.796    
(0.945) 
–0.782   
(0.925) 
    Legislature Nonbinding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Divided Partisan Leg (-) – – 
2.195*   
(1.182) 
2.039*   
(1.134) 
    Legislature Nonbinding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Unified Partisan Leg (-) – – 
1.224    
(0.968) 
1.361+   
(0.961) 
    Legislature Session Length (-) 0.014**   (0.007) 
0.013**   
(0.007) 
0.024**   
(0.011) 
0.024**    
(0.011) 
    Legislature Session Length x Divided  
    Partisan Leg (-) – – 
–0.017+   
(0.013) 
–0.018+   
(0.013) 
    Legislature Session Length x Unified  
    Partisan Leg (-) – – 
–0.003    
(0.013) 
–0.004   
(0.013) 
Divided Partisan Legislature Government (+) 0.664
+
    
(0.429) 
0.691+   
(0.427) 
–0.206    
(2.258) 
–0.048   
(2.207) 
Split Branch Government (+) 0.951***   (0.363) 
0.955***   
(0.360) 
0.975    
(1.469) 
0.843    
(1.452) 
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Table 2.10 Continued 
Shutdown  Provision (-) –2.164***   (0.817) 
–2.248***    
(0.821) 
–2.373***   
(0.836) 
–2.305***   
(0.823) 
Governor Legacy Year (+) –0.656   (0.775) 
–0.688   
(0.770) 
–0.822    
(0.811) 
–0.792   
(0.809) 
Legislative Election Year (-) 0.127    (0.331) 
0.128   
(0.331) 
0.095     
(0.347) 
0.076    
(0.346) 
Real General Expenditures (+) 4.65E–09   (1.36E–08) 
4.38E–09   
(1.35E–08) 
1.16E–08   
(1.48E–08) 
1.29E–08   
(1.47E–08) 
Biennial (+) 0.365    (0.722) 
0.402   
(0.706) 
0.252    
(0.762) 
0.213    
(0.744) 
No Balanced Budget Restriction (-) –1.250*   (0.697) 
–1.286*   
(0.689) 
–1.251*   
(0.715) 
–1.258*   
(0.722) 
Surplus (-) –0.034**   (0.017) 
–0.035**   
(0.017) 
–0.040**   
(0.018) 
–0.041**   
(0.018) 
Pct ∆ Real Per Capita Income (-) –0.161**   (0.068) 
–0.165**  
(0.069) 
–0.183**   
(0.074) 
–0.188**   
(0.074) 
Supermajority Requirement (+) 1.095   (1.431) 
1.084   
(1.359) 
0.915    
(1.492) 
0.711    
(1.473) 
Fiscal Year Begins (-) –0.659
+
   
(0.460) 
–0.669+   
(0.462) 
–0.595+   
(0.464) 
–0.584   
(0.468) 
Constant 1.990    (3.453) 
1.852   
(3.439) 
1.497    
(3.657) 
1.506    
(3.682) 
N × T (Effective Sample Size) 820 820 820 820 
Number of States 48 48 48 48 
AIC 447.246 438.438 445.387 441.230 
BIC 546.141 513.786 610.212 591.927 
Panel-Level Variance 1.242    (0.444) 
1.276    
(0.435) 
1.197    
(0.462) 
1.230    
(0.455) 
SD of Random Effects 1.861    (0.414) 
1.892   
(0.412) 
1.819    
(0.420) 
1.850    
(0.421) 
Proportion of Total Variance Contributed by 
Panel-Level Variance  
0.513    
(0.111) 
0.521   
(0.108) 
0.501    
(0.115) 
0.510    
(0.114) 
Notes: Estimates for random-effects logit model for cross-sectional time-series dataset. Dependent variable – Late 
Budget:  Late Budget  = 1 if the state passed budget after start of next fiscal year, 0 otherwise. Standard errors in 
parentheses.    *** p ≤ 0.01; ** p  ≤ 0.05; * p ≤ 0.10; +significant at the 0.10 level (one-tailed test) 
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Table 2.11: Duration of Budget Impasse in the American States (1986 – 2006) 
– Government Shutdown 
 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Gubernatorial Institutional Powers     
    Governor Possesses Budget Formulation  
    Authority (-) 
0.858    
(0.275) – 
0.619    
(0.444) 
0.619    
(0.444) 
    Governor Budget Formulation Authority x   
    Divided Partisan Leg (-) – – 
4.232*   
(3.428) 
4.232*  
(3.428) 
    Governor Budget Formulation Authority x  
    Unified Partisan Leg (-) – – 
1.349    
(1.053) 
1.349    
(1.053) 
    Governor Possesses Official Revenue  
    Forecast Authority – Binds Budget (-) 
1.621+   
(0.5904) 
1.483   
(0.537) 
66.505***   
(80.338) 
66.505***   
(80.338) 
    Governor Binding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Divided Partisan Leg (-) – – 
0.011***   
(0.015) 
0.011***   
(0.015) 
    Governor Binding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Unified Partisan Leg (-) – – 
0.033**   
(0.045) 
0.033**   
(0.045) 
    Governor Possesses Official Revenue  
    Forecast Authority – Does Not Bind  
    Budget (-) 
0.660    
(0.483) – 
0.173+    
(0.200) 
0.173+   
(0.200) 
    Governor Nonbinding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Divided Partisan Leg (-) – – 
1012.965***   
(1715.223) 
1012.965***   
(1715.223) 
    Governor Nonbinding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Unified Partisan Leg (-) – – 
3993.288***   
(7627.589) 
3993.288***   
(7627.589) 
    Governor Possesses Line Item Veto (-) 0.830    (0.344) – 
2.584+    
(1.767) 
2.584+   
(1.767) 
    Governor Line Item Veto x Divided  
    Partisan Leg (-) – – 
0.072**   
(0.095) 
0.072**   
(0.095) 
    Governor Line Item Veto x Unified  
    Partisan Leg (-) – – 
2.109    
(2.004) 
2.109    
(2.004) 
Legislature’s Institutional Powers     
    Legislature Possesses Official Revenue  
    Forecast Authority – Binds Budget (-) 
1.894+   
(0.922) 
1.875+    
(0.822) 
10.257***   
(8.950) 
10.257***   
(8.950) 
    Legislature Binding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Divided Partisan Leg (-) – – 
0.031***   
(0.038) 
0.031***   
(0.038) 
    Legislature Binding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Unified Partisan Leg (-) – – 
2.476    
(2.435) 
2.476    
(2.435) 
    Legislature Possesses Official Revenue  
    Forecast Authority – Does Not Bind  
    Budget (-) 
2.441**   
(0.979) – 
7.820**   
(6.599) 
7.820**   
(6.599) 
    Legislature Nonbinding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Divided Partisan Leg (-) – – 
0.342    
(0.316) 
0.342    
(0.316) 
    Legislature Nonbinding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Unified Partisan Leg (-) – – 
1.305   
(1.085) 
1.305   
(1.085) 
    Legislature Session Length (-) 0.997    (0.003) – 
0.995    
(0.005) 
0.995    
(0.005) 
    Legislature Session Length x Divided  
    Partisan Leg (-) – – 
1.005    
(0.007) 
1.005    
(0.007) 
    Legislature Session Length x Unified  
    Partisan Leg (-) – – 
0.990+    
(0.006) 
0.990+    
(0.006) 
Divided Partisan Legislature Government (+) 0.650
+
   
(0.218) 
0.706   
(0.219) 
4.146    
(6.199) 
4.146    
(6.199) 
Unified Partisan Legislature Government (+) 0.866    (0.225) 
0.880   
(0.213) 
0.646    
(0.604) 
0.646    
(0.604) 
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Table 2.11 Continued 
Shutdown Provision (-) 0.329**   (0.167) 
0.727   
(0.288) 
0.094***   
(0.056) 
0.094***   
(0.056) 
Governor Legacy Year (+) 0.933    (0.519) 
0.996   
(0.552) 
0.638     
(0.358) 
0.638    
(0.358) 
Legislative Election Year (-) 1.039    (0.216) 
1.037    
(0.205) 
1.223    
(0.274) 
1.223    
(0.274) 
Real General Expenditures (+) 1.000    (6.59E–09) 
1.000+   
(5.94E–09) 
1.000***   
(1.04E–08) 
1.000***   
(1.04E–08) 
Biennial (+) 0.104***    (0.052) 
0.268***    
(0.084) 
0.021***   
(0.013) 
0.021***   
(0.013) 
No Balanced Budget Restriction (-) 1.939
+
   
(0.870) 
0.842   
(0.304) 
4.058***  
(1.953) 
4.058***  
(1.953) 
Surplus (-) 1.042***   (0.011) 
1.037***   
(0.010) 
1.046***   
(0.014) 
1.046***   
(0.014) 
Pct ∆ Real Per Capita Income (-) 0.969    (0.035) 
0.960   
(0.033) 
0.982    
(0.041) 
0.982    
(0.041) 
Supermajority  Requirement (+) 0.308*   (0.199) 
0.931    
(0.388) 
0.417    
(0.361) 
0.417    
(0.361) 
Fiscal Year Begins (-) 1.380*   (0.245) 
1.250*   
(0.164) 
1.274+    
(0.241) 
1.274+   
(0.241) 
N × T (Effective Sample Size) 140 140 140 140 
Number of States 23 23 23 23 
AIC 1099.446 1097.734 1089.938 1089.938 
BIC 1155.337 1138.917 1187.012 1187.012 
Notes: Estimates for Cox proportional hazards survival analysis.  Failure = when a state adopts its budget for the 
next fiscal year bringing the budget impasse to an end. Coefficients are hazard ratios, followed by standard errors in 
parentheses.    *** p ≤ 0.01; ** p  ≤ 0.05; * p ≤ 0.10; +significant at the 0.10 level (one-tailed test) 
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When accounting for the inclusion of government shutdown provisions, an interesting 
result found.  As expected, the presence of this provision did significantly decrease the likelihood 
that the state would experience an impasse. Yet contrary to theoretical expectations, when this 
provision was present, states were significantly more likely to experience a longer impasse 
should one occur.  I surmise this is occurring because a shutdown provision serves as a source of 
important technical knowledge, informing budgetary actors up front of the costs of a budgetary 
impasse and motivating them to attempt to avoid this least preferred outcome.  However, once an 
impasse does occur, fiscal brinksmanship takes over, particularly because of the difficulty in 
attributing blame for the impasse by the electorate.  Budgetary actors, resolved that they are in a 
state of impasse (e.g. there is no turning back), attempt to use the event as a means to extract 
policy concessions from the other actors. 
The inclusion of this factor does have tangible implications for the key variables of 
interest, mainly by enhancing the robustness of the findings in the main analysis. Relationships 
which were marginally significant in the main analysis, were found to be even stronger.  The 
only change of significant note concerned the influence of whether the state legislature possessed 
non-binding revenue forecast authority during periods of unified government.  Previously, 
having this capacity under this partisan arrangement of government was shown to increase the 
duration of a budget impasse (though the effect failed to attain a level of statistical significant).  
With the inclusion of the shutdown provision variable, budget impasses were found to be 
significantly shorter, consistent with theoretical expectations.  Taken together, these results 
reveal that while the option of a state shutting down nonessential services when it fails to pass its 
budget by the start of the next fiscal year does influence the likelihood and duration of a budget 
impasse, the institutional capacity of the budgetary actors has a consistent effect. 
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In evaluating the results across the various models and specifications, it is clear that the 
institutional capacity of the budgetary actors is integral to the success or failure of the bargaining 
process.  Yet the political conditions under which the budgetary actors engage in their 
negotiations (e.g. unified or divided government), constrain their ability to use this capacity for 
their own political and electoral advantage, often resulting in outcomes inconsistent with 
theoretical expectations. 
2.9  Discussion 
James Madison notes in Federalist 10 that “the great security against a gradual concentration of 
the several powers in the same department consists in giving to those who administer each 
department the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachment of 
the others” (1961: 71).  Yet, while we afford each branch certain powers within the separation of 
powers system, Madison goes on to argue in Federalist 47  that unless each branch had some 
influence in the workings of the others, the branches would not work together and compromise to 
make national policy (1961: 303). Worse yet, the system could collapse into tyranny as each 
branch seeks to dominate the system using their own powers. What emerges from Madison’s 
argument is that power-checking within a separation of powers system is a normatively positive 
and necessary condition to maintain the democratic form of government.  Yet, the results from 
this analysis reveal that in certain circumstances, an imbalance of power exists to break 
institutional logjams.  
Using data on both the occurrence and duration of budget impasses in the American 
states 1986-2006, this essay sought to gain insight into the interplay between institutional 
capacity and partisan control of state government.  The results from the above analysis reveal 
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that the relative institutional capacity of governors and state legislatures matters in both 
facilitating and hindering the budgetary process.  However, when examined within the lens of 
divided government (either divided partisan legislature government or unified partisan legislature 
government), the results reveal a more nuanced understanding of institutional capacity.  While 
the reviewed theoretical understanding of increased institutional capacity was hypothesized to 
decrease budgetary conflict and reduce both the probability and duration of budgetary stalemates 
in the American states, the examined budgetary powers indicators in fact could lead either to 
increases or decreases, all depending on the context of divided government.  
As the results reveal, most of the significant effects concerning institutional capacity 
occur under periods of divided partisan legislative government. Under these periods of 
government when the governor has a partisan ally in control of one chamber of the legislature, 
conference committee sessions are made more difficult when members of the two chambers meet 
to reconcile difference in their respective versions of the state’s budget bill.  The governor’s 
partisan allies can advocate for the governors budgetary position and further can even employ the 
threat of the governor’s veto to the extract concessions they desire from the opposition members 
of the committee (Clarke 1998).  Additional effects are observed under periods of unified 
government, resulting likely from stalemates which occur during periods of unified government 
because the two branches cannot agree on the distribution of particularistic and statewide 
spending (e.g. Barrilleaux and Berkman 2003). 
While certain governors have gained and others have lost in terms of budgetary influence 
through the gradual changes in gubernatorial influence in recent decades (Dometrius and Wright 
2010), the influence of state legislatures additionally has changed, to varying degrees, as they 
underwent a period of professionalization over the last twenty-five years which better equipped 
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them to compete with the governor (e.g. Pound 1992).  From this expansion and reduction of 
institutional influence between governors and legislatures within the separation of powers 
system, we are left differences in budgetary authority across the American states.  Given that 
since World War II divided party control of the American government has become a institutional 
norm (e.g. Mayhew 1991),52 as the state legislatures continue to make additional increases in 
professionalization over time in response the increased demands and responsibilities of office, 
the resulting budgetary stalemates could have serious consequences for both the state 
governments and the people and nonprofit groups that reside in those states (discussed above 
concerning the consequences of late budgets).  As such, the results from this essay provide for a 
greater understanding of the consequences of certain institutional design features, and provide a 
potential solution for overcoming stalemates which do occur between institutional actors.  
Altering the power dynamic between governors and state legislatures can have mixed 
consequences, which especially when state legislatures are afforded increased authority relative 
to their gubernatorial counterparts, can have potentially harmful effects to the smooth 
functioning of government operations, in particular the budgetary process.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
52
 Which is not simply a national phenomena as the American states have experienced their fair share of divided 
partisan control (e.g. Fiorina 1992). 
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3.0  GIVING AWAY THE STORE – GUBERNATORIAL  
                CONTROL OF STATE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
 
 
In November 2010, Tom Corbett was elected the 46th Governor of Pennsylvania with 54.5% of 
the vote.  Over the course of his term in office, Corbett garnered the ire of both his political 
opponents and allies by proposing deep spending cuts and addressing a number of contentious 
social issues. By November 2013, his efforts labeled him the most unpopular governor in the 
country, with 65% of registered voters disapproving of his job performance.  Despite calls from 
the state Republican party, the electorally vulnerable Corbett announced his intention to seek 
reelection in 2014.  To improve his reelection prospects, the cornerstone of his reelection 
campaign focused on his efforts to create jobs and spur economic development in an ailing state 
economy which he inherited during the height of the economic recession.  In particular, he 
promoted that under his stewardship, Pennsylvania added more than 150,000 new private-sector 
jobs and experienced a dropped in the state’s jobless rate to a five-year low of 6.2%.  Further, he 
advertised that he engaged in numerous economic development efforts which included 
spearheading critical programs to support and protect Pennsylvania’s agriculture and 
manufacturing industries, prevented the closing of three Pennsylvania oil refineries (saving 
thousands of Pennsylvania jobs), competed with other states to promote Pennsylvania as a 
location of choice for companies looking to relocate or start new operations, especially 
concerning the expansion of the natural gas and energy industry, and  invested significant state 
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funds in job training, re-training programs, and a comprehensive online program that helps 
unemployed workers identify companies looking for their skills. 
What this anecdote illustrates is that for an electorally vulnerable governor, pursuing 
economic development policies was viewed as viable electoral strategy.  Like all governors, 
Corbett was tasked with restarting the state’s economy by spurring economic development and 
creating jobs.  In the words of Mario Cuomo, former Governor of New York, “while there are no 
panaceas, nothing comes closer than one simple word: jobs” (Eisinger 1988, 10).  Governors 
who fail to even attempt efforts to spur job growth via economic development policies and 
programs meet their own political death (e.g. Vaughan, Pollard, and Dyer 1985).  The story of 
Governor Corbett’s efforts serves as the launching point for this essay, whereby governors in the 
American states generally have the motivation to engage in economic development efforts given 
their inherent responsibility for the economic wellbeing of the state (e.g. Hansen 1999), and 
some more acutely feel this push given their electoral vulnerability, however not all governors 
possess the means to actually engage in this behavior to benefit their political fortunes.  This 
dissertation essay attempts to show that governors with both the motivation (electoral) and the 
means (institutional capacity) to pursue their goals will engage in behavior which supports and 
advances these goals. 
As such, a theory of gubernatorial behavior within the political economy of economic 
development programs is advanced, whereby these elected officials operate in a private 
enterprise market-oriented society in which they make numerous economic decisions which 
affect the local economy (e.g. Lindblom 1977).  For governors, state economic conditions have 
risen to a point of prominence for their reelection bids compelling them to stress the 
macroeconomic implications of their economic policy (e.g. Alesina and Cukierman 1990; Rogoff 
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1990; Atkeson and Partin 1995; Leyden and Borrelli 1995; Partin 1995; Carsey and Wright 
1998).  Therefore, governors devote significant energy recruiting businesses, promoting 
economic development, and creating jobs (e.g. Fosler 1988), given that these efforts are an 
excellent short term political strategy that benefits them in their subsequent election contests 
(e.g. Turner, Fleming and Kaufman 2005).   
However, not all governors are created equal in their ability to engage in economic 
development activities (e.g. Schlesinger 1971; Mueller 1985; Beyle and Ferguson 2008), and are 
constrained by their own formal authority to direct economic development spending efforts.  
Governors possessing greater formal powers are more likely to utilize a wide variety of 
economic development policies (e.g. Ambrosius 1989), are more likely than their weaker 
counterparts to produce more aggressive economic development policies (e.g. Brace 1994), and 
can respond more forcefully and more quickly to economic conditions than could office holders 
in institutionally less powerful states (e.g. Brace 1994).  In this essay, the governor’s formal 
authority, their institutional capacity, is considered their authority over the state’s economic 
development entity, specifically a governor’s ability to exert control over an agency by resisting 
external influences on that agency via controlling the appointment of the agency head (e.g. 
Woods 2004) and controlling the policy direction for economic development programs by 
serving as the head of their state’s economic development board or commission (e.g. Reinshuttle 
1983).   
These manifestations of institutional capacity are important given that data concerning 
the systematic targeting of economic efforts is either unavailable in any systematic fashion or 
that which is available is often unreliable, with most economic development negotiations held 
behind closed doors without the knowledge of other competing business and governmental actors 
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(e.g. Moss and Upadhyay 1998; Howe and Vallianatos 1998).  As such, much of the prior 
research which attempts to examine specific gubernatorial economic development efforts focuses 
only on a handful of states (e.g. Turner 2003).  This essay thus examines the state economic 
development budget data to illustrate the relationship between a governor’s electoral constraints 
and their capacity to direct economic development spending, given that these allocations provide 
governors with the raw means to engage in economic development efforts (e.g. Bradshaw and 
Blakey 1999) and ultimately influences the state’s ability to affect public policy (e.g. Meier 
1980).   
The governor however does not operate solely within a vacuum, having its capacity 
constrained by the state legislature during the policy development, appropriations, and 
implementations phases (e.g. Osborne 1988; Lampe 1988; Rosenthal 1990; Slavin and Adler 
1996).  Given the separation of powers system, legislatures serve the important role of 
authorizing the laws and appropriations on which a state’s economic development policy design 
and effectiveness is founded (e.g. Heclo 1986).  Further and more importantly, the natural 
partisan tensions which exist during differing compositions of divided government (when the 
governor faces either a unified or divided partisan legislature), constrain the governor’s ability to 
pursue economic development policy (e.g. Dye 1988; Atkinson 1991).  A governor’s own 
political party may further be divided into ideological factions which constrain the base 
legislative support he receives for his efforts (e.g. Jewell 1969; Ransone 1982; Beyle 1983). 
However legislatures often lack the resources and motivation to engage in ex ante 
statutory and ex post nonstatutory control of state bureaucratic entities (e.g. Calvert, McCubbins, 
and Weingast 1989; Huber and Shipan 2000; Huber, Shipan, and Pfahler 2001).  As such, once 
the funds have been allocated to the economic development entity, a governor with sufficient 
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control over the agency is afforded a blank check to pursue their particularistic goals, given that 
the institutionally stronger governors are more successful in directing resources to their state’s 
development agency and  tirelessly work to maintain a higher degree of control over how their 
economic development policies are implemented (e.g. Grady 1988).  Thus, having greater state 
economic development funds at their disposal will allow governors to rationally “shoot at 
everything that flies [and] claim everything that falls” (Rubin 1988, 236), particularly for those 
governors with the greater capacity to direct those funds, vis-à-vis control over the state 
economic development entity. 
 Within the scope of these state economic development budget allocations, this essay 
provides a systematic examination of how the electoral constraints of office compel governors to 
pursue greater growth in these allocations when they have the capacity to direct and implement 
economic development policies in pursuit of short term electoral benefits.  To be exact, I claim 
that the differences in behavior between governors possessing varying levels of control over their 
state’s economic development agency, in the form of unfettered appointment power of economic 
development agency heads and their control of the state’s economic development 
board/commission/council, results in greater growth in state economic entity funding.  This 
behavior should be less acute when the governor lacks the motivate, the electoral insecurity, to 
engage in this behavior. 
The remainder of the essay is outlined as follows. I first examine the efforts by governors 
in the American states to create jobs and improve state macroeconomic conditions through state 
economic development.  I next examine why governors should desire greater financial resources 
at their disposal for generating economic growth in their state (the Goal), how these funds are 
appropriated and in what manner (the Process), and how having greater control over how to 
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spend these funds functions in meaningful ways (the Role of Institutional Capacity).  The 
following two sections cover issues relating to the data and variables, and further, the statistical 
results from the empirical analysis. I end by discussing the policymaking implications of 
executive authority in a separation of powers system. 
3.1  Historic Efforts by States to Spur Economic Development 
All levels of government are concerned with the overall economic health of the areas they 
govern.  However, economic policy is a moving target, one which governments continually 
search for new tools and policy formulas to garner greater control of their economic destinies 
(e.g. Waits 1998).  The role of a state government “is to make basic strategic choices to guide 
state efforts to encourage investment, to establish elements of the business climate such as a tax 
and regulatory system, to provide specific development assistance and incentives … [and] to 
strike deals with business firms and entrepreneurs, [thus] creating public-private partnerships” 
(Eisinger 1998, 95-96).  Yet, state governments 1) do not possess the multitude of tools available 
to the federal government for affecting economic growth, 2) are sharply limited by the federal 
Constitution and the Interstate Commerce Clause from regulating economic activity to any large 
degree, and 3) because of balanced budget requirements, face different fiscal constraints 
compared to the federal level where states must either increase taxes or cut spending from other 
areas to pay for the means to influence their economic destinies (e.g. Cooper 2011).   
Given the lack of tools available to state governments, prior to the 1960’s the states took 
a neutral role toward influencing economic growth.  As such, through 3 waves of change in state 
economic development strategies, the American states altered the ways in which they engage in 
economic development within their boundaries and in competition with one another.  The first 
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wave of state economic development change began in the mid-1960’s as the prevailing attitude 
concerning the relationship between economic activity and state tax revenues and expenditures 
shifted (Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations 1967), bringing with it the idea 
of attracting firms from the old industrial areas to growing regions by offering subsidized loans 
or direct payments to firms for relocation expenses, tax reductions, subsidies for the cost of plant 
facilities or utilities, and competitive and expensive industrial recruitment programs (e.g. 
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations 1967; Cobb 1982; Chi 1994), beginning a 
war for economic development between the states (e.g. Chi and Hofmann 2000; Markusen and 
Nesse 2007).   
As this state economic development competition escalated, the second wave began in the 
early 1980s, with the states shifting their focus from attracting out-of-state firms to retaining and 
expanding existing firms by offering indirect types of firm-level assistance, such as increasing 
investment capital, developing entrepreneurial incubators, providing technical assistance to help 
local businesses grow or expand, and creating programs which offered capital for small 
businesses, accelerated technology transfers, and expanded workforce-training programs (e.g. 
Ross and Friedman 1990).  This persisted until recently, where the third wave has begun to alter 
state development policies by emphasizing the need to invent new organizational approaches, 
and shifting the focus to local development by creating the context for economic growth through 
public-private partnerships.  These partnerships leverage both capital and human resources in an 
attempt to increase the global competitiveness of a group of strategically linked firms.  These 
new third-wave programs however do not eliminate the first and second wave strategies, but 
rather provides these previous economic development strategies with both a specific purpose and 
focus to the use of these techniques (e.g. Ross and Friedman 1990), with the old industrial 
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recruitment philosophy and financial incentive programs remaining core elements of state 
economic development policies (e.g. Leicht and Jenkins 1994).  For the states, tasked with 
economic development, attracting larges industrial firms offers the potential for enhanced 
employment opportunities and creates economic activity in the areas they are located in during 
both the construction and operational phases.   
The role and evolution of state economic development efforts highlighted by this essay, 
while interesting on their own, is of importance given the various concerns raised by critics of 
fiscal incentives.  These critics argue that 1) smokestack chasing has very little effect on the 
locational decisions of firms (e.g. U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations 
1967; Wolman 1988; Smith and Fox 1990; Grant, Wallace, and Pitney 1995; Fisher and Peters 
1997), 2) financial incentives and programs have had very little actual effect on the 
macroeconomic health of the state (e.g. Hansen 1984; Ambrosius 1989; Kolko 2010), 3) 
programs enacted do not always produce their intended results (e.g. Jacobs 1979; Aulde 1980) 
with costs often exceeding their benefits (e.g. Burstein and Rolnick 1995; Buchholz 1999; Bartik 
2005), and 4) the competition between the states resulting from this behavior produces a race to 
the bottom among the states and produces no economic benefits for the nation as a whole (e.g. 
Burstein and Rolnick 1995; Zimmerman 1996; Mattera, Cafcas, McIlvaine, Seifter, and 
Tarczynska 2011).  The persistence and recent growth of industrial recruitment policies is 
puzzling given these detrimental effects (e.g. Lynch 1995; Peters and Fisher 2004).   
Further, some governors may not prioritize economic development efforts as highly as 
others, yet they are often compelled to engage in these efforts in response to nearby state 
competitors (e.g. Minnesota Office of the Legislative Auditor 1996; Patrick 2015).  As addressed 
above, states often must engage in bidding wars with their competitor states to avoid losing a 
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beneficial industrial development or relocation which could ultimately disadvantage their state 
compared to the winner of the bid.  Further, a governor may need to devote significant resources 
to retaining various industries in their state which are at risk of poaching by competitor states.  
Thus, these states must adopt specific economic development provisions in response to 
neighboring state competition and in response to financial crises (e.g. Benmelech and Moskowitz 
2010).  This behavior is best viewed as a diffusion effect whereby economic development policy 
efforts in a neighboring state can influence the outcomes and behavior in the focal state (e.g. 
Berry and Kaserman 1993; Lovett 2014), ultimately manifesting in 3 different forms: 1) states 
learn from each other, borrowing successful innovations and efforts, 2) states compete with each 
other, and 3) states respond to public pressure for new policies which they see as successful in 
other states. (e.g. Berry and Berry 1999).   
Yet, while these critiques paint a gloomy picture for economic development 
policymaking in the American states, despite their questionable effectiveness and motivation, 
state financial incentives remain politically desirable and are widely used (e.g. Litvak and 
Daniels 1983; Rubin and Zorn 1985; Wasylenko and McGuire 1985; Grady 1987; Wilson 1993).  
This essay provides a possible answer to this puzzle grounded in both the motivations and means 
by which governors choose to devote their scarce time and resources toward engaging in this 
behavior.  This is particularly important given the emphasis that some governors who are both 
sufficiently motivated and empowered, as illustrated in the prior anecdote, place on these efforts.   
The following section thus discusses why governors choose to devote state resources 
toward engaging in these efforts despite their efficacy as discussed above, how and the manner in 
which these resources are appropriated and dispersed, and how the capacity of both governors 
and their legislative counterparts influences this process. 
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3.2  Economic Development: the Goal, the Process, and the Role of Institutional Capacity 
It is commonly believed that politicians make decisions that further their own political interests 
rather than their constituents’ economic interests (e.g. Schweke, Rist, and Dabson 1994).  This 
essay advances a theory of gubernatorial behavior within the political economy of economic 
development programs whereby these elected officials operate in a private enterprise market-
oriented society in which they make numerous economic decisions which affect the local 
economy (e.g. Lindblom 1977).  While early studies indicated that gubernatorial elections were 
largely referenda on the incumbent President’s economic policy performance (e.g. Chubb 1988; 
Simon 1989), the literature now suggests that state macroeconomic conditions significantly 
impact these elections (e.g. Atkeson and Partin 1995; Leyden and Borrelli 1995; Carsey and 
Wright 1998).  Economic conditions have risen to a point of prominence for governors’ 
reelection bids, and as such, politicians who are concerned with their reelection will stress the 
macroeconomic implications of their economic policies (e.g. Alesina and Cukierman 1990; 
Rogoff 1990).  Because of this, governors devote significant energy recruiting businesses, 
promoting economic development, and creating jobs (e.g. Fosler 1988) as a short term political 
strategy that increases the number of votes a governor receives in the subsequent election (e.g. 
Eisinger 1995; Turner, Fleming and Kaufman 2005). 
However, as the above discussion details, critics of the efficacy of economic development 
policies argue that the they have a modest effect on the economic growth of a small region such 
as a state (e.g. Barkik 1991; Lowery and Gray 1992; Brace 1994).  Ultimately, governors have 
little power to influence employment and income, as it falls upon the businesses to choose the 
locations for their economic activity, their levels of investment and technology employed, both 
the number and kinds of workers hired, and the projects and services they produce (e.g. 
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Lindblom 1977; Elkin 1987).  However, voters are uncertain about the optimal economic policy, 
as well as the incumbent’s beliefs about the optimal policy, and as such, this allows the 
incumbent to manipulate policy for their reelection purposes (e.g. Harrington 1993).  This 
uncertainty surrounding economic policy compels governors to pursue a rational strategy 
whereby they “shoot at everything that flies, claim everything that falls” (Rubin 1988, 236), such 
that while economic development policies may have modest actual impact, they do satisfy the 
political need to do something to address voters’ concerns.  
What emerges then is a view where the electoral requirements of public office lead 
governors to act in ways inconsistent with achieving the explicit goals of encouraging actual 
economic growth or redistributing growth to distressed areas and to low-income individuals (e.g. 
Lindblom 1977).  Because of this little to modest effect, economic development policies are 
often viewed as being important to governors for their symbolic content (e.g. Wolman 1988).   
Economic development policies serve as a form of symbolic reassurance (e.g. Swanstrom 1985), 
which are evaluated by voters for their political rather than economic impact since they allow 
elected officials to appear active in promoting the state’s economic development and to claim 
credit for creating jobs (e.g. Burnier 1992).  Where unemployment and low incomes are 
concerns, economic development programs are invaluable for quickly delivering this symbolic 
reassurance (e.g. Wolman 1988).  Elected officials select highly visible activities which lend 
themselves to political announcements and groundbreaking ceremonies, rather than programs 
which are less visible or slow to show results which may actually impact the state’s 
macroeconomic conditions (e.g. Dewar and Hagenlocker 1996).  These efforts are newsworthy 
and highly salient, allowing the elected official to take credit for delivering funds that the 
constituents believe will increase employment, thus giving symbolic importance to economic 
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development efforts no matter what their actual effect (e.g. Swanstrom 1985; Rubin 1988; 
Wolman 1988; Accordino 1994). 
This narrative in which economic development policies are examined in political terms is 
consistent with the literature concerning political business cycles whereby Presidents attempt to 
spur economic expansions during election years.  While these actors cannot easily influence 
macroeconomic outcomes (e.g. Tufte 1978; Hibbs 1987; Nordaus 1989), they are able to award 
key government contracts prior to the election events to prime the economy (e.g. Mayer 1991, 
1995).  Despite the uncertainty and minimal economic impact, governors, like their presidential 
counterparts, see employing their control over the state economic development entity to engage 
in economic development efforts and deliver benefits to politically important regions as an 
attractive short term political strategy (e.g. Turner 2003).  However, a political actor’s propensity 
to manipulate of the economy may be governed by how they view their electoral security, 
manifesting as either the uncertainty of the election results (e.g. Schultz 1995) or their electoral 
prospects (e.g. Price 1998).  Together, a governor may be more or less likely to engage in this 
particularistic behavior given how they view their own electoral security.  
 Yet, it should be noted that elected officials are cautious and highly protective in 
maintaining their position. Many have witnessed colleagues, who by most objective indicators 
were believed to be electorally secure, suddenly lose their reelection bids.  As Fenno (1978) 
observes, “(n)o matter how secure their electoral circumstances may seem, [elected officials] can 
always find reasons to feel insecure.”  As such, even if there is little threat of defeat or facing a 
(quality)challenger (e.g. Goldenberg, Traugott, and Baumgartner 1986; Krasno and Green 1988; 
Van Dunk 1997; and Bardwell 2002), incumbent elected officials often act as if they are insecure 
in their position (e.g Fenno 1978).  Further, this behavior often occurs as many elected officials 
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are highly protective of their image in office as they harbor future progressive ambition and may 
someday be evaluated upon how they performed while in their previous elected position (e.g. 
Krause and Melusky 2014). 
Related to these electoral and political motivations, governors, like all political actors, 
can attempt to use their position of authority to reward political allies and punish political 
adversaries.  This opportunistic behavior has often been seen in the context of natural disasters, 
with governors rewarding electorally important or politically loyal areas with timely response 
efforts directing money and resources in the wake of recent disasters (e.g. Cray 2005; Gasper and 
Reeves 2015).  Given the magnitude of the grants and resources available, as well as the 
discretion often afforded the governors to direct these funds, economic development efforts are 
not immune to the attempts by governors to engage in favoritism or cronyism to benefit political 
allies and campaign donors (e.g. Burns and Thomas 2004; Hart 2008).  Favoritism/cronyism can 
manifest in governors awarding or directing economic development funds to: electorally loyal 
areas of the state, areas which are viewed as politically/electorally important in future electoral 
contests due to prior levels of electoral support, and areas or businesses which are controlled by 
political allies or campaign contributors.  Often distributing many of these rewards through the 
creation of state economic development “public-private partnerships,” governors have embroiled 
their states in economic development scandals involving the misuse of taxpayer funds, conflicts 
of interest, excessive executive pay and bonuses, questionable subsidy awards, exaggerated job-
creation claims, lack of public disclosure of key records, and other accountability abuses (e.g. 
LeRoy, Cafcas, McIlvaine, Tarczynska, and Mattera 2013).  While governors can use their 
control over the economic development efforts of the state to hand out favors to their friends and 
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campaign donors, due to data availability as discussed below, the analysis in this dissertation 
chapter is unable to directly examine this behavior.  
So then with this goal for their economic development efforts firmly planted in the minds 
of governors, what then is the process by which economic development policies and more 
importantly resources are developed and dispersed?  In the American states, both governors and 
the state legislatures share responsibility and authority for developing and enacting public policy 
(e.g. Rosenthal 1990) and economic development policies are no exception.53  After making their 
legislative proposals regarding economic development policy (e.g. Taylor 2008), the governor’s 
office drafts and introduces bills to the legislature.  After being introduced, the governor, vis-à-
vis his legislative liaison staff, works closely with the chamber leaders and various individual 
legislators to ensure that the bills are shepherded through each step of the legislative process.  
However, at each step of this process, legislators are provided the opportunity to oppose the 
governor’s economic development policy proposals by either amending the bills in ways which 
make them unacceptable to the governor or serve as veto points blocking their progress and 
passage (e.g. Slavin and Adler 1996).  Should the governor be successful in securing passage of 
their economic development policies, the legislature retains the ability to prevent or reduce the 
appropriations required to implement them.  Further, within the implementation phase of the 
economic development policy, the legislature can attempt to influence the economic 
development entity which is tasked with administering the particular program (e.g. Rosenthal 
1990; Slavin and Adler 1996). 
The economic development policies which are enacted by the legislature and 
implemented by the governor can be divided into 2 categories: direct and indirect. Direct 
                                                           
53
 However the actual ability of either actor to do so varies by state given the varying levels of constraint placed 
upon them by the other actors – as determined by their institutional capacity, which will be discussed in greater 
detail below. 
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policies of those which provide assistance to businesses and industries through monetary forms 
such as financial incentives or services like job training.  Indirect policies are those which 
involve investments which achieve a broader purpose and typically are evaluated through a 
broader lens, such as public schools (e.g. Bartik 1991).  Of these categories, cash or near-cash 
assistance provided on a discretionary basis to attract or retain business operations owned by 
large businesses provides the basis for the total resources devoted to economic development (e.g 
Bartik, Eisinger, and Erickcek 2003).  
 Of the efforts in the various waves of economic development detailed above, governors 
have moved away from using tax incentives as their main form of economic development policy 
for a multitude of reasons.  First, tax incentives are of modest importance to many businesses 
because of the risk that future legislatures may withdraw them or make changes to the state’s tax 
code (e.g. Pomp 1985).  Further, immigrating businesses are protective of their image and 
concerned with being labeled as freeloaders and bullies (e.g. Stolz 1986).  Second, in moving 
away from tax-base incentive programs to non-tax programs, governors began to pursue 
incentives to attract and retain large businesses which included customized services such as job 
training, direct loan programs, expedited infrastructure financing, information on potential sites, 
and assistance with state or local regulations (e.g. Bartik 2007).  These programs were more 
amenable than tax-based incentives because public officials could justify the non-tax incentives 
as investments in the productive capacity of their state (e.g. Waits 1998), thus avoiding many of 
the political problems associated with tax incentives (e.g. Salisbury 1986; Whereatt, 1986; Levy 
1990).  Further, these programs have greater accountability given that costs are fixed at the front-
end, and concerns over the equitability of the efforts are lessened because a larger group of 
existing businesses can benefit from the infrastructure improvements and a well-trained labor 
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pool (e.g. Kolesar 1990).  Third, the government sets precedent when it grants tax incentives, 
such that offering major tax incentives to one existing business leaves it open to demands by 
other existing businesses hoping to receive similar treatment (e.g. Lueck 1987).  Further, states 
fear that failure to offer similar treatment will render them at a competitive disadvantage with 
other states attempting to recruit existing businesses from their state (e.g. Goozner 2000).  
Fourth, tax-based incentives are viewed as revenue foregone (e.g. Kolesar 1990).  This revenue, 
which would have been derived from the taxes extracted from the recipient businesses, must be 
redirected from elsewhere in the form of higher property or sales taxes, or from other program 
funding which leaves the governor open to political retribution for cuts to services (e.g. Enrich 
2002).  Thus, governors often engage in non-tax incentives which are provided directly from the 
state economic development entity, which does not rely on changes to the tax code or the state 
legislature (e.g. Snow 1999).   
Each state has an agency responsible for economic development planning and promotion 
with the policy direction coming from the governor's office or the state economic development 
board/commission/council, and the day –to-day operations being directed by a single individual, 
typically the director/commissioner of economic development (e.g. Reinshuttle 1983).  These 
agencies are responsible for allocating public resources directly to the individual firms and 
corporations, and indirectly through various local development agencies in order to foster 
economic development and enhance their state’s competitive advantage in attracting new 
industry.  However, historically state commerce departments served as the main entity to house 
state economic development programs, though many programs were decentralized under 
numerous other state agencies (e.g. Sparks and Pappas 2012).  State commerce departments 
however were not designed for the economic realities whereby businesses and workers faced 
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rapidly changing markets and technology and greater competition from around the world as well 
as by other states (e.g. Sparks and Pappas 2012).  Realizing the inadequacy of these agencies and 
the historically decentralized nature of state economic development efforts, governors have 
worked to reorganize, stream-line, and consolidate exclusive or primary responsibility for state 
economic development efforts under a singular state entity with the sole mission of fostering the 
growth and development of their state’s economy (e.g. Reinshuttle 1983; Sparks and Pappas 
2012).54  Regardless of the name, size, or form, in terms of comparability, all state economic 
development entities are engaged in similar functions:  1) planning and initiating development 
programs, 2) coordination of state development activities, 3) provisioning information services, 
4) provisioning technical and other direct services, 5) provisioning financial assistance, 6) 
coordinating overseas development activities, 7) researching and promotion (e.g. Reinshuttle 
1983; Clarke 1986). 
The formal institutional powers of a governor can influence the operation of state 
agencies (e.g. Beyle 1968; Dometrius 1979; Schlesinger 1965).  Governors derive their influence 
over the policy process from their role as both chief legislator, vis-à-vis their ability to propose 
and secure the passage of legislation, and the role as head of the state bureaucracy, vis-à-vis their 
managerial role in overseeing program implementation  (e.g. Bernick and Wiggins 1991; 
Raymond 1991).  Both formulating and implementing state economic development policy 
requires a high degree of executive capacity (e.g Heclo 1986).  States which possess strong 
gubernatorial leadership are more likely to develop and aggressively pursue effective economic 
development policy than states with high levels of legislative involvement (e.g. Atkinson 1991; 
                                                           
54
 In New York, state economic development is directed through two distinct entities the Department of Economic 
Development and the Empire State Development Corporation, however both are headed by the Commissioner of 
Economic Development and share senior managers who oversee administration, policy formulation and research, 
as well as regional office operations. 
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Brace 1994).  These institutionally powerful officeholders can respond more forcefully and more 
quickly to economic conditions than can office holders in institutionally less powerful states (e.g. 
Brace 1994).  In this essay, the institutional capacity of a governor is considered their ability to 
direct how the funds of the state’s economic development agency are spent vis-à-vis their control 
over the state’s economic development agency.  The constitutional powers which translate into a 
governor’s institutional capacity specifically concern a governor’s ability to exert control over an 
agency by resisting external influences on that agency (e.g. Woods 2004) via controlling the 
agency head who carries out a broad range of management and policymaking functions, 
effectively extending their reach and influence over the agency (e.g. National Governor’s 
Association 2010) and over career staff instrumental in enacting policy. 
Gubernatorial control over the direction of a state’s economic development agency 
manifests in two forms.  First, surveys of state departmental administrators have consistently 
indicated that a governor’s ability to appoint an agency head is perceived to be an important 
source of gubernatorial influence over that state agency (e.g. Abney and Lauth 1983; Dometrius 
2002).  This appointment authority serves to break legislative-bureaucratic alliances by placing 
individuals who share the governor’s goals and policy agenda into key administrative positions 
where they can provide governors with influence over policy development and implementation, 
as well as the regulatory decisions made by the state agencies (e.g. Wright 1967; Hebert, 
Brudney, and Wright 1983; Ferguson 2003).  Thus, the ability to appoint the head of the state’s 
economic development entity, without interference by nomination/confirmation constraints, 
provides governors effective control over that entity.  Second, directing the state’s development 
efforts, setting policy direction and economic development spending, is sometimes controlled by 
an economic development board/commission/council.  These entities are often composed of 
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various state elected and non-elected officials from the executive and legislative branches, as 
well as business sector professionals.  In some states, the governor serves as the head of these 
entities, providing that governor the means to directly control the economic development efforts 
of the state (e.g. Reinshuttle 1983).  Table 3.1 below provides a listing of the states where the 
governors possess each form of economic development institutional capacity: 
 
Table 3.1: Economic Development Institutional Capacity  
in the American States (AY 2000-2009) 
 
Governor Possesses  
Unfettered Appointment 
Authority 
Governor Serves as Head of 
State Economic Development 
Board/Commission/Council 
Governor Possesses  
Neither Form of  
Economic Development  
Institutional Capacity 
AL, CO, FL, IN,  
MA, NC, ND, NJ,  
SD (2000-2002), TN,  
TX (2003-2009), 
UT, VT, WI,  
WV (2000-2004) 
GA, IA, KY, MI, SC, 
TX (2000-2002), VA, WY 
AK, AR, AZ, CA, CT, DE, HI, 
ID, IL, KS, LA, MD, ME, MN, 
MO, MS, MT, NE, NH, NM, 
NV, NY, OH, OK, OR, PA, 
RI, SD (2003-2009), WA,  
WV (2005-2009),  
Notes: 1) In 2003, South Dakota’s economic development authority was transitioned from within the Governor’s 
Office of Economic Development into the Department of Tourism and Economic Development;2) In 2003 Texas’s 
economic development authority was moved from the Texas Department of Economic Development to within the 
governor’s executive office as the Office of the Governor: Economic Development and Tourism Division; 3) The 
state’s economic development entity was moved into the Department of Commerce upon its creation in 2005. 
 
 
As observed in the above table, in 15 states the governors possesses the authority to 
unilaterally appoint the head of their state’s economic development entity, whereas in 8 states the 
governors serve as the head of their state’s economic development board/commission/council. In 
no state does a governor possess both manifestations of economic development institutional 
capacity.  Within the sample period of this analysis (FY2001-FY2010), there was little change in 
the institutional capacity within the states, as such, exhibiting little within state variation and 
more between state variation.  Historically, as discussed above, changes to this authority have 
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occurred during periods of economic development office/departmental reorganization or with the 
emergence of economic development boards/commissions/councils, often increasing the 
governor’s authority in response to state economic downturn or interstate competition. 
As such, governors vary in their ability to engage in economic development activities 
(e.g. Schlesinger 1971; Mueller 1985; and Beyle and Ferguson 2008).  When compared with 
their federal counterparts who possess a more formalized macroeconomic policymaking 
responsibility, the constitutional and statutory responsibility for promoting state economic 
growth and investment within the state economy is less formalized and varies among the states 
(e.g. Grady 1991).  Though, governors who are afforded greater formal powers are more likely to 
utilize a wide variety of economic development policies (e.g. Ambrosius 1989).  Since the 
1960’s, the trend has been to place the state planning agency in close proximity to the governor, 
either directly in his office or in his fiscal management arm – departments of administration or 
finance (e.g. Beyle and Wright 1972).  Further, there is variation in their perceived effectiveness 
by the governors themselves concerning their ability to pursue economic development efforts 
(e.g. Grady 1989).  While some governors possess the authority to propose and implement a 
development agenda, others are forced to bargain with other state policy leaders (e.g. Grady 
1991). 
As the above discussion reveals, the development and implementation of economic 
development policy is benefited by strong gubernatorial capacity given the need to negotiate 
between industries and governmental entities, provide planning and technical analysis, and serve 
as a singular point for the delivery government resources.  Yet, it is well established in the 
literature that the governor does not operate solely within a vacuum, rather having its capacity 
constrained by the legislative branch when pursuing economic development efforts (e.g. Osborne 
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1988; Lampe 1988).  Given the separation of powers system, legislatures serve the important role 
of authorizing the laws and appropriations on which a state’s economic development policy 
design and effectiveness is founded (e.g. Heclo 1986).  Within this process, legislatures are not 
limited to only considering the economic development proposals advanced by the governor, 
rather, they have their own economic development policy agendas and initiate many policy 
proposals (e.g. Rosenthal 1990). 
 How then do legislatures specifically constrain governors economic development efforts?  
First, since legislators are concerned with bringing pork-barrel projects back to their district 
based constituencies, they oppose gubernatorial initiatives which threaten their ability to deliver 
(e.g. Rosenthal 1990; Atkinson 1991; Slavin and Adler 1996) and announce the awarding of the 
pork via the “politics of announcement,” which establishes their reputation as one who can 
deliver for the district and builds political support across party lines and ideologies (e.g. Stone 
and Sanders 1987: 178; Hanson 1989).  Second, the legislature’s ability to deliver constituent 
dispensations relies on carefully developed relationships between the legislative committees and 
the associated administrative agencies. As such, legislators will oppose gubernatorial efforts 
which attempt to encroach upon and supplant these relationships (e.g. Bernick and Wiggins 
1991).  Third, the natural partisan tensions which exist during differing compositions of divided 
government constrain the governor’s ability to pursue economic development policy (e.g. Dye 
1988; Atkinson 1991).  A governor’s own political party when divided into ideological factions 
can constrain the base legislative support they received for their proposals (e.g. Jewell 1969; 
Ransone 1982; Beyle 1983).  The logical implication of the above discussion concerning 
governors who are insecure in their reelection prospects is that they could potentially harm the 
state by wasting state funds in pursuit of short-term electoral benefits.  Ultimately, these 
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legislative constraints on governors afford state legislatures the ability to serve as powerful ex-
ante checks upon governors from engaging in potentially wasteful and self-serving economic 
development spending.55   
 While most explanations for the development and growth of certain policy areas imply 
strong, well-informed policy committees dedicated to pursing the agenda through the chamber, 
when it comes to economic development policy this is not accurate (e.g. Advisory Commission 
on Intergovernmental Relations 1981).  Economic development policy is often a result of 
ignorance rather than information since the modest effect of financial incentives allows the 
policymakers the freedom to follow personal advice, intuition, and inclination (e.g. Advisory 
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations 1981; Dewar 1986).  Conversely, a more 
professional legislature when presented with proposed financial incentives, which may cost the 
state more in foregone revenue than it could hope to recoup in future taxes, should weight the 
evidence carefully and refuse to enact the incentive (e.g. Grady 1987).  Taken together, more 
professional state legislatures can constrain the economic development efforts of these 
electorally dependent governors. 
The institutional capacity of a governor to direct their state’s economic development 
entity is brought to bear because of the electoral requirements of their office which compel them 
to attempt to influence the macroeconomic environment through economic development efforts 
which generate more symbolic rather than actual effects.  Optimally, evaluating the role of 
institutional capacity given a governor’s electoral constraints would be done by comparatively 
                                                           
55
 A governor’s ability to harm the state through this spending behavior should be taken with some caution for 2 
reasons. First,  they are naturally constrained in the amount of harm they can cause by the percentage of the 
overall state budget which economic development entity appropriations composes.  Second, the prior literature 
suggests that because legislators possess strong electoral incentives to deliver particularistic benefits to their 
constituents without having to incur individual-level accountability for their policy actions, legislatures prefer a 
higher level of spending than compared to elected executives (e.g. Fitts and Inman 1992; Hallerberg and Marier 
2004).  As such, executives are often viewed as the political actor tasked with limiting fiscal-spending growth. 
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examining the specific efforts undertaken by governors.  However, systematic data concerning 
the targeting of these gubernatorial efforts at economic development is either unavailable in any 
systematic fashion or that which is available is often too unreliable.  Further, most economic 
development negotiations are held behind closed doors without the knowledge of other 
competing business and governmental actors (e.g. Moss and Upadhyay 1998; Howe and 
Vallianatos 1998).  As such, much of the prior research which attempts to examine specific 
gubernatorial economic development efforts focuses only on a handful of states (e.g. Turner 
2003).  Because of the limited and nonsystematic availability of economic development data, this 
essay thus examines the state economic development entity budget data to illustrate the 
relationship between a governor’s electoral constraints and their capacity to direct economic 
development spending.     
Yet, is it reasonable to assume that changes to economic development entity budgetary 
allocations reflect a governor’s electoral and political priorities? For governors, state budget 
allocations provide governors with the raw means to engage in economic development efforts, 
and these budget allocations are indicative of the type and direction of state policy and the 
emphasis the state puts on economic development activities (e.g. Bradshaw and Blakey 1999).  
When making budgetary requests, elected agency heads from the governor’s political party 
typically receive greater support, whereas elected officials from the opposition party of the 
governor do not receive the additional gubernatorial support for budget requests or growth (e.g. 
Clarke 1997).  Agency requests in terms of both short-term success (approval of the current 
year’s request) and long-term success (expansion over the previous year’s budget) are linked to a 
governor’s support (e.g. Wright 1967; Sharkansky 1968; Lauth 1984).  Ultimately, the support 
an agency receives influences its ability to affect public policy (e.g. Meier 1980).  Institutionally 
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stronger governors are more successful in directing resources to their state’s development agency 
and work to maintain a higher degree of control over how their economic development policies 
are implemented (e.g. Grady 1988).  Thus, having greater state economic development funds at 
their disposal will allow governors to rationally “shoot at everything that flies, claim everything 
that falls” (Rubin 1988, 236), particularly for those governors with the greater capacity to direct 
those funds, vis-à-vis control over the state economic development entity. 
 While changes in overall state spending, which include the growth in state economic 
development allocations, are well explained by general theories of public budgeting, most do not 
consider whether political actors have both the motivation and means to decide how specific 
funds are spent after the budget is enacted.  Because governors (and state legislatures) are 1) 
constrained by a scarcity of time and resources when developing a budget, 2) limited in both the 
amount and areas of the budget which they can extract budgetary concessions from their political 
counterparts and rivals, and 3) aware of the modest impact of economic development spending 
on actual macroeconomic changes, the growth in the budgetary allocations for the state’s 
economic development entity should be pursued by those actors who are sufficiently motivated 
and possess the means to actually direct the funds in pursuit of short-term electoral and political 
goals.  Thus, the growth in a state’s economic development entity appropriations provides the 
only systematic means available to examine the relationship between a governor’s electoral 
constraints and their capacity to direct economic development spending.  
 In considering the funds provided by the state for economic development efforts, prior to 
the 1960’s, only a handful of pioneering states and cities devoted significant funds toward 
attracting private investment and job creation (e.g. Eisinger 2002).  Because of the historical 
expansion of state economic development activities addressed above, and the importance that 
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governors place upon these efforts, today the 50 American states and the District of Columbia 
together spend billions of dollars each year on state economic development.  The precise amount 
specifically spent each year on economic development efforts however is unknown because 
many states do not regularly and reliably report such information (e.g. Pew Charitable Trusts 
2015).  Some limited surveys of specific economic development efforts have provided estimates 
of state spending.  Considering only major tax incentives, one aspect of state economic 
development entity spending, the combined costs exceed $9 billion per year, whereas 
considering incentives only for the film industry, the states spend about $1.3 billion per year (e.g. 
Henchman 2011; Pew Charitable Trusts 2015).  As such, the only systematic data available 
concerns the total budgetary appropriations allocated to each state’s economic development 
entity.  Across the sample period in the analysis below, states on average spent $94,706,860.71 
($24.18 per capita) each year.  While these raw appropriations in levels are interesting, only by 
considering the growth in the appropriations from one year to the next, can the relationships of 
interest be examined. 
Taken together, some governors may be more successful than others in directing state 
economic development efforts. As such it is expected that: 
Hypothesis 1a: States where governors can appoint their state’s economic development 
entity head, unconstrained by confirmations or approval requirements from other actors, 
will exhibit greater growth in that entity’s budget compared to states where governors lack 
this authority. 
Hypothesis 1b: States where governors serve as the head of the state’s economic 
development board/commission/council will exhibit greater growth in the state’s economic 
development entity budget compared to states where governors lack this authority. 
I expect the above hypotheses given that formal institutional capacity, vis-à-vis control over the 
appointment of their state’s economic development entity head or serving as the head of the 
state’s economic development board/commission/council, provides the governor with the ability 
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to direct how the money appropriated to the state’s economic development entity is spent.  
Having this increased authority affords the governor, compared to those governors who lack 
either form of economic development institutional capacity, a means by which he/she can engage 
in particularistic economic development efforts in pursuit of short term electoral benefits (e.g. 
Turner 2003).  Thus, these institutionally empowered governors should desire increased growth 
in their state’s economic development allocations as these funds afford them a greater ability to 
engage in economic development activities in pursuit of their electoral and political goals.  
Voters have been shown to evaluate governors in reference to their office’s “functional 
responsibilities,” expecting governors to provide for the state’s education, highways, and most 
importantly, prosperity (e.g. Atkeson and Partin 1995, 2001; Arceneaux 2006).  Numerous 
studies have found that state economic variables affect gubernatorial approval (e.g. Atkeson and 
Partin 1995; Niemi, Stanley, and Vogel 1995; Jacobson 2006).56  These governors who are held 
accountable for their state’s economy, are thus dependent on the electoral resources to remain in 
power and advance their agenda.  As such, those governors which are concerned with their 
electoral prospects should act as opportunists engaging in economic development efforts in 
pursuit of reelection (e.g. Besley and Case 1995; Lowry, Alt, and Ferree 1998; Gasper and 
Reeves 2015).   
Taken together, given that governors are held accountable for stimulating economic 
development and job creation, and that governors who are afforded greater formal powers are 
more likely to utilize a wide variety of economic development policies (e.g. Ambrosius 1989), it 
is expected that: 
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 Although some studies have found mixed evidence (e.g. Peltzman 1987; Stein 1990; Leyden and Borrelli 1995; 
Crew and Weiher 1996; Ebeid and Rodden 2006). 
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Hypothesis 1c: The effect of a governor’s authority to solely appoint their state’s economic 
development entity head on the growth in that entity’s budget should be less pronounced 
when they are more electorally secure in their electoral prospects. 
Hypothesis 1d: The effect of a governor’s authority to serve as the head of the state’s 
economic development board/commission/council on the growth in that entity’s budget 
should be less pronounced when they are more electorally secure in their electoral 
prospects. 
As discussed above, even those political actors who face little threat of electoral challenge or 
reelection defeat may act as though they see themselves as insecure in their position (e.g. Fenno 
1978).  However, I expect the above hypotheses given that while these governors have the means 
(the institutional capacity to direct economic development spending), they lack the compelling 
motivation and need to do such (electoral insecurity).  This is because governors are limited in 
which actions they prioritize and engage in by both time and resources.  Because the actual effect 
of economic development policies is often minimal (e.g. Peters and Fisher 2004) and because 
electorally secure governors can pursue their main political and policy goals through budgetary 
negotiations against a constraining legislature (e.g. Osborne 1988; Lampe 1988; Rosenthal 1990; 
Slavin and Adler 1996), ultimately these governors should have less of a need and desire to grow 
their state’s economic development entity budget necessary to engage in manipulate of the 
state’s economy, compared to governors who are uncertain of the election results (e.g. Schultz 
1995) or their electoral prospects (e.g. Price 1998). 
The next section details the data, hypotheses, and statistical methods used to test the 
proposition that unfettered gubernatorial control over a state’s economic development agency 
should exert a positive influence on the growth of agency’s budget appropriation. 
3.3  Data and Methods 
To examine how gubernatorial institutional capacity influences the growth in economic 
development agency funding, this analysis considers state economic development agency 
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budgets from FY 2001 (AY 2000) to FY 2010 (AY 2009).57  The budgets are the real total 
allocation per capita provided to the state economic development agency in a given fiscal year.58  
Because federal funds are typically provided to states in the form of grants with associated 
restrictions (e.g. CDBG, SBA, HUD grants) and given that not all states employ their state 
economic development agency as the office responsible for handling federal funds (e.g. Grady 
1988), these federal funds are subtracted from the total appropriations.  To examine the change 
in economic development agency funding from one fiscal year to the next, the analysis employs 
the dependent variable, Annual Real State Economic Development Funds Growth.  This 
variable is computed as (ln[Yi t]—ln[Yi t-1])*100, where Y represents the level of real state 
government budget allocations per capita for the economic development entity in state i in fiscal 
year t (t–1).59  Positive values indicate inflation-adjusted economic development agency 
spending growth, whereas, negative values indicate inflation-adjusted economic development 
entity spending cuts. Mean = 0.62, Min= -353.41, Max= 284.73, SD= 45.99.60,61 
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 The time period for this analysis was dependent on the emergence of singular state economic development 
entities due to reorganization and consolidation efforts by governors. 
58
 Data taken from various state sources including state budget documents and fiscal publications. This series is 
adjusted for inflation by the implicit price deflator (Index: 2005=100) from the Gross Domestic Product: Implicit 
Price Deflator series in the St. Louis Federal Reserve Database that can be located at 
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/GDPDEF?cid521). 
59
 An average growth rate for a particular period is typically specified in period-to-period growth margins and 
computed as the difference between the Current Period and Previous Period values divided by either the Current 
Period or Previous Period value. This can lead to considerable problems if average growth rates are calculated for 
times-series data with strongly pronounced fluctuations. As such, this standard approach (see for example 
Kirchgässner, Wolters, and Hassler 2012: 5-8; Hans Frances, van Dijk, and Opschoor 2014: 172-175; Kočenda and 
Cerný 2014: 19-21) to constructing a continuous growth rate for time-series data, which is less sensitive to false 
fluctuations from large year-to-year changes, is employed. 
60
 The plotted kernel density estimate presented in Figure B.1 located in Appendix B provides an illustration of the 
distribution of the dependent variable in this analysis. 
61
 It should be noted that the minimum and maximum values for the dependent variable are rather large in 
magnitude. These values are associated with structural changes to the economic development entity in Indiana 
2002-2005.  To examine whether these outlier values are driving the main analysis below, supplemental analysis 
was conducted by omitted these outlier values, the results of which are found in Table B.1 located in Appendix B. 
Given that there was little change in the results across model specifications, rather than deleting relevant data, the 
main analysis below includes these observations from Indiana. 
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A governor’s ability to control the economic development agency efforts is captured by 
two binary indicators.62  The first measure concerns a governor’s power to appoint the economic 
development agency head unfettered by needing approval from another institutional actor, 
Governor Solo Appointment Authority (+) (N=125, 25.99%).63,64  Akin to Beyle’s 1988 
Appointment Powers index, state’s were initially coded as: Governor’s appointment with no 
other approval needed; Governor’s cabinet appointment with governor’s approval; Governor's 
appointment with board, council or legislative approval; Governor’s cabinet appointment without 
governor’s approval; Board appointment with gubernatorial approval, or governor and legislative 
approval; Board appointment with no gubernatorial approval, civil service appointment or 
agency head appointment with board approval; Legislative appointment; and Official elected by 
popular vote.  From this initial coding, the indicator was further refined and coded 1 in states 
where governors make appointments without need for approval,65 and 0 otherwise. 
The second measure concerns the fact that governors who face within-branch rivals are 
uniquely disadvantaged in their efforts to manage the executive branch (e.g. Bowman, Woods, 
and Stark 2010).  Policy direction for economic development programs typically comes from a 
governor’s office, but this role is sometimes vested in a state economic development 
board/commission/council which is employed to direct the state’s development efforts (e.g. 
Reinshuttle 1983).  While 16 states currently have some form of economic development board or 
commission, variation exists in the degree of control over this entity enjoyed by the governor.  
As such, Control of Economic Development Board/Commission/Council (+) (N=73, 15.18%) 
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 Descriptive statistics for the following variables can be found in Table B.2 located in Appendix B. 
63
 Data for this variable were taken from the Book of the States (various years), various state documentation from 
economic development agencies, and communications with state officials. 
64
 The sign in the parenthesis following each variable’s name indicates the direction of the hypothesized 
relationship. 
65
 This coding includes the “Governor's appointment with no other approval needed” and “Governor's cabinet 
appointment with governor's approval.” 
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is coded 1 where the governor is the head (president, chair, etc) of the state’s economic 
development board/commission/council, and 0 otherwise.66 As noted above, in no state does a 
governor possess both manifestations of economic development institutional capacity.67 
  From the discussion above, governors are held accountable for their state’s economy, 
and further, are dependent on the electoral resources to remain in power and advance their 
agenda (e.g. Besley and Case 1995; Lowry, Alt, and Ferree 1998; Gasper and Reeves 2015).  As 
such, those governors who perceive themselves to be electorally vulnerable given their prior 
general election performance should be concerned with spurring economic development in their 
state.68  Thus, the indicator Previous Electoral Vote Share (+) (Mean=55.36, SD=6.98) is a 
measure of the percentage of the vote the governor won their last election.69,70  However, the 
opportunistic behavior of governors with greater institutional control over their state’s economic 
development agency, while positive, should be less pronounced when conditioned on their 
electoral security.  Thus, this conditional effect is captured with the inclusion of the interaction 
term: Gov Solo Appt x Vote Share (+).  To examine how this behavior is influenced when the 
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 Otherwise includes states where governors have no control or shared control over this entity, and states where 
these entities do not exist. Data for this variable were taken from various state economic development websites, 
publications, and statutes. 
67
 Supplemental analysis merges both indicators of economic development institutional capacity into a single 
indicator, Economic Development Capacity, coded 1 if the governor possesses either indicator of institutional 
capacity and coded 0 otherwise. The main analysis below is reestimated with the substitution of this binary 
indicator, and the results of this analysis are found in Table B.3 in Appendix B. Given the similarity in results, and 
since in no state does a governor possess both manifestations of economic development authority, the 
disaggregated institutional capacity indicators are used in the main empirical analysis below. 
68
 Previous iterations of this essay used a binary indicator for the electoral vulnerability of the governor, e.g. if the 
governor won their last election contest by less than 60% (a conservative threshold for electoral vulnerably which 
is well established in the literature as an acceptable threshold for operationalizing electoral vulnerability).  Because 
the truncated nature of the variable omitted important variation, it was replaced by the continuous indicator of 
the governor’s previous electoral vote share. 
69
 Data for this variable were taken from Scammon, McGillivray, and Cook’s America Votes series (various years) 
70
 All governors should desire to increase the economic development funds available given the weight placed upon 
governors to maintain the health of the state’s economy, thus necessitating a positive hypothesized relationship. 
The more electorally secure the governor is however, while still positive, should be smaller in magnitude.  
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electoral constraints are greatest, gubernatorial Election Years (+) (N=108, 22.45%), is 
additionally included and coded 1 if the year is a gubernatorial election year and 0 otherwise.71,72 
Given that poor economic conditions increase gubernatorial efforts to recruit corporations 
to their states (Grady 1988) and that governors are held accountable state economic conditions 
(e.g. Hanson 1993), the State Unemployment Rate (+) (Mean=5.14, SD=1.65),73,74,75 should 
influence a governor’s desire to increase their state economic development agency’s budget.   
It is the conventional wisdom that states with large urbanized populations possessing 
complex economic bases possess innovative and sophisticated public agencies in order to deal 
with higher levels of demand placed upon their state governments (Mohr 1969; Walker 1969).  
As such, larger, more economically complex states should provide greater resources to their state 
development agencies. Thus, State Population76 (+) (Mean=5746.04, SD=6416.78), is a 
measure of the size of the states population in thousands.  Further, states with a more activist 
orientation toward government are expected to devote more resources to their state economic 
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 Data for this variable were taken from Scammon, McGillivray, and Cook’s America Votes series (various years).  
72
 In the main analysis below, a governor’s previous electoral vote share (Previous Electoral Vote Share) and 
gubernatorial election years (Election Years) are considered separately.  However, this assumes that a governor’s 
vote share is in full effect for the full duration of a governor’s term in office. Supplemental analysis considers the 
conditional effect of these indicators, the results of which are found in Table B.4 in Appendix B. Given the 
similarity in results with the main model, the more parsimonious model is employed.   
73
 Data for this variable were taken from the Bureau of Labor Statistics website at http://www.bls.gov/lau/ (see 
Unemployment Rates for States Annual Average Rankings). 
74
 Supplemental analysis considers an alternative measure of the change in the state unemployment rate from the 
prior year to the current year, the results of which are found in Table B.5 in Appendix B. 
75
 As discussed above, a governor’s stewardship of the state’s economy influences their success in future political 
endeavors, e.g. affecting their progressive ambition. Supplemental analysis considers a crude measure for whether 
a governor harbors progressive ambition (i.e. if the governor ever sought election to higher office after serving as 
governor), the results of which are found in the Table B.6 in Appendix B.  Given that the inclusion of this variable 
yields similar results with the main model while yielding marginally significant findings (1-tailed significance), in the 
interest of using a more parsimonious model, these findings remain supplementary. 
76
 Data for this variable were taken from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, www.bea.gov/regional/index.html, 
midyear population estimations from US Census Bureau, in thousands. 
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development agencies (e.g. Grady 1988).  As such, State Liberalism77 (+) (Mean=48.67, 
SD=23.03) is included, measuring the citizen ideology of the state as a NOMINATE score. 
Agency requests in terms of both short-term success (approval of this year’s request) and 
long-term success (expansion over the previous year’s budget) are linked to a governor’s support 
(e.g. Wright 1967; Sharkansky 1968; Lauth 1984), resulting from legislative institutional 
capacity (e.g. Pound 1992; Squire 2007).  The measure Legislature Session Length (-) 
(Mean=64.55, SD=40.68) is used to measure the state’s legislative institutional capacity and is 
coded as the number of days a state legislature is in session in a given year.78 
When the governor and the legislature are divided on partisan lines, e.g. while in a state 
of divided government, the legislature typically reduces the amount of authority delegated to the 
executive branch (e.g. Epstein and O'Halloran 1999; Huber, Shipan, and Pfahler 2001) and 
desires greater control over the economic development agency (e.g. Bibby, Cotter, Gibson, and 
Huckshorn 1983).  As such, two measures of divided government are included: where Split 
Partisan Legislature Government (-) (N=120, 24.95%) is coded 1 for if the control of the 
chambers of the state legislature were divided between the two major political parties and 0 
otherwise; and Unified Partisan Legislature Government (-) (N=157, 32.64%) is coded 1 for if 
                                                           
77
 Data for this variable were provided by Berry, Ringquist, Fording, and Hanson (2007). 
78
Squire’s measure of legislative professionalization is calculated at uneven intervals, and lacks the yearly 
observations necessitated by this study. The number of days in session provides an accurate reflection of both the 
time a legislature is able to devote to budgetary negotiations, as well as their level of patience in these 
negotiations (e.g. Kousser and Phillips 2009). Data for this variable was taken from “Bill and Resolution 
Introductions and Enactments” Table in the Book of the States (various years). Missing data was resolved through 
the use of state legislative session calendars. Information unable to be resolved through these means was imputed 
in STATA. Given that state legislative session lengths do not vary much from one year to the next, this method is 
appropriate. In some states, the Book of the States lists different session lengths for each legislative chamber. As 
such, the primary analysis in this essay employs the lower session length of the two chambers listed for that state, 
to avoid overestimating the session length of the state legislature. 
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the branches of the government were divided between the two major political parties and 0 
otherwise.79, 80 
The change and organization of an agency, adding and eliminating programs, offices, and 
sections, can dramatically influence both the size of the agencies budget and its growth.  As 
such, Change in Agency (~) (N=30, 6.24%)81 is coded 1 if the state economic development 
entity underwent a structural change in the given year, and 0 otherwise.  Finally, given the 
impact of the economic recession in which began and significantly impacted the final two fiscal 
years (AY 2008 and 2009) in this analysis, binary indicators of included for Year 2008 and Year 
2009 (-). 
To account for both unobserved heterogeneity across states and dependence within states, 
panel regression models are estimated with cross–sectional random effects and robust standard 
errors clustered by state.82   
                                                           
79
 Data for this variable was taken from Carl Klarner’s “State Partisan Balance Data” located at 
http://www.indstate.edu/polisci/klarnerpolitics.htm. Unified government serves as the omitted category for 
baseline comparison. 
80
 Given its non-partisan unicameral legislature, Nebraska is always considered to be in a state of divided 
government. 
81
 These structural changes in the state economic development entity occur in a variety of ways: either moving the 
economic development jurisdiction into(out of) the executive office of the governor, transitioning the jurisdiction 
from the state’s commerce department into a stand-alone economic development agency, or simply reorganizing 
the economic development jurisdiction within the current entity.  These structural changes can sometimes benefit 
the governor by increasing his/her influence over the state’s economic development efforts (moving economic 
development jurisdiction into the executive office of the governor), decreasing their influence (moving this 
jurisdiction out of the executive office), or some combination depending on the influence the governor has over 
the reorganized or created entity.  With each of these changes comes an associated change to the budgetary 
allocations for the economic development entity. Given that a change to an economic development entity can 
either increase or decrease the size of its budget depending on the extent and circumstances concerning the 
change, and due to the data limitations concerning the changes and extent of the structural reorganization, no 
hypothesized direction is able to be offered. 
82
 A Hausman test was performed in STATA version 13 to determine whether to employ fixed or random effects.  
Given the insignificant P-value (0.15) obtained, the null hypothesis that the coefficients estimated by the efficient 
random effects estimator are the same as the ones estimated by the consistent fixed effects estimator cannot be 
rejected.   Thus, the more efficient model (random effects) is employed over the  less efficient but more consistent 
model (fixed effects). Given the low power of a Hausman test, supplemental robustness checks are performed by 
estimating the above model with various specifications as discussed below. 
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3.4  Statistical Findings 
The regression results from the analysis examining the growth in state economic development 
entity allocations are presented in Table 3.2 below: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 137 
 
Table 3.2: Economic Development Allocations in the American States (FY 2001 – FY 2010)  
– Random Effects Models 
 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Governor Solo Appointment  
Authority (+) 
5.931+  
(4.0003) 
4.686 
 (28.514) 
5.929+  
(3.999) 
4.951  
(29.372) 
Control of Economic Development   
Commission/Council (+) 
1.618   
(4.136) 
1.618 
 (4.143) 
4.554 
(36.272) 
4.284  
(37.607) 
Previous Electoral Vote Share (+) 0.068 (0.192) 
0.063 
(0.185) 
0.072  
(0.189) 
0.067  
(0.185) 
Gov Solo Appt x Vote Share (+) – 0.022  (0.516) – 
0.018 
(0.531) 
Control of Comm/Council  
x Vote Share (+) – – 
–0.053 
(0.628) 
–0.048 
(0.654) 
Ancillary Controls 
     Election Year (+) –2.879 (2.953) 
–2.883  
(2.971) 
–2.890  
(2.957) 
–2.892    
(2.971) 
     State UE Rate (+) –5.096***  (1.628) 
–5.098***    
(1.639) 
–5.095***    
(1.628) 
–5.096***   
(1.639) 
     State Population (thousands) (+) –0.001***   (0.0002) 
–0.001***   
(0.0002) 
–0.001***   
(0.0002) 
–0.001***   
(0.0002) 
     Change in Agency (~) 4.271    (7.893) 
4.271 
(7.906) 
4.272 
(7.903) 
4.272  
(7.915) 
     State Legislature Session Length (+) 0.218***    (0.046) 
0.218***     
(0.046) 
0.218***    
(0.045) 
0.218***    
(0.045) 
     State Liberalism (+) 0.013 (0.078) 
0.013  
(0.078) 
0.013     
(0.079) 
0.013    
(0.079) 
     Split Partisan Legislature (-) –3.458 (4.134) 
–3.457  
(4.140) 
–3.438     
(4.122) 
–3.439    
(4.121) 
     Unified Partisan Legislature (-) –0.735 (3.702) 
–0.728  
(3.717) 
–0.738    
(3.707) 
–0.732    
(3.723) 
     Year 2008 (-) –7.306*    (4.207) 
–7.298*    
(4.254) 
–7.286*     
(4.225) 
–7.281*    
(4.259) 
     Year 2009 (-) 7.379 (8.869) 
7.388  
(8.942) 
7.389 
(8.903) 
7.395    
(8.964) 
Constant 13.329 (14.549) 
13.646  
(15.474) 
13.105 
(14.072) 
13.374    
(15.171) 
N × T (Effective Sample Size) 481 481 481 481 
Overall R2 0.066 0.066 0.066 0.066 
Notes: Dependent variable is defined as: Annual Real State Economic Development Funds Growth. Standard errors 
in parentheses.  *** p ≤ 0.01; ** p  ≤ 0.05; * p ≤ 0.10; +significant at the 0.10 level (one-tailed) 
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Models 1-4 examine the change in real state economic development funding from one 
fiscal year to the next (Annual Real State Economic Development Funds Growth), with Models 
2-4 accounting for the conditional impact a governor’s electoral vulnerability plays in their 
desire to influence economic development allocations.  Examination of the ancillary control 
variables reveal several intriguing patterns.  For example, the more professional a state 
legislature (as measured in the number of days a state legislature is in session: State Legislature 
Session Length), each day longer the state legislature is in session (e.g. increasingly professional) 
results in a ~0.22% (Models 1-4) increase in economic development funds from one fiscal year 
to the next.  While contrary to hypothesized expectations, these findings are indicative of earlier 
findings by LeLoup (1978) showing that legislative professionalism is highly related to state 
economic development.  It may be that since these more highly professional legislatures tend to 
be more involved in the policymaking process compared to their more amateur counterparts, they 
push for greater growth in the economic development agency budgets to engage in more active 
economic development policymaking (examined more closely below).  Similarly, larger states 
(measured in thousands of persons: State Population (thousands)) experience a less than 1% 
decrease (Models 1-4) in economic development fund allocations than do states with smaller 
populations.  Contrary to expectations, state’s allocating funds in a gubernatorial election year or 
with higher unemployment rates, experience significant decreases in their economic 
development funding (-2.88% to -2.89% and -5.09  to -4.10 respectively).  These findings are 
rather confounding given that these are times when we would expect governors to push for 
greater economic development resource allocations, providing them with the tools to 1) generate 
electoral support for economic development investment efforts, and 2) to simulate economic 
recovery.  However, it might be that when considered within the lens of the extant literature by 
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Ragsdale and Theis (1997), poor state economic conditions often necessitate symbolic cuts in 
executive agency staffing and funding. 
 The main empirical results concerning the ability of a governor to direct the efforts of the 
state’s economic development agency, via unfettered appointment of the agency head (Governor 
Solo Appointment Authority) or control of the state’s economic development commission/council 
(Control of Economic Development  Commission/Council), present a unique scenario.  These 
governors experience growth in their economic development agency budgets when they control 
the appointment of the agency head (5.93%) and when they control the state economic 
development commission/council (1.62%), though these effects while correct in hypothesized 
direction, either is marginally significant (1-tailed) or fails to attain a level statistical significance 
respectively.  However, when the conditional relationship of the governor’s previous general 
election vote share (Previous Electoral Vote Share) is considered (Models 2-4), an interesting 
story begins to emerge, though albeit suggested by marginally significant or null effects.  When 
governors are electorally insecure given their previous electoral fortunes, the results suggest that 
state economic development agencies observe a sizable impact of 4.95% greater growth in their 
budget allocations for economic development when they control the appointment of that 
agency’s head, and 4.28% greater growth when they control the commission/council (Model 4), 
though neither effect attains a level of statistical significance.  Yet, as the governor becomes 
more secure in their electoral prospects, when they control the appointment of the agency head 
there is less than a 1% increase and when they control the commission/council there is a less than 
1% decrease, though neither effect obtains a level of statistical significance.  These findings 
tentatively suggest that the more electorally secure a governor is in their electoral prospects (vis-
à-vis their prior general election vote share), there is less of an urgent need to push for greater 
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growth in their state’s economic development budget, though the results should be taken with 
caution given the insignificant estimates.  
 To better examine the conditional relationship between a governor’s institutional capacity 
and their electoral security, simulations are performed on the regression estimates from Model 1 
to generate expected values of the dependent variable under alternative scenarios of the 
governor’s institutional capacity and their electoral vulnerability.  The results of these 
simulations are depicted in Figure 3.1 below: 
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Note: Point estimates are denoted by both circle and corresponding 95% confidence intervals from Model 1. All 
other covariates are held at their mean values. Mean = 55.36%, Standard Deviation = 6.98%. 
 
Figure 3.1: Simulated Impact of Economic Development Agency Control on State 
Economic Development Agency Allocations Growth in the American States 
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The simulations involve varying the level of the governor’s control over the economic 
development agency head appointments, serving as the head of the state’s economic 
development commission/council, and the governor’s previous electoral vote share, while 
holding all other variables at their mean values.  The wider shaded area in these figures reflects a 
larger 95% confidence interval surrounding the predicted values of the dependent variable for a 
given simulation.  As displayed in this figure, both a governor’s institutional capacity and their 
electoral vulnerability influence the growth of that state’s economic development agency 
budgetary allocations from one fiscal year to the next.  A governor who lacks the ability to 
appoint their state’s economic development entity head with a previous general election vote 
share of 2 standard deviations (41.40%) below the mean experiences 1.88% decreased growth in 
the budgetary allocation, while one 2 standard deviations (69.32%) above the mean experiences 
only a 0.03% increase in the growth of the budgetary allocations.  However, those governors 
with greater capacity to appoint their entity’s head experience a 4.05% increase in growth at -2 
standard deviations below the mean compared to a 5.96% increase in growth at +2 standard 
deviations above the mean.  Similarly, a governor who is not the head of the economic 
development commission/council in their state experiences a 0.54% decrease in the growth of the 
budgetary allocations at -2 standard deviations below the mean to 1.37% increase in the growth 
of the budgetary allocations at +2 standard deviations above the mean, whereas governors with 
greater capacity experience a 1.07% increase in growth at -2 standard deviations below the mean 
to 2.98% increase in growth at +2 standard deviations above the mean.  However, the confidence 
intervals in Figure 3.1 surrounding the predicted values of the dependent variable for the given 
simulation are very wide, such that they cross over the 0 line, thus not providing evidence that 
allows me to reject the null hypothesis.  As such, while the predicted values suggest the 
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importance of economic development efforts for governors, though presenting a situation 
contrary to theoretical expectations when the governor’s electoral security is considered, these 
simulation should be taken with care.  In cautiously interpreting these what these figures may 
suggest, governors which possess the ability to direct the economic development efforts of the 
state agency vis-à-vis their unfettered ability to appoint the head of that agency, or who are the 
head of the state’s economic development commission/council, experience a higher than the 
average rate (0.625) of growth in their economic development entity budget allocations 
compared to their institutionally weaker counterparts.  And further, when the electoral security of 
a governor is considered, the more secure a governor is in their electoral prospects, the greater 
the growth in the economic development budgetary allocations. What this perhaps signals is that 
the other budgetary actors (e.g. the legislature) are aware of the electoral constraints facing 
governors and given their historic use of economic development funds for particularistic gains, 
they thus draw tighter the state purse strings when governors would be most likely to need this 
increased funding and engage in this type of behavior. 
These null findings in the main conditional effects could be resulting from the relative 
lack of within-unit variation in these variables over time, with most of the variation occurring 
across the states rather than across time.83  To more closely examining the relationship between 
control over the state’s economic development agency and the growth in that agency’s resources, 
I employ a fixed-effects variance decomposition estimation approach as advanced by Plümper 
and Troeger (2007) which first estimates a fixed-effects model to obtain the unit effects, then 
derives the constituent parts (time-invariant and/or weakly time-invariant variables, and an error 
                                                           
83
 For comparative purposes, the previous models were specified with fixed effects. See Table B.7 in Appendix B 
for the results from that analysis. The most noticeable differences are a change in the direction of the main 
empirical effects, which are indicative are omitted variable bias.   
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term) of the unit effects, and finally reestimates the model by pooled OLS including the 
constituent parts to account for the unexplained part of the unit effects. The results from this 
analysis are presented in Table 3.3 below: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 145 
 
Table 3.3: Economic Development Allocations in the American States (FY 2001 – FY 2010)  
– Panel Fixed Effects Regression with Vector Decomposition 
 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Governor Solo Appointment 
Authority (+) 
7.017 
(6.311) 
20.159 
(145.531) 
6.947 
(6.347) 
  22.821 
(134.357) 
Control of Economic Development   
Commission/Council (+) 
4.720 
(7.539) 
4.761 
(7.562)  
24.179 
(133.936)   
  28.251 
(139.253) 
Previous Electoral Vote Share (+) –0.007 (0.393) 
0.051 
(0.783) 
0.021 
(0.444) 
0.097 
(0.701) 
Gov Solo Appt x Vote Share (+) – –0.236 (2.600) – 
–0.285 
(2.396) 
Control of Comm/Council x Vote 
Share (+) – – 
–0.353 
(2.420) 
–0.426 
(2.519) 
Ancillary Controls  
     Election Year (+) –0.294 (5.291) 
–0.250 
(5.327) 
–0.338 
(5.306) 
–0.295 
(5.354) 
     State UE Rate (+) –7.858*** (2.710) 
–7.825*** 
(2.769) 
–7.942*** 
(2.760) 
–7.919*** 
(2.839) 
     State Population (thousands) (+) –0.001** (0.0005) 
–0.001** 
(0.0005)    
–0.001* 
(0.0005) 
–0.001* 
(0.0005) 
     Change in Agency (~) 0.575 (10.133) 
0.598 
(10.153) 
0.582 
(10.146) 
0.611 
(10.164) 
     State Legislature Session  
     Length (+) 
0.341*** 
(0.095) 
0.341*** 
(0.095) 
0.340*** 
(0.095) 
0.340*** 
(0.095) 
     State Liberalism (+) 0.172 (0.163) 
0.176 
(0.169) 
0.170 
(0.164) 
0.173 
(0.172) 
     Split Partisan Legislature (-) –7.336 (8.059) 
–7.407 
(8.073) 
–7.248 
(8.073)  
–7.316 
(8.092) 
     Unified Partisan Legislature (-) 1.771 (6.543) 
  1.806 
(6.598) 
1.680 
(6.590)   
1.703 
(6.663)   
     Year 2008 (-) –5.297 (7.357) 
–5.391 
(7.464) 
–5.106 
(7.468) 
–5.181 
(7.629) 
     Year 2009 (-) 16.500
+ 
(12.623) 
16.334 
(12.898) 
16.913+ 
(12.890) 
16.798 
(13.281) 
Constant 13.907 (29.421) 
10.424 
(51.478) 
12.911  
(30.413) 
8.494 
(47.011) 
N × T (Effective Sample Size) 481 481 481 481 
R2 0.125 0.125 0.125 0.126 
Notes: Dependent variable is defined as: Annual Real State Economic Development Funds Growth. Standard errors 
in parentheses.  *** p ≤ 0.01; ** p  ≤ 0.05; * p ≤ 0.10; +significant at the 0.10 level (one-tailed) 
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As observed in these results, many of the same patterns concerning the aforementioned 
relationships persist.  However, with the inclusion of both fixed and random effects, relationships 
which were previously found to attain a level of statistical significance, have become attenuated 
and the magnitude of several effects noticeably altered.  Once accounting for some of the omitted 
variables bias, the constituent element of the governor’s electorally security changes in direction, 
however the effects across all four models fail to obtain a level of statistical significance. These 
null findings suggest that the more electorally secure governor is, they experience less growth in 
their economic development agency budget when they possess the capacity to direct that agency 
either through appointment authority or control of the state’s commission/council.   
Bell and Jones (2012) suggest that this XTFEVD approach by Plümper and Troeger 
retains many of the flaws of the Fixed Effects models.  As such, they propose a “within-
between” formulation which clearly separates the within and between effects.  To further 
examine these relationships, and I employ this hybrid model to overcome the noted flaws of the 
Fixed Effects approach and to generate results which the authors note as being more 
interpretable.  The results from the reestimation of Models 1-4 employing the this hybrid 
approach are presented in Table 3.4 below: 
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Table 3.4:  Economic Development Allocations in the American States (FY 2001 – FY 2010) 
– Hybrid Models 
 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Governor Solo Appointment Authority - 
within (+) 
–10.581 
(21.558) 
6.406 
(55.206) 
–10.285 
(21.627) 
9.938 
(56.216) 
Governor Solo Appointment Authority - 
mean (+) 
7.704+ 
(5.325) 
–35.340 
(66.622) 
7.696+ 
(5.336) 
–37.397 
(67.171) 
Control of Economic Development 
Commission/Council – within (+) 
–7.473 
(43.513) 
–5.655 
(43.920) 
15.475 
(90.541) 
23.101 
(92.765) 
Control of Economic Development   
Commission/Council – mean (+) 
1.606 
(6.255) 
1.670 
(6.266) 
–24.574 
(129.969) 
–34.298 
(130.965) 
Previous Electoral Vote Share - within (+) 0.003 (0.380) 
0.075 
(0.437) 
0.033 
(0.394) 
0.125 
(0.461) 
Previous Electoral Vote Share - mean (+) 0.535 (0.578) 
0.353 
(0.644) 
0.502 
(0.603) 
0.298 
(0.676) 
Gov Solo Appt x Vote Share - within (+) – –0.291 (0.871) – 
–0.346 
(0.887) 
Gov Solo Appt x Vote Share - mean (+) – 0.776 (1.197) – 
0.813 
(1.207) 
Control of Comm/Council x Vote Share - 
within (+) – – 
–0.373 
(1.291) 
–0.462 
(1.313) 
Control of Comm/Council x Vote Share - 
mean (+) – – 
0.477 
(2.366) 
0.656 
(2.385) 
Ancillary Controls  
     Election Year – within (+) –0.560 (5.161) 
–0.514 
(5.171) 
–0.609 
(5.174) 
–0.566 
(5.183) 
     Election Year – mean (+) –38.280 (33.283) 
–35.529 
(33.605) 
–38.148 
(33.357) 
–35.217 
(33.690) 
     State UE Rate – within (+)   –7.877*** (2.582) 
–7.837*** 
(2.589) 
–7.965*** 
(2.605) 
–7.938*** 
(2.610) 
     State UE Rate – mean (+) –2.803 (2.620) 
–2.679 
(2.631) 
–2.920 
(2.689) 
–2.835 
(2.696) 
     State Population (thousands)  
     – within (+) 
0.013 
(0.010) 
0.013 
(0.010) 
0.013 
(0.010) 
0.013 
(0.010) 
     State Population (thousands)  
     – mean (+) 
–0.001** 
(0.0004) 
–0.001** 
(0.0004) 
–0.001* 
(0.0004) 
–0.001** 
(0.0004) 
     Change in Agency – within (~) –0.097 (9.953) 
–0.086 
(9.969) 
–0.094 
(9.973) 
–0.081 
(9.988) 
     Change in Agency – mean (~) 19.104 (20.116) 
18.570 
(20.165) 
19.191 
(20.162) 
18.664 
(20.208) 
     State Legislature Session Length 
     – within (+) 
0.334*** 
(0.090) 
0.334*** 
(0.091) 
0.333*** 
(0.091) 
0.333*** 
(0.091) 
     State Legislature Session Length  
     – mean (+) 
0.117+ 
(0.073) 
0.124* 
(0.074) 
0.116+ 
(0.074) 
0.124* 
(0.075)   
     State Liberalism – within (+) 0.148 (0.160) 
0.152 
(0.160) 
0.145 
(0.160) 
0.149 
(0.161) 
     State Liberalism – mean (+) 0.020 (0.133) 
0.027 
(0.134) 
0.018 
(0.134) 
0.024 
(0.135) 
     Split Partisan Legislature – within (–) –7.189 (7.527) 
–7.273 
(7.543) 
–7.096 
(7.550) 
–7.173 
(7.564) 
     Split Partisan Legislature – mean (–) 3.730 (8.818) 
3.409 
(8.846) 
3.625 
(8.852) 
3.250 
(8.882) 
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Table 3.4 Continued 
     Unified Partisan Legislature  
     – within (–) 
1.657 
(6.182) 
1.697 
(6.193) 
1.560 
(6.203) 
1.584 
(6.213) 
     Unified Partisan Legislature  
     – mean (–) 
–1.531 
(8.993) 
–0.530 
(9.138) 
–1.737 
(9.069) 
–0.766 
(9.196) 
     Year 2008 – within (–) –14.045* (8.442) 
–14.160* 
(8.463) 
–13.851+ 
(8.486) 
–13.940+ 
(8.502) 
     Year 2008 – mean (–) 0 0 0 0 
     Year 2009 – within (–) 5.887 (13.292) 
5.678 
(13.328) 
6.312 
(13.400) 
6.165 
(13.426) 
     Year 2009 – mean (–) 0 0 0 0 
Constant 0.625 (2.045) 
0.625 
(2.048) 
0.625 
(2.049) 
0.625 
(2.052) 
Years – within 0.996 (1.151) 
1.024 
(1.156) 
1.002 
(1.154) 
1.036 
(1.159) 
N × T (Effective Sample Size) 481 481 481 481 
AIC 5051.838 5055.392 5055.824 5059.305   
BIC 5164.587 5176.492 5176.924 5188.757 
Notes: Dependent variable is defined as: Annual Real State Economic Development Funds Growth. Standard errors 
in parentheses.  *** p ≤ 0.01; ** p  ≤ 0.05; * p ≤ 0.10; +significant at the 0.10 level (one–tailed) 
 
 
What emerges from the hybrid approach are results which are more consistent with the 
initial Random Effects model compared to the Fixed Effects model.  Across the various 
covariates of interest, examination of both the explicitly modeled between and within effects 
reveals many of the previously observed relationships.  Consistently shown, governors who are 
electorally secure do they receive a increase in the growth of the economic development 
agency’s budget allocation.  However, when they are afforded the capacity to control their states 
economic development agency and when they are less secure in their electoral standing, the state 
agencies often observe a sizable reduction in their budget growth.  Though as in the previous 
specifications, the results either are marginally significant or fail to obtain a level of statistical 
significance.  Taken together, across a variety of specifications and if the marginal/null findings 
are cautiously viewed, a governor’s capability and their electoral vulnerability may influence the 
growth in economic development entity allocations from one fiscal year to the next, however 
often working in a manner contrary to theoretical expectations.  
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 Given the tepid support for gubernatorial influence over the growth of economic 
development entity funding in the American states, I am left to consider several alternative 
explanations which could be the source of the prior null findings.  In considering the process by 
which the funding for the state’s economic development entity is generated, and the insight from 
the simulated effects above, the role of the legislature as an active budgetary player demands 
further attention.  Prior findings by LeLoup (1978) show that legislative professionalism is 
highly related to state economic development.  It may be that since these more highly 
professional legislatures tend to be more involved in the policymaking process than their more 
amateur counterparts.  These more professional legislatures have a greater incentive and the 
capacity (staff expertise and resources) to engage in more active economic development 
policymaking and direct state funding to their core constituencies in pursuit of 1) reelection and 
maintaining majority control in the legislature (e.g. LeLoup 1978; Gerber, Maestas, and 
Dometrius 2005; Jenkins, Leicht, and Wendt 2006) and 2) enhancing the prospects for its most 
progressively ambitious members (e.g. Soule 1969; Francis and Baker 1986; Maestas 2000).  
These professional legislatures should be more capable of constraining the state’s economic 
development entity and thus should be more willing to expand funding tto better serve their own 
needs.  Taken together, perhaps the particularism of these more professionalized legislatures 
serves as an alternative explanation for understanding variation in economic development entity 
funding growth and not the executive universalism as espoused in the extant literature (evinced 
by the meager growth in state job creation as attributed to the efforts of governors addressed 
above).  
 Thus two alternative understandings considering the role of legislative capacity and the 
willingness of the legislature to help or hinder the governor in securing greater economic 
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development entity funding emerge.  Perhaps the more professional legislatures (those with 
greater capacity, e.g. longer session length), work to assist governors sharing their party brand 
while restricting their opposition governors.  It is well documented that the budgetary process 
increases rather than resolves partisan competition (e.g. National Conference of State 
Legislatures 1995), and when the governor and the legislature are divided on partisan lines, e.g. 
while in a state of divided government, the legislature typically reduces the amount of authority 
delegated to the executive branch (e.g. Epstein and O’Halloran 1999; Huber, Shipan, and Pfahler 
2001) and desires greater control over the economic development agency (e.g. Bibby, Cotter, 
Gibson, and Huckshorn 1983).  In essence, under periods of unified government, when there are 
shared incentives between the executive and legislative branches to deliver particularistic 
benefits, we should expect greater institutional cooperation, and thus economic development 
entity allocations growth should be increasing under these conditions compared to under periods 
of divided government.  Similarly, these effects should be more pronounced during election 
years when the need to deliver these benefits becomes more critical for purposes of maintaining 
partisan control of the government.  
As such, I reestimate the Random Effects models from Table 3.2 above to examine the 
relationship between legislative capacity and economic development entity allocations growth. 
Models 1-2 examine legislative capacity under a variety of combinations of the partisan control 
of the state government, while Models 3-4 account for the conditional impact of gubernatorial 
election years.  The results from this analysis are presented in Table 3.5 below:84 
 
                                                           
84
 These models were additionally estimated with the same Fixed Effects, XTFEVD, and Hybrid models from above. 
The results from this supplemental analysis can be found in Tables B.8, B.9, and B.10 located in Appendix B. 
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 Table 3.5: Economic Development Allocations in the American States (FY 2001 – FY 2010) 
 Random Effects Models –Legislative Incentive 
 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Governor Solo Appointment 
Authority (+) 
6.176+ 
(3.954) 
5.776+ 
(3.940) 
6.130+ 
(3.934) 
5.830+ 
(3.992) 
Control of Economic Development   
Commission/Council (+) 
1.606 
(4.192) 
1.932 
(4.242) 
1.759 
(4.252) 
2.233 
(4.369) 
Previous Electoral Vote Share (+) 0.060 (0.196) 
0.040 
(0.184) 
0.048 
(0.200) 
0.033 
(0.187) 
Ancillary Controls 
     State Legislature Session  
     Length (+) 
0.281*** 
(0.092) 
0.097+ 
(0.074) 
0.325*** 
(0.100) 
0.096 
(0.079) 
     Unified Government  (+) 5.678 (6.226) – 
8.944 
(7.026) – 
     Split Partisan Legislature (-) – –2.382 (6.770) – 
–1.648 
(7.674) 
     Unified Partisan Legislature (-) – –12.401* (7.137) – 
–16.621** 
(8.260) 
     Election Year (+) –3.039 (2.928) 
–3.119 
(2.886) 
10.686 
(8.986) 
–4.711 
(5.501) 
     Session Length x Unified   
     Government 
–0.090 
(0.103) – 
–0.124 
(0.117) – 
     Session Length x Split Partisan  
     Legislature – 
–0.020 
(0.100) – 
–0.031 
(0.116) 
     Session Length x Unified Partisan  
     Legislature – 
0.189+ 
(0.123) – 
0.235* 
(0.142) 
     Election Year x Session Length – – –0.174 (0.145) 
–0.024 
(0.101) 
     Election Year x Unified  
     Government – – 
–12.382 
(9.743) – 
     Election Year x Split Partisan  
     Legislature – – – 
–5.195 
(11.788) 
     Election Year x Unified Partisan  
     Legislature – – – 
15.354+ 
(10.538) 
     Session Length x Election Year x  
     Unified Government – – 
0.126 
(0.173) – 
     Session Length x Election Year x  
     Split Partisan Legislature – – – 
0.070 
(0.188) 
     Session Length x Election Year x  
     Unified Partisan Legislature – – – 
–0.155 
(0.188) 
     State UE Rate (+) –5.115*** (1.656) 
–4.910*** 
(1.648) 
–5.229*** 
(1.658) 
–5.027*** 
(1.661) 
     State Population (thousands) (+) –0.001*** (0.0002) 
–0.001*** 
(0.0002) 
–0.001*** 
(0.0002) 
–0.001*** 
(0.0002) 
     Change in Agency (~) 5.121 (7.738) 
5.123 
(7.875) 
5.078 
(7.654) 
5.121 
(7.776) 
     State Liberalism (+) 0.013 (0.077) 
0.019 
(0.077) 
0.011 
(0.076) 
0.017 
(0.077) 
     Year 2008 (-) –7.768* (4.377) 
–8.130* 
(4.386) 
–7.585* 
(4.485) 
–7.911* 
(4.499) 
     Year 2009 (-) 7.927 (8.999) 
7.464 
(8.984) 
8.439 
(9.065) 
7.902 
(9.108) 
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Table 3.5 Continued 
Constant 8.423 (15.623) 
20.828+ 
(13.380) 
5.960 
(16.021) 
22.360* 
(13.257) 
N × T (Effective Sample Size) 481 481 481 481 
Overall R2 0.066 0.071 0.067 0.074 
Notes: Dependent variable is defined as: Annual Real State Economic Development Funds Per Capita Growth. 
Standard errors in parentheses.  *** p ≤ 0.01; ** p  ≤ 0.05; * p ≤ 0.10; +significant at the 0.10 level (one-tailed) 
 
 
As can be observed in Models 1 and 2, in understanding the role of legislative capacity, 
there is a differential effect under both periods of unified and divided government consistent with 
the literature which asserts that that the dynamic between the governor and the legislature is very 
different under periods of unified and divided government (e.g. Clark 1998).  Contrary to 
theoretical expectations, under periods of unified government and the more nuanced condition of 
divided partisan legislature government, when the governor faces a split legislature where the 
governor has a partisan ally in one chamber of the legislature, the state economic development 
entity experience a decrease in the growth of its budgetary allocations, though neither effect 
attains a level of statistical significance.  Similar results emerge even when the electoral year 
constraints are considered (Models 3 and 4).  Yet, most telling is that when governor faces a 
unified legislature controlled by the opposition party (Unified Partisan Legislature 
Government).  It is during these periods that the budgetary process becomes more difficult, with 
each branch seeking to pursue a budget in line with its ideological and policy goals ensuring that 
the passage of conflictual policy is the most difficult (e.g. Bowling and Ferguson 2001).  When 
the legislature is institutionally weak and the chamber is politically unified against the governor, 
the largest significant effect is observed.  Under these conditions, the state economic 
development entity experiences a 12.40% decrease in its budgetary allocations growth.  Yet, 
when the legislature is institutionally strong, the entity experiences a 0.19% increase in the 
budgetary allocations.  What these two effects suggest is that perhaps there exists a story 
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whereby the capacity of both budgetary actors needs to be considered, given the importance of 
both the motivation and capacity to engage in economic development policymaking.   
As such, perhaps there is a power struggle between the legislative and executive branches 
concerning the control over the particularistic benefits of providing economic development 
efforts throughout the state.  In this second understanding of legislative capacity, the legislature 
can use its greater capacity to serve as an institutional check on the efforts of governors to 
engage in behavior which generate short-term electoral gains.  Under certain institutional 
conditions, the legislature should be more willing to reduce the funding the economic 
development entity receives.  In particular, when a highly professionalized legislature faces a 
governor which lacks the ability to appoint the head of the economic development entity or is not 
the head of the economic development commission/council, the state should experience the 
highest level of growth in the budgetary allocations given that the legislature not only needs the 
particularistic benefits addressed above, but now has the means to control and direct it.  Yet, 
when these same highly professionalized legislatures face governors with high capacity (control 
over either of the administrative processes), the state should experience its lowest levels of 
growth given that these professional legislatures which are dependent on the particularistic 
benefits should not want to cede control to the governor who can ultimately control the direction 
and dispersal of the benefits.  However, when the legislature is of low institutional capacity, they 
may be too weak to counter the advances of the governor in increasing the budgetary allocations 
to the state economic development agency.  Further, they may also lack the motivations 
necessary to hinder the governor given that they have weaker incentives for pursuing and 
obtaining particularistic benefits.  As such, it should be expected in states with an institutionally 
strong governor faced by a weaker legislature, it should experience greater growth in the 
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economic development entity allocations than in those states with both institutionally weak 
actors.  
I again reestimate the Random Effects models from Table 3.2 above to examine the 
relationship between the institutional capacity of the budgetary actors and economic 
development entity allocations growth.  Models 1-2 examine the conditional effect of executive 
and legislative capacity on the growth of state economic development entity budgetary 
allocations growth.  The results from this analysis are presented in Table 3.6 below:85 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
85
 These models were additionally estimated with the same Fixed Effects, XTFEVD, and Hybrid models from above. 
The results from this supplemental analysis can be found in Tables B.11, B.12, and B.13 found in Appendix B. 
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Table 3.6: Economic Development Allocations in the American States (FY 2001 – FY 2010) 
Random Effects Models – Institutional Conflict 
 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 
Governor Solo Appointment 
Authority (+) 
4.604  
(6.830) 
6.000+  
(4.004) 
Control of Economic Development   
Commission/Council (+) 
1.529  
(4.178) 
5.180 
(11.129) 
Previous Electoral Vote Share (+) 0.073  (0.190) 
0.069 
(0.194) 
Ancillary Controls 
     State Legislature Session  
     Length (+) 
0.213*** 
(0.051) 
0.222*** 
(0.045) 
     Session Length x Governor Appt  
     Authority 
0.021 
(0.097) – 
     Session Length x  
     Commission/Council – 
–0.061 
(0.187) 
     Split Partisan Legislature (-) –3.441  (4.145) 
–3.463 
(4.130) 
     Unified Partisan Legislature (-) –0.750  (3.715) 
–0.784 
(3.687) 
     Election Year (+) –2.862  (2.948) 
–2.883 
(2.949) 
     State UE Rate (+) –5.087***  (1.630) 
–4.982*** 
(1.743) 
     State Population (thousands) (+) –0.001*** (0.0002) 
–0.001*** 
(0.0002) 
     Change in Agency (~) 4.211  (7.912) 
4.134 
(7.935) 
     State Liberalism (+) 0.011 (0.079) 
0.015 
(0.079) 
     Year 2008 (-) –7.296*  (4.219)   
–7.318* 
(4.204) 
     Year 2009 (-) 7.293 (8.896) 
6.956 
(9.151) 
Constant 13.444 (14.694) 
12.461 
(15.529) 
N × T (Effective Sample Size) 481 481 
Overall R2 0.066 0.066 
Notes: Dependent variable is defined as: Annual Real State Economic Development Funds Per Capita Growth. 
Standard errors in parentheses.  *** p ≤ 0.01; ** p  ≤ 0.05; * p ≤ 0.10; +significant at the 0.10 level (one-tailed) 
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As can be observed in Models 1 and 2, the results offer limited support for this 
understanding of the power struggle between the executive and legislative branches.  When an 
institutionally strong governor faces a weaker legislature, they are able to obtain greater growth 
in the economic development entity’s budgetary allocations, experiencing 4.6%/6.0% greater 
growth when they can appoint the entity’s head and 1.5%/5.2% greater growth when they are 
they head of the state’s economic development commission/council, though these findings are 
either marginally significant or fail to obtain a level of statistical significance. Similarly, when a 
institutionally strong legislature faces a weak governor, the state experiences 0.21%/0.22% 
greater growth in the budgetary allocations growth.  Most telling of these results is that when the 
budgetary actors are both institutionally strong, the state experiences its lowest levels of growth 
at 0.02%/-0.06%, though these results too fail to obtain a level of statistical significance.  These 
results cautiously suggest that the budgetary process, specifically regarding economic 
development funding, is a battle of institutional wills.  Stronger institutional actors may be able 
to extract greater funds when it is to their advantage and when the they can exploit the weakness 
of their institutional counterparts.  However, when these actors are both institutionally strong, the 
typically interbranch competition emerges, and very little growth occurs. 
While governors historically have devoted significant energy toward utilizing their state’s 
economic development agency as an short term political strategy (e.g. Fosler 1988; Turner, 
Fleming and Kaufman 2005), they remain constrained by the budgetary process, and more 
importantly, their institutional counterparts which limit their ability to increase the resources 
available to pursue these electoral goals.  If the above findings are taken with a degree of 
caution, they may offer some relief for those who may be concerned with concentrating control 
over such an important state function in the hands of an electorally dependent unitary actor.  
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3.5  Discussion 
Using budgetary data collected for state economic development agencies in the American states 
FY 2001-2010, this essay sought to offer insight into the interplay between institutional capacity 
and electoral incentives.  The tepid results from the above analysis suggests that a governor’s 
control of the state’s economic development efforts matters in the growth of the state economic 
development agency’s budget, and when examined within the lens of electoral vulnerability, the 
results suggest a more nuanced understanding of economic development allocations.   
 Governors take office intent on accomplishing various policy and electoral goals, and like 
all executives, they find that their ability to do so is subject to various constraints.  As the 
subsequent analysis regarding institutional capacity, and the broader theme of this dissertation 
reveals, institutional actors do not operate within a vacuum.  While historically, governors have 
tended to dominate the executive-legislative branch relationship in budgetary matters, 
legislatures are not without influence (e.g. Abney and Lauth 1989, 1998).  The 
professionalization that the American state legislatures experienced over the last twenty-five 
years, has equipped them to compete with the governor (e.g. Pound 1992) by increasing their 
ability to perform their policy-making role “with an expertise, seriousness, and effort comparable 
to other actors” in this process (Mooney 1995, 48-49).  Ultimately, this institutional capacity 
enhances the ability of state legislatures to secure greater appropriations for their local 
geographic constituencies (e.g. Crain and Miller 1990), and as the above analysis cautiously 
suggests, the area of state economic development efforts is no exception to this claim.  
While the field of state economic development research has yielded much information 
about the efficacy of economic development spending and offering financial incentives (e.g. 
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Wolman 1988; Smith and Fox 1990; Mattera et. al 2011), what is less well known is how 
effective governors are in pursuing these incentives, and what this means for politics today given 
the current economic climate, with high levels of unemployment and states spending an 
estimated $70 billion a year in an attempt to spur economic development.  Especially in this 
current political and economic climate, this study offers insight into how executives respond to 
the pressure to maintain the health of their jurisdiction’s economy, all the while, being 
constrained by their own electoral security and the desires of the other institutional actors.  While 
these actors cannot easily influence salient macroeconomic outcomes (e.g. Tufte 1978; Hibbs 
1987; Nordaus 1989), what is known about these actors is that they are able to award key 
government contracts prior to the election events to prime the economy (e.g. Mayer 1991, 1995).  
Governors, like their presidential counterparts, use their control over their state’s economic 
development entity to engage in economic development efforts and deliver benefits to politically 
important regions, mainly as an attractive political strategy despite the uncertain and minimal 
economic impact (e.g. Turner 2003). 
Ultimately, this research has provided important first step in more fully understanding the 
process by which states actively attempt to encourage economic growth.  Further, this study 
presents a step towards shedding new light on unanswered questions concerning why economic 
development efforts and offering financial incentives matters, and more importantly, why some 
governors are more successful than others in their efforts to do so.  More broadly, to scholars of 
institutional design the findings from this essay suggest the consequences of gubernatorial power 
grabbing in a separation of powers system, and the Madisonian role that the separation of power 
system maintains. 
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4.0 LEGISLATIVE PAY IN THE AMERICAN STATES  
     AND INDIVIDUAL RETIREMENT DECISIONS 
 
 
In the spring of 2003, halfway through her second term, Maine state representative Marie 
Laverriere-Boucher resigned from the legislature to take a job teaching at her local high school.  
She like many of her fellow legislators, struggled with a desire to engage in public service but 
was faced with the realities of how to support her growing family.  The 186 members of Maine’s 
legislature spend on average two-thirds of their time on the job, but make about $10,000 a year 
for their service.  In particular, in the first year of their two-year terms, representatives and 
senators generally spend five to six months in session, while in the second year, the time in 
session usually drops to three or four months.  However, once the formal legislative session has 
adjourned for the year, a representative’s legislative responsibilities are not complete, as they are 
still accountable for dealing with requests from constituents and attending district and interest 
group functions, in what amounts to essentially year-round legislative service.  Yet for their 
service, the legislators each earn $19,515 for the two-year session, a $32 daily meal allowance, 
and a travel reimbursement of 32 cents for each mile they drive between their district and 
Augusta (a rate well below the federal mileage reimbursement).  For many legislators with long 
commutes, service during legislative sessions requires spending five nights a week in the capitol, 
a cost not reimbursed by the legislature (Wack 2004). 
While Representative Laverriere-Boucher would have preferred to remain in her office 
and push for reforms to Maine’s foster care system, her financial realities triumphed when faced 
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with a salary not representative of the demands of her office.  When questioned concerning this 
financial struggle to serve, she remarked that some of her fellow legislators went so far as to 
“mortgaged their homes just to be there” (Wack 2004).  However, even for members who hold 
other positions of primary employment, as another legislator from Maine accurately described 
the situation, service in the legislature represents a “significant loss in salary” from their primary 
employment given that “legislative salary has not kept up with the cost-of-living and 
reimbursement for meals, room, and travel have remained the same” (seacoastonline.com 2002).  
When comparing the difference in a legislator’s compensation and the median household income 
in the state, Maine ranks in the lowest 1/3 of the country.  Taken together, it is not uncommon for 
legislators to choose retirement over continued service because of financial reasons (Wack 
2004).  
Yet, the situation dramatically differs in nearby New York with its 213 member full-time 
legislature, each compensated $79,500 per year for their service.  Here legislative service is 
synonymous with careerism given that, on average, only 5% of the legislature turns over from 
one session to the next, and as such, the legislature has a history of members serving for lengthy 
amounts of time.  One of these careerist state legislators was Senator John Marchi, who served 
from May 20, 1921 until his death in office on April 25, 2009.  His lengthy tenure in the State 
Senate allowed him to obtain a position of leadership as the chair of the Senate Finance 
Committee, pursue numerous policy initiatives of concern to both his constituents and himself, 
and to be active in various interstate organizations including the National Conference of State 
Legislatures and the Council of State Governments (Kurtz 2006).  Unlike Maine, the difference 
in pay from the median household wage is one of the most favorable to state legislators in the 
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country, and affords individuals like Senator Marchi, the ability to forgo working as an attorney 
or in other lucrative professions in lieu of serving in the legislature. 
As the above narratives illustrate, the salary a state legislator is paid for their service is a 
significant consideration for members in their decision to remain in office, especially when that 
salary does not accurately reflect the demands of that office, and when that pay pales in 
comparison to the wages earned by the rest of their state.  Yet, this phenomena is not restricted 
only to Maine or New York, as payment for legislative service is often a controversial topic and 
tends to vary drastically from one state to the next.  This essay thus seeks to provide new 
answers to the much researched question of why legislators retire by examining how this 
variation in legislative pay and its difference from other state wages influences an individual 
legislator’s decision-making behavior.  As such, this dissertation chapter examines the 
overarching theme of institutional capacity within the context of this well studied indicator of 
state legislative capacity, the compensation provided to the membership.   
Over the last two decades, students of legislative elections and institutional change have 
attempted to examine the causes and consequences of membership turnover in legislative bodies 
(e.g. Moore and Hibbing 1992; Kiewiet and Zeng 1993; Groseclose and Krehbiel 1994; Hall and 
Van Houweling 1995; Moore and Hibbing 1998).  Frequent turnover in legislative chambers 
raises several normatively important issues of concern for both elected officials and their 
constituents.  High turnover can be costly to an electorate as the previously experienced 
politicians are replaced by an incoming cohort of inexperienced politicians (e.g. Adams and 
Kenny 1986), electoral accountability suffers as it weakens reelection constraints (e.g. Crain 
1977; Krupnikov, Morton, and Shipan 2008), and politicians develop a shortsighted view of the 
consequences of their behavior resulting in inefficient fiscal policy and decreased long-term 
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economic growth (e.g. Uppal and Glazer 2011).  For the legislators and the greater legislative 
body which they are part of, frequent legislative turnover can result in decreased performance by 
legislative committees effectively deteriorating the policymaking process (e.g. Rosenthal 1974a; 
Hamm and Moncrief 1982) and the associated increases in staff turnover decrease policy output 
and increase conflict between the chambers (e.g. Cain and Kousser 2004).  Consistent with the 
greater theme of this dissertation concerning the influence of institutional capacity, ultimately 
this frequent turnover can lead to a drain in the capacity of the institution to respond to the needs 
of the constituency and its ability to contend with the historically stronger executive counterparts 
in developing and enacting new public policy and state budgets.   
In the American states, for legislatures to better compete with governors in these 
aforementioned areas, they seek to increase the quality of their membership by attracting and 
retaining candidates with unique personal and professional experience, as maintaining a 
legislature of higher quality individuals leads to more capable legislatures with increased policy-
making capabilities and collective responsiveness (e.g. Rosenthal 1996; Squire 1992a).  
However, public service is not the most glamorous nor is it the most lucrative career option and 
these institutions must incentivize quality candidates with sufficient compensation to sacrifice 
lucrative outside employment and private income to both run for and remain in public office (e.g. 
Rosenthal 1974b).  If these members are not adequately paid, then the candidates to fill these 
offices are drawn from a smaller pool.  A selection criterion is imposed on who can serve in 
office as many potential candidates are not in a position to devote the time being a legislator 
usually requires or accept the financial consequences of service (e.g. Squire, Moncrief, and 
Jewell 2010).  As such, attracting good candidates becomes more difficult when legislative pay is 
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not representative of the requirements of the position and when it is lower when compared to 
other jobs and professions in the state (e.g. Kelderman 2007).   
Thus, increasing legislative salary serves as a form of institutional maintenance, as it is 
necessary to maintaining a caliber of membership capable of providing the policy-making and 
constituent services demanded by the state electorate.  Legislatures vary in their capacity to set 
legislative compensation, though state legislators typically play some role in determining their 
own compensation (Sollars 1994).  Traditionally, legislative compensation has been set by both 
statute and constitution; however the trend has been the removal of constitutional restrictions on 
legislative salaries and expenses (e.g. Balutis 1979).  Despite the fact that legislatures possess the 
capacity, to varying degrees, to raise the pay of their membership, in 28 states legislative 
compensation has declined when adjusted for inflation.  Even in states where legislative pay has 
increased, it has failed to keep pace with the wages of other jobs (Penchoff 2007).  To provide a 
visual account of this trend, Figure 4.1 below graphically presents the real legislative salary, real 
median household income, and the difference between these amounts across all 50 states, and is 
separated by the various professional, hybrid, and citizen/amateur legislatures.86 
 
 
                                                           
86
 State legislatures are grouped according to NCSL color categories: Professional Legislatures = Green (AK, CA, FL, 
IL, MA, MI, OH, NY, PA, WI); Hybrid Legislatures = Gray (AL, AZ, AR, CO, CT, DE, HI, IN, IA, KY, LA, MD, MN, NJ, MO, 
NE, NC, OK, OR, SC, TN, TX, VA, Wa); and Amateur Legislatures = Gold (GA, ID, KS, ME, MS, MT, NH, ND, NM, NV, RI, 
SD, UT, VT, WV, WY). http://www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-legislatures/full-and-part-time-legislatures.aspx. 
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Figure 4.1: Legislative Salary Compared to Median Household Income Over Time 
 
 
 
 
 
 
20
00
0
40
00
0
60
00
0
-
20
00
0
0Am
o
u
n
ts
 
(in
 
re
al
 
do
lla
rs
)
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Years
Average Salary Average Median Household Average Pay Diff
Legislative Salary vs Median Household Income: Overall Averages
-
20
00
0
0
20
00
0
40
00
0
60
00
0
Am
o
u
n
ts
 
(in
 
re
a
l d
ol
la
rs
)
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Years
Average Salary Average Median Household Average Pay Diff
Legislative Salary vs Median Household Income: Professional Legislatures
20
00
0
40
00
0
60
00
0
0
-
20
00
0
Am
o
u
n
ts
 
(in
 
re
al
 
do
lla
rs
)
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Years
Average Salary Average Median Household Average Pay Diff
Legislative Salary vs Median Household Income: Hybrid Legislatures
0
20
00
0
40
00
0
60
00
0
-
20
00
0
Am
o
u
n
ts
 
(in
 
re
al
 
do
lla
rs
)
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Years
Average Salary Average Median Household Average Pay Diff
Legislative Salary vs Median Household Income: Amateur Legislatures
 165 
 
As this essay shall show, legislative salary and its difference from the real median house income 
in the state, though strongly related, present two different reference points for members of the 
these institutions.  The former serves as a base value for the attractiveness of the seat, while the 
later serves as a reference for if service in the legislature compared to outside employment 
represents a boon (higher legislative pay relative to a lower median household income) or a bane 
(lower legislative pay relative to a higher median household income) to the member.   
While critics of increasing legislative compensation argue that higher state legislative pay 
erodes public confidence in the institution (e.g. Kelleher and Wolak 2007) and creates a 
environment of careerist politicians (e.g. Berkman 1994; Squire 1992a; Thompson and Moncrief 
1992), the benefits of greater legislative pay often outweigh these critiques as it maintains a 
quality membership (e.g. Maestas 2000) which is better equipped to compete with the governor 
(e.g. Karnig and Sigelman 1975; Roeder 1979; Thompson 1986; Rosenthal 1996).   
Considering the disparity in legislative pay from one state to the next, the essay examines 
the extent to which pay influences legislative behavior, offering insight into the consequences of 
declining legislative compensation which often fails to keep pace with other state wages.  Using 
a unique dataset of individual retirement decisions of all state legislators from 2000 through 
2010, this essay seeks to answer the question of why individual legislators decide whether to 
remain in their elected position or voluntarily retire, especially when faced with meager 
legislative compensation and compensation which lags behind other state wages.  In particular 
this essay provides the first systematic examination of individual legislative retirement behavior 
across all 50 states, whereas prior studies have only examined legislative turnover in the 
aggregate (e.g. Jewell and Breaux 1988; Squire 1988a) or across a subset of the American states 
(Blair and Henry 1981; Francis and Baker 1986; Stonecash 1993), thus making prior 
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generalizations difficult.  Accounting for personal and political constraints, this essay in 
particular attempts to show that a meager legislative salary significantly increases the likelihood 
that an individual legislator chooses to vacate their elected office rather than remain in office.   
This essay thus proceeds in the following order.  In the first section I examine the 
importance of legislative retirement, the consequences of turnover, the determinants of 
legislative retirement, and the role that salary plays in that determination.  In the second section I 
establish the data, the variables theoretically associated with legislative retirement decisions, and 
the methodological framework by which I will evaluate the hypothesized relationships. I 
conclude by describing the results from the empirical analysis and discussing both the practical 
and broader implications of the findings for our understanding of legislative behavior.    
4.1  The Importance of Legislative Retirement 
Studies of legislative behavior tend to start from the understanding that elected officials are 
single-minded seekers of reelection.  This goal of winning reelection explains a significant 
portion of their behavior, including the time and resources they devote to constituent service and 
casework, the issues they devote their attention and resources toward pursuing, and their 
committee assignment requests and transfers which aid in their pursuit of this goal (e.g. Fenno 
1973; Mayhew 1974; Fiorina 1977).  Yet, this understanding concerning reelection is not true 
forever, as most members choose at some point in their legislative career to retire for a multitude 
of reasons.  Turnover in both Congress (e.g. Hall and Van Houweling 1995; Ornstein, Mann, and 
Malbin 2000) and the American state legislatures (e.g. Hyneman 1938; Calvert 1979; Breaux and 
Jewell 1992) results more from voluntary departure rather than electoral defeat, often conflicting 
with Rohde’s (1979) assumption that returning to private status is an undesirable alternative 
except in very unusual circumstances. 
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While most studies of legislative retirement focus on Congress, this institution tends to be 
categorized by a lack of turnover and an insulation of the membership, as Congress has become a 
place for long-term careers (e.g. Polsby 1968; Bullock 1972; Fiorina, Rohde, and Wissel 1975).87  
State legislatures however have historically experienced a high rate of turnover in their 
membership from one session to the next.  Some of the earliest estimates of state legislatures 
revealed turnover rate of between 30 and 40 percent (Rosenthal 1974b), and though rates have 
declined in subsequent years, turnover still remain fairly high averaging between 25 to 30 
percent (e.g. Francis and Baker 1986; Moncrief, Niemi, and Powell 2004).  As such, the 
American state legislatures provide an optimal unit of observation by which to examine this 
manifestation of legislative decision-making behavior.  
Of critical importance in examining legislative retirement decisions in the American 
states is first establishing that turnover is of substantive importance and has tangible implications 
for the institution and the electorate.  Normatively, high levels of legislative turnover, resulting 
mainly due to voluntary retirement, can poses a significant threat to a responsive government.  
An individual’s political ambition is linked to the concept of accountability such that if the 
popular control of elected government is to be effective, politicians must care about their 
political future.  Without a desire to seek reelection, politicians lack a strong incentive to act 
according to the will of their constituents, depriving the electorate of the ability to control its 
representatives through electoral constraints (Schlesinger 1966).  While the American 
democratic system is unlikely to suffer from this form of electoral breakdown as a result of 
legislative retirement, turnover more generally underscores more serious problems associated 
with the institution’s ability to recruit and retain quality members and the incentive structure 
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 The decline in Congressional turnover rates is well documented in the previous literature (e.g. Rosenthal 1974b; 
Calvert 1979; Shin and Jackson 1979; Jewell 1982). 
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employed to do such (e.g. Francis and Baker 1986).  The key take away from these normative 
implications is that, in short, legislative retirement matters.  
More practically, legislative turnover influences both the functionality of the institution 
and the electoral system.  As such, over the last two decades, students of legislative elections and 
institutional change have attempted to examine the various causes and consequences of 
membership turnover in legislative bodies (e.g. Moore and Hibbing 1992; Kiewiet and Zeng 
1993; Groseclose and Krehbiel 1994; Hall and Van Houweling 1995; Moore and Hibbing 1998).  
These explanations often include a reduction in the policymaking capacity of the legislature as 
experienced members are replaced with inexperienced freshmen, resulting in a decrease in 
organizational functioning.  New members are assigned to committee posts and merely emulate 
their precursors, screening out fewer bills, effectively deteriorating the policymaking process 
(e.g. Rosenthal 1974a; Hamm and Moncrief 1982).  Further, as the experienced members leave 
the legislature, they take with them years of knowledge and expertise required in committee 
negotiations, influencing the institutional memory of the legislature’s procedures and previous 
decisions, making it a less effective policymaking branch (e.g. Francis and Baker 1986).  
Membership turnover inevitably results in staff turnover with new members bringing new staff 
into the process, decreasing policy output and increasing conflict between the chambers (e.g. 
Cain and Kousser 2004).  For the members themselves, with the revolving door that is legislative 
service in legislatures experiencing high turnover, members have less of a chance develop 
interpersonal relationships with other members generating little incentive to establish norms of 
civility between the membership (e.g. Axelrod 1986).  This increases uncertainty and makes 
commitment to policy more difficult (e.g. Persson and Svensson 1989; Alesina and Tabellini 
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1990).  Further, this can result in inefficient fiscal policy and decreased long-term economic 
growth (Uppal and Glazer 2011).      
 For the electorate, turnover can be costly as the previously experienced politicians are 
replaced by an incoming cohort of inexperienced politicians.  As there is a significant learning 
curve associated with serving as a legislator, this has serious implications for both satisfying 
constituent service demands and the representation of the constituency in the policymaking arena 
(e.g. Adams and Kenny 1986).  Additionally, electoral accountability suffers from frequent 
turnover as it weakens reelection constraints (e.g. Crain 1977; Krupnikov, Morton, and Shipan 
2008), as the responsiveness and accountability of an elected official depends on whether they 
are motivated to remain in office (e.g. Schumpeter 1950; Schlesinger 1966; Prewitt and Eulau 
1969; Griffin 2006).   
  Yet, while these consequences of turnover highlight the various normative and practical 
implications, scholars of legislative behavior have devoted significant attention to understanding 
the initial motivation behind why members decide to vacate their office.  Overtime, state 
legislators like their Congressional counterparts have developed an incumbency advantage, 
signaling an increase in the tendency of the legislators to be reelected at overwhelming rates and 
garnering significantly larger proportions of the vote in their reelection contests; a trend which 
even has become particularly obvious in states with less professional legislatures (e.g. Jewell and 
Breaux 1988).  As such, turnover in both Congress (e.g. Hall and Van Houweling 1995; 
Ornstein, Mann, and Malbin 2000) and the American state legislatures (e.g. Hyneman 1938; 
Calvert 1979: Breaux and Jewell 1992) results more from voluntary departure.  If state 
legislators enjoy a similar incumbency advantage as their Congressional counterparts, why then 
do these states experience higher turnover rates, particularly resulting from voluntarily 
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retirement?  The next section addresses the previously examined determinants of voluntary 
retirement and the role that salary plays in the decision-making calculus.  
4.2  The Determinants of Legislative Retirement 
Much ink has been spilled in an attempt to understand why a legislator would decide to leave 
their elected office rather than pursue reelection.  An incumbent member may decide to 
voluntarily retire, pursue reelection to their office, or seek election/appointment to another 
political office.  In considering each alternative, the member evaluates the expected utility of 
each choice (e.g. Rohde 1979).  Members with the same preference ordering of alternatives will 
differ in the intensity of those preferences, influencing the utility assigned to each outcome.  
Further, a member seeking reelection or pursing their progressive ambition toward another 
political office, bears a certain amount of risk associated with each alternative. Although a 
member may not know specifically what their retirement entails (the challenges faced, 
employment opportunities, etc), the status of being retired from their current political office is 
solely at the member’s discretion, whereas the other alternatives rely on factors outside of the 
individual member’s control (e.g. Brace 1985).  In selecting voluntary retirement, the member 
can choose this alternative without any inherent cost relative to the costs associated with seeking 
reelection or another political office which involve the expenditure of time and resources (e.g. 
Brace 1985). 
As such, a member’s retirement decision requires a carefully timed and presented 
rationale (e.g. Frantzich 1978).  Members consider their own views concerning the nature of 
their job, as well as their perceptions of their own and their colleagues’ reasons for voluntarily 
retiring (e.g. Hibbing 1982).  Ultimately, a member’s career decisions are shaped by a 
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combination of personal and institutional factors (e.g. Schlesinger 1966; Squire 1988a; Fowler 
and McClure 1989), and their retirement decisions can thus be broken down into 3 categories: a 
member’s personal and financial reasons (the latter to be discussed in depth below), the political 
vulnerability of the member, and if the member is suffering from legislative burnout (e.g. Blair 
and Henry 1981; Theriault 1998). 
For many members, personal considerations often necessitate voluntary retirement (e.g. 
Blair and Henry 1981).  The long session hours, extended absences from home, stressful 
conditions both during the session and the campaign season, and the responsibility to often place 
the needs of the constituency above family concerns, often makes continued service in a 
legislature a very family-unfriendly choice (e.g. Blair and Henry 1981; Theriault 1998).  These 
demands often result in familial problems which include unhappy marriages, threatened 
divorces, guilt about long distances from young children, and concerns over teenagers and their 
potential problems (e.g. Blair and Henry 1981).  As such, a legislator’s marital status and if they 
have children influence the likelihood of voluntary retirement.  Similarly related, simply being a 
female legislator in historically male-dominated institutions makes some legislators less willing 
to remain in office, particularly since female legislators often do not have the power to 
sufficiently influence policy areas which they are both responsible for and concerned with (e.g. 
Lawless and Theriault 2005).  These personal considerations thus can compel some legislators to 
vacate their office and return to their familial responsibilities.  
One personal characteristic has received a significant amount of attention in the literature 
as consistent predictor of legislative retirement; the age of the legislator.  A legislator’s age is not 
an automatic determinant of retirement, as both Congress and the American state legislatures are 
replete with accounts of members serving well into their golden years and often to their death 
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while in office.  However, for some individuals, it may become more difficult to continue 
serving at the frenzied pace and maintain the high level of service demanded in the modern 
legislature the older they become (e.g. Frantzich 1978).  These factors thus would increase the 
personal cost of service for the member, decreasing the utility they derive from their service, and 
ultimately influencing the likelihood of their retirement.  Similarly related, the member’s age is 
highly related to a their progressive ambitions, whereby the older a politician is, the less likely 
they are to express the ambition to advance (e.g. Hain 1974; Fulton, Maestas, Maisel, and Stone 
2006). 
Two institutional features shape a member’s personal considerations for voluntary 
retirement.  A member’s integration into the formal power structure of the chamber, including 
serving in formal leadership positions and exerting institutional influence on the floor and in 
committee, can influence their retirement decisions.  Expanding beyond the assumption that 
members are single-minded seekers of reelection (e.g. Mayhew 1974), some members are driven 
by a desire to influence their legislative institution and develop good public policy (e.g. Fenno 
1973).  Holding positions within the formal power structure provide these members with the 
means by which they can achieve these goals.  Because of the value that members affix to these 
positions, holding or anticipating that they will hold these positions can entice a member to 
remain in office (e.g. Hain 1974; Hibbing 1982; Groseclose and Krehbiel 1994; Hall and Van 
Houweling 1995; Kanthak 2011).   
Further, often members will voluntarily leave their elected position for a more desirable 
political position (e.g. Eulau, Buchanan, Ferguson, and Wahlke 1961; Hain 1974).  In doing so, 
these members either choose to run for another elective office (local, state, or federal), incurring 
the costs as noted above, or they may be appointed to other positions of public service in the 
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bureaucracy, judiciary, or local government (e.g. Francis and Baker 1986).  When running for 
another elective office, members may be reluctant to give up their seats and the benefits which 
come with it, in pursuit of higher office, even for an open seat where they would not face the 
incumbent office holder (e.g. Fowler and McClure 1989).  The expected utility obtained from the 
new position must outweigh that received from remaining in office and the cost associated with 
pursing that office. 
 Yet, personal factors do not solely dominate the decision-making calculus of a legislator.  
Given that most turnover in Congress (e.g. Hall and Van Houweling 1995; Ornstein, Mann, and 
Malbin 2000) and the American states (e.g. Hyneman 1938; Calvert 1979; Breaux and Jewell 
1992)  results from voluntary departure rather than electoral defeat, a member’s electoral 
prospects have been shown to be a significant factor influencing their retirement decisions (e.g. 
Francis and Baker 1986; Bernstein and Wolak 2002).  When faced with negative electoral 
prospects and adverse political circumstances in their district, in addition to the time and 
resource costs associated with waging a reelection campaign, members often choose retirement 
rather than incur these costs.  However, as the extant literature has shown, the impact of the 
electoral factors in a member’s retirement decision calculus is often murky as it is confounded by 
a complexity of factors (e.g. Fenno 1978), yet the vast majority of studies examining legislative 
retirement include some measure of the legislator’s electoral prospects.88 
Finally, legislators, like any members of other professions, suffer from burnout and at 
some point need to voluntarily depart from their office.  The longer an individual legislator is in 
the institution, the greater the degree of change in the institution observed and experienced by 
that member (e.g. Theriault 1998).  Over time, changes in the legislative institutions have led to 
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 See Bernstein and Wolak (2002) for a review of these studies. 
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increased partisanship, increased time and responsibility commitments to the position, and an 
emphasis on 24/7 fundraising, which together influence the desirability of the job and can cause 
member retirement (e.g. Frantzich 1978); although some studies have found not found a direct 
connection (e.g. Cooper and West 1981).  In the American states, this institutional change began 
in the late 1960’s through a process of modernization by which these legislatures experienced a 
certain measure of professionalization (e.g. Pound 1992).  Professionalization refers to the 
process by which legislatures developed attributes more attractive to career-oriented politicians 
(e.g. Schlesinger 1966; Berkman 1994), and in doing so, increased the salary and benefits for its 
members, increased the time demands of service including the move from part-time to full-time 
service, and increased their staff and resources (e.g. Squire 1988a, 1992, 2007).  In many states, 
this process fundamentally changed both the role and requirements of legislative service for the 
membership.   
Taken together, these factors significantly influence a individual legislator’s decision-
making calculus for whether they should stay or remain in their current elective office.  These 
factors are particularly evident in the American state legislatures, where public service is not the 
most glamorous nor is it the most lucrative career option available.  As such, these institutions 
must incentivize quality candidates to both run for and remain in public office (e.g. Rosenthal 
1974b).  The next section examines the role that the member’s financial rationale plays in their 
decision-making calculus. 
4.3  The Role of Legislative Pay in the American States 
Every year, thousands of individuals across the American states devote their time and energy to 
the demanding and often thankless job of public service in their state’s legislature.  Legislators 
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typically must sacrifice outside employment and private income to run for and hold public office 
(e.g. Rosenthal 1974b).  Further, as state legislative elections are increasingly becoming more 
competitive (e.g. Salka 2009), the cost to run a campaign for a state legislative seat has increased 
(e.g. Moncrief 1992).  As such, certain incentives are thus necessary to motivate individuals to 
seek out and remain in public office, as evidenced in Table 4.1 below: 
 
Table 4.1: Incentives for Holding Public Office 
Incentive Satisfaction 
Program Working upon specific, concrete public policies 
Status Attaining and exhibiting prestige 
Adulation Receiving the affection and praise of others 
Mission Committing oneself to a transcendental cause 
Obligation Relieving anxieties of conscience 
Conviviality Pleasing others and being accepted by them 
Game Competing with others in highly structured 
interactions 
Source: Payne 1972, 3 
 
 
Additionally, tenure, pensions, merit pay, public official employee benefits, outside income 
while in office, and the rewards gained after leaving office from having held that post, serve to 
incentivize public service (e.g. King and Peters 1994).  At the most basic level, the salary that an 
individual receives for holding that office should incentivize that individual to defer other forms 
of lucrative employment and run for office.   
Legislative compensation is the most explicit benefit a member derives from their public 
service, and as such, prior studies have shown some relationship between the level of 
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compensation a member is paid and their decision to voluntarily retire (e.g. Brace 1985; Hibbing 
1982; Groseclose and Krehbiel 1994; Hall and Van Houweling 1995).  However, prior studies 
have only examined legislative turnover in the aggregate (e.g. Jewell and Breaux 1988; Squire 
1988a) or across a subset of the American states (Blair and Henry 1981; Francis and Baker 1986; 
Stonecash 1993) making generalizations from the results difficult.  As noted above, clearly there 
are a multitude of personal, electoral, and burnout factors which interact with salary in unique 
and interesting ways only observed at the individual legislator level.  As such, this essay 
provides the first systematic examination of individual legislative retirement behavior across all 
50 states, perhaps allowing true insight into the blackbox which is an individual’s legislative 
retirement decision. 
While increased legislative compensation incentivizes an individual to initially serve, it 
further should compel those individuals to remain in their position.  As discussed above, 
members voluntarily leave their office for a variety of reasons including career ambitions for 
other offices, opportunity costs (including occupational and familial), dissatisfaction with the 
legislature, and health or age (e.g. Francis and Baker 1986).  Mayhew suggests that it is difficult 
to get members to do “grueling and unrewarding legislative work” (1974, 141).  Every legislator 
thus performs an implicit cost-vs-benefit analysis for whether they should stay or should they go. 
A member will continue to serve in their elective office until the costs outweigh the benefits of 
seeking reelection.  Beyond the costs of time and resources to run for reelection, all members of 
a legislature must pay an opportunity cost to engage in public service.  These costs are the 
benefits (e.g. the salary they would receive had they remained in their prior profession) they 
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must forego because they choose to serve in the legislature.89  These costs differ between states 
as well as individuals, because many legislators are able to maintain private occupations which 
generate income and other benefits. 
Salary increases however tend to encourage quality legislators to remain in office (e.g. 
Opheim 1991).  Seats in professional legislatures afford the individual members greater power 
and thus are highly prized (e.g. Hogan 2004), encouraging the retention of that office.  When 
compensation is high enough (and if elections permit), members are more likely to remain in 
office, however when compensation is low (and even if elections pose little threat) members are 
more likely to relinquish their legislative careers and return to more remunerative pursuits 
(Rosenthal 1974b, 616).  This, at least in the aggregate, is evidenced where states with higher 
levels of legislative compensation typically have lower turnover rates than states with lower 
compensation (e.g. Oxendale 1979). 
Historically, most state governments were dominated by the executive branch, as the 
legislatures in these states were amateur in comparison, and were ill-equipped to compete with 
their executive counterparts in public policymaking and budget enactment, much less even 
capable of meeting the ever growing demands place upon them by their constituents.  Beginning 
in the late 1960’s, the American state legislatures underwent a dramatic metamorphosis, and 
through a series of reforms, increased their capacity to perform the tasks of policymaking, 
oversight, and constituent service in an attempt to professionalize (e.g. Mooney 1995).  Yet, as 
these state legislatures professionalized, greater demands were placed on the membership which 
required higher levels of competence and performance vis-à-vis a quality membership (e.g. 
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 Service in the legislature additionally takes away from the benefits accumulated from time with their families, as 
well as leisure, and personal satisfaction enjoyed in the home or family environment (e.g Francis and Baker 1986). 
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Cloner and Gable 1959; Rosenthal 1982).  Legislators in more professionalized legislatures have 
to spend more time on the job, while both in and out of session (e.g. Rosenthal 1996).  As such 
the cost-benefit structure for holding state public office dramatically changed in many states.  
The incentive structure for a legislator is different in a part-time, low-pay, low-staff legislature 
compared to the incentive structure in a highly professionalized legislature (e.g. Maddox 2004). 
However, legislative compensation over time has declined when adjusted for inflation 
(e.g. Chi 2007).  Even in states where legislative pay has increased, it has failed to keep pace 
with the wages of other jobs (e.g. Penchoff 2007).  Ultimately, this restricts who can serve as it 
imposes a selection criterion given that many potential candidates are not in a position to devote 
the time that being a legislator usually requires or to accept the financial consequences of service 
(e.g. Squire, Moncrief, and Jewell 2001; Shuler 2008).  Further, in states were legislative service 
is not a full-time occupation (amateur and hybrid legislatures), the salary members are 
compensated for their service is hardly a perfect substitute for the income they receive for their 
normal employment. Together, this potentially results in a class bias within the membership (e.g. 
Carnes 2013, 2014), whereby only those with high occupational status (e.g. greater personal 
wealth or access to other sources of income) typically have a chance of legislative membership 
(e.g. Dye 1981; Jewell and Patterson 1986; Keefe and Ogul 1989).  In considering then the 
impact that legislative salary has on the membership, it should have less of an influence on those 
legislators who are either independently wealthy or employed in a lucrative primary profession. 
As such, this makes attracting and retaining good candidates more difficult when 
legislative pay is lower when compared to other jobs and professions in the state (e.g. Kelderman 
2007).  While legislative salary is important to the membership for the reasons addressed above, 
this difference between the compensation and the other wages in the state, too serves an 
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important purpose for the membership.  This difference represents the tangible draw of outside 
employment for the membership, and in these higher compensation states (higher legislative pay 
relative to a lower median household income), the position of state legislator is considered 
sufficiently attractive to provide career incentives whereby an individual could support a family 
on the income from the position alone, while in lower compensation states (lower legislative pay 
relative to a higher median household income) this was not possible (Chubb 1988). 
Within the extant literature, consideration of legislative pay relative in some respect to 
other state wages, most often operationalized as the state’s median household(family) income, 
has been well established.  Chubb’s (1988) measure of legislative compensation is used with the 
state median family income to distinguish states that offered legislative compensation at least 
equal to the median family income from those states which did not offer a comparable wage.  
Similarly, Weber, Tucker, and Brace (1991), Van Dunk (1997), and Sanbonmatsu (2002) use 
compensation as a percentage of the state’s median household income.  Practically, several states 
consider the compensation their members receive relative to the state’s median household 
income, with several states tying their legislature’s compensation (and subsequent 
decreases/increases) to indexes adjusted by the median household income for the state, and 
several others are beginning to consider similar proposals.90  Ultimately, legislative 
compensation and how it compares to other state wages are important considerations which 
affect the calculus of potential candidates and incumbents in deciding whether to run for the 
legislature (Kurtz, Moncrief, Niemi, and Powell 2006). 
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 Massachusetts passed a Constitutional amendment in 1998 tying the base pay of legislators to changes in the 
median household income.  Alabama recently passed an amendment to its Constitution in 2012 setting the base 
pay of legislators to the median household income for the state. Several other states have considered similar 
plans, including New York and Oregon. 
 180 
 
Despite the fact that these legislatures desire to raise the level of legislative compensation 
provided in order attract and retain quality members, and that most legislatures possess the 
capacity to actually raise the salary of the membership, this may be easier said than done.  
Returning to the framework by which legislators are single-minded seekers of reelection (e.g. 
Mayhew 1974), they are heavily motivated by the desire to avoid blame for unpopular actions 
(e.g. Weaver 1986; Melusky 2014).  Given that legislative pay raises are highly salient and very 
unpopular with voters (e.g. Bianco, Spence, and Wilkerson 1996; Clark 1996; Theriault 2005), 
these risk averse legislators are more likely to vote against a pay increase or for the repeal of one 
that was passed, leading to legislative salaries failing overtime to keep pace with the average 
wage of other jobs in the state. 
Given the discussion above, while legislative compensation and its relative level to that 
of other state wages may not be sole factor motivating citizens to seek out or remain in public 
office, these purely financial concerns are meaningful to legislators (e.g. Barro 1973; Stonecash 
1993).  In New York state, where legislative pay has not increased since 1999, a former 
Assembly Speaker was quoted as saying when asked about a pay raise for the members, that he 
is “proud to say [he] support[ed] it” and that “there are many legislators who work very hard, 
work extremely long hours, and it’s not just the days of session in Albany” (The New York Times 
2008).  A fellow New York Assemblyman stated that “your job takes over your life. You’re a 
public servant and you work to help people, and the pay is just ridiculous. Not to have a 
respectable pay, if you compare salaries to people in other fields, you find the legislators are way 
behind” (The New York Times 2008).  A sentiment echoed by a New York Senator who said that 
“I sit down at the kitchen table like everyone else and I wonder how I’m going to pay for the oil 
and gas and for college” (The New York Times 2008).  Legislators have been “grumbling” both 
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publicly and privately that the pay has not kept up with the high living costs and that many 
legislators are compelled to take other outside jobs to supplement their income (Precious 2010).   
These quotes from members of the New York legislature, as well as the motivating 
anecdote above, highlight an important implication of legislative salary.  Failing to compensate 
members with pay which is proportionate to the demands of their position, as well as comparable 
to pay they could receive outside the legislature, is fraught with two inherent problems.  First, if 
members are unsatisfied with their pay, they may engage in more nefarious and ethically grey 
means of supplementing their income.  In doing so, members can take side jobs which can lead 
to ethical complications (e.g. Billups 2010), become entangle with special interests (e.g. Pitzl 
2008), or become mired in corruption and scandal (e.g. Welch and Peters 1977; Meier and 
Holbrook 1992; Alt and Lassen 2003).  Second, as addressed above, while the demands of office 
make it difficult to hold full-time outside employment (e.g. Pitzl 2008) and thus may limit 
service to only the wealthiest (e.g. Shuler 2008), it could also impose a selection effect on the 
quality of the individuals actually serving in the legislature.  If highly qualified individuals can 
obtain more lucrative employment outside of the legislature, the intangible incentives found in 
Table 4.1 above may be insufficient to retain these members, especially when they are faced 
with the economic costs of service in the legislature (e.g. Squire, Moncrief, and Jewell 2001; The 
New York Times 2008).  Thus, even in the most professional, high paying legislatures, some 
individuals may only be serving because they are not capable of obtaining better compensation in 
the private sector.91 
                                                           
91
 While this implication concerning the potential selection effect imposed by legislative salary is important to 
note, it however is an empirical question beyond the scope of this examination, though warranting future 
examination. 
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Some individuals may also be serving because of the potential to translate present 
economic hardship into future a future economic windfall (e.g. a willingness to accept a low 
salary in the present for a higher salary in the future).  It is well established that state legislators 
harbor progressive ambition for higher political office and this can influence their behavior while 
in office (Maestas 2000, 2003; Maestas, Fulton, Maisel, and Stone 2006).  Yet, beyond seeking 
higher political office, legislators can parlay the policy expertise and professional network 
connections developed during their time in office into future employment either in the private 
sector or more often, into lobbying their former colleagues on behalf of a well-financed interest.  
However, at least 33 states have “revolving door” laws in place, which mandate a “cooling-off 
period” before the legislator is able to serve as a legislative agent (lobbyist) (National 
Conference of State Legislatures 2015).  While this can slow their transition into lucrative 
employment post public service, the stringency of these laws are not sufficiently burdensome as 
to prohibit a member from engaging in this practice, given that no law currently in effect 
mandates a “cool-off period” of greater than two years (with most being restricted to one 
calendar year after leaving office).  
Clearly individual legislators weigh the costs and benefits of remaining in public office.  
Often lost in the fervor of debates concerning increasing legislative compensation is that most 
state legislators are faced with many of the same economic constraints as their constituents 
(reinforcing the importance of legislative compensation compared to other state wages).  These 
legislators must weigh the pay they do receive while in office against what they could receive 
from employment outside of the legislature (their opportunity cost).  Typically, when legislators 
voluntarily leave public service and return to the private sector, they tend to have successful 
careers (e.g. Mattozi and Merlo 2008).  In doing so, each member generates a self-contemplated 
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wage differential which serves as the reservation wage (e.g. Gordon and Blinder 1980; Gustman 
and Steinmeir 1983; Dorn 2005) for individual legislators in their decision to remain in their 
elected position or to voluntarily retire.92,93  While they are dependent on the electoral resources 
to remain in office, they are more dependent on the economic resources which dictate whether 
they decide to even pursue these electoral resources via reelection.  As such, the economic 
circumstances facing the membership of a state legislature should affect their individual decision 
to voluntarily retire or remain in the legislature, and thus many quality legislators have to forego 
their reelection desires and return to more lucrative previous employment to make ends meet.  As 
such, the following set of empirically testable hypotheses concerning state legislative voluntary 
retirement and alternative exit options, and the compensation provided to members of each 
state’s legislature, are thus expected:94 
H1: State legislators who are paid a higher salary are less likely to voluntarily retire 
than to remain in their current office in any given year. 
                                                           
92
 Initial attempts to examine legislative compensation focused on directly measuring the pay a member could 
reasonably expect to earn should they voluntarily retire and return to their previous profession.  However due to 
data limitations concerning wages for classifications of jobs reported by the states and the occupations reported 
by the legislators, this wage differential cannot be directly observed.  Prior professions of state legislators are 
problematic because members often report their professions as generic business categories (which fail to reflect 
the actual nature of their position for classification purposes) or often self report that their profession is a 
legislator (e.g. Squire and Moncrief 2010).  This prior attempt further is inherently problematic, as it 1) assumes 
that the member will return to that prior employment, and 2) given that the experience, policy expertise, and 
networking connections accumulated by the individual legislators can be parlayed into more lucrative employment 
after office, these future opportunities may not be certain at the time of retirement. 
93
 It is nearly impossible to determine with any certainty if an individual voluntarily leaving the legislature returned 
to the non-electoral workforce or if they simply retired to draw upon the lucrative benefits some states offer for 
having served in their legislature.  As such, supplemental analysis includes a crude indicator for if the individual 
was older than or equal to the minimum age required to draw upon the state’s retirement benefits. The various 
state age requirements were taken from The Book of the States (various year): Table “State Legislative Retirement 
Benefits.” The main analysis found below was reestimated with the inclusion of this indicator, the results of which 
are found in Table C.1 in Appendix C. Similarly, to account for differences in retirement benefits between states 
(with better retirement benefits typically present in states with high legislative compensation), this indicator is 
additionally interacted with the main covariates of interest, the results of which are found in Table C.2 in Appendix 
C. 
94
 A legislator’s decision to Remain in Office (Status Quo) serves as the baseline category for comparison in the 
analysis below. 
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H1a: State legislators who are paid a higher salary are less likely to be defeated in 
their reelection attempt than to remain in their current office in any given year. 
H1b: State legislators who are paid a higher salary are less likely to seek other 
political offices than to remain in their current office in any given year. 
H1c: State legislators who are paid a higher salary are less likely to seek other 
employment in the private sector than to remain in their current office in any given 
year. 
Because of the era of professionalization that the American states experienced, state legislators 
enjoy an incumbency advantage which allows them to return to office at rate similar to their 
Congressional counterparts (e.g. Carey, Niemi, and Powell 2000; Ansolabehere and Snyder 
2002).  Yet, states with higher levels of legislative compensation typically have lower turnover 
rates than states with lower compensation (Oxendale 1979; Thompson and Moncrief 1992).  The 
above hypotheses are thus expected given that legislators in states which provide higher levels of 
compensation to the membership should be more likely to remain in office rather than pursue 
other exit alternatives. It should be noted that legislators in both high and low compensation 
states, because of professionalization, more often choose to remain in office rather than choosing 
any of these options (evidenced by the low turnover rates across the American states).  Thus the 
comparison of interest across exit alternatives centers on those how those legislators which are 
well paid for their time and service (higher legislative salary) differ from those legislators which 
are not afforded adequate compensation (lower legislative salary). 
The above hypotheses examine the effect of legislative compensation, the explicit benefit 
a member receives for their service, upon the individual exit decisions of state legislators. Yet, as 
addressed above, legislative pay does not exist in a vacuum and legislators need a reference point 
by which to generate a self-contemplated wage differential.  While an individual legislator’s 
expectation of pay from their previous profession cannot be directly observed, their current pay 
relative to the rest of the state (e.g. their constituency) however is known.  The consideration of 
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if the position of state legislator is considered sufficiently attractive to provide career incentives 
whereby an individual could support a family on the income from the position alone thus 
generates a similar set of empirically testable hypotheses concerning state legislative exit 
options: 
H2: State legislators in states where legislative salary is higher relative to their 
state’s median household income are less likely to voluntarily retire than to remain 
in their current office in any given year. 
H2a: State legislators in states where legislative salary is higher relative to their 
state’s median household income are less likely to be defeated in their reelection 
attempt than to remain in their current office in any given year. 
H2b: State legislators in states where legislative salary is higher relative to their 
state’s median household income are less likely to leave office in pursuit of another 
political office than to remain in their current office in any given year. 
H2c: State legislators in states where legislative salary is higher relative to their 
state’s median household income are less likely to seek other employment in the 
private sector than to remain in their current office in any given year. 
While legislators are in general more likely to remain in office rather than pursue any exit 
alternative, the above hypotheses are expected given the role of the self-contemplated wage 
differential in their decision-making calculus.  This tangible comparison between what the 
legislator is being paid for their service and the financial health of the rest of their state serves to 
enhance the attractiveness of remaining in their current position, making it more likely that they 
remain in office compared to choosing any of the exit alternatives. 
The next section thus addresses the data, variables, and methodology employed to 
examine the role that legislative compensation serves in the individual cost-benefit analysis in 
deciding whether to stay or retire from legislative service.  Similar to prior to studies, this essay 
too makes the assumption for the sake of analytical simplicity that there exists an inverse 
relationship between the likelihood of remaining in service and the costs of incurred from 
 186 
 
remaining in office (e.g. Brace 1985).  As such, the factors addressed below are narrowed to 
those which were previously examined and found the influence a state legislator’s expected 
utility of continued legislative service. 
4.4  Data and Methods 
To examine why individual American state legislators decide whether to remain in their 
elected position or voluntarily retire, this analysis considers the individual retirement 
decision of all American state legislators from 2000 to 2010.95  The data include 81,783 
total legislator by year observations96 with, on average, legislators serving 4.24 years in 
the dataset (Min= 1, Max = 11).97  However, state legislators (or legislators more 
generally) jointly consider multiple career decisions in any given year (e.g. Kiewiet and 
Zeng 1993; Kanthak 2011).  Examining each alternative separately “artificially truncates” 
(Kiewiet and Zeng 1993: 928) the actual alternatives which each member is 
simultaneously considering.98  As such, a competing risks model, in particular a 
                                                           
95
 Ideally, the analysis would include all retirement decisions since 1968, the point at which the American state 
legislatures underwent the process of professionalization. However, due to time and more importantly data 
limitations concerning the individual reasons for vacating the legislature, the time period of 2000-2010 was 
chosen. Future analysis shall attempt to extend this time period further back so to allow for meaningful variation in 
both state and national political and economic conditions. 
96
 230 (0.28%) observations were individuals who died while in office. Because “death” typically is unforeseen (and 
death that is foreseen usually results in early retirement due to illness/health concerns, as addressed below), the 
legislators exit is considered out of their control. As such, because the outcome death is unable to serve as a 
competing alternative, these cases are excluded from the analysis. 
97
 With the exception of Virginia, state legislators are compensated at the same level, regardless if they are a 
member of the upper or lower chamber. Given the theoretical argument of this essay considering the role that 
salary plays in a members decision to stay or go, movement between chambers is not considered an exit but rather 
a continuation of service, provided that service is contiguous. However, there were 288 (0.35%) observations 
where the legislator unsuccessfully ran for either the upper or lower chamber, while in service in the alternative 
chamber.  Given this understanding of how movement between chambers is viewed (with the exception of 
Virginia) these observations were coded as having lost their reelection bid.  
98
 Separate probit regression models were estimated to examine each exit choice individually. The results from 
these models are included for reference in the Table C.3  of Appendix C. The results from these individual models 
are similar to the main analysis below, though these regression estimates lack the precision of the multinomial 
probit model which simultaneously examines each exit outcome compared to a baseline category. 
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multinomial probit model, is employed to examine the factors which the influence state 
legislative retirement decisions.99 
The dependent variable is the outcome observed for each state legislator in a given 
year.100 There are five outcomes available: 1) Status Quo (N= 72,742, 88.94%): this outcome 
captures whether the state legislator remains in their elected position, 2) Retire (N=4,630, 
5.66%): this outcome captures whether the legislator foregoes the other outcome alternatives and 
returns to private citizenship,101 3) Lost Reelection (N=2,869, 3.51%): this outcome captures 
whether the legislator sought reelection to their political office but vacated their seat because the 
lost their reelection bid,102 4) Seek Other Political Office (N=1,384, 1.69%): this outcome 
captures whether the state legislator vacated their office to run for another elective office or if 
they were appointed to another political position, and 5) Other Employment (N=158, 0.19%): this 
outcome captures whether the legislator vacated their seat either through retirement or 
resignation to take a private sector job or to return to private employment. 
To examine the determinants of individual legislative retirement decisions, the following 
variables shall be considered.103  As discussed above, legislative pay is an important variable in 
explaining membership stability (e.g. Squire 1988a), and increasing legislative salary increases 
                                                           
99
 See Kanthak (2011) for a discussion concerning several methods for estimating competing risks models when 
examining legislative retirement, including the benefits and shortcomings of each method. 
100
 Data for this variable was taken from Scammon and McGillivray’s America Votes (various years), as well as was 
collected from a variety of sources including the state Secretary of State Office websites, legislative clerks, state 
legislative historians in each state, and LexisNexis searches. 
101
 69 (0.08%) observations were individuals who initially sought reelection but withdrew before either the primary 
or general election for personal or non-disclosed reasons. These individuals are coded as having retired. 
102
 If a politician expects to lose in their next election contest, they may strategically vacate their position prior to 
the election contest or choose not to run in this contest (e.g. Jacobson and Kernell 1983; Cox and Katz 2002).  
Strategic retirements however are difficult to differentiate from voluntary retirements, especially at the state level 
given the variation in saliency of these election contests.  As such, this analysis makes use of the standard 
approach of including the incumbent’s prior electoral vote share (see the variable, Electoral Expectations, as 
described below) to account for how their electoral prospects influence their choice of exit alternative. 
103
 See Table C.4 in Appendix C for the descriptive statistics associated with the following variables. 
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the probability of running (e.g. Fisman, Harmon, Kamenica, Munk 2012).  Thus, the key 
variables of interest for this essay involve the salary state legislators are compensated for their 
service in office.  Real Legislative Salary is a measure of the real legislative salary provided to 
the legislator in the given year for their service.104  To examine how a legislator’s pay compares 
to the rest of the states wages, the variable Pay Difference is measured as the difference between 
the Real Median Household Income 105 in each legislator’s state and their Real Legislative 
Salary.106  Increased positive values reflect larger real legislative compensation compared to 
smaller median household wages.107   
I include as controls the most common factors influencing legislative retirement 
grounded in the previous scholarly literature.  Positions of power within the legislature held by 
the individual member, which increase the prestige or intrinsic value that a member places on 
their seat, should decrease the likelihood that a member will voluntarily retire.  These positions 
include Party Leadership Positions108 and Committee Chairmanships.109  The Party 
Leadership Positions variable is a dichotomous variable measured 1 if the member holds a party 
                                                           
104 Data for this variable was taken from Krause and Douglas (2012) which was originally taken from the Book of 
the States (various years), and values are presented in real dollars (2005 = base year). 
105
 Median household income by state data were taken from the U.S. Census Bureau 
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/data/statemedian/index.html. 
106
 These values are presented in real dollars (2005 = base year). 
107
 It should be noted that these two key independent variables are measured at the state level because individual 
level values for the salary a member could reasonably expect to earn from their prior employment are impossible 
to obtain as addressed above.  As such, these variables reflect very little within state variation yet more between 
state variation. While individual level factors would be ideal for an analysis which utilizes individual level 
retirement decisions, this analysis represent a first step in attempting to understand how legislative compensation 
influences the choice of exit options. 
108
 While party leadership positions vary by state, all states possess a chamber leader and majority/minority party 
leaders.  For purposes of this analysis, party leadership positions are limited to the equivalent positions in each 
state. These data are taken from the various state legislative websites, publications, and web searches. 
109
 Chairmanships are for standing committees only. Interim, special, and select committees are excluded given the 
temporary nature of these committees. When considering the benefits a member receives from service on these 
committees in relation to the likelihood of remaining in their elected position, these benefits are temporary and 
often cease to remain at the start of the next legislative session. These data are taken from the various state 
legislative websites, state publications, and web searches. 
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leadership position and 0 otherwise.110  The Committee Chairmanships variable is a dichotomous 
variable measured 1 if the member holds a committee chairmanship or vice-chairmanship 
position and 0 otherwise.  Data for these variables were obtained from legislative clerks and state 
legislative historians in each state.  Further, given the prestige associated with being a member of 
the upper chamber, this status should decrease the likelihood that a member will voluntarily 
retire.  The dichotomous variable Member of Upper Chamber is coded 1 if the legislator is a 
member of the state’s upper chamber and 0 otherwise.111 
Given that state legislative elections are increasingly becoming more competitive (e.g. 
Salka 2009), and the cost to run a campaign for a state legislative seat has increased (Moncrief 
1992), a legislator’s Electoral Expectations can influence their retirement decisions.  
Legislators who won their last general election with a greater percentage of the total vote are 
seen as holding a less competitive seat and thus may expect a less difficult reelection campaign.  
This variable is measured as the percentage of the total vote the legislator garnered in the 
previous general election.112,113 
                                                           
110
 In many states, members receive additional compensation for serving in party and committee leadership 
positions.  See tables “Additional Compensation for Senate Leaders” and “Additional Compensation for 
House/Assembly Leaders” in the Book of the States (various years) for specific values.  These variables, thus 
capture the variation in the value attached to party and committee leadership positions which exists both within 
and between states. 
111
 Legislators (Senators) from Nebraska’s unicameral legislature are coded as being members of the state’s upper 
chamber. 
112
 Congressional studies of legislative retirement  often include a measure of the incumbent legislator’s electoral 
margin of victory of the 2
nd
 highest grossing candidate.  Others include a dichotomous variable for if the incumbent 
received an electoral share of 60% or more of the total vote (e.g Jewell  1982; Weber, Tucker, and Brace 1991).  
However, across the American states, variation exists in electoral rules which confounds the ability to include 
similar prior measures.  In particular, in many states which employ multimember districts, the margins of victory 
over other candidates are not possible and in many elections a 60 percent threshold would inaccurately code many 
winning candidates as being electorally vulnerable. Data for this variable was taken from Klarner, Carl, William 
Berry, Thomas Carsey, Malcolm Jewell, Richard Niemi, Lynda Powell, and James Snyder. State Legislative Election 
Returns (1967-2010). ICPSR34297-v1. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research 
[distributor], 2013-01-11. doi:10.3886/ICPSR34297.v1. 
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As addressed above, family is an important factor explaining state legislative turnover 
(e.g. Blair and Henry 1981).  Married is a dichotomous variable measured 1 if the member is 
married, and 0 otherwise.114  Children is a measure for whether the legislator has children for 
which their time away from them due to their legislative commitment, could cause a strain.  This 
dichotomous variable is measured 1 if the member has children and 0 otherwise.  Data for this 
variable was obtained from Project Vote Smart. Female is a dichotomous variable measured 1 if 
the member is a woman, and 0 if the member is a male.115   
Additionally, the Age116 of a members can influence the retirement decisions of state 
legislators (e.g. Francis and Baker 1986).  Further, the rate of progressive political ambition 
declines as age increases (e.g. Hain 1974; Fulton, Maestas, Maisel, and Stone 2006).  Since, time 
variables often do not have simple linear relationships, Age2 is included.117 
 As the previous literature has shown, differences exist between the incentives and cost 
structure, as well as in the individual behavior associated with being a state legislator in 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
113
 In many states, vacancies in office are filled through political appointments. The Electoral Expectations of these 
“appointed” observations are coded as 0% given that other arbitrary values misrepresent these observations 
(N=1018, 1.24%). A score of 100% would inaccurately assume that these observations are very secure in their 
electoral expectations, which is inconsistent and often incorrect given that many members who were initially 
appointed lose their reelection bids. Attempts to include a dummy variable for these observations results in the 
models being unable to converge. Further, an interaction between the Electoral Expectations and the dummy 
variable for Appointment is not possible due to collinearity. 
114
 Civil unions and same-sex partners are coded as being married. Divorced and separated are coded as not being 
married. 
115
 Data for these biographical variables was obtained from Project Vote Smart candidate biographies at 
http://votesmart.org/. 
116
 Data from this biographical variable was obtained from Project Vote Smart candidate biographies at 
http://votesmart.org/, Our Campaigns candidate biographies at http://www.ourcampaigns.com/, and various web 
searches. 
117
 Several other personal variables could be included but their inclusion in the analysis results in a failure of the 
models to converge. Scandals: members who vacated office due to their involvement in a political scandal are 
coded has having retired (N=161, 0.20%); Term-Limits: members who were term limited are coded as having 
retired, albeit it being a involuntary decision (N= 1584, 1.94%); and Illness/Health: members who vacated their 
office due to health concerns are coded as having retired (N=75, 0.09%).  The results from the main analysis are 
robust across specifications which omit these cases, and while analysis performed only on these cases would 
reveal if individuals experiencing these factors were significantly different from the main sample, the sample size 
of these cases prevents further examination. 
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amateur(citizen) legislatures compared to professional legislatures (e.g. Squire, Moncrief, and 
Jewell 2010).  Further, since it is difficult to get members to do “grueling and unrewarding 
legislative work” (Mayhew 1974, 141), a member’s satisfaction with their legislative body can 
influence their retirement decision (e.g. Francis and Baker 1986), with legislators who serve in 
more professionalized legislatures being more satisfied with their work than their counterparts in 
amateur legislative bodies because of the greater resources at their disposal (Opheim 1990).  To 
capture these additional effects of serving in legislatures with varying degrees of 
professionalization, a series of binary variables are included.  The National Conference of State 
Legislatures developed a categorization of the 50 American state legislatures which considers the 
amount of time spent on the job, the amount they are compensated for their service, and the size 
of the legislature’s staff.  States are grouped into 5 categories (Green, Green Lite, Gray, Gold 
Lite, and Gold), derived from 3 major categories: Green Legislatures (full-time, well-paid, large 
staff), Gray Legislatures (hybrid), and Gold Legislatures (part-time, low pay, small staff).118 As 
such, the dichotomous variables Green Lite, Gray, Gold Lite, and Gold are included.119  
Finally, to examine the potential for the burnout a member may experience the longer 
they are in office, I include a measure of time spent in their current legislative position.  Years in 
Office is a count variable for the number of years the member has served.   
                                                           
118
 Previous iterations of the NCSL rankings used Red, White, and Blue as color codes.  Members of Green 
Legislatures on average spend 82% of their time on the job, are paid $81,079, and have a total staff of 1340 
persons; Members of Gray Legislatures on average spend 70% of their time on the job, are paid $43,429, and have 
a total staff of 479 persons; and Members of Gold Legislatures on average spend 54% of their time on the job, are 
paid $19,197, and have a total staff of 169 persons.  Classifications and coding are taken from 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-legislatures/full-and-part-time-legislatures.aspx.  
119
 Given the salary component in all measures of professionalization, the dummy variable for Green Legislatures 
correlates with Real Legislative Salary and Pay Difference at 0.67 and 0.66 respectively. As such, Green 
Legislatures serve as the omitted category in the statistical analysis below. The remaining included categories 
correlate with these salary indicators from: -0.12 to 0.46 (Real Legislative Salary) and -0.43 to 0.45 (Pay Difference). 
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The next section considers the results from the statistical analysis in which a member’s 
decision to stay or vacate their office is influenced by legislative salary. 
4.5  Statistical Findings 
The results of the data analysis examining an individual state legislator’s decision to remain or 
vacate their position in a given year appears below in Table 4.2: 
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Table 4.2: Multinomial Probit With Status Quo as the Omitted Category (2000–2010) 
 
 Retire Defeat 
1A 1B 1C 2A 2B 2C 
Financial Factors 
Real 
Legislative 
Salary (thou) 
0.008***   
(0.001) – 
0.007***   
(0.001) 
–0.004***   
(0.001) – 
–0.007***      
(0.001) 
Pay Difference 
(thou) – 
0.005***   
(0.001) – – 
–0.012***   
(0.001) – 
Real Median 
Household 
Income (thou) 
– – 
0.003**   
(0.001) – – 
0.016***      
(0.001) 
Personal Factors 
Party 
Leadership 
0.187***   
(0.048) 
0.194***   
(0.048) 
0.188***   
(0.048) 
–0.295***   
(0.080) 
–0.285***   
(0.080) 
–0.297***      
(0.080) 
Committee 
Leadership  
–0.040*   
(0.023) 
–0.042*   
(0.023) 
–0.037+    
(0.023) 
–0.081***   
(0.027) 
–0.063**   
(0.028) 
–0.065**   
(0.027) 
Member of 
Upper 
Chamber 
–0.090***   
(0.025) 
–0.089***   
(0.025) 
–0.088***    
(0.025) 
–0.197***    
(0.031) 
–0.190***   
(0.031) 
–0.191***      
(0.031) 
Married 0.189***   (0.033) 
0.184***   
(0.033) 
0.192***   
(0.033) 
–0.094**   
(0.037) 
–0.082**   
(0.037) 
–0.075**      
(0.037) 
Female 0.018   (0.027) 
0.030 
(0.027) 
0.014   
(0.027) 
–0.002   
(0.031) 
–0.012   
(0.031) 
–0.025   
(0.031) 
Children –0.302***   (0.027) 
–0.298***   
(0.027) 
–0.305***   
(0.027) 
–0.096***   
(0.034) 
–0.105***   
(0.034) 
–0.113***      
(0.034) 
Age –0.037***   (0.007) 
–0.038***   
(0.007) 
–0.037***       
(0.007) 
–0.001   
(0.008) 
0.0005   
(0.008) 
0.001   
(0.008) 
Age2 0.0005***   (0.0001) 
0.0005***   
(0.0001) 
0.0005***          
(0.0001) 
0.0001+   
(0.0001) 
0.0001+   
(0.0001) 
0.0001+    
(0.0001) 
Green–Lite 0.650***   (0.057) 
0.566***   
(0.056) 
0.629***         
(0.057) 
–0.003    
(0.074) 
–0.271***    
(0.074) 
–0.121+    
(0.075) 
Gray 0.579***   (0.072) 
0.398***   
(0.069) 
0.545***         
(0.073) 
–0.015    
(0.089) 
–0.479***   
(0.085) 
–0.188**   
(0.090) 
Gold–Lite 0.637***   (0.085) 
0.398***    
(0.078) 
0.609***         
(0.086) 
0.015    
(0.104) 
–0.493***   
(0.095) 
–0.118   
(0.105) 
Gold 1.119***   (0.095) 
0.875***   
(0.091) 
1.071***         
(0.096) 
0.013   
(0.116) 
–0.649***   
(0.113) 
–0.246**   
(0.119) 
Electoral Factors 
Electoral 
Expectations 
–0.001**   
(0.0005) 
–0.002***   
(0.0004) 
–0.001*   
(0.0005) 
–0.009***   
(0.0005) 
–0.008***     
(0.0005) 
–0.008***     
(0.0005) 
Burnout Factors 
Years in 
Position 
0.024***   
(0.002) 
0.024***   
(0.002) 
0.024***      
(0.002) 
–0.002   
(0.002) 
–0.004*   
(0.002) 
–0.004*   
(0.002) 
Constant –2.538***   (0.214) 
–2.000***   
(0.198) 
–2.628***          
(0.220) 
–1.870***   
(0.254) 
–1.846***     
(0.234) 
–2.487***     
(0.260) 
N = 71,249 
 
 Other Political Other Employment 
3A 3B 3C 4A 4B 4C 
Financial Factors 
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Table 4.2 Continued 
Real 
Legislative 
Salary (thou) 
0.003**   
(0.001) – 
2.83E–07   
(0.001) 
–0.0003   
(0.003) – 
–0.003   
(0.003) 
Pay Difference 
(thou) – 
–0.005***   
(0.001) – – 
–0.005+   
(0.003) – 
Real Median 
Household 
Income (thou) 
– – 
0.014***   
(0.002) – – 
0.012***      
(0.003) 
Personal Factors 
Party 
Leadership 
0.088+   
(0.064) 
0.1018+   
(0.064) 
0.089+   
(0.064) 
–0.208   
(0.173) 
–0.203   
(0.173) 
–0.209    
(0.173) 
Committee 
Leadership  
–0.089***   
(0.032) 
–0.080**   
(0.032) 
–0.076**   
(0.032) 
–0.109+   
(0.072) 
–0.103+    
(0.072) 
–0.099+   
(0.073) 
Member of 
Upper 
Chamber 
0.263***   
(0.034) 
0.267***   
(0.034) 
0.268***     
(0.034) 
0.133*     
(0.077) 
0.136*   
(0.077) 
0.138*   
(0.077) 
Married 0.148***   (0.050) 
0.153***   
(0.050) 
0.166***      
(0.050) 
0.076   
(0.106) 
0.080   
(0.106) 
0.093   
(0.107) 
Female –0.005   (0.040) 
–0.004   
(0.041) 
–0.025   
(0.041) 
–0.075   
(0.097) 
–0.077   
(0.097) 
–0.093   
(0.097) 
Children –0.062
+
   
(0.040) 
–0.067*   
(0.040) 
–0.078*   
(0.041) 
–0.129+   
(0.086) 
–0.132+   
(0.086) 
–0.142+   
(0.087) 
Age 0.055***   (0.012) 
0.055***   
(0.012) 
0.056***      
(0.012) 
0.029   
(0.027) 
0.029   
(0.027) 
0.030    
(0.027) 
Age2 –0.001***   (0.0001) 
–0.001***   
(0.0001) 
–0.001***      
(0.0001) 
–0.0005**   
(0.0003) 
–0.0005**   
(0.0003) 
–0.0005**      
(0.0003) 
Green–Lite 0.294***   (0.077) 
0.043   
(0.079) 
0.174**   
(0.079) 
0.096   
(0.169) 
–0.040   
(0.173) 
–0.014   
(0.173) 
Gray 0.263***    (0.098) 
–0.199**    
(0.097) 
0.077   
(0.100) 
0.038   
(0.215) 
–0.208   
(0.213) 
–0.128   
(0.220) 
Gold–Lite 0.300***   (0.116) 
–0.238**   
(0.109) 
0.139   
(0.117) 
–0.080   
(0.256) 
–0.359+   
(0.244) 
–0.226   
(0.261) 
Gold 0.273**    (0.132) 
–0.353***   
(0.132) 
0.007   
(0.136) 
0.246   
(0.282) 
–0.094   
(0.284) 
0.005   
(0.292) 
Electoral Factors 
Electoral 
Expectations 
0.00001 
(0.00001) 
0.00001   
(0.00001) 
0.00001   
(0.00001) 
–0.00001 
(0.0001) 
0.000006   
(0.0001) 
–1.83E–06   
(0.0001) 
Burnout Factors 
Years in 
Position 
0.030***   
(0.003) 
0.029***    
(0.003) 
0.029***       
(0.003) 
0.035***   
(0.006) 
0.034***   
(0.006) 
0.034***      
(0.006) 
Constant –4.276***   (0.334) 
–3.840***   
(0.318) 
–4.726***      
(0.339) 
–4.050***   
(0.710) 
–3.920***   
(0.671) 
–4.432***      
(0.718) 
N = 71,249 
Notes: *** p ≤ 0.01; ** p  ≤ 0.05; * p ≤ 0.10; +significant at the 0.10 level (one–tailed test). 
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The omitted outcome is “Status Quo,” where there is no change and the legislator remains in 
their political office.  The coefficients reported are interpreted as the difference from this “no 
change” outcome.  The “A models” (1-4 A) represent regression results with the inclusion of 
only the variable for Real Legislative Salary, the “B models” (1-4 B) with the inclusion of only 
the variable for the Pay Difference, and the “C models” (1-4 C) include the components of the 
Pay Difference variable: Real Legislative Salary and Real Median Household Income.120 
Contrary to expectations, state legislators who voluntarily retire from their political office 
receive more compensation for their service than do those who remain in office (the “Status 
Quo” baseline category in the regression analysis).  This effect varies across the other outcomes, 
with those legislators who choose to remain in the legislature being paid more in cases of 
electoral defeat (significantly so) and retiring to seek other private employment, but more in 
cases of retiring to seek/take other political office.   
In cases of electoral defeat, the results are intuitive given the state politics literature 
which shows that the characteristics of the state legislature serve to attract members with similar 
career ambitions, with more professional legislatures placing greater valuation on their 
legislative seat and attracting more career oriented, long-term politicians compared to their 
amateur counterparts in less professional legislatures (e.g. Squire 1988a; Berkman 1994; Maestas 
2003).  Higher legislative salary can increase the valuation attached to a seat and can mitigate the 
                                                           
120
 It should be noted that due to the construction of the Pay Difference indicator, both it and the Real Legislative 
Salary indicator are very highly correlated.  Yet, because the data for these variables only varies by state (and with 
little change over time), the correlation is picking up non-changing values which overestimates the correlation, 
biasing it from 0 toward +1. Yet while a portion of the unexplained variance is mutually exclusive to each indicator, 
including both indicators in the same model results in a difficult interpretation of the Pay Difference variable, given 
that its construction is linked to the Real Legislative Salary indicator. Because of this, the “C” models include both 
the Real Legislative Salary and Real Median Household Income indicators, the constituent elements of the Pay 
Difference indicator, to observe how each component influences a state legislator’s exit option choice. 
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dampening effect upon quality challenger emergence (e.g. Hogan 2001).  Similarly, for 
legislators seeking/taking other political office, legislators from more professional legislatures 
harbor greater progressive ambition than their less professional counterparts (e.g. Maestas 2003).  
These results are mirrored in results for the additional control variables for state legislative 
professionalism, in particular those for professional and hybrid legislatures (Green-Lite and 
Gray). 
 Yet, in cases of retirement compared to remaining in the legislature, the results are less 
telling.  Given the difficulty in substantively understanding multinomial probit coefficients, 
Figure 4.2 below is constructed from the prior regression as reported in Table 4.2, and depicts 
the implied effects of legislative salary (from its minimum observed value to its maximum 
observed value, with all other variables held at their mean values) on the predicted probability of 
the various alternative outcomes: 
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Figure 4.2: Predicted Probabilities of Outcomes as a Function of Legislative Salary (Thou) 
 
What emerges from these figures, is that in cases concerning the probability of electoral defeat, 
taking/seeking another political position, or pursuing other private employment, the substantive 
probabilities are rather small.  These probabilities range from 3.3% (in instances of electoral 
defeat) to a tiny 0.16% (in instances of pursing private employment).  Yet, when examining 
cases of voluntary retirement, a more substantial story emerges. When legislative salary is at its 
lowest level (0 as in cases of New Mexico), the probability of retirement is about 3.5%.  
However, when salary is at its maximum level (as in cases of California in 2000), the probability 
of retirement is about 12.1%.  Taken together with the initial regression results, legislative salary 
does play a significant role in the decision of a state legislator to voluntarily leave their office, 
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albeit still only a ~12% likelihood of voluntarily retiring as opposed to remaining in office.  Even 
considering the effect of salary, the impetus to remain in their office and continue to receive the 
benefits from that position remains a strong draw for most legislators, as evidenced by the fact 
that there was only 11.05% turnover across the sample period.  As such, while salary may be 
important to the membership (e.g. Barro 1973; Stonecash 1993),  members consider a multitude 
of other factors when they make their carefully timed and rationale retirement decisions (e.g. 
Frantzich 1978). 
Yet, as addressed above, state legislators do not consider their salary in a vacuum.  
Legislators are aware that their compensation has failed to keep pace with the average wage of 
other jobs in their states (e.g. Kelderman 2007; The New York Times 2008).  As such, the results 
of the a state legislator’s difference in pay on their decision to remain in office or retire in a 
given year appear above in Table 4.2, Models 1B-4B.  Recall that the Pay Difference variable is 
measured as the difference between each legislator’s Legislative Salary and their state’s real 
median household income, with positive values reflecting larger legislative compensation 
compared to a smaller median household wage. 
In examining these results, a similar pattern emerges concerning a state legislator’s pay 
and their choice of alternatives.  As the difference between the wages a member receives and the 
median wages of their state increases, state legislators are less likely to be defeated in their 
reelection bid, seek/take another political office, or pursue private employment rather than 
remain in the legislature. Contrary to theoretical expectations, as the wage difference increases 
(better legislative wages compared to paltry outside wages), state legislators are more likely to 
voluntarily retire from their position.  Again, the salary a member is compensated for their 
service does not produce the retention effect that many of the prior studies of legislative 
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retirement.  Members are deciding to vacate their office, potentially absorbing an increasingly 
costly financial hit, as they reenter an electorate that is financially worse off than they are.  To 
provide insight into the substantive effects observed, Figure 4.3 below is constructed from the 
prior regression as reported in Table 4.2 above, and depicts the implied effects of the Pay 
Difference (from its minimum observed value to its maximum observed value, with all other 
variables held at their mean values) on the predicted probability of the various alternate 
outcomes: 
 
  
  
Figure 4.3: Predicted Probabilities of Outcomes as a Function of Pay Difference (Thou) 
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What emerges from these figures, is that in all cases concerning the alternatives compared to the 
Status Quo, the substantive probability is rather small.  These probabilities range from a tiny 
0.36% (in instances of electoral defeat) to 9.0% (in instances of voluntary retirement).  Taken 
together with the initial regression results, while legislative salary again does influence a state 
legislator’s decision to voluntarily leave their position, the substantive effect of it is rather 
negligible.  
The results from examining legislative salary, both in levels as well as relative to the 
state’s median household income, paint a picture of legislative behavior for certain exit 
alternative choices contrary to expectations found in the previous literature (e.g. Blair and Henry 
1981; Francis and Baker 1986; Jewell and Breaux 1988; Squire 1988a).  Yet, as addressed above, 
legislative compensation and how it compares to other state wages both influence the decision-
making calculus of potential candidates and incumbents in deciding whether to run for the 
legislature (Chubb 1988; Weber, Tucker, and Brace 1991; Van Dunk 1997; Kurtz, Moncrief, 
Niemi, and Powell 2006).  Given the inherent difficulty in interpreting the findings when both 
indicators are included in the same model, considering the constituent elements of the Pay 
Difference indicator separately offer some further insight into the influence of legislative 
compensation on exit alternative choice.  The results of this analysis appear above in Table 4.2, 
Models 1C-4C. 
 Once these constituent indicators are included in the same analysis, several consistent 
effects emerge. First, Real Legislative Salary significantly increases the likelihood that a state 
legislator will choose to voluntarily retire or leave office for another political position (though 
not found to significantly influence this likelihood) compared to the status quo/remaining in 
office, whereas consistent with theoretical expectations, it decreases the likelihood of being 
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defeated in their reelection contest and leaving office in pursuit of other private sector 
employment (though insignificant).  Interestingly, across all exit alternatives, the Real Median 
Household Income in a state significantly increases the likelihood of choosing an alternative 
exit option compared to remaining in office.  What these divergent results tell is that while 
legislative salary may not be the best incentive for motivating individuals to serve in public 
office, how the economic health of the legislator’s constituency (vis-à-vis the real median 
household income of the state) provides a significant draw for the legislator when deciding 
whether to stay or vacate their position. These findings perhaps best purport with the findings of 
Stonecash (1993) who examined the New York Legislature and questioned the literature which 
suggests that the inclination to pursue reelection may involve financial considerations.   
For the previous findings to be true, whereby, salary levels serve as incentive for 
legislators to seek reelection, 1) the two should have a positive association and 2) real salary 
increases should precede or at least coincide with increases in the inclination to stay in office.  
Stonecash’s (1993) findings reveal that in the case of New York, that while they do have a weak 
association, there was a steady rise in the inclination to pursue reelection among incumbents in 
the legislature though real salary levels remained essentially the same from 1870 to 1940.  
Further, though legislative salary has lagged, this has not led to an increase in tenure amongst 
incumbents, suggesting that further investigation into the source of increased interest in the 
position needs to start somewhere other than salary.  Consistent with the findings from the above 
analysis, Stonecash (1993) further examines the ratio of legislative salary to income per capita in 
New York, and finds that the pursuit of reelection was greatest when the salary ratio was highest, 
and surmises that that legislators consider the opportunity cost of holding their position 
(particularly as the legislative session length increases, as have sessions in New York).  Taken 
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together, the findings from this analysis seem to generalize these state-centric finding to 
legislative compensation across the American states. 
Consistent with this claim, as stated above, the intent of this analysis is to examine 
individual retirement decisions of state legislators from 2000-2010.  Yet, the two key 
independent variables are measured at the state level because of the impossibility of determining 
individual level values for the salary a member could reasonably expect to earn from their prior 
employment.  As such, the above analysis is unable to include individual level and state level 
effects which are present in the hypothesized relationships.  In an attempt to empirically examine 
these multilevel effects, this dissertation essay exhausted a variety of advanced methods: 
Generalized Linear Latent And Mixed Modeling (GLLAMM) for multinomial probit models, 
generalized multinomial logit, fixed effects multinomial logit, multinomial probit with 
dichotomous indicators included for years, states, and legislative chambers.  However, each 
method was unsuccessful or inapplicable due to the number of observations or form of the data.   
 Yet, an important robustness check available concerning these multilevel effects involves 
utilizing the GLLAMM estimation procedure for a two-level random intercept probit model, 
developed by Sophia Rabe-Hesketh as part of joint work with Anders Skrondal and Andrew 
Pickles.  Using this procedure, the individual exit alternatives probit models found in Table C.3 
in Appendix C were re-estimated while controlling for both individual and state level effects, 
with the results of this analysis being presented in Table C.5 in Appendix C.  Examination of 
these results reveals a pattern consistent with the findings from both the individual exit option 
models found in Table C.3 and the findings from the main analysis found in Table 4.2, such that 
Real Legislative Salary increases the likelihood that an individual legislator chooses any of the 
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four alternatives compared to remaining in office, and, that the Pay Difference significantly 
decreases the likelihood that an individual legislator make the same choice of exit alternatives.   
 Yet, the above theory governing legislative retirement decisions is exclusively focused on 
the compensation afforded a member for their service (and how that compensation compares to 
other wages in the state).  The vast literature examining the era of professionalism states 
experienced, to varying degrees, suggests that other factors may play a role in shaping the 
retirement decisions of American state legislators. Most measures of state legislative 
professionalism consist of three components: legislator compensation, legislative resources 
measured as staff or expenditures, and session length (e.g. Grumm 1971; Morehouse 1981; 
Bowman and Kearney 1988; Squire 1992b; Kousser and Phillips 2009).  As such, the main 
analysis above was re-estimated to include measures of state legislative session length (Session 
Length), coded as the number of days a state legislature is in session in a given year, and the 
legislative resources allocated to each legislator (Expenditures Per Legislator),121 coded as the 
expenditures per legislator in thousands of dollars.122,123 
The results from this alternative analysis are presented in Table 4.3 below:124 
                                                           
121
 Data for this variable was taken from the “Bill and Resolution Introductions and Enactments” table in The Book 
of the States (various years). Missing data was resolved through the use of state legislative session calendars. 
Information unable to be resolved through these means was imputed in STATA. Given that state legislative session 
lengths do not vary much from one year to the next, this method is appropriate. In some states, the Book of the 
States lists different session lengths for each legislative chamber. As such, this alternative analysis employs the 
lower session length of the two chambers listed for that state, to avoid overestimating the session length of the 
state legislature. 
122
 These data were taken from Bowen and Greene (2014). 
123
 The NCSL color variables correlate with these additional measures of professionalism at: -0.14 (Gold Lite) to 
0.35 (Green Lite) [Session Length] and -0.29 (Gold) to 0.18 (Green Lite) [Expenditures Per Legislator]. To avoid 
entering indicators for session length, compensation, and legislative resources multiple times into the model, the 
NCSL color code indicators were omitted from this alternative analysis. The influence of these NCSL color indicators 
is further examined in supplemental analysis which omits the key indicators, the results of which are found in 
Table C.6 in Appendix C. Given the consistent findings across specifications, the inclusions of both the key 
indicators and the NCSL color indicators is appropriate.  
124
 To ensure that the variance in legislative pay is not driven entirely by the professionalization of a state 
legislature, supplemental analysis is conducted in which the sample is divided into three professionalization 
groups: Amateur (Gold and Gold Lite legislatures), Hybrid (Gray legislatures), and Professional (Green and Green 
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Table 4.3: Multinomial Probit With Status Quo as the Omitted Category (2000–2010)  
– Additional Professionalism Indicators 
 
 Retire Defeat 
1A 1B 1C 2A 2B 2C 
Financial Factors 
Real 
Legislative 
Salary (thou) 
0.002***   
(0.001) – 
0.002**   
(0.001) 
–0.004***   
(0.001) – 
–0.006***       
(0.001) 
Pay Difference 
(thou) – 
–0.0002   
(0.0008) – – 
–0.010***   
(0.001) – 
Real Median 
Household 
Income (thou) 
– – 
0.006***   
(0.001) – – 
0.015***       
(0.001) 
Professionalism Factors 
Session Length –0.001***   (0.0002) 
–0.0005***   
(0.0001) 
–0.001***      
(0.0002) 
0.00003   
(0.0002) 
0.0005***   
(0.0002) 
0.0001   
(0.0002) 
Expenditures 
Per Legislator 
0.00005***   
(0.00002) 
0.0001***   
(0.00002) 
0.00006***      
(0.00002) 
0.00004*   
(0.00002) 
0.0001***    
(0.00002) 
0.00006**   
(0.00002) 
Personal Factors 
Party 
Leadership 
0.226***   
(0.048) 
0.226***   
(0.048) 
0.225***      
(0.048) 
–0.309***   
(0.082) 
–0.312***    
(0.082) 
–0.313***       
(0.083) 
Committee 
Leadership  
–0.029   
(0.023) 
–0.025   
(0.023) 
–0.023   
(0.023) 
–0.100***   
(0.028) 
–0.083***   
(0.028) 
–0.083***       
(0.028) 
Member of 
Upper 
Chamber 
–0.108 ***  
(0.026) 
–0.107***   
(0.026) 
–0.106***      
(0.026) 
–0.201***    
(0.032) 
–0.195***   
(0.032) 
–0.194***      
(0.032) 
Married 0.190***   (0.034) 
0.187***   
(0.034) 
0.197***      
(0.034) 
–0.095**   
(0.038) 
–0.087**   
(0.038) 
–0.075**      
(0.038) 
Female 0.018   (0.027) 
0.020   
(0.027) 
0.009   
(0.027) 
–0.006   
(0.032) 
–0.019   
(0.032) 
–0.030   
(0.032) 
Children –0.315***   (0.028) 
–0.312***   
(0.028) 
–0.323***      
(0.028) 
–0.077**    
(0.035) 
–0.078**   
(0.035) 
–0.093***   
(0.035) 
Age –0.039***   (0.007) 
–0.039***   
(0.007) 
–0.038***      
(0.007) 
–0.001    
(0.008) 
0.001   
(0.008) 
0.001   
(0.008) 
Age2 0.0005***   (0.0001) 
0.0005***   
(0.0001) 
0.0005***      
(0.0001) 
0.0001+   
(0.0001) 
0.0001   
(0.0001) 
0.0001   
(0.0001)   
Electoral Factors 
Electoral 
Expectations 
–0.003***   
(0.0004) 
–0.003***   
(0.0004) 
–0.002***      
(0.0005) 
–0.009***   
(0.0005) 
–0.008***   
(0.0005) 
–0.007***      
(0.0005) 
Burnout Factors 
Years in 
Position 
0.021***   
(0.002) 
0.021***    
(0.002) 
0.021***      
(0.002) 
–0.001   
(0.002) 
–0.002    
(0.002) 
–0.003   
(0.002) 
Constant –1.498***   (0.195) 
–1.501***   
(0.199) 
–1.810***      
(0.205) 
–1.893***   
(0.230) 
–2.448***   
(0.237) 
–2.749***      
(0.243) 
N = 67,529 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Lite legislatures), the results of which are found in Tables C.7, C.8, and C.9 in Appendix C.  Across the three groups, 
similar trends in both magnitude and significance are found, though with some variation in the direction of the 
effect depending on which group is examined. From a theoretical perspective, the impact of salary on legislative 
exit choice should be most powerful for members of Hybrid legislatures, where the demands of the job have 
increased over time yet salary often fails to adequately compensate for this commitment. 
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Table 4.3 Continued 
 Other Political Other Employment 
3A 3B 3C 4A 4B 4C 
Financial Factors 
Real 
Legislative 
Salary (thou) 
–0.001   
(0.001) – 
–0.003***      
(0.001) 
–0.001   
(0.003) – 
–0.002   
(0.003) 
Pay Difference 
(thou) – 
–0.006***   
(0.001) – – 
–0.004+    
(0.002) – 
Real Median 
Household 
Income (thou) 
– – 
0.015***        
(0.001) – – 
0.013***           
(0.003) 
Professionalism Factors 
Session Length 0.0002   (0.0002) 
0.0006***    
(0.0002) 
0.0002   
(0.0002) 
0.0004   
(0.0004) 
0.0007*   
(0.0004) 
0.0005    
(0.0004) 
Expenditures 
Per Legislator 
0.0001***   
(0.00002) 
0.0002***   
(0.00002 ) 
0.0001***      
(0.00002) 
–0.00004   
(0.00007) 
5.88E–06   
(0.0001) 
–0.00002   
(0.00007) 
Personal Factors 
Party 
Leadership 
0.079   
(0.066) 
0.076   
(0.066) 
0.074   
(0.066) 
–0.204    
(0.174) 
–0.206   
(0.174) 
–0.210   
(0.174) 
Committee 
Leadership  
–0.079**   
(0.033) 
–0.068**   
(0.033) 
–0.065**      
(0.033) 
–0.110+   
(0.073) 
–0.103+   
(0.073) 
–0.099+    
(0.073) 
Member of 
Upper 
Chamber 
0.253***   
(0.035) 
0.254***   
(0.035) 
0.257***      
(0.035) 
0.122+   
(0.078) 
0.123+    
(0.078) 
0.127+    
(0.078) 
Married 0.142***    (0.051) 
0.145***   
(0.051) 
0.160***      
(0.051) 
0.055   
(0.107) 
0.058   
(0.108) 
0.074   
(0.108) 
Female –0.007   (0.041) 
–0.015  
(0.041) 
–0.030   
(0.041) 
–0.101   
(0.100) 
–0.106   
(0.100) 
–0.122   
(0.100) 
Children –0.061
+
   
(0.042) 
–0.061+   
(0.042) 
–0.076*   
(0.042) 
–0.118+   
(0.088) 
–0.118+   
(0.088) 
–0.131+   
(0.088) 
Age 0.057***   (0.012) 
0.057***   
(0.012) 
0.059***       
(0.013) 
0.036+   
(0.027) 
0.036+   
(0.027) 
0.037+   
(0.027) 
Age2 –0.001***   (0.0001) 
–0.001***    
(0.0001) 
–0.0008***    
(0.0001) 
–0.0006**   
(0.0003) 
–0.001**   
(0.0003) 
–0.001**      
(0.0003) 
Electoral Factors 
Electoral 
Expectations 
0.00001   
(0.00001) 
0.00001   
(0.00001) 
0.00001   
(0.00001) 
–0.00001   
(0.0002) 
–9.14E–06    
(0.0002) 
–3.07E–06   
(0.0001127) 
Burnout Factors 
Years in 
Position 
0.031***   
(0.003) 
0.031***   
(0.003) 
0 .030***      
(0.003) 
0.035***   
(0.006) 
0.035***   
(0.006) 
0.035***      
(0.006) 
Constant –4.034***   (0.318) 
–4.330***   
(0.322) 
–4.743***      
(0.328) 
–4.181***   
(0.676) 
–4.370***   
(0.685) 
–4.788***      
(0.698) 
N = 67,529 
Notes: *** p ≤ 0.01; ** p  ≤ 0.05; * p ≤ 0.10; +significant at the 0.10 level (one–tailed test). 
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As the results in the above table reveal, the inclusion of the additional professionalization 
indicators (Session Length and Expenditures Per Legislator) yielded results similar to those 
from the model specification used in the main analysis in this essay, though with some minor 
attenuation in magnitude and significance.  Only of instances where a legislator chooses to leave 
office in pursuit of another political office did the direction of the effect of legislative 
compensation change, though only when the median household income of the state was consider 
was the effect found to be statistically significant.  Similarly, in instances of voluntary 
retirement, the effect of the pay difference change direction, though this effect was not found to 
be statistically significant.  With the exception of voluntary retirement, longer legislative 
sessions increase the likelihood that a member chooses the other exit alternatives compared to 
remaining in their current position.  Similarly, only in instances of a member choosing to seek 
other private sector employment, did an increase in the total expenditures per legislature decrease 
the likelihood that a member chooses that alternative compared to staying in office.  However, 
across the various exit alternatives, only in the case of voluntary retirement (Models 1A-1C) are 
the both additional professionalization indicators (Session Length and Expenditures Per 
Legislator) consistently shown to be significant predictors, and in instances of a legislator 
choosing to vacate their current office in pursuit of another political office (Models 3A-3C), 
only the resources afforded each legislator (Expenditures Per Legislator) are consistently 
found to be a statistically significant influence on an individual legislator’s exit choice.125  
                                                           
125
 Salary and Session Length perhaps interact in a more nuanced manner, e.g. legislatures where pay either is 
paltry compared to the required time on the job or where legislators are overcompensated for very little required 
time on the job, thus altering a member’s valuation of their seat and in turn influencing whether they remain in 
the position of vacate for better opportunities. As such, supplemental analysis considers the legislative salary 
specifications (the “A” models) from the analysis used in Table 4.3, and examines the conditional impact of salary 
and session length, the results of which are found in Table C.10 in Appendix C.  Across the various exit alternatives, 
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Interestingly, the greater the resources afforded a state legislator, the more likely they are the 
vacate their position. This finding is counter-intuitive given that we should expect that greater 
resources, typically conceptualized as something which would make the legislator’s job easier, 
should enhance their satisfaction with their position and decrease the likelihood of them vacating 
their office.  Perhaps because of the very nature of resources, in easing the burden of performing 
their legislative tasks, members with greater resources are capable of accomplishing the goals 
they originally entered office seeking to attain.  For members choosing to voluntarily retire, the 
members may be satisfied with their progress, and choose to retire to return to the demands of 
non-electoral life, which is especially important in less professional legislatures where elective 
service is viewed as part-time and often a civic duty.  Similarly, because the member may be 
able to accomplish their goals, they may be better able to parlay these accomplishments into 
other political service.  Yet, having these greater resources should enhance the valuation of the 
legislative seat attracting greater, and more qualified, electoral competition, resulting in a greater 
likelihood of electoral defeat.   
This alternative analysis reveals that the professionalism of a state legislature does 
influence the decision-making calculus of an individual legislator, though the effect varies 
depending on what exit alternative is being considered compared to remaining in office (status 
quo), and these findings are sensible given the attention that legislative salary as an indicator has 
received in the extant literature (e.g. Opheim 1991).   
Yet salary alone may not be the best predictor of the financial need to pursue an exit 
alternative.  As discussed above, legislative salary, especially in the more amateur legislatures, 
may not be a substitute for income the member can earn in a profession outside of the legislature.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
the inclusion of this conditional effect fails to yield a significant effect, and though the findings remain robust, 
several effects experienced an attenuation in their previously found level significance. 
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The wealthier an individual or those members who are employed in high-paying jobs, should be 
less sensitive to the influence of low legislative compensation.  However, measuring an 
individual’s wealth or earning potential is inherently problematic, as previously discussed.  Thus, 
in an attempt to examine this alternative influence, a crude measure of an individual’s earning 
potential is constructed from their educational experience.  There is a strong belief that there is a 
relationship between attaining higher levels of education and an individual’s earning potential 
(e.g. Julian and Kominski 2011).  Thus, the variable Earning Potential is coded 1 if the state 
legislator possesses a graduate-level degree (master’s/professional degree, J.D., Ph.D.), and 0 if 
the state legislator possessed a lower level educational degree (high school/GED, associate, or 
BA/BS degree).126,127  As such, the main analysis above was re-estimated to include this 
indicator, and the results from this alternative analysis are presented in Table 4.4 below: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
126
 Data for this variable was obtained from Project Vote Smart candidate biographies at http://votesmart.org/. 
127
 Given the large variation in the earning potential of individuals with master’s degrees and Ph.D’s which could 
bias the effect downwards, supplemental analysis considers only those individuals with MBA’s and J.D.’s. The 
results of this analysis are found in Table C.11 in Appendix C. Across both specifications, similar findings 
concerning the influence of an individual’s earning potential and their choice of exit option are revealed.  The only 
difference between models was that when the limited indicator of earning potential is considered, it makes 
individual less likely to retire to seek other employment in the private sector, though this effect is not significant.    
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Table 4.4: Multinomial Probit With Status Quo as the Omitted Category (2000–2010) 
 – Earning Potential Indicator  
 
 Retire Defeat 
1A 1B 1C 2A 2B 2C 
Financial Factors 
Real 
Legislative 
Salary (thou) 
0.007***   
(0.001) – 
0.007***      
(0.001) 
–0.004***      
(0.001) – 
–0.007***      
(0.001) 
Pay Difference 
(thou) – 
0.004***       
(0.001) – – 
–0.012***         
(0.001) – 
Real Median 
Household 
Income (thou) 
– – 
0.003**   
(0.001) – – 
0.016***      
(0.001) 
Earning 
Potential 
–0.039   
(0.038) 
–0.043   
(0.038) 
–0.038   
(0.038) 
–0.035    
(0.044) 
–0.034   
(0.045) 
–0.031   
(0.045) 
Personal Factors 
Party 
Leadership 
0.200***      
(0.049) 
0.207***         
(0.049) 
0.200***         
(0.049) 
–0.294***            
(0.082) 
–0.284***               
(0.082) 
–0.296***               
(0.082) 
Committee 
Leadership  
–0.034+   
(0.023) 
–0.035+   
(0.023) 
–0.031+   
(0.023) 
–0.080***            
(0.028) 
–0.062**   
(0.028) 
–0.065**      
(0.028) 
Member of 
Upper 
Chamber 
–0.087***         
(0.026) 
–0.087***            
(0.026) 
–0.086***            
(0.026) 
–0.205***            
(0.032) 
–0.200***               
(0.032) 
–0.200***               
(0.032) 
Married 0.172***         (0.034) 
0.167***            
(0.034) 
0.176***            
(0.034) 
–0.089**   
(0.038) 
–0.077**      
(0.038) 
–0.070*   
(0.038) 
Female 0.010   (0.028) 
0.020   
(0.028) 
0.005   
(0.028) 
0.004   
(0.032) 
–0.006   
(0.032) 
–0.020   
(0.032) 
Children –0.295***       (0.028) 
–0.291***            
(0.028) 
–0.298***            
(0.028) 
–0.083**   
(0.035) 
–0.093***                  
(0.035) 
–0.101***                  
(0.035) 
Age –0.039***            (0.007) 
–0.039***               
(0.007) 
–0.038***            
(0.007) 
0.00003  
(0.008) 
0.002   
(0.008) 
0.002    
(0.008) 
Age2 0.0005***            (0.0001) 
0.0005***               
(0.0001) 
0.0005***               
(0.0001) 
0.0001+   
(0.00008) 
0.0001   
(0.0001) 
0.0001   
(0.0001) 
Green–Lite 0.638***           (0.058) 
0.549***                     
(0.058) 
0.613***               
(0.059) 
–0.019   
(0.075) 
–0.289***                     
(0.076) 
–0.140*    
(0.076) 
Gray 0.555***                   (0.074) 
0.367***                     
(0.071) 
0.518***      
(0.075) 
–0.025   
(0.091) 
–0.491***                     
(0.087) 
–0.201**    
(0.092) 
Gold–Lite 0.606***                  (0.088) 
0.360***                     
(0.080) 
0.574***               
(0.088) 
–0.0004   
(0.106) 
–0.510 ***           
(0.097) 
–0.137   
(0.107) 
Gold 1.089***                   (0.098) 
0.835***                     
(0.093) 
1.035***               
(0.099) 
0.012   
(0.119) 
–0.652***                     
(0.115) 
–0.251**   
(0.122) 
Electoral Factors 
Electoral 
Expectations 
–0.001**   
(0.0005) 
–0.002***                      
(0.0005) 
–0.001**      
(0.0005) 
–0.008***                      
(0.0005) 
–0.008***                          
(0.0005) 
–0.007***                          
(0.0005) 
Burnout Factors 
Years in 
Position 
0.024***                
(0.002) 
0.024***                          
(0.002) 
0.024***                          
(0.002) 
–0.002   
(0.002) 
–0.004*   
(0.002) 
–0.004*   
(0.002) 
Constant –2.463***                   (0.220) 
–1.943***                          
(0.203) 
–2.570***                             
(0.226) 
–1.905***                        
(0.260) 
–1.884***                          
(0.240) 
–2.534***                          
(0.267) 
N = 67,631 
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Table 4.4 Continued 
 Other Political Other Employment 
3A 3B 3C 4A 4B 4C 
Financial Factors 
Real 
Legislative 
Salary (thou) 
0.003**   
(0.001) – 
–0.0004   
(0.001) 
–0.0006   
(0.003) – 
–0.004   
(0.003) 
Pay Difference 
(thou) – 
–0.005***   
(0.001) – – 
–0.005+   
(0.003) – 
Real Median 
Household 
Income (thou) 
– – 
0.015***   
(0.002) – – 
0.013***    
(0.004) 
Earning 
Potential 
–0.068   
(0.056) 
–0.070   
(0.056) 
–0.066   
(0.056) 
0.141+    
(0.108) 
0.140+   
(0.108) 
0.145+   
(0.108) 
Personal Factors 
Party 
Leadership 
0.103+    
(0.066) 
0.117*    
(0.065) 
0.105+   
(0.066) 
–0.282+   
(0.187) 
–0.276+    
(0.187) 
–0.283+   
(0.188) 
Committee 
Leadership  
–0.102**   
(0.033) 
–0.092***   
(0.033) 
–0.088***      
(0.033) 
–0.107+   
(0.074) 
–0.100+    
(0.074) 
–0.096+   
(0.074) 
Member of 
Upper 
Chamber 
0.267***    
(0.035) 
0.270***      
(0.035) 
0.271***      
(0.035) 
0.143*   
(0.078) 
0.146*   
(0.078) 
0.148*   
(0.079) 
Married 0.160***   (0.051) 
0.164***      
(0.051) 
0.179***      
(0.051) 
0.063   
(0.107) 
0.067   
(0.107) 
0.081   
(0.108) 
Female 0.002   (0.041) 
0.002   
(0.041) 
–0.020   
(0.042) 
–0.060   
(0.098) 
–0.063    
(0.098) 
–0.080   
(0.098) 
Children –0.074*   (0.041) 
–0.079*     
(0.041) 
–0.090**   
(0.042) 
–0.120+   
(0.088) 
–0.124+   
(0.088) 
–0.135+   
(0.088) 
Age 0.056***       (0.012) 
0.056***          
(0.013) 
0.057***          
(0.013) 
0.027   
(0.027) 
0.026   
(0.027) 
0.027   
(0.027) 
Age2 –0.001***       (0.0001) 
–0.001***          
(0.0001) 
–0.001***          
(0.0001) 
–0.0005*   
(0.0003) 
–0.0005*   
(0.0003) 
–0.0005**   
(0.0003) 
Green–Lite 0.272***          (0.079) 
0.006   
(0.081) 
0.145*   
(0.081) 
0.120   
(0.172) 
–0.025   
(0.176) 
0.004   
(0.177)   
Gray 0.241**   (0.101) 
–0.245**   
(0.100) 
0.044   
(0.103) 
0.043   
(0.220) 
–0.217   
(0.217) 
–0.129   
(0.225) 
Gold–Lite 0.261**      (0.119) 
–0.303***   
(0.112) 
0.090   
(0.121) 
–0.085   
(0.261) 
–0.378+   
(0.249) 
–0.238   
(0.266) 
Gold 0.251*   (0.135) 
–0.407***   
(0.135) 
–0.031   
(0.139) 
0.270   
(0.287) 
–0.089   
(0.289) 
0.018   
(0.298) 
Electoral Factors 
Electoral 
Expectations 
0.00001   
(0.00001) 
0.00001   
(0.00001) 
0.00001   
(0.00001) 
–7.22E–06   
(0.0001) 
–5.68E–06   
(0.0001) 
–2.01E–06   
(0.0001) 
Burnout Factors 
Years in 
Position 
0.030***          
(0.003) 
0.028***             
(0.003) 
0.028***             
(0.003) 
0.036***             
(0.006) 
0.035***   
(0.006) 
0.035***      
(0.006) 
Constant –4.275***             (0.344) 
–3.838***                
(0.327) 
–4.759***                
(0.349) 
–3.998***                 
(0.716) 
–3.873***                 
(0.677) 
–4.401***                 
(0.725) 
N = 67,631 
Notes: *** p ≤ 0.01; ** p  ≤ 0.05; * p ≤ 0.10; +significant at the 0.10 level (one–tailed test). 
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The results of this alternative analysis again yielded findings similar to those from the 
model specification used in the main analysis in this essay.  Compared to remaining in office, 
those state legislators with greater earning potential, vis-à-vis possessing higher levels of 
education, were less likely to voluntarily retire, be defeated in their reelection attempt, or seek 
another political office, however none of these effects were found to be statistically significant.  
Interestingly, only in cases of a legislator deciding to retire to take employment in the private 
sector does a state legislator’s earning potential have a marginally significant (1-tailed) and 
positive effect.128  This however is sensible, given that a legislator with greater earning potential 
should have greater prospects for more lucrative employment outside of the legislature, and thus 
would choose to vacate their seat in pursuit of this employment. 
Perhaps the specification of the dependent variable used in the main analysis presents an 
overly nuanced understanding of the decision-making process of an incumbent state legislator.  
Two aspects of the coding for the dependent variable in the above analysis warrant additional 
examination.  First, considering a state legislator’s exit resulting from electoral defeat, this 
alternative perhaps does not signify a choice by an incumbent politician, as no politician chooses 
to be defeated.  As such, considering the status quo of remaining in office and electoral defeat as 
a single category may be more representative.  Second, as addressed above, it is difficult to 
determine whether an state legislator retired from office to take a position in the private sector as 
opposed to simply retiring and potentially facing unemployment.  As such, these exit alternatives 
may best be considered as a single category.  A simplified version of the dependent variable used 
                                                           
128
 Salary however may serve to  dampen the effect of an individual’s earning potential, such that high legislative 
salary may entice an individual with a sufficiently high earning potential (e.g. possesses a higher education degree) 
to remain in office rather than vacating their office.  Supplemental analysis thus considers the legislative salary 
specifications (the “A” models) from the analysis used in Table 4.4 and includes the conditional influence of 
legislative salary and an individual’s earning potential, the results of this analysis are found in Table C.12 in 
Appendix C. However, even when this conditional effect is considered, the same null findings from this alterative 
analysis, as they relate to the influence of a legislator’s earning potential, persist.  
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in the main analysis above is thus constructed by 1) combining the “status quo” and “defeat” exit 
alternative categories into a new baseline category “seek re-election,” 2) combining the “other 
employment” categories into the “retire” category, and 3) leaving the “other political” category 
unchanged.  The main analysis conducted above is re-estimated with the substitution of this 
simplified dependent variable, and the results from this alternative analysis are presented in 
Table 4.5 below: 
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Table 4.5: Multinomial Probit With Seek Reelection as the Omitted Category (2000–2010) 
– Simplified Dependent Variable 
 
 Retired Other Political 
1A 1B 1C 2A 2B 2C 
Financial Factors 
Real 
Legislative 
Salary (thou) 
0.008***   
(0.001) – 
0.007***   
(0.001) 
0.003***      
(0.001) – 
0.0005   
(0.001) 
Pay Difference 
(thou) – 
0.006***      
(0.001) – – 
–0.003***         
(0.001) – 
Real Median 
Household 
Income (thou) 
– – 
0.001+   
(0.001) – – 
0.013***         
(0.002) 
Personal Factors 
Party 
Leadership 
0.195***      
(0.048) 
0.200***         
(0.048) 
0.195***         
(0.048) 
0.113*   
(0.065) 
0.125*   
(0.065) 
0.115*   
(0.065) 
Committee 
Leadership  
–0.036+   
(0.023) 
–0.039*   
(0.023) 
–0.034+   
(0.023) 
–0.081**   
(0.033) 
–0.074**   
(0.033) 
–0.069**   
(0.033) 
Member of 
Upper 
Chamber 
–0.063**   
(0.025) 
–0.063**   
(0.025) 
–0.062**   
(0.025) 
0.286***            
(0.034) 
0.289***                
(0.034) 
0.290***                
(0.035) 
Married 0.206***         (0.033) 
0.199***            
(0.033) 
0.208***            
(0.033) 
0.167***            
(0.051) 
0.171***      
(0.051) 
0.184***               
(0.051) 
Female 0.015   (0.027) 
0.027   
(0.027) 
0.013   
(0.027) 
–0.003   
(0.041) 
–0.001    
(0.041) 
–0.021   
(0.041) 
Children –0.297***         (0.027) 
–0.292***              
(0.027) 
–0.299***              
(0.027) 
–0.062+   
(0.041) 
–0.066+   
(0.041) 
–0.075*   
(0.042) 
Age –0.040***            (0.007) 
–0.041***                 
(0.007) 
–0.040***                 
(0.007)  
0.057***               
(0.012) 
0.057***                  
(0.012) 
0.058***                  
(0.012) 
Age2 0.0005***            (0.0001) 
0.0005***                 
(0.0001) 
0.0005***                 
(0.0001) 
–0.001***               
(0.0001) 
–0.001***                  
(0.0001) 
–0.001***                  
(0.0001) 
Green–Lite 0.646***         (0.057) 
0.584***                    
(0.057) 
0.633***                    
(0.057) 
0.300***                        
(0.079)  
0.075   
(0.080) 
0.191**   
(0.081)  
Gray 0.576***               (0.072) 
0.435***                    
(0.069) 
0.556***          
(0.073) 
0.258***                     
(0.100) 
–0.156+   
(0.099) 
0.088   
(0.102) 
Gold–Lite 0.623***               (0.085) 
0.428***                    
(0.078) 
0.607***                    
(0.085) 
0.290**   
(0.118) 
–0.197*   
(0.112) 
0.141    
(0.120) 
Gold 1.116***               (0.093) 
0.928***                    
(0.091) 
1.087***                    
(0.095) 
0.249*   
(0.135) 
–0.309**   
(0.135) 
0.007   
(0.139) 
Electoral Factors 
Electoral 
Expectations 
–0.0001   
(0.0002) 
–0.001+   
(0.0005) 
–0.00006   
(0.0002) 
0.00001    
(0.00001) 
0.00001   
(0.00001) 
0.00001   
(0.00001)  
Burnout Factors 
Years in 
Position 
0.026***               
(0.002) 
0.026***                  
(0.002) 
0.026***                  
(0.002) 
0.032***                  
(0.003) 
0.031***                     
(0.003) 
0.031***                     
(0.003) 
Constant –2.533***                  (0.212) 
–2.011***                     
(0.197) 
–2.586***                     
(0.216) 
–4.400***                     
(0.342) 
–3.974***               
(0.325) 
–4.799***                        
(0.347) 
N = 71,249 
Notes: *** p ≤ 0.01; ** p  ≤ 0.05; * p ≤ 0.10; +significant at the 0.10 level (one–tailed test). 
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Substituting this simplified dependent variable for the more nuanced variable used in the 
above analysis again presents results similar to those from main analysis in this essay.  The only 
notable change concerns the Real Legislative Salary variable, which was significant in the prior 
results for seeking another political office, now fails to attain a level of statistical significance.  
This change however may be resulting from reducing key variation by condensing those 
individuals who vacated their office to pursue other employment in the private sector with those 
individuals who voluntarily retired from their office.  However, when these results are 
considered together with those from the above analysis, a consistent trend concerning the 
influence of legislative compensation is revealed across a variety of models and specifications.  
As such, I am left then to consider the implications of these findings below. 
4.6  Discussion 
Faced with a potentially unstable and weak political system (Polsby 1968), the American state 
legislatures which were incapable of serving the public good (e.g. Miller 1965; Herzberg and 
Rosenthal 1971) underwent a period of professionalization (e.g. Mooney 1994; Squire 2007) 
increasing membership compensation in an effort to attract and retain higher quality individuals 
who could provide for increased policy-making capabilities and collective responsiveness (e.g. 
Squire 1992b; Rosenthal 1996).  However, legislative salaries in the majority of the American 
states decreased between 1975 and 2005 because pay increases did not keep up with inflation 
rates.  Even in states where legislative pay has improved, it has often failed to keep up with the 
wages of other jobs (Chi 2007).  This essay has analyzed the factors which influence an 
individual legislator’s decision of whether to remain in their elected position or voluntarily retire, 
especially when faced with paltry legislative compensation or compensation which pales in 
comparison to the rest of their state’s wages.  The results from this analysis however reveal that 
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while legislative salary may not be sufficient to motivate individuals to engage in the grueling 
task of public service, the opportunity cost associated with serving, as well as other personal 
factors, do serve to entice members to remain in their elected position rather than pursue a 
variety of exit alternatives. 
Practically however, the above analysis and associated simulations yielded results 
showing a very small actual effect in terms of influencing the probability that a individual 
legislator decides to choose an exit alternative rather than stay in office.  While small in 
magnitude, these effects do have important implications for turnover in legislatures in the 
American states.  As addressed above, regardless of what type of legislature the member is from, 
most often members choose to remain in office rather than pursue any of the examined exit 
alternatives, as evidenced by the fact that there was only 11.07% turnover across the sample 
period and low turnover rates previously examined by the extant literature (e.g. Oxendale 1979; 
Thompson and Moncrief 1992; Carey, Niemi, and Powell 2000; Ansolabehere and Snyder 2002).  
Yet when this turnover is considered over time, the real effect of legislative compensation and 
the other determinants on exiting the legislature are revealed.  For illustrative purposes, suppose 
a 100 member legislative chamber loses 10% of its membership after one election (10 members) 
and a 30 member legislative chamber loses the same percentage of its membership (3 members). 
Similarly, within the sample period the average legislature (upper and lower chambers together), 
has ~150 members.  If the average legislature in the sample period experienced the 11.07% 
turnover, it would experience a lose of ~14 (13.55) members.  In any given year these losses are 
not significant, however with each election cycle that passes, and if turnover rates persist as 
evidenced in the previous literature, these losses begin to amount to a significant loss of 
members over time. With these losses, comes decreases in: legislative efficiency (e.g. Squire 
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1998); the ability to reform government personnel practices and the adoption of complex and 
technical policies (e.g. Ka and Teske 2002; Kellough and Selden 2003); providing direction to 
the state bureaucracy (Huber and Shipan 2002); institutional memory and member expertise (e.g. 
Oxendale 1979; Thompson and Moncrief 1992); and constituent service responsiveness (Jewell 
1982; Pound 1992).  In both high and low salaried legislatures these effects are important given 
that: 1) in well paid, professional legislatures, these tasks are expected by the constituency, and 
failure to meet these demands may have electoral consequences for the membership, and 2) in 
low compensation, amateur legislatures, these effects further degrade the capacity of an already 
weak institution to meet the demands placed upon it.  
So then are the observed results, though in part contrary to the prior literature, 
representative of the influence of legislative salary?  States with higher levels of legislative 
compensation typically have lower turnover rates than states with lower compensation (Oxendale 
1979; Thompson and Moncrief 1992), yet, salary was shown in the aforementioned literature to 
increase the likelihood that individual members will voluntarily retire compared to remaining in 
office.  A boisterous claim from the findings in this essay would suggest that much of the prior 
literature focused either on aggregate turnover rates (e.g. Jewell and Breaux 1988; Squire 1988a) 
or only on a subset of the American states (Blair and Henry 1981; Francis and Baker 1986), and 
as such, failed to either accurately model individual decisions and factors which vary from one 
individual to the next or failed to present findings which are generalizable to the American states 
collectively.  Rather, this essay does not proceed to reject the prior literature but instead suggests 
that these findings be taken with some caution for the following reasons. 
First, as noted above, this essay examined retirement decisions from 2000-2010.  Given 
that professionalization in the American states began in the late 1960s, a more comprehensive 
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understanding of the role of legislative salary would be garnered from a study of retirement 
decisions from the start of this time period until present.  As legislative salary changed in 
response to the professionalization movement, retirement decisions of state legislators should 
have similarly changed in response.  The 11 year time-period under analysis encompasses a 
period of time when the professionalization movement was mostly completed and the effects of 
it have since become institutionalized into the various state legislatures.  Members entering (or 
remaining in the legislature) are well aware before-the-fact that their legislative salary is 
essentially fixed (or in many states declining when inflation is considered).  As such, other 
personal factors perhaps serve a greater role in the impetus for their choice between alternatives.  
Future studies, with the time and resources available, will extend this analysis back to the start of 
professionalization to examine how this decision-making behavior has changed over time in 
response to changes in professionalism. 
Second, with the exception of the variables which measure the type of legislature the 
member serves in (Green-Lite, Gray, Gold-Lite, and Gold), all control variables in the analysis 
vary at the individual level.  Legislative Salary and Pay Difference however do not vary from 
one individual to the next, but only vary between states.  As such, these measures may be 
missing important variation which exists at the individual level which may be informing an 
individual legislator’s decision-making calculus for whether they should stay or if they should 
go.  However, given the issues addressed above, short of somehow acquiring the tax information 
for every American state legislator, future studies are restricted to these same blunt instruments 
for examining legislative salary at the individual level.  The consistency in the findings from the 
separate regression models for each exit alternative, including those which employ the 
GLLAMM procedure to include individual and state effects, as well as the results from 
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considering a crude measure for the earning potential of a state legislator, suggests some reason 
for restrained optimism in the overall findings from this study. 
Yet, if these results are taken as representative, they point to an interesting normative 
debate concerning legislative pay more generally, and further, more specifically concerning the 
attempts by memberships to increase their pay.  Functionally, higher pay equates to greater 
capacity for the legislature to perform its daily roles and compete with the governor in the 
policy-making and budgetary arenas.  Higher professionalized legislatures, which provide greater 
compensation to their members, display greater legislative efficiency in terms of the percentage 
of bills passed and the number of bills enacted each day (e.g. Squire 1998), a greater ability to 
reform government personnel practices (e.g. Kellough and Selden 2003) and to adopt complex 
and technical policies (e.g. Ka and Teske 2002), and provide greater direction to the state 
bureaucracy (Huber and Shipan 2002).  Further, because states with higher levels of legislative 
compensation typically have lower turnover rates, this allows for institutional memory to 
develop and member expertise to accumulate through time (e.g. Oxendale 1979; Thompson and 
Moncrief 1992).  States that provide the greatest service responsiveness, as well as those in 
which constituent service has a higher priority, are those states with the lowest turnover (Jewell 
1982; Pound 1992).  As the aforementioned suggests, high compensation for the membership 
would be greatly desired by legislatures who seek to increase their institutional capacity.  Yet, 
across the American states, state legislators have been clamoring for increases in their pay for 
many years.  However, efforts to increase their own pay have often been met with public 
outrage, especially when the statewide economic conditions are slumping (e.g. Melusky 2014).  
Yet, as the results from this essay show, legislative compensation only plays a small role in an 
individual member’s choice for whether they should remain in their position or leave voluntarily 
 219 
 
for some other prospect.  As such, these institutions which are concerned with increasing their 
institutional capacity, should perhaps not be as concerned with increasing the compensation of 
the membership, given the role that personal factors play in their decision-making calculus.  
 Further, the previous research has suggested that decreased legislative compensation has 
negatively impacted the quality of the state legislatures in terms of their ability to effectively 
meet the demands of the electorate and develop policy.  As discussed above, as the American 
state legislatures professionalized, greater demands were placed on the membership which 
required higher levels of competence and performance, i.e. a quality membership (e.g. Cloner 
and Gable 1959; Rosenthal 1982).  Prior to the wave of legislative professionalism in the 
American states that began in the 1960’s, the pool of potential candidates for state office was 
restricted mostly to well-to-do white males who were natives and long time residents of their 
districts (e.g. Dye 1981; Keefe and Ogul 1989).  Only those with high occupational status 
typically had a chance of legislative membership (e.g. Jewell and Patterson 1986).  Higher pay 
for serving in the position ensured that those most qualified members could serve regardless of 
their personal financial circumstances (e.g. Smith 2003).  Thus, higher professionalized 
legislatures, which provide higher pay for members, allow for these most qualified members to 
serve, populating the legislature with a variety of occupations and social backgrounds.  This is 
important given that this influences the way legislatures organize and how members behave. 
Further, this influences the policies that the membership pursues (e.g. Squire and Hamm 2005).  
However, given that states like New York haven’t had an increase in legislative compensation in 
many years, the quality of the membership, in terms of attracting and retaining qualified 
members, may have decreased.  Further, given the cost of living difference across the state, a 
constituent in Albany may be better represented compared to a constituent from New York city, 
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i.e. lower cost of living in Albany compared to New York city though legislators receive the 
same legislative compensation.  Taken together, if there has been a decrease in membership 
quality, this can translate into a corresponding decrease in terms of legislative capacity.  While 
the results of this study do not directly test these claims, they can perhaps offer a silver-lining to 
the trend in legislative compensation, whereby, state legislatures perhaps do not have to be as 
fearful of decreases in their institutional capacity resulting from the level of legislative salary.    
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5.0 CONCLUSIONS 
 
 “The problem of power is how to achieve its responsible use rather than its 
irresponsible and indulgent use - of how to get men of power to live for the public 
rather than off the public.” 
                                                                                            ~Robert F. Kennedy 
While the capacity of a governmental institution/actor translates into its ability to influence 
political outcomes, it is difficult to get that actor to bring about a change to the status quo for the 
betterment of the public good as opposed to in pursuit of their own self-interest.  This 
dissertation and its findings are best viewed as a lens for students of institutional design, future 
researchers of institutional capacity, policy developers, and elected officials alike for viewing 
and understanding the influence of power on the behavior of political actors.  As such, the 
solution to Kennedy’s problem may be found in the opening quote of this dissertation 
expounding the virtues of a separation of powers system, whereby the powers of one institutional 
actor shall not be infringed upon by the powers of another.  By building this concept of 
separation of powers into the American constitutional system, at both the national and state 
levels, this functional yet idealistic mechanism established well-defined boundaries of formal 
constitutional authority between the branches.  Yet because men are not angels (Federalist 51), 
possessing strong personal ambition, conflicts between the branches were inevitable. As such, 
the American states have served as battlegrounds for frequent clashes resulting over setting and 
administering state government policy, controlling the legislative process, raising and spending 
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money, appointing officials to executive and judicial positions, and jurisdiction over numerous 
other facets of state government operations.  Personal and partisan conflicts often escalate into 
political tug-of-war matches for institutional control, often between the executive and legislative 
branches, with each institutional actor jockeying for a position of greater institutional capacity 
and ultimately greater political influence. 
These contemporary struggles were foreshadowed even at the founding of the nation by 
Madison who astutely noted that power is of an encroaching nature (Federalist 48), as formal 
institutional capacity affords political actors the ability to pursue their political, personal, and 
most importantly, electoral goals.  This is especially important in the American states, given the 
role that the states serve in the development of public policy in their individual states and 
nationally through spearheading efforts and policy diffusion (e.g. Mooney 2001; Boehmke and 
Witmer 2004; Karch 2007).  Over the past four decades, the American state governments have 
changed dramatically in both their function and performance, with these subnational entities 
often manning the frontlines of political and public policy reform through innovation and 
implementation.  These reforms are becoming increasingly important given the ever changing 
relationship between the federal and state governments, and the autonomy enjoyed by the 
subnational actors in designing policy and the delivery of public services resulting from federal 
mandates and the devolution of authority (e.g. Petersen 1995).  Yet developing and 
implementing these reforms has been made more difficult due to the recent economic crisis and 
the resulting state revenue shortfalls and reductions in federal transfers.  Still, state political 
leaders wield tremendous power and influence over their states and the cornucopia of policy 
generated by them.  By seeking greater control over this power and influence, an institutional 
arms race has resulted with governors and legislatures employing their powers to achieve their 
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goals, with governors asserting greater control over the bureaucracy and legislatures increasing 
their efforts to oversee these agencies. 
 As such, through a careful examination of institutional capacity, capability, authority, 
power, or however its labeled (e.g. Gargan 1981) across three salient American state government 
topics, this dissertation supports the prevailing understanding that institutional capacity is a 
complex, multidimensional concept, which is not easily observed nor easily understood by the 
constituents served by those institutions/actors (e.g. Gargan 1981).  Generally, the findings from 
this dissertation speak to our greater understanding of power.  Often defined as “the probability 
that one actor in a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite 
resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests” (Weber 1978: 53), power here 
concerns the relationship between individual actors or groups of individuals where some are able 
to do as they please in spite of the resistance by others, or more generally, “A has power over B 
to the extent that A can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do” (Dahl 1957: 202-
203).  Because of the varying imbalances of power across the American states, unlike the 
national governmental structure, this ability to get one’s way despite opposition is a frightening 
concept which harkens back to the original fears of tyranny at the hands of a powerful unitary 
actor.  
However, the ability of political actors in the American states is constrained given the 
historical changes in the institutional capacity of both governors and state legislatures.  For 
governors, their capacity to engage as a budgetary and policy tyrant in the mid 1900’s, today has 
been reduced, restricting their ability to keep up with the flow of policies and the vastness of the 
policy responsibly (e.g. Abney and Lauth 1987, 1998; Dometrius 1987).  Even with reduced 
authority, modern governors are still expected to fulfill the roles of agenda setter, policy 
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developer, and policy achiever within today’s broader and increasingly complex political arenas.  
Similarly, state legislatures, many of which previously were limited in their capacity to compete 
with their gubernatorial counterparts, are expected to pursue district-centered agendas as well as 
those of the party leaders and governors, provide greater resources and services in this highly 
complex environment, and fulfill greater demands of time and resources.  
 Complementing this evolution in state institutional capacity, a key takeaway from this 
dissertation is that state legislatures possess the capacity to undermine governors under certain 
conditions, particularly in budgetary realms and under periods of divided partisan control of the 
state government.  These findings offer support for the professionalism movement in the 
American states which drove much of this institutional change and altered the (im)balance of 
power between the branches.  Prior to the era of professionalism, state legislatures were 
criticized as being backwater institutions occupied by under-qualified and unintelligent 
individuals (e.g. Miller 1965; Heard 1966; Keefe 1966).  Even the most professional state 
legislatures at the time operated with less than half of the resources available to those of 
Congress.  Because of their inadequacies, calls for  legislative reform grew.  As states removed 
their legal restrictions on legislative session length, experienced population growth, and 
witnessed neighboring states developing more institutionally advanced chambers, they too began 
to began to develop more professional legislatures.  The decision to professionalize was a willful 
decision, undertaken by these states in a manner similar to the way they decide to pass another 
policy change (e.g. Mooney 1995; King 2000).  These states wanted to enhance the capacity of 
their legislatures to better perform their role in the policymaking process (e.g. Mooney 1994).  In 
doing so state legislatures slowly become more like their Congressional counterparts (e.g. 
Rosenthal 1989).  However history has shown that legislatures do not evolve in a monotonic 
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fashion, with periods of increasing institutional development and periods of organizational 
regression. It is thus well acknowledged that the wave of professionalism was not universal, and 
as such, today disparities among state legislatures have increased as some legislatures are only 
slightly more professional today than they were 30 years ago (e.g. Squire 1992b; Mooney1995; 
King 2000; Squire 2000; Squire & Hamm 2005). 
The professionalism movement in the American states has been met with both praise and 
criticism. Proponents of the movement have cited Madison in arguing that increasing the 
competence of all representatives has served the benefit the public good, given that as legislators 
improved their skills in conducting public business, their commitment to the vocation would 
harden (Federalist 53).  Further, professionalism has altered the internal arrangement of these 
legislatures, resulting in more frequent change to their committee systems (e.g Freeman and 
Hedlund 1993), a decentralization of the power of party leadership (e.g Squire 1988a, 1988b, 
1992a), and a more streamlined and efficient decision-making and legislative process (e.g. 
Thompson 1986; Squire 1997).  As such, under specific conditions, professionalism can 
influence particular policy generation and success/failure (e.g. Carmines 1974; Uslaner and 
Weber 1975; LeLoup 1978; Roeder 1979).  
Yet, critics of professionalism argue that these full-time legislatures are now occupied by 
career politicians who spend the vast majority of their time pursuing their own reelection or 
progressive ambition, detracting from their attention to their constituencies and the greater good 
of the state.  It further can negatively influence the level of job satisfaction of the membership, 
turnover rates and length of tenure in office, and career choices (e.g Rosenthal 1974; Francis 
1985; Squire 1988a; Berkman 1994).  Additionally, it alters the leadership styles of the party 
elites to become less collaborative (e.g. Rosenthal 1998) and makes advancement to party 
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leadership positions less well-defined (e.g. Freeman 1995).  Though disagreement exists, divided 
government may be a result of legislative professionalism (e.g. Fiorina 1994, 1997; Squire 1997; 
Stonecash and Agathangelou 1997).  Ultimately, these more professional legislatures have both 
the means and incentive to spend more than their citizen counterparts (Malhotra 2006), 
ultimately feeding into the pursuit of their self-serving goals. 
Whether benefiting or hindering the state, taken together, the professionalism movement 
significantly influenced the ability of most state legislatures to try and act as coequal branch of 
state government, fulfilling Madison’s vision of separation of power.  In doing so, the 
established structure of checks and balances between the different departments of the 
government has constrained the ambitions of the politically motivated, and as this dissertation 
has shown, state legislatures have upheld their role as a check on the executive dominance.  
Taken together, this dissertation suggests that a system of shared powers is a necessary check on 
the encroaching nature of power.  Affording each branch sufficient authority to resist a 
usurpation of power by another is essential to constraining the opportunistic behavior of elected 
officials occupying positions within each branch.  In doing so, this can lead to more responsible 
majoritarian policymaking (e.g. Krause and Melusky 2012), even in the absence of divided party 
government (e.g. Berkowitz and Krause 2015).   
    
Ultimately, the findings from this dissertation, including the murkiness in our 
understanding of both the role and definition of institutional capacity, support the claim that it is 
easy to “invent a government and devise a strong executive” yet it is much harder “to devise a 
strong legislature that can survive transfers of power and shifts of party control” (Loftus 1994: 
63). 
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5.1  Future Research 
The results from this dissertation more generally suggest that the field of state politics research 
remains a fertile field, capable of examining interesting and meaningful questions concerning the 
American governmental system, which those studies focused soley the federal level are ill-
equipped to handle.  Future research capitalizing on the meaningful variation at the American 
state level can and should strive to be better than merely filling old skins with new wine, (e.g. 
Krause and Woods 2014).   As such, there still remains much more research and many new roads 
to be travelled to better develop our understanding of institutional capacity as well as its 
implications for both political and policy outcomes. 
As this dissertation and the extant literature highlighted, changes in institutional authority 
over time altered the dispersion of power across the branches, and in doing so has distorted the 
lines of institutional authority and responsibility, making it increasingly difficult for the public to 
hold institutions and individuals responsible. While this research touched on concepts of blame 
and electoral accountability, future research needs to delve deeper into how this variation over 
time in the institutional capacity of state actors has altered the ability of the public maintain the 
agency style of representation.  In doing so, it will first need to be established that the electorate 
is aware of the difference(parity) in the institutional capacity of these actors (depending on the 
individual state), a difficult task given the lack of general state-level knowledge compared to 
federal-level knowledge.  Further, the research will need to disentangle whether blame(reward) 
by the electorate is resulting because of this difference(parity) or because of other confounding 
political, economic, and social factors.  Again, this will be an uphill struggle given that it is more 
plausible that these other factors influence the ability of the electorate to sanction or reward 
incumbent political actors, rather than the electorate holding a firm understanding for ascribing 
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blame based upon which actors actually possess the means to influence the outcomes for which 
they are being evaluated.  
The findings from this dissertation support several normative questions regarding 
institutional capacity previously raised in the previous literature: “how much capacity is enough, 
too much, too little? What additional capacity is necessary? What does capacity cost? How 
should capacity investments be evaluated, how frequently? How can adequate capacity be 
sustained?” (Hall 2002: 24).  Given the murkiness in our understanding of both the definition and 
role of institutional capacity, there remains significant room for future studies which attempt to 
define and examine institutional capacity across a variety of other salient state government 
topics.  No matter what phenomena is chosen for examination, these studies too must begin from 
an umbrella definition whereby the institutional capacity varies based upon the institution/actor 
under examination as well as the context under which it is examined. 
While the results of Essay 2 of this dissertation suggest that the institutional capacity of 
governors influences the growth in economic development budget appropriations, optimally this 
research needs to examine the type, number, and value of economic development grants and 
efforts being undertaken by governors vis-à-vis their state economic development entities.  For 
this future research to be conducted, systematic data on actual economic development grants and 
efforts needs to be collected and compiled.  While there currently is no singular source (and no 
sources in general for some states), the national policy resource center, Good Jobs First, has 
begun to track economic development subsidies in the American states.  There still remains some 
inherent problems in collecting this information, mainly, that not all states collect and share this 
information in the same manner.  This results in some states only reporting the numbers of 
subsidies provided and not the magnitude of the subsidies for all states, making comparison 
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between states difficult.  However, should this information be systematically compiled and made 
available, the results of this future research would ultimately promote greater corporate and 
government accountability, offering transparency in economic development spending.  This 
transparency would potentially reduce the benefits accrued by governors who engage in this 
behavior in pursuit of short term electoral benefits, as high levels of economic development 
spending with little actual job creation, business recruitment, or macroeconomic influence could 
be exposed and negatively associated with the governor. 
This dissertation, as well as the prior literature, has shown the importance of variation in 
legislative salaries, session lengths, staff support and other resources (e.g. Fiorina 1994; Berry, 
Berkman, and Schneiderman 2000; Hamm and Moncrief 2004; Squire and Hamm 2005).  The 
often used indicators of professionalization are intended to assess the legislative body’s capacity 
to consume information in the policy-making process, and regardless of slight differences, these 
measures generate regular state rankings (e.g. Mooney 1994; Berkman 2001; Maestas 2003) 
which are consistent with qualitative assessments (e.g. Hamm and Moncrief 2004).  Similarly, 
measures and indexes of gubernatorial capacity are embroiled in an ongoing debate concerning 
their validity and reliability. This debate centers around concerns that these measures only focus 
on the governor’s institutional powers and often ignore their informal powers (personal resources 
like charisma and an individual’s persuasive ability, and enabling resources like staff support) 
(e.g. Bernick 1979; Dometrius 1987; Mueller 1985), and that indexes constructed from these 
measures fail to assign weights to the various components (e.g. Sigelman and Dometrius 1988).  
While this literature has developed a variety of measures to tap into dimensions of institutional 
capacity, Essay 1 of this dissertation, as well as the extant literature (e.g. Dometrius 1987; 
Mueller 1985; Gross 1989; Rosenthal 1990), has discussed the need for considering the 
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institutional capacity of institutional actors relative to one another, given that most measures of 
legislative and gubernatorial strength covary positively.  Thus, any attempt to predict 
gubernatorial effectiveness in office must, at the very least, account for the relationship between 
the powers and resources present in the governor's office and the powers and resources present in 
the state legislature. 
Yet, this dissertation raises an interesting empirical question: is the relationship between 
the governor and the state legislature a zero-sum power game (e.g. Rosenthal 1990)?  While the 
capacity of the governor and/or the legislature can be increased, there is a limit to how much 
increasing one actor’s capacity decreases the capacity of the other.  Considering the basic 
concept of power (e.g. Dahl 1957; Weber 1978), it is at least partly related to whether or not an 
actor is faced with opposition which has the capacity to undo changes to the status quo made by 
that actor.  Further, the power relationship is not necessarily a zero-sum game, with professional 
legislatures sometimes bolstering the legislative success of the governor (e.g. Dilger, Krause, and 
Moffett 1995; Ferguson 2003).  As such, future studies examining institutional capacity must 
examine more closely instances of when institutional capacity is altered, evaluating how the 
capacity of the competing actors changes in response.   
This evolution in the institutional capacity of American state political institutions, 
perhaps more so than the American national institutions, should be of great interest for students 
of institutional design.  In considering the American state legislatures, given the disparity in 
legislative capacity across the American states today and historically, it is both interesting and 
ironic that many of the men who drafted the Constitution held them in such low regard since they 
felt that these institutions wielded too much power (Riker 1984).  Yet, the foundations of the 
current Congress owe much more to the state legislatures than to its predecessor legislative body 
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under the Articles of Confederation (e.g. Lutz 1999; Squire & Hamm 2005), which is 
unsurprising given that the founders drew on the state legislative experience in writing the 
Constitution because of the 39 men who signed it, 19 had served in colonial legislatures and 32 
had served in state legislatures (Squire and Hamm 2005) given that state legislatures were in 
existence 13 years before Congress met for the first time in 1789 (Squire 2006).  In better 
understanding its state-level foundations and the changes in the state political institutions 
overtime, future examinations of the American national institutions can better determine how 
they respond and adapt to the current social, political, and economic climate.  
Finally, scholars have advanced the idea the legislatures can deprofessionalize as well as 
professionalize (Hibbing 1999).  States like Pennsylvania are considering reducing the size of its 
legislative membership (Migdail-Smith 2015).  Other states, like California, have reduced the 
compensation to their membership (Propheter 2011), with similar bills being introduced across 
the country (e.g. Grovum 2014; Fitton 2015).  Given the key findings from this dissertation 
concerning the ability of state legislatures to constrain the actions of encroaching governors, this 
regressive trend in legislative professionalism is concerning.  This concern is compounded by  
the current economic crisis, where states are faced with revenue shortfalls and thus reduce the 
size and services of their government, and the increased authority delegated to governors, like 
their Presidential counterparts, in the wake of times of such crisis.   
As such, the dissertation closes with a goal for the aforementioned students, researchers, 
policy developers, and elected officials: through a careful consideration of both the importance 
and role of institutional capacity, seek a solution to Robert Kennedy’s problem of facilitating the 
responsible use of power for the public good by advocating for and working to maintain the 
system of separation of powers and institutional checks and balances as envisioned by James 
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Madison.  Only when the proper balance of power sharing is achieved between sufficiently 
robust institutional actors, can the passions and ambition of man be channeled toward the public 
good. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
 
Table A.1: Predicting the Likelihood of Observing a Budget Impasse in the American 
States (1986 – 2006) – Alternative Specification of Duration Variable  
as a Continuous Variable 
 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Gubernatorial Institutional Powers     
    Governor Possesses Budget Formulation  
    Authority (-) 
–1.275  
(3.721) – 
–0.150  
(5.155) – 
    Governor Budget Formulation Authority x   
    Divided Partisan Leg (-) – – 
–4.936  
(7.632) – 
    Governor Budget Formulation Authority x   
    Unified Partisan Leg (-) – – 
4.754  
(7.180) – 
    Governor Possesses Official Revenue  
    Forecast Authority – Binds Budget (-) 
–5.399 
(13.597) – 
–5.623  
(15.292) 
–4.856 
(13.941) 
    Governor Binding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Divided Partisan Leg (-) – – 
–6.546  
(10.488) 
–6.991 
(10.109) 
    Governor Binding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Unified Partisan Leg (-) – – 
13.645+  
(9.584) 
13.023+ 
(9.449) 
    Governor Possesses Official Revenue  
    Forecast Authority – Does Not Bind  
    Budget (-) 
–11.753 
(9.510) – 
–12.394 
(11.248) – 
    Governor Nonbinding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Divided Partisan Leg (-) – – 
–4.376 
(13.133) – 
    Governor Nonbinding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Unified Partisan Leg (-) – – 
8.408  
(10.396) – 
    Governor Possesses Line Item Veto (-) –0.488 (5.700) – 
–9.201+  
(6.867) 
–10.826+ 
(6.738)   
    Governor Line Item Veto x Divided  
    Partisan Leg (-) – – 
17.192** 
(8.369) 
18.792** 
(8.120) 
    Governor Line Item Veto x Unified  
    Partisan Leg (-) – – 
  9.755  
(8.369) 
11.196+ 
(8.243) 
Legislature’s Institutional Powers     
    Legislature Possesses Official Revenue  
    Forecast Authority – Binds Budget (-) 
53.529***  
(20.199) 
56.398*** 
(19.563) 
57.362*** 
(22.200) 
57.717*** 
(20.200) 
    Legislature Binding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Divided Partisan Leg (-) – – 
–6.853  
(11.343) 
–6.199 
(11.091) 
    Legislature Binding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Unified Partisan Leg (-) – – 
–10.876 
(12.983) 
–10.171 
(12.786) 
    Legislature Possesses Official Revenue  
    Forecast Authority – Does Not Bind  
    Budget (-) 
–5.394  
(6.092) – 
–9.620  
(7.830) 
–8.764  
(7.419) 
 
 234 
 
Table A.1 Continued 
    Legislature Nonbinding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x  Divided Partisan Leg (-) – – 
1.192  
(7.689) 
1.742  
(7.410) 
    Legislature Nonbinding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x  Unified Partisan Leg (-) – – 
15.728** 
(6.383) 
14.863** 
(6.275) 
    Legislature Session Length (-) 0.341*** (0.058) 
0.351*** 
(0.058) 
0.332*** 
(0.082) 
0.353*** 
(0.081) 
    Legislature Session Length x Divided  
    Partisan Leg (-) – – 
–0.010  
(0.101) 
–0.020  
(0.100) 
    Legislature Session Length x Unified  
    Partisan Leg (-) – – 
–0.055  
(0.096) 
–0.079  
(0.093) 
Divided Partisan Legislature Government (+) 15.052*** (3.203) 
15.370*** 
(3.177) 
6.840  
(12.569) 
2.167 
(10.342) 
Unified Partisan Legislature Government (+) 13.369*** (2.691) 
13.484*** 
(2.676) 
–0.741  
(11.506) 
4.700  
(9.727) 
Governor Legacy Year (+) –1.012  (5.141) 
–0.765 
(5.129) 
–0.213  
(5.132) 
–0.306  
(5.142) 
Legislative Election Year (-) –3.837
+
 
(2.462) 
–3.872+ 
(2.459) 
–3.978+  
(2.451) 
–3.980+ 
(2.460) 
Real General Expenditures (+) 3.12E–07** (1.41E–07) 
3.26E-07** 
(1.38E-07) 
2.64E–07* 
(1.49E–07) 
2.91E–07** 
(1.43E–07) 
Biennial (+) 9.818
+
  
(6.307) 
8.550+ 
(6.109) 
8.485+  
(6.512) 
7.113  
(6.158) 
No Balanced Budget Restriction (-) –17.130** (7.684) 
–16.384** 
(7.511) 
–17.657** 
(8.126) 
–16.534** 
(7.516) 
Surplus (-) –0.324*** (0.120) 
–0.319*** 
(0.119) 
–0.342*** 
(0.120) 
–0.342*** 
(0.120) 
Pct ∆ Real Per Capita Income (-) –0.573  (0.498) 
–0.605 
(0.496) 
–0.619  
(0.502) 
–0.637  
(0.502) 
Supermajority Requirement (+) 11.661 (17.053) 
8.918 
(16.270) 
13.829  
(18.320) 
9.648  
(16.442) 
Fiscal Year Begins (-) –11.456** (5.050) 
–11.631** 
(4.886) 
–11.822** 
(5.436) 
–11.796** 
(4.932) 
Constant 25.693 (37.513) 
  21.364 
(36.318) 
38.499  
(40.603) 
36.357 
(36.856) 
N × T (Effective Sample Size) 654 654 654 654 
Number of States 47 47 47 47 
SD of Random Effects ( individual 
component) 26.127 25.513 28.143 25.270 
SD of Random Effects ( idiosyncratic 
component) 25.627 25.562 25.499 25.464 
Proportion of Total Variance Contributed by 
Panel-Level Variance  0.510 0.499 0.549 0.496 
Notes: Estimates for random-effects regression analysis for cross-sectional time-series dataset. Dependent variable – 
Days Late: the number of days before or after the start of the fiscal year that state passed its budget. Standard errors 
in parentheses.    *** p ≤ 0.01; ** p  ≤ 0.05; * p ≤ 0.10; +significant at the 0.10 level (one-tailed test) 
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Table A.2: Predicting the Likelihood of Observing a Budget Impasse in the American 
States (1986 – 2006) – Alternative Specification of Duration Variable as a  
Continuous Variable – On Time Budgets 
 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Gubernatorial Institutional Powers     
    Governor Possesses Budget Formulation  
    Authority (-) 
–1.925    
(3.748)  – 
–0.595    
(4.681) – 
    Governor Budget Formulation Authority x   
    Divided Partisan Leg (-) – – 
–6.519    
(8.271) – 
    Governor Budget Formulation Authority x   
    Unified Partisan Leg (-) – – 
–5.300 
(6.915) – 
    Governor Possesses Official Revenue  
    Forecast Authority – Binds Budget (-) 
–12.646   
(12.257) – 
–8.587 
(10.606) 
–5.236   
(12.585) 
    Governor Binding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Divided Partisan Leg (-) – – 
–15.431+ 
(10.505) 
–16.608*   
(9.897) 
    Governor Binding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Unified Partisan Leg (-) – – 
–4.371    
(9.901) 
–5.403   
(9.578) 
    Governor Possesses Official Revenue  
    Forecast Authority – Does Not Bind  
    Budget (-) 
–14.103+   
(8.689) 
–12.927+   
(8.610) 
–9.941 
(9.065) – 
    Governor Nonbinding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Divided Partisan Leg (-) – – 
–5.482 
(11.446) – 
    Governor Nonbinding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Unified Partisan Leg (-) – – 
2.933 
(9.014) – 
    Governor Possesses Line Item Veto (-) –2.031   (5.317) – 
–10.985* 
(6.466) 
–9.470+   
(6.380) 
    Governor Line Item Veto x Divided  
    Partisan Leg (-) – – 
9.216    
(8.024) 
9.180    
(7.487) 
    Governor Line Item Veto x Unified  
    Partisan Leg (-) – – 
10.352 
(8.311) 
11.694+   
(8.079) 
Legislature’s Institutional Powers     
    Legislature Possesses Official Revenue  
    Forecast Authority – Binds Budget (-) 
38.396**   
(18.507) 
41.068**   
(18.529) 
48.626***   
(15.745) 
48.785***      
(18.791) 
    Legislature Binding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Divided Partisan Leg (-) – – 
–33.384*    
(18.061) 
–28.774*    
(17.271) 
    Legislature Binding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Unified Partisan Leg (-) – – 
–29.710*   
(17.284) 
–31.031*   
(16.801) 
    Legislature Possesses Official Revenue  
    Forecast Authority – Does Not Bind  
    Budget (-) 
–5.444   
(6.146) – 
–14.046**    
(6.336) 
–9.592+   
(6.834) 
    Legislature Nonbinding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x  Divided Partisan Leg (-) – – 
3.916    
(8.097) 
0.976    
(7.726) 
    Legislature Nonbinding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x  Unified Partisan Leg (-) – – 
20.616***   
(5.999) 
20.035***      
(5.761) 
    Legislature Session Length (-) 0.411***   (0.083) 
0.411***      
(0.083) 
0.575***   
(0.098) 
0.559***      
(0.100) 
    Legislature Session Length x Divided  
    Partisan Leg (-) – – 
–0.238*   
(0.144) 
–0.185+   
(0.139) 
    Legislature Session Length x Unified  
    Partisan Leg (-) – – 
–0.249**   
(0.105) 
–0.229**      
(0.102) 
Divided Partisan Legislature Government (+) 11.006***      (3.111) 
11.151***      
(3.073) 
26.733*    
(14.150) 
17.449+    
(11.821) 
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Table A.2 Continued 
Unified Partisan Legislature Government (+) 12.374***         (2.577) 
12.424***         
(2.542) 
19.406*   
(11.641) 
12.684+    
(9.900) 
Governor Legacy Year (+) 0.895    (4.932) 
0.996   
(4.912) 
0.465    
(4.989) 
1.263    
(4.862) 
Legislative Election Year (-) –4.035*   (2.356) 
–4.111*   
(2.346) 
–3.835+   
(2.363) 
–3.864*   
(2.311) 
Real General Expenditures (+) 3.87E–07**   (1.76E–07) 
3.69E–07**      
(1.74E–07) 
3.66E–07**   
(1.63E–07) 
3.43E–07**   
(1.74E–07) 
Biennial (+) 6.493    (5.539) 
  6.237   
(5.501) 
2.825    
(5.017) 
3.361    
(5.413) 
No Balanced Budget Restriction (-) –5.828   (7.279) 
–5.472   
(7.353) 
–5.729    
(6.013) 
–5.453   
(7.234) 
Surplus (-) –0.195*   (0.116) 
–0.196*   
(0.115) 
–0.254**   
(0.117) 
–0.238**   
(0.114) 
Pct ∆ Real Per Capita Income (-) –0.490   (0.495) 
–0.518     
(0.490) 
–0.710+    
(0.503) 
–0.731+   
(0.486) 
Supermajority Requirement (+) 0.535   (15.625) 
2.741   
(15.694) 
–2.071   
(12.968) 
–2.653    
(15.304) 
Fiscal Year Begins (-) –11.395**   (5.347) 
–12.434**      
(5.384) 
–11.743***   
(4.284) 
–12.170**   
(5.332) 
Constant 11.443   (39.442) 
12.653   
(39.748) 
13.872   
(32.337) 
14.195   
(39.719) 
N × T (Effective Sample Size) 505 505 505 505 
Number of States 45 45 45 45 
SD of Random Effects ( individual 
component) 22.543 22.969 17.123 22.511 
SD of Random Effects ( idiosyncratic 
component) 21.326 21.265 20.974 20.896 
Proportion of Total Variance Contributed by 
Panel-Level Variance  0.528 0.538 0.400 0.537 
Notes: Estimates for random-effects regression analysis for cross-sectional time-series dataset. Dependent variable – 
Days Late: the number of days before or after the start of the fiscal year that state passed its budget. Standard errors 
in parentheses.    *** p ≤ 0.01; ** p  ≤ 0.05; * p ≤ 0.10; +significant at the 0.10 level (one-tailed test) 
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Table A.3: Predicting the Likelihood of Observing a Budget Impasse in the American 
States (1986 – 2006) – Alternative Specification of Duration Variable as a  
Continuous Variable – Late Budgets 
 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Gubernatorial Institutional Powers     
    Governor Possesses Budget Formulation  
    Authority (-) 
–4.376   
(8.140) – 
–14.022   
(21.909) – 
    Governor Budget Formulation Authority x   
    Divided Partisan Leg (-) – – 
4.863    
(23.696) – 
    Governor Budget Formulation Authority x   
    Unified Partisan Leg (-) – – 
16.566   
(23.122) – 
    Governor Possesses Official Revenue  
    Forecast Authority – Binds Budget (-) 
0.551   
(10.781) – 
–0.924   
(15.932) – 
    Governor Binding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Divided Partisan Leg (-) – – – – 
    Governor Binding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Unified Partisan Leg (-) – – 
  4.182   
(22.914) – 
    Governor Possesses Official Revenue  
    Forecast Authority – Does Not Bind  
    Budget (-) 
–29.337   
(25.335) – 
–38.547   
(37.508) – 
    Governor Nonbinding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Divided Partisan Leg (-) – – – – 
    Governor Nonbinding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Unified Partisan Leg (-) – – 
–17.098    
(53.018) – 
    Governor Possesses Line Item Veto (-) 11.276   (11.377) – 
12.682   
(17.693) – 
    Governor Line Item Veto x Divided  
    Partisan Leg (-) – – 
12.824   
(23.324) – 
    Governor Line Item Veto x Unified  
    Partisan Leg (-) – – 
–35.367   
(27.923) – 
Legislature’s Institutional Powers     
    Legislature Possesses Official Revenue  
    Forecast Authority – Binds Budget (-) 
2.355   
(12.854) – 
6.213    
(21.576) 
0.124   
(17.176) 
    Legislature Binding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Divided Partisan Leg (-) – – 
11.735    
(23.920) 
6.598   
(19.845) 
    Legislature Binding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Unified Partisan Leg (-) – – 
–50.544+    
(32.132) 
–20.889   
(21.403) 
    Legislature Possesses Official Revenue  
    Forecast Authority – Does Not Bind  
    Budget (-) 
–22.476**   
(9.386) 
–18.617**      
(8.164) 
–31.601+   
(20.042) 
–35.011**   
(16.757) 
    Legislature Nonbinding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x  Divided Partisan Leg (-) – – 
14.686   
(21.349) 
17.196   
(18.094) 
    Legislature Nonbinding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x  Unified Partisan Leg (-) – – 
–0.293   
(21.028) 
0.997   
(17.400) 
    Legislature Session Length (-) 0.135*   (0.077) 
0.164**   
(0.071) 
0.017    
(0.158) – 
    Legislature Session Length x Divided  
    Partisan Leg (-) – – 
0.142    
(0.182) – 
    Legislature Session Length x Unified  
    Partisan Leg (-) – – 
0.188    
(0.203) – 
Divided Partisan Legislature Government (+) 3.850    (8.109) 
4.534   
(7.779) 
–30.412   
(35.235) 
1.283   
(11.322) 
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Unified Partisan Legislature Government (+) 2.121    (7.644) 
2.707   
(7.289) 
8.150    
(30.066) 
5.740   
(10.556) 
Governor Legacy Year (+) –1.311   (13.388) 
1.574   
(12.961) 
4.787    
(14.156) 
1.075   
(13.360) 
Legislative Election Year (-) –3.237   (6.057) 
–3.555    
(5.739) 
–3.074    
(6.220) 
–3.265   
(6.081) 
Real General Expenditures (+) 2.15E–07   (1.74E–07) 
2.37E–07*   
(1.40E–07) 
3.39E–07+   
(2.38E–07) 
4.18E–07***   
(1.44E–07) 
Biennial (+) 43.863***   (11.764) 
36.511***      
(9.623) 
53.657***   
(13.525) 
48.768***   
(10.652) 
No Balanced Budget Restriction (-) –19.644**   (9.966) 
–20.093**      
(8.606) 
–26.970**   
(12.102) 
–27.435***      
(10.523) 
Surplus (-) –0.562**   (0.284) 
–0.479*   
(0.278) 
–0.518*   
(0.314) 
–0.511*   
(0.291)  
Pct ∆ Real Per Capita Income (-) 1.459    (1.197) 
1.507+   
(1.171) 
1.236    
(1.306) 
1.967+   
(1.205) 
Supermajority Requirement (+) 14.653    (14.973) 
  10.305   
(11.087) 
10.101   
(20.434) 
16.644+   
(12.079) 
Fiscal Year Begins (-) –7.396*   (3.863) 
–6.635**   
(3.197) 
–4.710    
(4.416) 
–9.552***         
(3.051) 
Constant 52.361*   (27.239) 
50.703*   
(26.697) 
47.958   
(37.856) 
80.811***         
(24.622) 
N × T (Effective Sample Size) 149 149 149 149 
Number of States 22 22 22 22 
SD of Random Effects ( individual 
component) 0 0 0 0 
SD of Random Effects ( idiosyncratic 
component) 32.057 32.605 32.866 32.851 
Proportion of Total Variance Contributed by 
Panel-Level Variance  0 0 0 0 
Notes: Estimates for random-effects regression analysis for cross-sectional time-series dataset. Dependent variable – 
Days Late: the number of days before or after the start of the fiscal year that state passed its budget. Standard errors 
in parentheses.    *** p ≤ 0.01; ** p  ≤ 0.05; * p ≤ 0.10; +significant at the 0.10 level (one-tailed test). In Model 3, 
the variables Governor Binding Revenue Forecast Authority x Divided Partisan Leg and Governor Nonbinding 
Revenue Forecast Authority x Divided Partisan Leg were omitted due to collinearity.  
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Table A.4:  Predicting the Likelihood of Observing a Budget Impasse in the American 
States (1986 – 2006) – Additive Institutional Indexes 
 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
    Governor Capacity Additive Index (-) –0.171  (0.351) 
0.037  
(0.890) 
– – 
    Legislature Capacity Additive Index (-) 0.428  (0.693) 
–0.479  
(0.456) 
– – 
    Institutional Difference Index – – –0.230  (0.297) 
–0.301  
(0.354) 
    Divided Partisan Legislature Government (+) 0.717*  (0.428) 
0.120  
(1.425) 
0.718*  
(0.428) 
0.584  
(0.745) 
    Unified Partisan Legislature Government (+) 0.921** (0.364) 
–0.355  
(0.974) 
0.911** 
(0.363) 
0.707  
(0.637) 
    Governor Capacity x Divided Partisan  
    Legislature Government – 
0.274  
(0.611) – – 
    Governor Capacity x Unified Partisan  
    Legislature Government – 
0.572  
(0.471) – – 
    Legislature Capacity x Divided Partisan  
    Legislature Government – 
0.300  
(0.881) – – 
    Legislature Capacity x Unified Partisan  
    Legislature Government – 
0.926  
(0.822) – – 
    Institutional Index x Divided Partisan  
    Legislature Government – – 
– 0.093  
(0.415) 
    Institutional Index x Unified Partisan  
    Legislature Government – – 
– 0.142  
(0.365) 
Governor Legacy Year (+) –0.744  (0.775) 
–0.671  
(0.780) 
–0.746  
(0.774) 
–0.736  
(0.776) 
Legislative Election Year (-) 0.061  (0.328) 
0.044  
(0.331) 
0.063  
(0.329) 
0.067  
(0.329)  
Real General Expenditures (+) 1.09E–08 (1.47E–08) 
1.16E–08 
(1.54E–08) 
1.09E–08 
(1.48E–08) 
9.69E–09 
(1.52E–08) 
Biennial (+) 0.705  (0.831) 
0.644  
(0.847) 
0.726  
(0.831) 
0.723  
(0.833) 
No Balanced Budget Restriction (-) –1.469* (0.782) 
–1.534* 
(0.796) 
–1.484* 
(0.781) 
–1.487* 
(0.783) 
Surplus (-) –0.036** (0.017) 
–0.033* 
(0.017) 
–0.035** 
(0.017) 
–0.035** 
(0.017) 
Pct ∆ Real Per Capita Income (-) –0.153** (0.068) 
–0.145** 
(0.069) 
–0.152** 
(0.069) 
–0.151** 
(0.069) 
Supermajority Requirement (+) 1.925  (1.716) 
1.925  
(1.753) 
1.907  
(1.718) 
1.955  
(1.733) 
Fiscal Year Begins (-) –0.886
+
 
(0.576) 
–0.896+  
(0.581) 
–0.881+ 
(0.579) 
–0.891+ 
(0.584) 
Constant 3.425  (4.150) 
4.180  
(4.255) 
3.566  
(4.139) 
3.744  
(4.199) 
N × T (Effective Sample Size) 140 140 140 140 
Number of States 23 23 23 23 
AIC 451.623 457.349 449.719 453.559 
BIC 522.263 546.826 515.649 528.908 
Notes: Estimates for random-effects logit model for cross-sectional time-series dataset. Dependent variable – Late 
Budget:  Late Budget  = 1 if the state passed budget after start of next fiscal year, 0 otherwise. Standard errors in 
parentheses.    *** p ≤ 0.01; ** p  ≤ 0.05; * p ≤ 0.10; +significant at the 0.10 level (one-tailed test) 
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Table A.5: Duration of Budget Impasse in the American States (1986 – 2006)  
–  Additive Institutional Indexes 
 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
    Governor Capacity Additive Index (-) 0.910  (0.168) 
0.598+ 
(0.191) 
– – 
    Legislature Capacity Additive Index (-) 1.428
+
  
(0.382) 
0.775  
(0.426) 
– – 
    Institutional Difference Index – – 0.832
+
  
(0.117) 
0.806  
(0.164) 
    Divided Partisan Legislature Government (+) 0.763  (0.220) 
0.134** 
(0.137) 
0.736  
(0.210) 
0.616  
(0.279) 
    Unified Partisan Legislature Government (+) 0.970  (0.229) 
0.455  
(0.337) 
0.951  
(0.223) 
1.029  
(0.416) 
    Governor Capacity x Divided Partisan  
    Legislature Government – 
2.149* 
(0.933) – – 
    Governor Capacity x Unified Partisan  
    Legislature Government – 
1.277  
(0.461) – – 
    Legislature Capacity x Divided Partisan  
    Legislature Government – 
2.072  
(1.392) – – 
    Legislature Capacity x  Unified Partisan  
    Legislature Government – 
2.177+ 
(1.206) – – 
    Institutional Index x  Divided Partisan  
    Legislature Government – – 
– 1.171  
(0.343) 
    Institutional Index x  Unified Partisan  
    Legislature Government – – 
– 0.948  
(0.243) 
Governor Legacy Year (+) 1.011  (0.562) 
0.940  
(0.525) 
0.996  
(0.553) 
0.962  
(0.536) 
Legislative Election Year (-) 1.012  (0.195) 
1.040  
(0.207) 
1.012 
(0.194) 
1.023  
(0.202) 
Real General Expenditures (+) 1.000  (5.73E–09) 
1.000 
(7.55E–09) 
1.000  
(5.01E–09) 
1.000  
(5.21E–09) 
Biennial (+) 0.261*** (0.088) 
0.237*** 
(0.094) 
0.287*** 
(0.090) 
0.270*** 
(0.087) 
No Balanced Budget Restriction (-) 1.092  (0.260) 
1.206  
(0.300) 
  1.042  
(0.242) 
1.040  
(0.242) 
Surplus (-) 1.034*** (0.010) 
1.034*** 
(0.011) 
1.036*** 
(0.010) 
1.036*** 
(0.011) 
Pct ∆ Real Per Capita Income (-) 0.968  (0.034) 
0.971  
(0.034) 
0.967  
(0.033) 
0.969  
(0.034) 
Supermajority Requirement (+) 0.627  (0.283) 
0.402* 
(0.213) 
0.567+  
(0.243) 
0.509+  
(0.234) 
Fiscal Year Begins (-) 1.320*  (0.193) 
1.304* 
(0.200) 
1.382**  
(0.179) 
1.377** 
(0.178) 
N × T (Effective Sample Size) 140 140 140 140 
Number of States 23 23 23 23 
AIC 1098.774 1102.848 1097.336 1100.728 
BIC 1137.015 1152.856 1132.636 1141.911 
Notes: Estimates for Cox proportional hazards survival analysis.  Failure = when a state adopts its budget for the 
next fiscal year bringing the budget impasse to an end. Coefficients are hazard ratios, followed by standard errors in 
parentheses.    *** p ≤ 0.01; ** p  ≤ 0.05; * p ≤ 0.10; +significant at the 0.10 level (one-tailed test) 
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Table A.6: Predicting the Likelihood of Observing a Budget Impasse in the American 
States (1986 – 2006) –  Shipan and Krupnikov Budgetary Powers Indicators 
 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
    Governor Can Spend Unanticipated  
    Federal Funds 
–0.862* 
(0.501) 
–0.804+ 
(0.502) 
–0.366  
(0.744) – 
    Spend Funds x Divided Partisan Leg – – –0.351  (0.959) – 
    Spend Funds x Unified Partisan Leg – – –0.871  (0.819) – 
    Governor Has Line-Item Veto Power –0.544  (1.030) – 
–1.273  
(1.210) 
–1.617+ 
(1.253) 
    Line-Item Veto x Divided Partisan Leg – – 2.406
+ 
(1.534) 
2.750*  
(1.435) 
    Line-Item Veto x Unified Partisan Leg – – 0.375  (1.112) 
0.674  
(1.106) 
    Governor Has Power to Reorganize  
    Departments 
–0.375  
(0.520) – 
–1.551*  
(0.906) 
–1.935** 
(0.913) 
    Reorganize Department x Divided Partisan  
    Leg – – 
1.010  
(1.083) 
1.163  
(1.007) 
    Reorganize Departments x Unified      
    Partisan Leg – – 
1.519+  
(0.941) 
2.053** 
(0.926) 
    Governor Can Reduce the Budget –0.860
+
 
(0.580) 
–0.833+ 
(0.573) 
–0.406  
(0.870) – 
    Reduce Budget x Divided Partisan Leg – – 0.028  (1.107) – 
    Reduce Budget x Unified Partisan Leg – – –0.880  (1.039) – 
    Governor’s Level of Budget Preparation  
    Authority 
–0.488  
(0.734) – 
0.056  
(0.890) 
0.277  
(0.891) 
    Budget Preparation Authority x Divided  
    Partisan Leg – – 
–0.345  
(1.153) 
–0.377  
(1.184) 
    Budget Preparation Authority x Unified  
    Partisan Leg – – 
–1.883*  
(0.950) 
–1.892* 
(0.932) 
Divided Partisan Legislature Government (+) 0.614
+
  
(0.438) 
0.597+ 
(0.434) 
–1.503  
(2.158) 
–2.028+ 
(1.440) 
Unified Partisan Legislature Government (+) 0.871** (0.376) 
0.876** 
(0.375) 
2.199  
(1.827) 
0.777  
(1.307) 
Governor Legacy Year (+) –0.754  (0.797) 
–0.743 
(0.797) 
–1.119  
(0.876) 
–1.003  
(0.884) 
Legislative Election Year (-) 0.075  (0.337) 
0.071  
(0.336) 
0.120  
(0.347) 
0.120  
(0.344) 
Real General Expenditures (+) 9.26E–09 (1.60E–08) 
6.99E–09 
(1.55E–08) 
9.07E–09 
(1.70E–08) 
7.88E–09 
(1.69E–08) 
Biennial (+) 0.838  (0.835) 
0.801  
(0.834) 
1.176+  
(0.860) 
1.023  
(0.900) 
No Balanced Budget Restriction (-) –1.566** (0.763) 
–1.522** 
(0.769) 
–1.695** 
(0.820) 
–1.691** 
(0.844) 
Surplus (-) –0.040** (0.017) 
–0.040** 
(0.017) 
–0.043** 
(0.018) 
–0.040** 
(0.018) 
Pct ∆ Real Per Capita Income (-) –0.150** (0.070) 
 –0.152** 
(0.070) 
–0.139*  
(0.071) 
–0.154** 
(0.072) 
Supermajority Requirement (+) 2.002  (1.690) 
1.896  
(1.651) 
2.412+  
(1.829) 
2.647+  
(1.938) 
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Table A.6 Continued 
Fiscal Year Begins (-) –1.117** (0.559) 
–1.145** 
(0.569) 
–1.075*  
(0.599) 
–0.886+ 
(0.631) 
Constant 7.223*  (4.340) 
6.376+ 
(4.238) 
6.932+  
(4.677) 
5.222  
(4.734) 
N × T (Effective Sample Size) 787 787 787 787 
Number of States 48 48 48 48 
AIC 442.419 437.472 449.601 443.894 
BIC 526.447 507.495 580.311 546.595 
Panel-Level Variance 1.724  (0.419) 
1.767  
(0.406)   
1.868  
(0.428) 
2.072  
(0.419) 
SD of Random Effects 2.368  (0.495) 
2.420  
(0.491)   
2.544  
(0.544) 
2.818  
(0.590) 
Proportion of Total Variance Contributed by 
Panel-Level Variance  
0.630  
(0.097) 
0.640  
(0.093) 
0.663  
(0.095) 
0.707  
(0.087) 
Notes: Estimates for random-effects logit model for cross-sectional time-series dataset. Dependent variable – Late 
Budget:  Late Budget  = 1 if the state passed budget after start of next fiscal year, 0 otherwise. Standard errors in 
parentheses.    *** p ≤ 0.01; ** p  ≤ 0.05; * p ≤ 0.10; +significant at the 0.10 level (one-tailed test) 
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Table A.7: Duration of Budget Impasse in the American States (1986 – 2006)  
– Shipan and Krupnikov Budgetary Powers Indicators 
 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
    Governor Can Spend Unanticipated  
    Federal Funds 
0.665+  
(0.171) 
0.626* 
(0.154) 
0.389**  
(0.169) 
0.398** 
(0.170) 
    Spend Funds x Divided Partisan Leg – – 1.376  (0.879) 
1.380  
(0.862) 
    Spend Funds x Unified Partisan Leg – – 2.272
+
  
(1.232) 
2.105+  
(1.116) 
    Governor Has Line-Item Veto Power 0.701  (0.237) – 
1.347  
(0.791) – 
    Line-Item Veto x Divided Partisan Leg – – 1.82E–09 (1.60E–08) – 
    Line-Item Veto x Unified Partisan Leg – – 0.502  (0.306) – 
    Governor Has Power to Reorganize      
    Departments 
0.623** 
(0.143) 
0.618** 
(0.138) 
1.650  
(0.846) 
1.321  
(0.595) 
    Reorganize Department x Divided Partisan  
    Leg – – 
0.398  
(0.377) 
0.577  
(0.398) 
    Reorganize Departments x Unified  
    Partisan Leg – – 
0.304**  
(0.178) 
0.404*  
(0.216) 
    Governor Can Reduce the Budget 1.054  (0.328) – 
1.161  
(0.699) – 
    Reduce Budget x Divided Partisan Leg – – 0.640  (0.674) – 
    Reduce Budget x Unified Partisan Leg – – 0.503  (0.313) – 
    Governor’s Level of Budget Preparation  
    Authority 
1.403  
(0.379) – 
1.217  
(0.583) 
1.336  
(0.560) 
    Budget Preparation Authority x Divided  
    Partisan Leg – – 
4.41E–08*** 
(5.64E–08) 
2.714  
(2.193) 
    Budget Preparation Authority x Unified  
    Partisan Leg – – 
0.775  
(0.452)   
0.772  
(0.402) 
Divided Partisan Legislature Government (+) 0.680  (0.212) 
0.669+ 
(0.196) 
1.532  
(2.978) 
0.270+  
(0.258) 
Unified Partisan Legislature Government (+) 0.894  (0.232) 
0.880  
(0.216) 
3.343  
(3.192) 
1.078  
(0.600) 
Governor Legacy Year (+) 1.034  (0.582) 
0.913  
(0.506) 
1.058  
(0.607) 
0.973  
(0.555) 
Legislative Election Year (-) 1.122  (0.228) 
1.142  
(0.231) 
1.493*  
(0.338) 
1.458*  
(0.329) 
Real General Expenditures (+) 1.000  (5.40E–09) 
1.000 
(5.16E–09) 
1.000 (7.24E–
09) 
1.000  
(5.63E–09) 
Biennial (+) 0.433** (0.151) 
0.523** 
(0.145) 0.458** (0.172) 
0.502** 
(0.144) 
No Balanced Budget Restriction (-) 1.033  (0.310) 
0.985  
(0.232) 1.064 (0.389) 
1.098  
(0.342) 
Surplus (-) 1.037*** (0.011) 
1.033*** 
(0.010) 1.026** (0.012) 
1.037*** 
(0.011) 
Pct ∆ Real Per Capita Income (-) 0.970  (0.036) 
0.984  
(0.035) 0.992 (0.042)  
0.992  
(0.039) 
Supermajority Requirement (+) 0.611  (0.279) 
0.823  
(0.300) 
0.710  
(0.329) 
0.750  
(0.303) 
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Table A.7 Continued 
Fiscal Year Begins (-) 1.433** (0.218) 
1.314** 
(0.179) 
1.266  
(0.264) 
1.309+  
(0.216) 
N × T (Effective Sample Size) 137 137 137 137 
Number of States 23 23 23 23 
AIC 1065.935   1062.459 1065.536 1065.171 
BIC 1112.655 1100.419 1138.536 1123.570 
Notes: Estimates for Cox proportional hazards survival analysis.  Failure = when a state adopts its budget for the 
next fiscal year bringing the budget impasse to an end. Coefficients are hazard ratios, followed by standard errors in 
parentheses.    *** p ≤ 0.01; ** p  ≤ 0.05; * p ≤ 0.10; +significant at the 0.10 level (one-tailed test) 
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Table A.8: Predicting the Likelihood of Observing a Budget Impasse in the American 
States (1986 – 2006) –  Shipan and Krupnikov Budgetary Powers Additive Index 
 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 
    Governor Can Spend Unanticipated  
    Federal Funds –0.673** (0.291) –0.494 (0.402) 
    Spend Funds x Divided Partisan Leg – 0.120 (0.523) 
    Spend Funds x Unified Partisan Leg – –0.502 (0.456) 
Divided Partisan Legislature Government (+) 0.639+ (0.432) 0.261 (1.768) 
Unified Partisan Legislature Government (+) 0.883** (0.374) 2.435* (1.481) 
Governor Legacy Year (+) –0.745 (0.799) –0.782 (0.808) 
Legislative Election Year (-) 0.080 (0.337) 0.082 (0.338) 
Real General Expenditures (+) 9.95E–09 (1.57E–08) 8.80E–09 (1.59E–08) 
Biennial (+) 0.855 (0.837) 0.876 (0.836) 
No Balanced Budget Restriction (-) –1.596** (0.770) –1.615** (0.772) 
Surplus (-) –0.039** (0.017) –0.039** (0.017) 
Pct ∆ Real Per Capita Income (-) –0.150** (0.070) –0.148** (0.069) 
Supermajority Requirement (+) 2.262+ (1.661) 2.352+ (1.674) 
Fiscal Year Begins (-) –1.047* (0.559) –1.027* (0.563) 
Constant 6.795+ (4.255) 6.091+ (4.357) 
N × T (Effective Sample Size) 787 787 
Number of States 48 48 
AIC 435.083 437.182 
BIC 500.438 511.874 
Panel-Level Variance 1.783 (0.404) 1.792 (0.403) 
SD of Random Effects 2.438 (0.493) 2.450 (0.494) 
Proportion of Total Variance Contributed by 
Panel-Level Variance  0.644 (0.093)  0.646 (0.092) 
Notes: Estimates for random-effects logit model for cross-sectional time-series dataset. Dependent variable – Late 
Budget:  Late Budget  = 1 if the state passed budget after start of next fiscal year, 0 otherwise. Standard errors in 
parentheses.    *** p ≤ 0.01; ** p  ≤ 0.05; * p ≤ 0.10; +significant at the 0.10 level (one-tailed test) 
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Table A.9: Duration of Budget Impasse in the American States (1986 – 2006)  
– Shipan and Krupnikov Budgetary Powers Additive Index 
 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 
    Governor Can Spend Unanticipated  
    Federal Funds 0.792* (0.109) 1.018 (0.210) 
    Spend Funds x Divided Partisan Leg – 0.829 (0.388) 
    Spend Funds x Unified Partisan Leg – 0.634* (0.170) 
Divided Partisan Legislature Government (+) 0.764 (0.219) 1.314 (1.992) 
Unified Partisan Legislature Government (+) 0.967 (0.229) 3.856+ (3.278) 
Governor Legacy Year (+) 0.939 (0.522) 0.887 (0.491) 
Legislative Election Year (-) 1.027 (0.201) 0.998 (0.198) 
Real General Expenditures (+) 1.000 (5.04E-09) 1.000 (5.26E-09) 
Biennial (+) 0.368*** (0.092) 0.372*** (0.096) 
No Balanced Budget Restriction (-) 0.917 (0.218) 0.841 (0.215) 
Surplus (-) 1.033*** (0.010) 1.033*** (0.010) 
Pct ∆ Real Per Capita Income (-) 0.972 (0.033) 0.972 (0.035) 
Supermajority Requirement (+) 0.747 (0.257) 0.768 (0.266) 
Fiscal Year Begins (-) 1.266** (0.151) 1.272+ (0.199) 
N × T (Effective Sample Size) 137 137 
Number of States 23 23 
AIC 1066.279 1067.442 
BIC 1101.319 1108.322 
Notes: Estimates for Cox proportional hazards survival analysis.  Failure = when a state adopts its budget for the 
next fiscal year bringing the budget impasse to an end. Coefficients are hazard ratios, followed by standard errors in 
parentheses.    *** p ≤ 0.01; ** p  ≤ 0.05; * p ≤ 0.10; +significant at the 0.10 level (one-tailed test) 
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Table A.10: Predicting the Likelihood of Observing a Budget Impasse in the American 
States (1986 – 2006) – Squire Index 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Gubernatorial Institutional Powers     
    Governor Possesses Budget Formulation  
    Authority (-) 
–0.180  
(0.473) – 
1.079  
(0.981) 
1.217  
(0.956) 
    Governor Budget Formulation Authority x   
    Divided Partisan Leg (-) – – 
–2.385*  
(1.253) 
–2.436** 
(1.216) 
    Governor Budget Formulation Authority x   
    Unified Partisan Leg (-) – – 
–0.611  
(1.066) 
–0.766  
(1.062) 
    Governor Possesses Official Revenue  
    Forecast Authority – Binds Budget (-) 
0.810  
(1.206) – 
–1.062  
(1.751) 
–0.571  
(1.694) 
    Governor Binding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Divided Partisan Leg (-) – – 
2.012  
(1.644) 
1.232  
(1.450) 
    Governor Binding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Unified Partisan Leg (-) – – 
3.156**  
(1.565) 
2.981** 
(1.521) 
    Governor Possesses Official Revenue  
    Forecast Authority – Does Not Bind  
    Budget (-) 
–0.812  
(0.863) – 
0.171  
(1.424) – 
    Governor Nonbinding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Divided Partisan Leg (-) – – 
0.519  
(2.307) – 
    Governor Nonbinding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Unified Partisan Leg (-) – – 
–1.676  
(1.755) – 
    Governor Possesses Line Item Veto (-) –0.414  (0.790) – 
–2.478** 
(1.256) 
–2.460** 
(1.212) 
    Governor Line Item Veto x  Divided 
Partisan Leg (-) – – 
4.628**  
(1.939) 
4.647** 
(1.875) 
    Governor Line Item Veto x  Unified 
Partisan Leg (-) – – 
1.286  
(1.298) 
1.445  
(1.280) 
Legislature’s Institutional Powers     
    Legislature Possesses Official Revenue  
    Forecast Authority – Binds Budget (-) 
3.015*  
(1.569) 
3.253** 
(1.616) 
3.358*  
(1.857) 
3.791** 
(1.811) 
    Legislature Binding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Divided Partisan Leg (-) – – 
0.240  
(1.556) 
–0.520 
(1.364) 
    Legislature Binding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Unified Partisan Leg (-) – – 
–0.179  
(1.737) 
–0.271 
(1.674) 
    Legislature Possesses Official Revenue  
    Forecast Authority – Does Not Bind  
    Budget (-) 
–0.639  
(0.720) – 
–1.245  
(1.059) – 
    Legislature Nonbinding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Divided Partisan Leg (-) – – 
1.369  
(1.231) – 
    Legislature Nonbinding Revenue Forecast  
   Authority x Unified Partisan Leg (-) – – 
0.859  
(1.147) – 
    Squire Index (-) 11.178*** (2.430) 
10.820*** 
(2.414) 
12.434*** 
(3.597) 
12.194*** 
(3.467) 
    Squire Index x Divided Partisan Leg (-) – – –1.031  (3.651) 
–1.390  
(3.573) 
    Squire Index x Unified Partisan Leg (-) – – –3.959  (3.536) 
–3.248  
(3.153) 
Divided Partisan Legislature Government (+) 0.470  (0.435) 
0.523  
(0.434) 
–2.123  
(2.270) 
–1.237  
(2.100) 
Unified Partisan Legislature Government (+) 1.093*** (0.383) 
1.132*** 
(0.382) 
1.030  
(1.192) 
1.031  
(1.175) 
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Table A.10 Continued 
Governor Legacy Year (+) –0.597  (0.70) 
–0.594 
(0.788) 
–0.678  
(0.828) 
–0.616 
(0.825) 
Legislative Election Year (-) 0.009  (0.337) 0.005 (0.336) 
–0.019  
(0.353) 
–0.022  
(0.350) 
Real General Expenditures (+) –3.46E–09 (1.46E–08) 
–2.45E–09 
(1.47E–08) 
1.17E–09 
(1.65E–08) 
–2.02E–09 
(1.58E–08) 
Biennial (+) 1.341*  (0.749) 
1.233* 
(0.739) 
1.234+  
(0.818) 
1.021+  
(0.763) 
No Balanced Budget Restriction (-) –1.056
+
 
(0.717) 
–0.979+ 
(0.732) 
–1.118+ 
(0.773) 
–0.993+ 
(0.753) 
Surplus (-) –0.034* (0.017) 
–0.036** 
(0.017) 
–0.037** 
(0.019) 
–0.038** 
(0.019) 
Pct ∆ Real Per Capita Income (-) –0.158** (0.068) 
–0.167** 
(0.068) 
–0.189** 
(0.075) 
–0.191*** 
(0.074) 
Supermajority Requirement (+) 1.413  (1.452) 
1.299  
(1.420) 
1.738  
(1.598) 
1.604  
(1.559) 
Fiscal Year Begins (-) –0.982** (0.471) 
–0.960** 
(0.484) 
–0.937*  
(0.506) 
–0.930* 
(0.502) 
Constant 2.124  (3.448) 
1.317  
(3.528) 
2.390  
(3.788) 
1.872  
(3.745) 
N × T (Effective Sample Size) 820 820 820 820 
Number of States 48 48 48 48 
AIC 431.958 424.706 436.528 428.497 
BIC 526.144 495.346 596.645 560.358 
Panel-Level Variance 1.274  (0.413) 
1.383  
(0.397) 
1.419 
(0.427) 
   1.418 
(0.408) 
SD of Random Effects 1.891  (0.390) 
1.996  
(0.396) 
2.033  
(0.434)   
2.032  
(0.415) 
Proportion of Total Variance Contributed by 
Panel-Level Variance  
0.521  
(0.103) 
0.548  
(0.098) 
0.557  
(0.105) 
0.556  
(0.101) 
Notes: Estimates for random-effects logit model for cross-sectional time-series dataset. Dependent variable – Late 
Budget:  Late Budget  = 1 if the state passed budget after start of next fiscal year, 0 otherwise. Standard errors in 
parentheses.    *** p ≤ 0.01; ** p  ≤ 0.05; * p ≤ 0.10; +significant at the 0.10 level (one-tailed test) 
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Table A.11: Duration of Budget Impasse in the American States (1986 – 2006)  
– Squire Index 
 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Gubernatorial Institutional Powers     
    Governor Possesses Budget Formulation  
    Authority (-) 
0.996  
(0.319) – 
0.685  
(0.483) – 
    Governor Budget Formulation Authority x   
    Divided Partisan Leg (-) – – 
2.485  
(1.940) – 
    Governor Budget Formulation Authority x  
    Unified Partisan Leg (-) – – 
1.174  
(0.936) – 
    Governor Possesses Official Revenue  
    Forecast Authority – Binds Budget (-) 
1.998*  
(0.732) 
1.570+ 
(0.533) 
39.629*** 
(50.734) 
32.435*** 
(39.201) 
    Governor Binding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Divided Partisan Leg (-) – – 
0.043**  
(0.064) 
0.054** 
(0.074) 
    Governor Binding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Unified Partisan Leg (-) – – 
0.061**  
(0.084) 
0.059** 
(0.077) 
    Governor Possesses Official Revenue  
    Forecast Authority – Does Not Bind  
    Budget (-) 
0.421  
(0.296) – 
0.104*  
(0.123) 
0.148*  
(0.169) 
    Governor Nonbinding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Divided Partisan Leg (-) – – 
186.487*** 
(313.510) 
75.761*** 
(120.357) 
    Governor Nonbinding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Unified Partisan Leg (-) – – 
217.264*** 
(391.152) 
63.733*** 
(101.929) 
    Governor Possesses Line Item Veto (-) 0.663  (0.266) – 
1.085  
(0.700) – 
    Governor Line Item Veto x Divided  
    Partisan Leg (-) – – 
0.215  
(0.258) – 
    Governor Line Item Veto x Unified  
    Partisan Leg (-) – – 
1.682  
(1.762) – 
Legislature’s Institutional Powers     
    Legislature Possesses Official Revenue  
    Forecast Authority – Binds Budget (-) 
1.740 
(0.882) – 
3.637+  
(3.344) 
2.934+  
(2.094) 
    Legislature Binding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Divided Partisan Leg (-) – – 
0.205  
(0.254) 
0.445  
(0.407) 
    Legislature Binding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Unified Partisan Leg (-) – – 
2.310  
(2.296) 
1.168  
(0.762) 
    Legislature Possesses Official Revenue  
    Forecast Authority – Does Not Bind  
    Budget (-) 
1.477  
(0.443) – 
1.082  
(0.746) – 
    Legislature Nonbinding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Divided Partisan Leg (-) – – 
1.308  
(1.205) – 
    Legislature Nonbinding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Unified Partisan Leg (-) – – 
2.427  
(2.085) – 
    Squire Index (-) 6.185** (5.020) 
5.311** 
(4.288) 
6.711+  
(8.812) 
7.435*  
(8.448) 
    Squire Index x  Divided Partisan Leg (-) – – 0.847  (1.833) 
0.854  
(1.640) 
    Squire Index x  Unified Partisan Leg (-) – – 0.085
+ 
(0.161) 
0.239  
(0.358) 
Divided Partisan Legislature Government (+) 0.581
+
  
(0.196) 
0.540** 
(0.167) 
1.538 
(2.676) 
0.650  
(0.622) 
Unified Partisan Legislature Government (+) 0.777 (0.198) 
0.809  
(0.193) 
0.612  
(0.543) 
1.134  
(0.717) 
 250 
 
 
Table A.11 Continued 
Governor Legacy Year (+) 1.151  (0.655) 
1.135  
(0.642) 
0.852  
(0.496) 
1.021  
(0.577) 
Legislative Election Year (-) 1.045  (0.214) 
1.033  
(0.208) 
1.260  
(0.299) 
1.190  
(0.260) 
Real General Expenditures (+) 1.000* (7.05E–09) 
1.000* 
(5.64E–09) 
  1.000* 
(1.16E–08) 
1.000** 
(6.71E–09) 
Biennial (+) 0.206*** (0.077) 
0.393*** 
(0.100) 
0.128*** 
(0.060) 
0.214*** 
(0.077) 
No Balanced Budget Restriction (-) 1.355  (0.513) 
1.272  
(0.348) 
1.198  
(0.569) 
0.895  
(0.381) 
Surplus (-) 1.042*** (0.012) 
1.037*** 
(0.010) 
1.046*** 
(0.014) 
1.049*** 
(0.012) 
Pct ∆ Real Per Capita Income (-) 0.957  (0.036) 
0.967  
(0.035) 
0.961  
(0.043) 
0.944+  
(0.037) 
Supermajority  Requirement (+) 0.609  (0.329) 
0.829  
(0.285) 
0.889  
(0.762) 
1.046  
(0.401) 
Fiscal Year Begins (-) 1.293*  (0.197) 
1.229* 
(0.148) 
1.218  
(0.223) 
1.329** 
(0.167) 
N × T (Effective Sample Size) 140 140 140 140 
Number of States 23 23 23 23 
AIC 1097.982 1095.707 1103.075 1093.754 
BIC 1150.931 1133.948 1197.207 1161.412 
Notes: Estimates for Cox proportional hazards survival analysis.  Failure = when a state adopts its budget for the 
next fiscal year bringing the budget impasse to an end. Coefficients are hazard ratios, followed by standard errors in 
parentheses.    *** p ≤ 0.01; ** p  ≤ 0.05; * p ≤ 0.10; +significant at the 0.10 level (one-tailed test) 
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Table A.12: Predicting the Likelihood of Observing a Budget Impasse in the American 
States (1986 – 2006) – Simple Divided Government 
 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Gubernatorial Institutional Powers     
    Governor Possesses Budget Formulation  
    Authority (-) 
0.056  
(0.479) – 
–0.057  
(0.582) – 
    Governor Budget Formulation Authority x   
    Simple Divided Gov (-) – – 
0.928  
(0.826) – 
    Governor Possesses Official Revenue  
    Forecast Authority – Binds Budget (-) 
0.805  
(1.319) – 
–0.069  
(1.449) 
–0.023  
(1.385) 
    Governor Binding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Simple Divided Gov (-) – – 
2.477**  
(1.166) 
2.108*  
(1.095) 
    Governor Possesses Official Revenue  
    Forecast Authority – Does Not Bind  
    Budget (-) 
–0.781  
(0.856) – 
–0.545  
(1.075) – 
    Governor Nonbinding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Simple Divided Gov (-) – – 
–0.961  
(1.514) – 
    Governor Possesses Line Item Veto (-) –0.500  (0.832) – 
–0.095  
(0.920) – 
    Governor Line Item Veto x Simple  
    Divided Gov (-) – – 
–1.311  
(1.024) – 
Legislature’s Institutional Powers     
    Legislature Possesses Official Revenue  
    Forecast Authority – Binds Budget (-) 
3.751** 
(1.760) 
3.822** 
(1.759) 
3.655** 
(1.862) 
3.581** 
(1.800) 
    Legislature Binding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Simple Divided Gov (-) – – 
0.604  
(1.343) 
1.137  
(1.181) 
    Legislature Possesses Official Revenue  
    Forecast Authority – Does Not Bind  
    Budget (-) 
0.267  
(0.700) – 
0.098  
(0.747) – 
    Legislature Nonbinding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Simple Divided Gov (-) – – 
0.522  
(0.871) – 
    Legislature Session Length (-) 0.014** (0.007) 
0.014** 
(0.007) 
0.014*  
(0.007) 
0.013*  
(0.007) 
    Legislature Session Length x Simple  
    Divided Gov (-) – – 
0.005  
(0.011) 
1.137  
(1.181) 
Simple Divided Government (+) 0.703** (0.332) 
0.704** 
(0.329) 
0.199  
(1.265) 
0.252  
(0.883) 
Governor Legacy Year (+) –0.616  (0.782) 
–0.648 
(0.779) 
–0.535  
(0.804) 
–0.564  
(0.790) 
Legislative Election Year (-) 0.170  (0.331) 
0.170  
(0.331) 
0.157  
(0.338) 
0.164  
(0.334) 
Real General Expenditures (+) 4.20E–09 (1.41E–08) 
4.30E–09 
(1.40E–08) 
–9.92E–10 
(1.51E–08) 
1.70E–09 
(1.45E–08) 
Biennial (+) 0.636  (0.766) 
0.675  
(0.756) 
0.658  
(0.801) 
0.645  
(0.756) 
No Balanced Budget Restriction (-) –1.688** (0.739) 
–1.731** 
(0.738) 
–1.733** 
(0.764) 
–1.703** 
(0.738) 
Surplus (-) –0.032* (0.017) 
–0.033* 
(0.017) 
–0.031* 
(0.018) 
–0.032* 
(0.017) 
Pct ∆ Real Per Capita Income (-) –0.152** (0.067) 
–0.157** 
(0.068) 
–0.162** 
(0.071) 
–0.156** 
(0.069) 
Supermajority Requirement (+) 2.090
+
  
(1.573) 
2.012+ 
(1.516) 
2.467+  
(1.650) 
2.272+  
(1.529) 
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Table A.12 Continued 
Fiscal Year Begins (-) –0.838* (0.505) 
–0.824+ 
(0.508) 
–0.901*  
(0.528) 
–0.875* 
(0.514) 
Constant 2.597  (3.744) 
  2.236 
(3.738) 
3.056  
(3.961) 
2.716  
(3.779) 
N × T (Effective Sample Size) 820 820 820 820 
Number of States 48 48 48 48 
AIC 452.908 444.834 458.953 447.616 
BIC 542.385 510.764 581.395 532.384 
Panel-Level Variance 1.531  (0.432) 
1.574  
(0.421) 
1.613  
(0.440) 
1.573  
(0.426) 
SD of Random Effects 2.150  (0.464) 
2.197  
(0.462) 
2.241  
(0.494) 
2.196  
(0.468) 
Proportion of Total Variance Contributed by 
Panel-Level Variance  
0.584  
(0.105) 
0.595  
(0.101) 
0.604  
(0.105) 
0.594  
(0.103) 
Notes: Estimates for random-effects logit model for cross-sectional time-series dataset. Dependent variable – Late 
Budget:  Late Budget  = 1 if the state passed budget after start of next fiscal year, 0 otherwise. Standard errors in 
parentheses.    *** p ≤ 0.01; ** p  ≤ 0.05; * p ≤ 0.10; +significant at the 0.10 level (one-tailed test) 
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Table A.13: Duration of Budget Impasse in the American States (1986 – 2006)  
–  Simple Divided Government 
 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Gubernatorial Institutional Powers     
    Governor Possesses Budget Formulation  
    Authority (-) 
0.926  
(0.291) – 
1.225  
(0.470) – 
    Governor Budget Formulation Authority x   
    Simple Divided Gov (-) – – 
0.559  
(0.313) – 
    Governor Possesses Official Revenue  
    Forecast Authority – Binds Budget (-) 
1.636+  
(0.572) 
1.481  
(0.497) 
1.455  
(0.720) – 
    Governor Binding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Simple Divided Gov (-) – – 
1.258  
(0.937) – 
    Governor Possesses Official Revenue  
    Forecast Authority – Does Not Bind  
    Budget (-) 
0.603  
(0.405) – 
0.267+  
(0.229) 
0.397 
(0.318) 
    Governor Nonbinding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Simple Divided Gov (-) – – 
72.582*** 
(114.226) 
16.441** 
(22.355) 
    Governor Possesses Line Item Veto (-) 0.739  (0.299) – 
0.761  
(0.356) – 
    Governor Line Item Veto x Simple  
    Divided Gov (-) – – 
2.887  
(2.496) – 
Legislature’s Institutional Powers     
    Legislature Possesses Official Revenue  
    Forecast Authority – Binds Budget (-) 
2.126+  
(1.042) 
2.349** 
(0.935) 
1.729  
(0.985) 
1.825+  
(0.847) 
    Legislature Binding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Simple Divided Gov (-) – – 
5.529*  
(4.989) 
1.867  
(1.017) 
    Legislature Possesses Official Revenue  
    Forecast Authority – Does Not Bind  
    Budget (-) 
1.374  
(0.433) – 
1.291  
(0.429) – 
    Legislature Nonbinding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Simple Divided Gov (-) – – 
1.616  
(0.962) – 
    Legislature Session Length (-) 0.998  (0.003) – 
1.000  
(0.003) 
0.998  
(0.003)   
    Legislature Session Length x Simple  
    Divided Gov (-) – – 
0.990*  
(0.006) 
0.994  
(0.005) 
Simple Divided Government (+) 1.048  (0.221) 
1.034  
(0.211) 
1.053  
(0.897) 
1.680  
(0.934) 
Governor Legacy Year (+) 1.000  (0.555) 
1.037  
(0.572) 
0.816  
(0.457) 
0.960  
(0.525) 
Legislative Election Year (-) 1.043  (0.213) 
1.024  
(0.202) 
1.070  
(0.223) 
1.036  
(0.204) 
Real General Expenditures (+) 1.000  (6.87E–09) 
1.000** 
(5.75E–09) 
1.000*  
(7.64E–09) 
1.000+  
(5.56E–09) 
Biennial (+) 0.203*** (0.074) 
0.272*** 
(0.076) 
0.145*** 
(0.059) 
0.232*** 
(0.069) 
No Balanced Budget Restriction (-) 0.882  (0.309) 
0.689  
(0.205) 
0.979  
(0.395) 
0.715  
(0.239) 
Surplus (-) 1.037*** (0.011) 
1.033*** 
(0.010) 
1.034*** 
(0.011) 
1.036*** 
(0.010) 
Pct ∆ Real Per Capita Income (-) 0.966  (0.036) 
0.954+ 
(0.033) 
0.977  
(0.040) 
0.962  
(0.034) 
Supermajority Requirement (+) 0.710  (0.391) 
1.138  
(0.407) 
0.948  
(0.617) 
1.027  
(0.362) 
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Table A.13 Continued 
Fiscal Year Begins (-) 1.275
+
  
(0.217) 
1.250* 
(0.147) 
1.263+  
(0.226) 
1.330** 
(0.174) 
N × T (Effective Sample Size) 140 140 140 140 
Number of States 23 23 23 23 
AIC 1101.359 1095.439 1105.085 1095.990 
BIC 1151.367 1130.739 1175.684 1143.056 
Notes: Estimates for Cox proportional hazards survival analysis.  Failure = when a state adopts its budget for the 
next fiscal year bringing the budget impasse to an end. Coefficients are hazard ratios, followed by standard errors in 
parentheses.    *** p ≤ 0.01; ** p  ≤ 0.05; * p ≤ 0.10; +significant at the 0.10 level (one-tailed test) 
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Table A.14: Predicting the Likelihood of Observing a Budget Impasse in the American 
States (1986 – 2006) – Term Limits 
 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Gubernatorial Institutional Powers     
    Governor Possesses Budget Formulation  
    Authority (-) 
0.0005  
(0.479)   – 
1.361+  
(0.946) 
1.305+  
(0.937) 
    Governor Budget Formulation Authority x   
    Divided Partisan Leg (-) – – 
–2.718** 
(1.187) 
–2.708** 
(1.178) 
    Governor Budget Formulation Authority x   
    Unified Partisan Leg (-) – – 
–0.685  
(1.072) 
–0.743  
(1.061) 
    Governor Possesses Official Revenue  
    Forecast Authority – Binds Budget (-) 
0.774  
(1.304) – 
–1.405  
(1.777) 
–1.330  
(1.776) 
    Governor Binding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Divided Partisan Leg (-) – – 
2.278+  
(1.611) 
2.206+  
(1.584) 
    Governor Binding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Unified Partisan Leg (-) – – 
3.650**  
(1.541) 
3.697** 
(1.538) 
    Governor Possesses Official Revenue  
    Forecast Authority – Does Not Bind  
    Budget (-) 
–0.692  
(0.866) – 
–0.155  
(1.377) – 
    Governor Nonbinding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Divided Partisan Leg (-) – – 
0.310  
(2.263) – 
    Governor Nonbinding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Unified Partisan Leg (-) – – 
–1.242  
(1.750) – 
    Governor Possesses Line Item Veto (-) –0.462  (0.830) – 
–2.003*  
(1.175) 
–2.074* 
(1.163) 
    Governor Line Item Veto x Divided  
    Partisan Leg (-) – – 
3.769**  
(1.753) 
3.827** 
(1.748) 
    Governor Line Item Veto x Unified  
    Partisan Leg (-) – – 
0.223  
(1.162) 
0.432  
(1.143) 
Legislature’s Institutional Powers     
    Legislature Possesses Official Revenue  
    Forecast Authority – Binds Budget (-) 
3.760** 
(1.736) 
3.821** 
(1.740) 
3.869*  
(1.987) 
3.949** 
(1.986) 
    Legislature Binding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Divided Partisan Leg (-) – – 
–0.141  
(1.549) 
–0.219  
(1.514) 
    Legislature Binding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Unified Partisan Leg (-) – – 
0.194  
(1.595) 
0.327  
(1.584) 
    Legislature Possesses Official Revenue  
    Forecast Authority – Does Not Bind  
    Budget (-) 
0.237  
(0.692) – 
–0.769  
(0.990) 
–0.731  
(0.970) 
    Legislature Nonbinding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Divided Partisan Leg (-) – – 
1.796+  
(1.171) 
1.753+  
(1.133) 
    Legislature Nonbinding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Unified Partisan Leg (-) – – 
1.176  
(0.989) 
1.317+  
(0.982) 
    Legislature Session Length (-) 0.013** (0.007) 
0.013* 
(0.007) 
0.023*  
(0.012) 
0.023*  
(0.012) 
    Legislature Session Length x Divided  
    Partisan Leg (-) – – 
–0.016  
(0.013) 
–0.016  
(0.013) 
    Legislature Session Length x Unified  
    Partisan Leg (-) – – 
–0.003  
(0.013) 
–0.004  
(0.013) 
Divided Partisan Legislature Government (+) 0.659
+
  
(0.430) 
0.694+ 
(0.428) 
0.052  
(2.290) 
0.069  
(2.247) 
Unified Partisan Legislature Government (+) 0.919** (0.364) 
0.933*** 
(0.361) 
0.881  
(1.489) 
0.761  
(1.472) 
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Table A.14 Continued 
Reelection Eligible (-) –0.175  (0.413) 
–0.206 
(0.411) 
–0.172  
(0.468) 
–0.149  
(0.469) 
Governor Legacy Year (+) –0.499  (0.840) 
–0.502 
(0.839) 
–0.655  
(0.893) 
–0.642  
(0.892) 
Legislative Election Year (-) 0.135  (0.333) 
0.132  
(0.334) 
0.101  
(0.350) 
0.089  
(0.349) 
Real General Expenditures (+) 6.44E–09 (1.40E–08) 
6.45E–09 
(1.39E–08) 
1.35E–08 
(1.54E–08) 
1.45E–08 
(1.53E–08) 
Biennial (+) 0.598  (0.765) 
0.645  
(0.756) 
0.543  
(0.815) 
0.442  
(0.807) 
No Balanced Budget Restriction (-) –1.645** (0.734) 
–1.681** 
(0.734) 
–1.712** 
(0.773) 
–1.730** 
(0.778) 
Surplus (-) –0.033* (0.017) 
–0.034** 
(0.017) 
–0.039** 
(0.019) 
–0.040** 
(0.018) 
Pct ∆ Real Per Capita Income (-) –0.151** (0.067) 
–0.155** 
(0.068) 
–0.168** 
(0.073) 
–0.174** 
(0.073) 
Supermajority Requirement (+) 2.113
+
  
(1.554) 
2.071+ 
(1.502) 
2.083  
(1.646) 
1.863  
(1.633) 
Fiscal Year Begins (-) –0.784
+
 
(0.497) 
–0.775+ 
(0.502) 
–0.724+  
(0.515) 
–0.713+ 
(0.519) 
Constant 1.883  (3.720) 
1.480  
(3.720) 
1.329  
(4.023) 
1.373  
(4.050) 
N × T (Effective Sample Size) 820 820 820 820 
Number of States 48 48 48 48 
AIC 454.433 446.000 453.598 449.113 
BIC 553.329 521.349 618.424 599.811 
Panel-Level Variance 1.498  (0.427) 
1.547  
(0.417) 
1.528  
(0.439) 
1.557  
(0.431) 
SD of Random Effects 2.115  (0.452) 
2.168  
(0.452) 
2.147  
(0.471) 
2.178  
(0.469) 
Proportion of Total Variance Contributed by 
Panel-Level Variance  
0.576  
(0.104) 
0.588  
(0.101) 
0.583  
(0.107) 
0.590  
(0.104) 
Notes: Estimates for random-effects logit model for cross-sectional time-series dataset. Dependent variable – Late 
Budget:  Late Budget  = 1 if the state passed budget after start of next fiscal year, 0 otherwise. Standard errors in 
parentheses.    *** p ≤ 0.01; ** p  ≤ 0.05; * p ≤ 0.10; +significant at the 0.10 level (one-tailed test) 
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Table A.15: Duration of Budget Impasse in the American States (1986 – 2006)  
– Term Limits 
 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Gubernatorial Institutional Powers     
    Governor Possesses Budget Formulation  
    Authority (-) 
0.898  
(0.283) – 
0.592  
(0.417) 
0.571  
(0.403) 
    Governor Budget Formulation Authority x   
    Divided Partisan Leg (-) – – 
2.729+  
(2.138) 
2.785+  
(2.176) 
    Governor Budget Formulation Authority x  
    Unified Partisan Leg (-) – – 
1.224  
(0.968) 
1.596  
(1.247) 
    Governor Possesses Official Revenue  
    Forecast Authority – Binds Budget (-) 
1.787+  
(0.653) 
1.444  
(0.488) 
35.870*** 
(43.097) 
28.503*** 
(33.768) 
    Governor Binding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Divided Partisan Leg (-) – – 
0.036**  
(0.050) 
0.046** 
(0.064) 
    Governor Binding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Unified Partisan Leg (-) – – 
0.057**  
(0.075) 
0.083*  
(0.107) 
    Governor Possesses Official Revenue  
    Forecast Authority – Does Not Bind  
    Budget (-) 
0.490  
(0.343) – 
0.084**  
(0.095) 
0.069** 
(0.077) 
    Governor Nonbinding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Divided Partisan Leg (-) – – 
196.701*** 
(321.287) 
207.577*** 
(332.366) 
    Governor Nonbinding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Unified Partisan Leg (-) – – 
200.608*** 
(365.306) 
154.700*** 
(281.317) 
    Governor Possesses Line Item Veto (-) 0.812  (0.346) – 
1.538  
(1.016) 
1.245  
(0.753) 
    Governor Line Item Veto x Divided  
    Partisan Leg (-) – – 
0.094*  
(0.130) 
0.125+  
(0.158) 
    Governor Line Item Veto x Unified  
    Partisan Leg (-) – – 
1.376  
(1.320) 
0.780  
(0.706) 
Legislature’s Institutional Powers     
    Legislature Possesses Official Revenue  
    Forecast Authority – Binds Budget (-) 
1.939  
(1.021) – 
3.411+  
(2.881) 
2.400  
(1.922) 
    Legislature Binding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Divided Partisan Leg (-) – – 
0.123*  
(0.151) 
0.153+  
(0.184) 
    Legislature Binding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Unified Partisan Leg (-) – – 
2.188  
(2.179) 
1.707  
(1.655) 
    Legislature Possesses Official Revenue  
    Forecast Authority – Does Not Bind  
    Budget (-) 
1.368  
(0.437) – 
0.779  
(0.518) 
0.847  
(0.539) 
    Legislature Nonbinding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Divided Partisan Leg (-) – – 
2.112  
(1.834) 
2.065  
(1.761) 
    Legislature Nonbinding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Unified Partisan Leg (-) – – 
2.907+  
(2.376) 
3.274+  
(2.691) 
    Legislature Session Length (-) 0.998  (0.003) – 
0.998  
(0.005) – 
    Legislature Session Length x Divided  
    Partisan Leg (-) – – 
1.003  
(0.007) – 
    Legislature Session Length x Unified  
    Partisan Leg (-) – – 
0.992  
(0.006) – 
Divided Partisan Legislature Government (+) 0.696  (0.234) 
0.629+ 
(0.189) 
2.057  
(3.124) 
2.001  
(3.013) 
Unified Partisan Legislature Government (+) 0.887  (0.228) 
0.873  
(0.206) 
0.678  
(0.648) 
0.395  
(0.322) 
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Table A.15 Continued 
Reelection Eligible (-) 1.046  (0.325) 
1.193  
(0.340) 
1.409  
(0.488) 
1.383  
(0.468) 
Governor Legacy Year (+) 0.922  (0.564) 
0.853  
(0.513) 
0.556  
(0.350) 
0.620  
(0.390) 
Legislative Election Year (-) 1.079  (0.223) 
1.100  
(0.218) 
1.300  
(0.291) 
1.354+  
(0.296) 
Real General Expenditures (+) 1.000  (6.88E–09) 
1.000 
(5.24E–09) 
  1.000+ 
(1.09E–08) 
1.000+  
(1.05E–08) 
Biennial (+) 0.219*** (0.083) 
0.368*** 
(0.094) 
0.140*** 
(0.063) 
0.122*** 
(0.053) 
No Balanced Budget Restriction (-) 0.943  (0.333) 
0.929  
(0.225) 
1.001  
(0.415) 
1.281  
(0.503) 
Surplus (-) 1.040*** (0.011) 
1.037*** 
(0.010) 
1.041*** 
(0.013) 
1.045*** 
(0.013) 
Pct ∆ Real Per Capita Income (-) 0.975  (0.037) 
0.975  
(0.035) 
0.991  
(0.042) 
0.986  
(0.039) 
Supermajority  Requirement (+) 0.696  (0.395) 
0.879  
(0.299) 
0.915  
(0.768)  
0.596  
(0.488) 
Fiscal Year Begins (-) 1.218  (0.227) 
1.218+ 
(0.158) 
1.188  
(0.265) 
1.208  
(0.234) 
N × T (Effective Sample Size) 140 140 140 140 
Number of States 23 23 23 23 
AIC 1104.167 1099.514 1104.150 1102.261 
BIC 1160.058 1137.755 1201.224 1190.511 
Notes: Estimates for Cox proportional hazards survival analysis.  Failure = when a state adopts its budget for the 
next fiscal year bringing the budget impasse to an end. Coefficients are hazard ratios, followed by standard errors in 
parentheses.    *** p ≤ 0.01; ** p  ≤ 0.05; * p ≤ 0.10; +significant at the 0.10 level (one-tailed test) 
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Table A.16: Predicting the Likelihood of Observing a Budget Impasse in the American 
States (1986 – 2006) – Previous Vote Share 
 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Gubernatorial Institutional Powers     
    Governor Possesses Budget Formulation  
    Authority (-) 
–0.002  
(0.486) – 
1.417+  
(0.962) 
1.365+  
(0.955) 
    Governor Budget Formulation Authority x   
    Divided Partisan Leg (-) – – 
–2.845** 
(1.210) 
–2.832** 
(1.203) 
    Governor Budget Formulation Authority x   
    Unified Partisan Leg (-) – – 
–0.691  
(1.095) 
–0.748  
(1.086) 
    Governor Possesses Official Revenue  
    Forecast Authority – Binds Budget (-) 
0.886  
(1.341) – 
–1.218  
(1.826) 
–1.163  
(1.825) 
    Governor Binding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Divided Partisan Leg (-) – – 
2.031  
(1.630) 
2.001  
(1.604) 
    Governor Binding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Unified Partisan Leg (-) – – 
3.598**  
(1.572) 
3.653** 
(1.568) 
    Governor Possesses Official Revenue  
    Forecast Authority – Does Not Bind  
    Budget (-) 
–0.637  
(0.870) – 
–0.056  
(1.378) – 
    Governor Nonbinding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Divided Partisan Leg (-) – – 
0.060  
(2.326) – 
    Governor Nonbinding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Unified Partisan Leg (-) – – 
–1.203  
(1.754) – 
    Governor Possesses Line Item Veto (-) –0.515  (0.843) – 
–2.225*  
(1.168) 
–2.278** 
(1.1566) 
    Governor Line Item Veto x Divided  
    Partisan Leg (-) – – 
4.306**  
(1.848)   
4.368** 
(1.847) 
    Governor Line Item Veto x Unified  
    Patisan Leg (-) – – 
0.594  
(1.209) 
0.797  
(1.189) 
Legislature’s Institutional Powers     
    Legislature Possesses Official Revenue  
    Forecast Authority – Binds Budget (-) 
3.522*  
(1.810)  
3.554** 
(1.814) 
3.0383+  
(2.136) 
3.097+ 
(2.140) 
    Legislature Binding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Divided Partisan Leg (-) – – 
0.867  
(1.741) 
0.862  
(1.721) 
    Legislature Binding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Unified Partisan Leg (-) – – 
1.311  
(1.788) 
1.460  
(1.782) 
    Legislature Possesses Official Revenue  
    Forecast Authority – Does Not Bind  
    Budget (-) 
0.337  
(0.707) – 
–0.686  
(1.008) 
–0.658  
(0.989) 
    Legislature Nonbinding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Divided Partisan Leg (-) – – 
1.800+ 
(1.186) 
1.794+  
(1.153) 
    Legislature Nonbinding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Unified Partisan Leg (-) – – 
1.191  
(0.999) 
1.317+  
(0.992) 
    Legislature Session Length (-) 0.015** (0.007) 
0.014** 
(0.007) 
0.028**  
(0.012) 
0.027** 
(0.012) 
    Legislature Session Length x Divided  
    Partisan Leg (-) – – 
–0.021+  
(0.014) 
–0.021+ 
(0.013) 
    Legislature Session Length x Unified  
    Partisan Leg (-) – – 
–0.007  
(0.013) 
–0.008  
(0.013) 
Divided Partisan Legislature Government (+) 0.658
+
  
(0.439) 
0.692+ 
(0.438) 
0.001  
(2.352) 
–0.046  
(2.316) 
Unified Partisan Legislature Government (+) 0.891** (0.371) 
0.902** 
(0.368) 
0.784  
(1.506) 
0.669  
(1.490) 
 260 
 
 
Table A.16 Continued 
    Previous General Election Vote Share –0.014  (0.020) 
–0.014 
(0.020) 
–0.025  
(0.023) 
–0.027  
(0.023) 
Governor Legacy Year (+) –0.571  (0.789) 
–0.608 
(0.784) 
–0.541  
(0.834) 
–0.504  
(0.832) 
Legislative Election Year (-) 0.138  (0.339) 
0.139  
(0.339) 
0.047  
(0.356) 
0.036  
(0.355) 
Real General Expenditures (+) 2.74E–09 (1.44E–08) 
2.49E–09 
(1.44E–08) 
8.53E–09 
(1.59E–08) 
9.23E–09 
(1.58E–08) 
Biennial (+) 0.553  (0.785) 
0.623  
(0.777) 
0.469  
(0.838) 
0.370  
(0.829) 
No Balanced Budget Restriction (-) –1.673** (0.749) 
–1.721** 
(0.751) 
–1.792** 
(0.791) 
–1.814** 
(0.796) 
Surplus (-) –0.035* (0.018) 
–0.037** 
(0.018) 
–0.038*  
(0.020) 
–0.038* 
(0.020) 
Pct ∆ Real Per Capita Income (-) –0.165** (0.070) 
–0.169** 
(0.071) 
–0.191** 
(0.078) 
–0.196** 
(0.078) 
Supermajority Requirement (+) 2.182
+
  
(1.598) 
2.178+ 
(1.551) 
2.265+  
(1.704) 
2.080  
(1.696) 
Fiscal Year Begins (-) –0.788
+
 
(0.513) 
–0.786+ 
(0.519) 
–0.753+  
(0.534) 
–0.744+ 
(0.540) 
Constant 2.856  (3.978) 
2.526  
(4.019) 
2.983  
(4.378) 
3.136  
(4.408) 
N × T (Effective Sample Size) 820 820 820 820 
Number of States 48 48 48 48 
AIC 445.154 436.836 443.905 439.059 
BIC 543.817 512.008 608.345 589.403 
Panel-Level Variance 1.564  (0.429) 
1.616  
(0.418) 
1.608  
(0.440) 
1.638  
(0.432) 
SD of Random Effects 2.186  (0.469) 
2.244  
(0.469) 
2.235  
(0.491) 
2.268  
(0.490) 
Proportion of Total Variance Contributed by 
Panel-Level Variance  
0.592  
(0.104) 
0.605  
(0.100) 
0.603  
(0.105) 
0.610  
(0.103) 
Notes: Estimates for random-effects logit model for cross-sectional time-series dataset. Dependent variable – Late 
Budget:  Late Budget  = 1 if the state passed budget after start of next fiscal year, 0 otherwise. Standard errors in 
parentheses.    *** p ≤ 0.01; ** p  ≤ 0.05; * p ≤ 0.10; +significant at the 0.10 level (one-tailed test) 
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Table A.17: Duration of Budget Impasse in the American States (1986 – 2006)  
– Previous Vote Share 
 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Gubernatorial Institutional Powers     
    Governor Possesses Budget Formulation  
    Authority (-) 
0.855  
(0.272) – 
0.643  
(0.452) – 
    Governor Budget Formulation Authority x   
    Divided Partisan Leg (-) – – 
2.034  
(1.582) – 
    Governor Budget Formulation Authority x  
    Unified Partisan Leg (-) – – 
1.085  
(0.846) – 
    Governor Possesses Official Revenue  
    Forecast Authority – Binds Budget (-) 
1.744+  
(0.656) 
1.458  
(0.504) 
35.640*** 
(43.122) 
17.160*** 
(18.964) 
    Governor Binding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Divided Partisan Leg (-) – – 
0.045**  
(0.062) 
0.116*  
(0.145) 
    Governor Binding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Unified Partisan Leg (-) – – 
0.054**  
(0.072) 
0.083** 
(0.103) 
    Governor Possesses Official Revenue  
    Forecast Authority – Does Not Bind  
    Budget (-) 
0.505  
(0.353) – 
0.094**  
(0.107) 
0.087** 
(0.095) 
    Governor Nonbinding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Divided Partisan Leg (-) – – 
148.705*** 
(243.197) 
91.958*** 
(144.578) 
    Governor Nonbinding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Unified Partisan Leg (-) – – 
227.053*** 
(411.690) 
66.826*** 
(106.540) 
    Governor Possesses Line Item Veto (-) 0.729  (0.314) – 
0.987  
(0.676) – 
    Governor Line Item Veto x Divided  
    Partisan Leg (-) – – 
0.213  
(0.278) – 
    Governor Line Item Veto x Unified  
    Partisan Leg (-) – – 
1.681  
(1.635) – 
Legislature’s Institutional Powers     
    Legislature Possesses Official Revenue  
    Forecast Authority – Binds Budget (-) 
1.684  
(0.848) – 
2.346  
(2.090) – 
    Legislature Binding Revenue Forecast  
   Authority x Divided Partisan Leg (-) – – 
0.267  
(0.327) – 
    Legislature Binding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Unified Partisan Leg (-) – – 
3.001  
(3.060) – 
    Legislature Possesses Official Revenue  
    Forecast Authority – Does Not Bind  
    Budget (-) 
1.247  
(0.410) – 
0.731  
(0.490) 
0.532  
(0.285) 
    Legislature Nonbinding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Divided Partisan Leg (-) – – 
2.082  
(1.835) 
3.138*  
(2.045) 
    Legislature Nonbinding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Unified Partisan Leg (-) – – 
2.870+  
(2.352) 
2.788*  
(1.729) 
    Legislature Session Length (-) 0.997  (0.003) – 
1.000  
(0.005) 
0.998  
(0.004) 
    Legislature Session Length x Divided  
    Partisan Leg (-) – – 
1.000  
(0.007) 
0.998  
(0.006) 
    Legislature Session Length x Unified  
    Partisan Leg (-) – – 
0.990+  
(0.007) 
0.993  
(0.006) 
Divided Partisan Legislature Government (+) 0.682  (0.229) 
0.639+ 
(0.195) 
1.565  
(2.396) 
0.391  
(0.307) 
Unified Partisan Legislature Government (+) 0.930  (0.246) 
0.924  
(0.225) 
0.749  
(0.724) 
1.136  
(0.744) 
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    Previous General Election Vote Share 1.004  (0.015) 
1.004  
(0.015) 
1.002  
(0.016) 
1.004  
(0.015) 
Governor Legacy Year (+) 0.898  (0.504) 
0.935  
(0.522) 
0.700  
(0.398) 
0.801  
(0.448) 
Legislative Election Year (-) 1.042  (0.222) 
1.062  
(0.218) 
1.192  
(0.272) 
1.239  
(0.263) 
Real General Expenditures (+) 1.000  (7.09E–09) 
1.000 
(5.20E–09) 
1.000  
(1.09E–08) 
1.000  
(5.94E–09) 
Biennial (+) 0.220*** (0.086) 
0.358*** 
(0.092) 
0.133*** 
(0.062) 
0.247*** 
(0.090) 
No Balanced Budget Restriction (-) 0.926  (0.329) 
0.960  
(0.232) 
0.973  
(0.412) 
1.175  
(0.396) 
Surplus (-) 1.043*** (0.013) 
1.037*** 
(0.011) 
1.046*** 
(0.015) 
1.041*** 
(0.013) 
Pct ∆ Real Per Capita Income (-) 0.986  (0.042) 
0.991  
(0.040) 
0.997  
(0.046) 
1.012  
(0.045) 
Supermajority Requirement (+) 0.614  (0.349)  
0.855  
(0.294) 
0.732  
(0.638) 
0.655  
(0.255) 
Fiscal Year Begins (-) 1.267
+
  
(0.234) 
1.246* 
(0.157) 
1.264  
(0.281) 
1.219  
(0.222) 
N × T (Effective Sample Size) 140 140 140 140 
Number of States 23 23 23 23 
AIC 1065.867 1060.738 1068.573 1060.201 
BIC 1121.208 1098.603 1164.690 1130.105 
Notes: Estimates for Cox proportional hazards survival analysis.  Failure = when a state adopts its budget for the 
next fiscal year bringing the budget impasse to an end. Coefficients are hazard ratios, followed by standard errors in 
parentheses.    *** p ≤ 0.01; ** p  ≤ 0.05; * p ≤ 0.10; +significant at the 0.10 level (one-tailed test) 
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Table A.18: Predicting the Likelihood of Observing a Budget Impasse in the American 
States (1986 – 2006) – Progressive Ambition 
 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Gubernatorial Institutional Powers     
    Governor Possesses Budget Formulation  
    Authority (-) 
0.010  
(0.477) – 
1.390+  
(0.936) 
1.343+  
(0.928) 
    Governor Budget Formulation Authority x   
    Divided Partisan Leg (-) – – 
–2.733** 
(1.180) 
–2.734** 
(1.170) 
    Governor Budget Formulation Authority x   
    Unified Partisan Leg (-) – – 
–0.698  
(1.068) 
–0.773  
(1.058) 
    Governor Possesses Official Revenue  
    Forecast Authority – Binds Budget (-) 
0.793  
(1.301) – 
–1.513  
(1.777) 
–1.426  
(1.776) 
    Governor Binding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Divided Partisan Leg (-) – – 
2.296+  
(1.608) 
2.216+  
(1.581) 
    Governor Binding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Unified Partisan Leg (-) – – 
3.930**  
(1.575) 
3.961** 
(1.569) 
    Governor Possesses Official Revenue  
    Forecast Authority – Does Not Bind  
    Budget (-) 
–0.693  
(0.864) – 
–0.266  
(1.370) – 
    Governor Nonbinding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Divided Partisan Leg (-) – – 
0.384  
(2.267) – 
    Governor Nonbinding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Unified Partisan Leg (-) – – 
–1.1288  
(1.750) – 
    Governor Possesses Line Item Veto (-) –0.451  (0.840) – 
 –1.860+ 
(1.176) 
–1.947* 
(1.164) 
    Governor Line Item Veto x Divided  
    Partisan Leg (-) – – 
3.583**  
(1.713) 
3.665** 
(1.714) 
    Governor Line Item Veto x Unified  
    Partisan Leg (-) – – 
0.166  
(1.169) 
0.396  
(1.149) 
Legislature’s Institutional Powers     
    Legislature Possesses Official Revenue  
    Forecast Authority – Binds Budget (-) 
3.780** 
(1.736) 
3.834** 
(1.736) 
3.938**  
(1.973) 
  4.038** 
(1.977) 
    Legislature Binding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Divided Partisan Leg (-) – – 
–0.197  
(1.517) 
–0.282  
(1.482) 
    Legislature Binding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Unified Partisan Leg (-) – – 
0.347  
(1.633) 
0.459  
(1.623) 
    Legislature Possesses Official Revenue  
    Forecast Authority – Does Not Bind  
    Budget (-) 
0.257  
(0.692) – 
–0.797  
(0.986) 
–0.744  
(0.966) 
    Legislature Nonbinding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Divided Partisan Leg (-) – – 
1.839+  
(1.167) 
1.787+  
(1.131) 
    Legislature Nonbinding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Unified Partisan Leg (-) – – 
1.254  
(0.990) 
1.380+  
(0.982) 
    Legislature Session Length (-) 0.014** (0.007) 
0.013** 
(0.007) 
0.022*  
(0.012) 
0.022*  
(0.012) 
    Legislature Session Length x Divided  
    Partisan Leg (-) – – 
–0.015  
(0.013) 
–0.015  
(0.013) 
    Legislature Session Length x Unified  
    Partisan Leg (-) – – 
–0.001  
(0.013) 
–0.002  
(0.013) 
Divided Partisan Legislature Government (+) 0.647
+
  
(0.429) 
0.683+ 
(0.427) 
0.151  
(2.255) 
0.174  
(2.213) 
Unified Partisan Legislature Government (+) 0.904** (0.365) 
0.913** 
(0.363) 
0.655  
(1.493) 
0.564  
(1.475) 
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    Progressive Ambition –0.124  (0.440) 
–0.152 
(0.436) 
–0.413  
(0.495) 
–0.409  
(0.493) 
Governor Legacy Year (+) 0.152  (0.332) 
–0.659 
(0.776) 
–0.797  
(0.820) 
–0.765  
(0.819) 
Legislative Election Year (-) 0.152  (0.332) 
0.153  
(0.332) 
0.127  
(0.348) 
0.113  
(0.347) 
Real General Expenditures (+) 5.90E–09 (1.40E–08) 
5.91E–09 
(1.39E–08) 
1.20E–08 
(1.54E–08) 
1.32E–08 
(1.53E–08) 
Biennial (+) 0.582  (0.763) 
0.627  
(0.753) 
0.551  
(0.810) 
0.447  
(0.803) 
No Balanced Budget Restriction (-) –1.655** (0.733) 
–1.695** 
(0.732) 
–1.719** 
(0.769) 
–1.738** 
(0.774) 
Surplus (-) –0.033* (0.017) 
–0.034** 
(0.017) 
–0.039** 
(0.019) 
–0.040** 
(0.018) 
Pct ∆ Real Per Capita Income (-) –0.151** (0.068) 
–0.155** 
(0.068) 
–0.162** 
(0.074) 
–0.167** 
(0.074) 
Supermajority Requirement (+) 2.105
+
  
(1.552) 
2.052+ 
(1.500) 
2.127+  
(1.645) 
1.887  
(1.632) 
Fiscal Year Begins (-) –0.779
+
 
(0.497) 
–0.767+ 
(0.501) 
–0.707+  
(0.513) 
–0.694+ 
(0.519) 
Constant 1.989  (3.703) 
1.624  
(3.699) 
1.372  
(3.987) 
1.366  
(4.020) 
N × T (Effective Sample Size) 820 820 820 820 
Number of States 48 48 48 48 
AIC 454.535 446.133 453.023 448.510 
BIC 553.430 521.482 617.849 599.207 
Panel-Level Variance 1.494  (0.427) 
1.541  
(0.417) 
1.519  
(0.434) 
1.552  
(0.427) 
SD of Random Effects 2.111  (0.451) 
2.161  
(0.450)   
2.137  
(0.464) 
2.173  
(0.464) 
Proportion of Total Variance Contributed by 
Panel-Level Variance  
0.575  
(0.104) 
0.587  
(0.101) 
0.581  
(0.106) 
0.589  
(0.103) 
Notes: Estimates for random-effects logit model for cross-sectional time-series dataset. Dependent variable – Late 
Budget:  Late Budget  = 1 if the state passed budget after start of next fiscal year, 0 otherwise. Standard errors in 
parentheses.    *** p ≤ 0.01; ** p  ≤ 0.05; * p ≤ 0.10; +significant at the 0.10 level (one-tailed test) 
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Table A.19: Duration of Budget Impasse in the American States (1986 – 2006)  
– Progressive Ambition 
 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Gubernatorial Institutional Powers     
    Governor Possesses Budget Formulation  
    Authority (-) 
0.873  
(0.275) – 
0.369+  
(0.271) 
0.369+  
(0.271) 
    Governor Budget Formulation Authority x   
    Divided Partisan Leg (-) – – 
3.328+  
(2.607) 
3.328+  
(2.607) 
    Governor Budget Formulation Authority x  
    Unified Partisan Leg (-) – – 
2.065  
(1.684) 
2.065  
(1.684) 
    Governor Possesses Official Revenue  
    Forecast Authority – Binds Budget (-) 
1.767+  
(0.643) 
1.425  
(0.482) 
67.210*** 
(81.693) 
67.210*** 
(81.693) 
    Governor Binding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Divided Partisan Leg (-) – – 
0.028*** 
(0.038) 
0.028*** 
(0.038) 
    Governor Binding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Unified Partisan Leg (-) – – 
0.024*** 
(0.032) 
0.024*** 
(0.032) 
    Governor Possesses Official Revenue  
    Forecast Authority – Does Not Bind  
    Budget (-) 
0.528  
(0.372) – 
0.139*  
(0.159) 
0.139*  
(0.159) 
    Governor Nonbinding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Divided Partisan Leg (-) – – 
148.990*** 
(243.602) 
148.990*** 
(243.602) 
    Governor Nonbinding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Unified Partisan Leg (-) – – 
175.088*** 
(317.860) 
175.088*** 
(317.860) 
    Governor Possesses Line Item Veto (-) 0.770  (0.324) – 
1.360  
(0.900) 
1.360  
(0.900) 
    Governor Line Item Veto x Divided  
    Partisan Leg (-) – – 
0.109*  
(0.140) 
0.109*  
(0.140) 
    Governor Line Item Veto x Unified  
    Partisan Leg (-) – – 
0.963  
(0.927) 
0.963  
(0.927) 
Legislature’s Institutional Powers     
    Legislature Possesses Official Revenue  
    Forecast Authority – Binds Budget (-) 
1.871  
(0.920) – 
4.346*  
(3.668) 
4.346*  
(3.668) 
    Legislature Binding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Divided Partisan Leg (-) – – 
0.059**  
(0.072) 
0.059** 
(0.072) 
    Legislature Binding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Unified Partisan Leg (-) – – 
2.051  
(2.041) 
2.051  
(2.041) 
    Legislature Possesses Official Revenue  
    Forecast Authority – Does Not Bind  
    Budget (-) 
1.396  
(0.446) – 
0.701  
(0.479) 
0.701  
(0.479) 
    Legislature Nonbinding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Divided Partisan Leg (-) – – 
2.524  
(2.163) 
2.524  
(2.163) 
    Legislature Nonbinding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Unified Partisan Leg (-) – – 
3.374+  
(2.795) 
3.374+  
(2.795) 
    Legislature Session Length (-) 0.998  (0.003) – 
1.003  
(0.005) 
1.003  
(0.005) 
    Legislature Session Length x Divided  
    Partisan Leg (-) – – 
0.997  
(0.007) 
0.997  
(0.007) 
    Legislature Session Length x Unified  
    Partisan Leg (-) – – 
0.987*  
(0.007) 
0.987*  
(0.007) 
Divided Partisan Legislature Government (+) 0.726  (0.240) 
0.683  
(0.205) 
3.264  
(4.907) 
3.264  
(4.907) 
Unified Partisan Legislature Government (+) 0.945  (0.256)  
0.947  
(0.233) 
1.236  
(1.243) 
1.236  
(1.243) 
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    Progressive Ambition 1.328  (0.425) 
1.531 
 (0.453) 
2.472 
(2.354) 
2.472 
(2.354) 
Governor Legacy Year (+) 0.962  (0.538) 
0.992  
(0.551) 
0.737  
(0.414) 
0.737  
(0.414) 
Legislative Election Year (-) 1.066  (0.220) 
1.082  
(0.214) 
1.283  
(0.285) 
1.283  
(0.285) 
Real General Expenditures (+) 1.000  (6.92E–09) 
1.000 
(5.04E–09) 
1.000  
(1.03E–08) 
1.000  
(1.03E–08) 
Biennial (+) 0.205*** (0.080) 
0.345*** 
(0.090) 
0.109*** 
(0.050) 
0.109*** 
(0.050) 
No Balanced Budget Restriction (-) 0.953  (0.333) 
0.952  
(0.223) 
0.850  
(0.337) 
0.850  
(0.337) 
Surplus (-) 1.040*** (0.011) 
1.036*** 
(0.010) 
1.047*** 
(0.014) 
1.047*** 
(0.014) 
Pct ∆ Real Per Capita Income (-) 0.967  (0.038) 
0.967  
(0.035) 
0.946  
(0.042) 
0.946  
(0.042) 
Supermajority Requirement (+) 0.641  (0.363) 
0.872  
(0.296) 
0.699  
(0.592) 
0.699  
(0.592) 
Fiscal Year Begins (-) 1.258  (0.235) 
1.239* 
(0.155) 
1.343+  
(0.297) 
1.343+  
(0.297) 
N × T (Effective Sample Size) 140 140 140 140 
Number of States 23 23 23 23 
AIC 1103.424 1097.928 1095.697 1095.697 
BIC 1159.315 1136.169 1192.771 1192.771 
Notes: Estimates for Cox proportional hazards survival analysis.  Failure = when a state adopts its budget for the 
next fiscal year bringing the budget impasse to an end. Coefficients are hazard ratios, followed by standard errors in 
parentheses.    *** p ≤ 0.01; ** p  ≤ 0.05; * p ≤ 0.10; +significant at the 0.10 level (one-tailed test) 
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Table A.20: Variable Descriptions 
 
Variable Name Mean Min Max 
Overall 
Standard 
Deviation 
Between 
Standard 
Deviation 
Within 
Standard 
Deviation 
Governor Possesses Budget 
Formulation Authority 0.804 0 1 0.397 0.295 0.272 
Governor Possesses Official 
Revenue Forecast Authority  
 – Binds Budget 
0.088 0 1 0.283 0.309 0 
Governor Possesses Official 
Revenue Forecast Authority 
 – Does Not Bind Budget 
0.094 0 1 0.292 0.284 0.149 
Governor Possesses Line Item 
Veto 0.863 0 1 0.344 0.332 0.147 
Legislature Possesses Official 
Revenue Forecast Authority  
 – Binds Budget 
0.051 0 1 0.220 0.202 0 
Legislature Possesses Official 
Revenue Forecast Authority  
 – Does Not Bind Budget 
0.291 0 1 0.455 0.439 0.148 
Legislature Session Length 70.607 19 260.714 35.429 30.779 16.505 
Divided Partisan Legislature 
Government 0.232 0 1 0.422 0.265 0.330 
Unified Partisan Legislature 
Government 0.343 0 1 0.475 0.243 0.407 
Governor Legacy Year 0.050 0 1 0.218 0.049 0.212 
Legislative Election Year 0.402 0 1 0.491 0.256 0.441 
Real General Expenditures 16,000,000 1,334,548 131,000,000 18,400,000 16,400,000 6,385,250 
Biennial 0.274 0 1 0.446 0.476 0.132 
No Balanced Budget Restriction 0.547 0 1 0.498 0.499 0.047 
Surplus 7.544 -38.844 55.532 8.955 3.355 8.319 
Pct ∆ Real Per Capita Income 2.022 -13.089 9.643 2.147 0.400 2.115 
Supermajority  Requirement 0.063 0 1 0.244 0.245 0 
Fiscal Year Begins 7.101 4 10 0.855 0.805 0 
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Figure A.1: Baseline Hazard Rate 
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Table A.21: Duration of Budget Impasse in the American States (1986 – 2006)  
– Parametric Model 
 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Gubernatorial Institutional Powers     
    Governor Possesses Budget Formulation  
    Authority (-) 
1.049  
(0.382) – 
0.783  
(0.657) – 
    Governor Budget Formulation Authority x   
    Divided Partisan Leg (-) – – 
2.254  
(2.180) – 
    Governor Budget Formulation Authority x  
    Unified Partisan Leg (-) – – 
1.081  
(1.002) – 
    Governor Possesses Official Revenue  
    Forecast Authority – Binds Budget (-) 
1.875  
(1.605) – 
29.024** 
(38.831) 
13.963* 
(19.401) 
    Governor Binding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Divided Partisan Leg (-) – – 
0.047**  
(0.065) 
0.129+  
(0.163) 
    Governor Binding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Unified Partisan Leg (-) – – 
0.178  
(0.252) 
0.171+  
(0.229) 
    Governor Possesses Official Revenue  
    Forecast Authority – Does Not Bind  
    Budget (-) 
1.384  
(1.223) – 
0.279  
(0.373) 
0.383  
(0.492) 
    Governor Nonbinding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Divided Partisan Leg (-) – – 
38.817* 
(79.455) 
13.828+ 
(27.470) 
    Governor Nonbinding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Unified Partisan Leg (-) – – 
161.029** 
(341.995) 
15.895+ 
(32.685) 
    Governor Possesses Line Item Veto (-) 0.575  (0.320)   – 
1.058  
(0.878) – 
    Governor Line Item Veto x Divided  
    Partisan Leg (-) – – 
0.203  
(0.288) – 
    Governor Line Item Veto x Unified  
    Partisan Leg (-) – – 
2.792  
(3.259) – 
Legislature’s Institutional Powers     
    Legislature Possesses Official Revenue  
    Forecast Authority – Binds Budget (-) 
1.212  
(1.184) – 
3.342  
(3.444) 
2.174  
(2.274) 
    Legislature Binding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x  Divided Partisan Leg (-) – – 
0.086*  
(0.117) 
0.338+  
(0.277) 
    Legislature Binding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x  Unified Partisan Leg (-) – – 
5.337+ 
(6.350) 
1.804  
(1.243) 
    Legislature Possesses Official Revenue  
    Forecast Authority – Does Not Bind  
    Budget (-) 
2.008+  
(0.912) 
1.664  
(0.718) 
2.523  
(2.711) – 
    Legislature Nonbinding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x  Divided Partisan Leg (-) – – 
0.656  
(0.771) – 
    Legislature Nonbinding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x  Unified Partisan Leg (-) – – 
2.653  
(2.364) – 
    Legislature Session Length (-) 0.993*  (0.004) 
0.992** 
(0.003) 
1.000  
(0.006) 
1.001  
(0.004) 
    Legislature Session Length x  Divided  
    Partisan Leg (-) – – 
0.991  
(0.008) 
0.984** 
(0.006) 
    Legislature Session Length x  Unified  
    Partisan Leg (-) – – 
0.983**  
(0.007) 
0.987** 
(0.007) 
Divided Partisan Legislature Government (+) 0.598
+
  
(0.233) 
0.537* 
(0.199) 
8.419  
(14.146) 
3.355*  
(2.401) 
Unified Partisan Legislature Government (+) 0.943  (0.285) 
0.921  
(0.269) 
0.986  
(0.964) 
2.793+  
(1.944) 
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Table A.21 Continued 
Governor Legacy Year (+) 0.749  (0.424) 
0.737  
(0.417) 
0.636  
(0.361) 
0.691  
(0.388) 
Legislative Election Year (-) 1.212  (0.270) 
1.219  
(0.268) 
1.218  
(0.291) 
1.311  
(0.301) 
Real General Expenditures (+) 1.000
+
  
(9.51E–09) 
1.000* 
(8.86E–09) 
1.000** 
(1.14E–08) 
1.000* 
(9.31E–09) 
Biennial (+) 0.106*** (0.072) 
0.145*** 
(0.092) 
0.046*** 
(0.037) 
0.114*** 
(0.070) 
No Balanced Budget Restriction (-) 1.974  (1.231) 
2.154+ 
(1.246) 
2.159  
(1.451) 
1.106  
(0.742) 
Surplus (-) 1.033*** (0.013) 
1.030** 
(0.012) 
1.044*** 
(0.015) 
1.039*** 
(0.013) 
Pct ∆ Real Per Capita Income (-) 0.996  (0.041) 
0.994  
(0.040) 
0.980  
(0.043) 
0.967  
(0.039) 
Supermajority  Requirement (+) 0.367  (0.354) 
0.453  
(0.392) 
0.615  
(0.697) 
0.725  
(0.608) 
Fiscal Year Begins (-) 1.341  (0.326) 
1.276  
(0.282) 
1.202  
(0.285) 
1.183  
(0.251) 
Constant 0.015** (0.030) 
0.017** 
(0.033) 
0.009**  
(0.016) 
0.013** 
(0.022) 
N × T (Effective Sample Size) 140 140 140 140 
Number of States 23 23 23 23 
AIC 441.269 432.815 443.361 436.563 
BIC 503.043 479.881 546.318 513.046 
Notes: Estimates for parametric survival analysis with a Weibull distribution.  Failure = when a state adopts its 
budget for the next fiscal year bringing the budget impasse to an end. Coefficients are hazard ratios, followed by 
standard errors in parentheses.    *** p ≤ 0.01; ** p  ≤ 0.05; * p ≤ 0.10; +significant at the 0.10 level (one-tailed test) 
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Table A.22: Predicting the Likelihood of Observing a Budget Impasse in the American 
States (1986 – 2006) – Basic Model: Logit 
 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Gubernatorial Institutional Powers     
    Governor Possesses Budget Formulation  
    Authority (-) 
–0.355  
(0.332) – 
0.877  
(0.770) 
0.877  
(0.770) 
    Governor Budget Formulation Authority x   
    Divided Partisan Leg (-) – – 
–2.158** 
(0.995) 
–2.158** 
(0.995) 
    Governor Budget Formulation Authority x   
    Unified Partisan Leg (-) – – 
–0.992  
(0.865) 
–0.992  
(0.865) 
    Governor Possesses Official Revenue  
    Forecast Authority – Binds  Budget (-) 
0.430  
(0.413) – 
–1.966*  
(1.122) 
–1.966* 
(1.122) 
    Governor Binding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Divided Partisan Leg (-) – – 
3.588*** 
(1.354) 
3.588*** 
(1.354) 
    Governor Binding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Unified Partisan Leg (-) – – 
3.031**  
(1.271) 
3.031** 
(1.271) 
    Governor Possesses Official Revenue  
    Forecast Authority – Does Not Bind  
    Budget (-) 
–1.283*  
(0.660) 
–1.295** 
(0.647) 
–1.660+  
(1.097) 
–1.660+ 
(1.097) 
    Governor Nonbinding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Divided Partisan Leg (-) – – 
1.686  
(1.617) 
1.686  
(1.617) 
    Governor Nonbinding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Unified Partisan Leg (-) – – 
–0.272  
(1.516) 
–0.272  
(1.516) 
    Governor Possesses Line Item Veto (-) –0.203  (0.365) – 
–0.871+  
(0.596) 
–0.871+ 
(0.596) 
    Governor Line Item Veto x Divided  
    Partisan Leg (-) – – 
2.134**  
(1.050) 
2.134** 
(1.050) 
    Governor Line Item Veto x Unified  
    Partisan Leg (-) – – 
–0.153  
(0.831) 
–0.153  
(0.831) 
Legislature’s Institutional Powers     
    Legislature Possesses Official Revenue  
    Forecast Authority – Binds Budget (-) 
2.556***  
(0.486) 
2.557*** 
(0.444) 
1.768**  
(0.706) 
1.768** 
(0.706) 
    Legislature Binding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Divided Partisan Leg (-) – – 
1.186  
(1.052) 
1.186  
(1.052) 
    Legislature Binding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Unified Partisan Leg (-) – – 
1.225  
(1.149) 
1.225  
(1.149) 
    Legislature Possesses Official Revenue  
    Forecast Authority – Does Not Bind  
    Budget (-) 
–0.380 
(0.314) – 
–1.563*** 
(0.601) 
–1.563*** 
(0.601) 
    Legislature Nonbinding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Divided Partisan Leg (-) – – 
3.201*** 
(0.889) 
3.201*** 
(0.889) 
    Legislature Nonbinding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Unified Partisan Leg (-) – – 
0.722  
(0.757) 
0.722  
(0.757) 
    Legislature Session Length (-) 0.018*** (0.004) 
0.018*** 
(0.004) 
0.024*** 
(0.008) 
0.024*** 
(0.008) 
    Legislature Session Length x Divided  
    Partisan Leg (-) – – 
–0.017*  
(0.010) 
–0.017* 
(0.010) 
    Legislature Session Length x Unified  
    Partisan Leg (-) – – 
–0.001  
(0.010) 
–0.001  
(0.010) 
Divided Partisan Legislature Government (+) 0.276  (0.318) 
0.336  
(0.315) 
0.006  
(1.594) 
0.006  
(1.594) 
Unified Partisan Legislature Government (+) 0.746*** (0.287) 
0.763*** 
(0.284) 
1.217  
(1.263) 
1.217  
(1.263) 
 272 
 
 
Table A.22 Continued 
Governor Legacy Year (+) –0.380 (0.645) 
–0.341 
(0.646) 
–0.714  
(0.676) 
–0.714  
(0.676) 
Legislative Election Year (-) 0.031  (0.260) 
0.025  
(0.258) 
0.034  
(0.274) 
0.034  
(0.274) 
Real General Expenditures (+) 1.28E–08* (7.74E–09) 
1.17E–08* 
(7.09E–09) 
2.01E–08** 
(8.25E–09) 
2.01E–08** 
(8.25E–09) 
Biennial (+) 0.581**  (0.285) 
0.558** 
(0.266) 
0.729**  
(0.313) 
0.729** 
(0.313) 
No Balanced Budget Restriction (-) –1.443*** (0.295) 
–1.293*** 
(0.282) 
–1.404*** 
(0.313) 
–1.404*** 
(0.313) 
Surplus (-) –0.016
+
 
(0.012) 
–0.016+ 
(0.012) 
–0.017+  
(0.013) 
–0.017+ 
(0.013) 
Pct ∆ Real Per Capita Income (-) –0.114** (0.050) 
–0.116** 
(0.050) 
–0.139*** 
(0.052) 
–0.139*** 
(0.052) 
Supermajority Requirement (+) 1.339** (0.565) 
1.505*** 
(0.480) 
1.287**  
(0.650) 
1.287** 
(0.650) 
Fiscal Year Begins (-) –0.610*** (0.193) 
–0.567*** 
(0.176) 
–0.595*** 
(0.209) 
–0.595*** 
(0.209) 
Constant 1.734  (1.462) 
0.832  
(1.351) 
1.143  
(1.790) 
1.1436  
(1.790) 
N × T (Effective Sample Size) 820 820 820 820 
AIC 545.283 542.565 534.501 534.501 
BIC 634.759 613.204 689.908 689.908 
Notes: Estimates for logit model. Dependent variable – Late Budget:  Late Budget  = 1 if the state passed budget 
after start of next fiscal year, 0 otherwise. Standard errors in parentheses.    *** p ≤ 0.01; ** p  ≤ 0.05; * p ≤ 0.10; 
+significant at the 0.10 level (one-tailed test) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 273 
 
Table A.23: Duration of Budget Impasse in the American States (1986 – 2006)  
– Basic Model OLS 
 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Gubernatorial Institutional Powers     
    Governor Possesses Budget Formulation  
    Authority (-) 
–4.356** 
(2.071) 
–4.344** 
(2.054) 
1.122  
(3.176) 
0.720  
(3.116) 
    Governor Budget Formulation Authority x   
    Divided Partisan Leg (-) – – 
–16.800*** 
(5.071) 
–17.206*** 
(4.970) 
    Governor Budget Formulation Authority x  
    Unified Partisan Leg (-) – – 
0.804  
(4.60) 
1.033  
(4.556) 
    Governor Possesses Official Revenue  
    Forecast Authority – Binds Budget (-) 
–1.254  
(2.803) – 
–2.775  
(4.029) – 
    Governor Binding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Divided Partisan Leg (-) – – 
–2.321  
(6.720) – 
    Governor Binding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Unified Partisan Leg (-) – – 
7.173  
(6.551) – 
    Governor Possesses Official Revenue  
    Forecast Authority – Does Not Bind  
    Budget (-) 
–3.361  
(2.803) – 
0.171  
(3.641) 
0.750  
(3.556) 
    Governor Nonbinding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Divided Partisan Leg (-) – – 
–16.918* 
(8.651) 
–16.711* 
(8.579) 
    Governor Nonbinding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Unified Partisan Leg (-) – – 
–7.175  
(5.947) 
–8.012+ 
(5.875) 
    Governor Possesses Line Item Veto (-) 2.060 (2.420) – –5.237
+
  
(3.875) 
–5.320+ 
(3.872) 
    Governor Line Item Veto x Divided  
    Partisan Leg (-) – – 
15.183** 
(5.562) 
14.458*** 
(5.497) 
    Governor Line Item Veto x Unified  
    Partisan Leg (-) – – 
2.623  
(5.656) 
3.000  
(5.641) 
Legislature’s Institutional Powers     
    Legislature Possesses Official Revenue  
    Forecast Authority – Binds Budget (-) 
8.342** 
(3.724) 
8.181** 
(3.554) 
6.759+  
(5.178) 
7.456+  
(5.050) 
    Legislature Binding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Divided Partisan Leg (-) – – 
2.015  
(8.056) 
2.147  
(7.956) 
    Legislature Binding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Unified Partisan Leg (-) – – 
–2.679  
(9.130) 
–3.504  
(9.075) 
    Legislature Possesses Official Revenue  
    Forecast Authority – Does Not Bind  
    Budget (-) 
0.460  
(1.782) – 
2.152  
(2.684) 
2.710  
(2.551) 
    Legislature Nonbinding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Divided Partisan Leg (-) – – 
–6.104+  
(4.502) 
–5.729+ 
(4.311) 
    Legislature Nonbinding Revenue Forecast  
    Authority x Unified Partisan Leg (-) – – 
–2.313  
(4.043) 
–3.342  
(3.908) 
    Legislature Session Length (-) 0.122*** (0.026) 
0.125*** 
(0.026) 
0.045  
(0.043) 
0.046  
(0.043) 
    Legislature Session Length x Divided  
    Partisan Leg (-) – – 
0.123**  
(0.057) 
0.120**  
(0.056) 
    Legislature Session Length x Unified  
    Partisan Leg (-) – – 
0.089+  
(0.060) 
0.090+  
(0.060) 
Divided Partisan Legislature Government (+) 3.709*  (2.030) 
3.667* 
(1.993) 
–1.092  
(8.262) 
–0.270  
(8.225) 
Unified Partisan Legislature Government (+) 1.797  (1.764) 
1.986  
(1.742) 
–6.081  
(7.620) 
–5.682  
(7.609) 
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Table A.23 Continued 
Governor Legacy Year (+) –3.565  (3.550) 
–3.476 
(3.536) 
–2.970  
(3.522) 
–3.155  
(3.505) 
Legislative Election Year (-) 1.962  (1.657) 
2.024  
(1.654) 
1.696  
(1.637) 
1.728  
(1.635) 
Real General Expenditures (+) 1.70E-07*** (5.44E-08) 
1.82E-07*** 
(5.18E-08) 
1.61E-07*** 
(5.56E-08) 
1.60E-07*** 
(5.48E-08) 
Biennial (+) 6.422*** (1.842) 
5.723*** 
(1.762) 
7.384*** 
(1.845) 
7.218*** 
(1.818) 
No Balanced Budget Restriction (-) –1.879  (1.656) 
–1.977 
(1.644) 
–0.527  
(1.693) 
–0.613  
(1.682) 
Surplus (-) –0.296*** (0.085) 
–0.287*** 
(0.084) 
–0.317*** 
(0.084) 
–0.319*** 
(0.084) 
Pct ∆ Real Per Capita Income (-) 0.017  (0.355) 
–0.014 
(0.353) 
–0.029  
(0.353) 
–0.042  
(0.352) 
Supermajority  Requirement (+) –2.205  (3.679) 
–3.723 
(3.410) 
0.150  
(3.968) 
–0.021  
(3.950) 
Fiscal Year Begins (-) –3.121  (0.930) 
–2.986*** 
(0.919) 
–1.860*  
(0.973) 
–1.866* 
(0.970) 
Constant 18.025** (7.653) 
18.365*** 
(7.360) 
14.263+  
(8.748) 
14.248+ 
(8.721) 
N × T (Effective Sample Size) 820 820 820 820 
AIC 7335.783 7330.263   7323.481 7319.662 
BIC 7425.260 7400.903 7478.888 7460.941 
Notes: Estimates for OLS regression model.  Dependent variable = number of days after the end of the fiscal year it 
takes to pass a state’s budget. Standard errors in parentheses.    *** p ≤ 0.01; ** p  ≤ 0.05; * p ≤ 0.10; +significant at 
the 0.10 level (one-tailed test) 
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Table A.24: Predicting the Likelihood of Observing a Budget Impasse in the American 
States (1986 – 2006) – Basic Model Logit with Institutional Indexes 
 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
    Governor Capacity Additive Index (-) –0.445** (0.175) 
–0.687** 
(0.283) 
– – 
    Legislature Capacity Additive Index (-) 0.272  (0.237) 
–0.271  
(0.428) 
– – 
    Institutional Difference Index – – –0.379*** (0.126) 
–0.347* 
(0.202) 
    Divided Partisan Legislature  
    Government (+) 
0.523*  
(0.298) 
–1.658* 
(0.941) 
0.542*  
(0.296) 
0.450  
(0.521) 
    Unified Partisan Legislature  
    Government (+) 
0.998*** 
(0.265) 
0.919  
(0.748) 
1.014*** 
(0.263) 
1.186** 
(0.471) 
    Governor Capacity x Divided Partisan  
    Legislature Government – 
0.889** 
(0.438) – – 
    Governor Capacity x Unified Partisan  
    Legislature Government – 
–0.036  
(0.364) – – 
    Legislature Capacity x Divided Partisan  
    Legislature Government – 
1.348** 
(0.614) – – 
    Legislature Capacity x Unified  
    Partisan Legislature Government – 
0.291  
(0.561) – – 
    Institutional Index x Divided Partisan  
    Legislature Government – – 
– 0.070  
(0.320) 
    Institutional Index x Unified Partisan  
    Legislature Government – – 
– –0.119  
(0.275) 
Governor Legacy Year (+) –0.487  (0.619) 
–0.628  
(0.627) 
–0.480  
(0.619) 
–0.513  
(0.623) 
Legislative Election Year (-) 0.055  (0.245) 
0.062  
(0.246) 
0.055  
(0.245) 
0.054  
(0.245) 
Real General Expenditures (+) 3.74E–08*** (7.02E–09) 
3.95E–08*** 
(7.00E–09) 
3.66E–08*** 
(6.86E–09) 
3.68E–08*** 
(6.88E–09) 
Biennial (+) 0.703*** (0.248) 
0.752*** 
(0.256) 
0.683*** 
(0.245) 
0.681*** 
(0.246) 
No Balanced Budget Restriction (-) –0.790*** (0.234) 
–0.827*** 
(0.240) 
–0.769*** 
(0.231) 
–0.761*** 
(0.232) 
Surplus (-) –0.017
+
  
(0.011) 
–0.016+  
(0.011) 
–0.018+  
(0.011) 
–0.018+ 
(0.011) 
Pct ∆ Real Per Capita Income (-) –0.092* (0.049) 
–0.094* 
(0.049) 
–0.093* 
(0.049) 
–0.094* 
(0.049) 
Supermajority Requirement (+) 0.399  (0.466) 
0.147  
(0.484) 
0.455  
(0.455) 
0.400  
(0.466) 
Fiscal Year Begins (-) –0.524*** (0.174) 
–0.577*** 
(0.181) 
–0.535*** 
(0.173) 
–0.548*** 
(0.176) 
Constant 1.977
+
  
(1.284) 
2.980** 
(1.422) 
1.894+  
(1.275) 
1.942+  
(1.318) 
N × T (Effective Sample Size) 820 820 820 820 
AIC 597.850 596.198 596.139 599.738 
BIC 663.780 680.966 657.360 670.377 
Notes: Estimates for logit model. Dependent variable – Late Budget:  Late Budget  = 1 if the state passed budget 
after start of next fiscal year, 0 otherwise. Standard errors in parentheses.    *** p ≤ 0.01; ** p  ≤ 0.05; * p ≤ 0.10; 
+significant at the 0.10 level (one-tailed test) 
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Table A.25: Duration of Budget Impasse in the American States (1986 – 2006)  
– Basic Model OLS with Institutional Indexes 
 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
    Governor Capacity Additive Index (-) –2.462** (1.199) 
–1.778  
(1.738) – – 
    Legislature Capacity Additive Index (-) 1.371 (1.635) 
2.723  
(2.461) – – 
    Institutional Difference Index – – –2.053** (0.862) 
–2.117* 
(1.215) 
    Divided Partisan Legislature  
    Government (+) 
5.426*** 
(2.009) 
12.863** 
(6.110) 
5.586*** 
(1.982)   
6.806*  
(3.781) 
    Unified Partisan Legislature  
    Government (+) 
3.351*  
(1.741) 
  2.714  
(5.700) 
3.439**  
(1.730) 
2.146  
(3.530) 
    Governor Capacity x Divided Partisan  
    Legislature Government – 
–3.458  
(2.968) – – 
    Governor Capacity x Unified Partisan  
    Legislature Government – 
0.624  
(2.665) – – 
    Legislature Capacity x Divided Partisan  
    Legislature Government – 
–3.669  
(4.114) – – 
    Legislature Capacity x  Unified Partisan  
    Legislature Government – 
–1.258  
(3.748) – – 
    Institutional Index x  Divided Partisan  
    Legislature Government – – – 
–0.873  
(2.217) 
    Institutional Index x  Unified Partisan  
    Legislature Government – – – 
0.826  
(1.967) 
Governor Legacy Year (+) –4.372  (3.590) 
–3.994  
(3.603) 
–4.311  
(3.586) 
–4.177  
(3.595) 
Legislative Election Year (-) 1.704  (1.672) 
1.698  
(1.674) 
1.710  
(1.671) 
1.706  
(1.673) 
Real General Expenditures (+) 3.18E–07*** (4.73E–08) 
3.14E–07*** 
(4.79E–08) 
3.14E–07*** 
(4.65E–08) 
3.13E–07*** 
(4.66E–08) 
Biennial (+) 6.923*** (1.769) 
6.975*** 
(1.776) 
6.859*** 
(1.764) 
6.864***  
(1.766) 
No Balanced Budget Restriction (-) –1.177  (1.595) 
–1.208  
(1.600) 
–1.117  
(1.589) 
–1.169  
(1.593) 
Surplus (-) –0.290*** (0.086) 
–0.293*** 
(0.086) 
–0.294*** 
(0.086) 
–0.291*** 
(0.086) 
Pct ∆ Real Per Capita Income (-) 0.056  (0.358) 
0.052  
(0.360) 
0.052  
(0.358) 
0.053  
(0.359) 
Supermajority  Requirement (+) –4.222  (3.443) 
–3.288  
(3.580) 
–3.910  
(3.383) 
–3.453  
(3.470) 
Fiscal Year Begins (-) –4.077*** (0.914) 
–3.954*** 
(0.936) 
–4.160*** 
(0.898) 
–4.054*** 
(0.914) 
Constant 32.242*** (7.050) 
29.549*** 
(7.997) 
31.834*** 
(6.997) 
31.176*** 
(7.293) 
N × T (Effective Sample Size) 820 820 820 820 
AIC 7355.216 7360.730 7353.461 7356.959 
BIC 7421.146 7445.497 7414.682 7427.598 
Notes: Estimates OLS regression model.  Dependent variable = number of days after the end of the fiscal year it 
takes to pass a state’s budget. Standard errors in parentheses.    *** p ≤ 0.01; ** p  ≤ 0.05; * p ≤ 0.10; +significant at 
the 0.10 level (one-tailed test) 
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Table B.1: Economic Development Allocations in the American States (FY 2001 – FY 2010)  
– Indiana Outliers Dropped 
 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Governor Solo Appointment  
Authority (+) 
4.053 
(3.710) 
5.604 
(29.230) 
4.052 
(3.710) 
5.797 
(30.063) 
Control of Economic Development   
Commission/Council (+) 
1.540 
(4.092) 
1.540 
(4.092) 
2.994 
(36.272) 
3.474   
(37.552) 
Previous Electoral Vote Share (+) 0.057 (0.193) 
0.064 
(0.182) 
0.059 
(0.190) 
0.068 
(0.182) 
Gov Solo Appt x Vote Share (+) – –0.028 (0.533) – 
–0.031 
(0.548) 
Control of Comm/Council  
x Vote Share (+) – – 
–0.026 
(0.630) 
–0.035 
(0.655) 
Ancillary Controls 
     Election Year (+) –2.170 (2.953) 
–2.165 
(2.973) 
–2.176 
(2.958) 
–2.171 
(2.973) 
     State UE Rate (+) –4.925***   (1.619) 
–4.923***   
(1.635) 
–4.924***   
(1.617) 
–4.922***    
(1.634) 
     State Population (thousands) (+) –0.001***   (0.0002) 
–0.001***   
(0.0002) 
–0.001***   
(0.0002) 
–0.001***   
(0.0002) 
     Change in Agency (~) 4.420    (7.996) 
4.420    
(8.001) 
4.420 
(8.006) 
4.420 
(8.010) 
     State Legislature Session Length (+) 0.211***   (0.047) 
0.211***   
(0.047) 
0.211***   
(0.047) 
0.211***   
(0.047) 
     State Liberalism (+) 0.008 (0.078) 
0.008 
(0.078) 
0.008 
(0.079) 
0.008     
(0.079) 
     Split Partisan Legislature (-) –5.151
+
   
(4.012) 
–5.153+   
(4.019) 
–5.141+   
(3.991) 
–5.139+   
(3.993) 
     Unified Partisan Legislature (-) –0.941    (3.704) 
–0.950 
(3.721) 
–0.942 
(3.709) 
–0.953 
(3.727) 
     Year 2008 (-) –6.871
+
   
(4.273) 
–6.881+   
(4.323) 
–6.861+    
(4.291) 
–6.869+   
(4.328) 
     Year 2009 (-) 7.468    (8.880) 
7.457    
(8.973) 
7.473 
(8.913) 
7.463 
(8.995) 
Constant 14.103   (14.825)  
13.709 
(15.593) 
13.991 
(14.350) 
13.512 
(15.265) 
N × T (Effective Sample Size) 478 478 478 478 
Overall R2 0.084 0.084 0.084 0.084 
Notes: Dependent variable is defined as: Annual Real State Economic Development Funds Growth. Standard errors 
in parentheses.  *** p ≤ 0.01; ** p  ≤ 0.05; * p ≤ 0.10; +significant at the 0.10 level (one-tailed) 
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Table B.2: Variable Descriptions 
 
Variable Name Mean Min Max 
Overall 
Standard 
Deviation 
Between 
Standard 
Deviation 
Within Standard 
Deviation 
Governor Solo Appointment 
Authority 
0.260 0 1 0.439 0.431 0.116 
Control of Economic 
Development   
Commission/Council 
0.152 0 1 0.359 0.351 0.062 
Previous Electoral Vote 
Share 
55.364 36.99 79.17 6.980 4.039 5.731 
Election Year 0.224 0 1 0.418 0.077 0.411 
State UE Rate 5.142 2.3 13.5 1.649 0.936 1.353 
State Population 
(thousands)  
5746.042 494.3 36961.23 6416.781 6519.949 280.642 
Change in Agency 0.062 0 1 0.242 0.123 0.210 
State Legislature Session 
Length 
64.553 0 260.714 40.684 34.925 23.558 
State Liberalism 48.671 6.214 90.986 23.034 18.838 13.626 
Split Partisan Legislature 0.249 0 1 0.433 0.303 0.315 
Unified Partisan Legislature 0.557 0 1 0.497 0.319 0.385 
Year 2008 0.102 0 1 0.303 0.017 0.302 
Year 2009 0.096 0 1 0.294 0.029 0.293 
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Table B.3: Economic Development Allocations in the American States (FY 2001 – FY 2010)  
– Single Economic Development Institutional Capacity Indicator 
 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 
Economic Development Capacity (+) 4.337
+ 
(3.214) 
3.752 
(27.188) 
Previous Electoral Vote Share (+) 0.070 (0.196) 
0.067 
(0.184) 
Economic Development Capacity x Vote 
Share (+) – 
0.010 
(0.490) 
Ancillary Controls 
     Election Year (+) –2.761 (2.940) 
–2.761 
(2.943) 
     State UE Rate (+) –5.211*** (1.644) 
–5.212*** 
(1.653) 
     State Population (thousands) (+) –0.001*** (0.0002) 
–0.001*** 
(0.0002) 
     Change in Agency (~) 4.638 (7.992) 
4.638 
(7.997) 
     State Legislature Session Length (+) 0.220*** (0.046) 
0.220*** 
(0.045) 
     State Liberalism (+) 0.018 (0.078) 
0.018 
(0.078) 
     Split Partisan Legislature (-) –3.474 (4.165) 
–3.478 
(4.149) 
     Unified Partisan Legislature (-) –1.062 (3.717) 
–1.057 
(3.735) 
     Year 2008 (-) –7.235* (4.173) 
–7.235* 
(4.174) 
     Year 2009 (-) 7.794  (8.914) 
7.796 
(8.943) 
Constant 13.528 (14.806) 
13.721 
(15.237) 
N × T (Effective Sample Size) 481 481 
Overall R2 0.065 0.065 
Notes: Dependent variable is defined as: Annual Real State Economic Development Funds Growth. Standard errors 
in parentheses.  *** p ≤ 0.01; ** p  ≤ 0.05; * p ≤ 0.10; +significant at the 0.10 level (one-tailed) 
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Table B.4: Economic Development Allocations in the American States (FY 2001 – FY 2010) 
– Random Effects Models – Vote Share x Election Year Interactions 
 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Governor Solo Appointment 
Authority (+) 
5.880+ 
(4.010) 
3.398  
(33.233) 
7.652* 
(4.247) 
0.484 
(34.513) 
Control of Economic Development   
Commission/Council (+) 
1.708 
(4.198) 
1.776  
(4.263) 
–8.528 
(33.627) 
–21.495 
(38.548) 
Previous Electoral Vote Share (+) –0.037 (0.248) 
–0.067 
(0.248) 
–.0504 
(0.244) 
–0.102 
(0.256) 
Gov Solo Appt x Vote Share (+) – 0.088 (0.613) – 
0.129 
(0.635) 
Control of Comm/Council x Vote 
Share (+) – – 
0.130 
(0.584) 
0.363 
(0.682) 
Vote Share x Election Year 0.468 (0.465) 
0.581 
(0.470) 
0.573+ 
(0.432) 
0.724+ 
(0.475) 
Gov Solo Appt x Election Year – 4.099 (60.746) – 
14.882 
(61.861) 
Control of Comm/Council x Election 
Year – – 
14.857** 
(7.389) 
114.162 
(117.396) 
Gov Solo Appt x Vote Share x 
Election Year – 
–0.255 
(1.102) – 
–0.399 
(1.118) 
Control of Comm/Council x Vote 
Share x Election Year – – 
–0.131 
(0.123) 
–1.825 
(2.185) 
Ancillary Controls 
     Election Year (+) –28.709 (26.471) 
–32.173 
(27.405) 
–34.626+ 
(25.317) 
–43.007+ 
(28.111) 
     State UE Rate (+) –5.179*** (1.638) 
–5.269*** 
(1.678) 
–5.229*** 
(1.648) 
–5.198*** 
(1.672) 
     State Population (thousands) (+) –0.001*** (0.0002) 
–0.001*** 
(0.0002) 
–0.001*** 
(0.0002) 
–0.001*** 
(0.0002) 
     Change in Agency (~) 3.910 (8.054) 
3.505 
(7.994) 
3.469 
(7.989) 
3.340 
(8.065) 
     State Legislature Session  
     Length (+) 
0.220*** 
(0.046) 
0.221*** 
(0.045) 
0.220*** 
(0.045) 
0.220*** 
(0.045) 
     State Liberalism (+) 0.014 (0.078) 
0.014 
(0.078) 
0.016 
(0.078) 
0.015 
(0.078) 
     Split Partisan Legislature (-) –3.369 (4.122) 
–3.504 
(4.123) 
–3.371 
(4.071)   
–3.345 
(4.074) 
     Unified Partisan Legislature (-) –0.584 (3.733) 
–0.406 
(3.746) 
–0.402 
(3.738) 
–0.404 
(3.743) 
     Year 2008 (-) –7.284* (4.180) 
–6.741+ 
(4.434) 
–6.554+ 
(4.356) 
–6.620+ 
(4.433) 
     Year 2009 (-) 8.025 (8.958)  
8.464 
(9.197) 
8.023 
(9.065) 
7.830 
(9.249) 
Constant 19.250 (17.465) 
20.541 
(18.795) 
20.047 
(17.078) 
22.755 
(19.006) 
N × T (Effective Sample Size) 481 481 481 481 
Overall R2 0.067 0.069 0.071    0.071 
Notes: Dependent variable is defined as: Annual Real State Economic Development Funds Growth. Standard errors 
in parentheses.  *** p ≤ 0.01; ** p  ≤ 0.05; * p ≤ 0.10; +significant at the 0.10 level (one-tailed) 
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Table B.5: Economic Development Allocations in the American States (FY 2001 – FY 2010)  
– Random Effects Models – Alternative Unemployment Rate Indicator 
 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Governor Solo Appointment  
Authority (+) 
7.619*   
(4.308) 
7.834   
(30.832) 
7.615*   
(4.306) 
8.212   
(31.855) 
Control of Economic Development   
Commission/Council (+) 
1.624     
(3.719) 
1.624    
(3.723) 
5.274   
(31.325) 
5.438   
(33.094) 
Previous Electoral Vote Share (+) 0.205    (0.198) 
0.206    
(0.168) 
0.209    
(0.197) 
0.212    
(0.173) 
Gov Solo Appt x Vote Share (+) – –0.004   (0.558) – 
–0.011   
(0.576) 
Control of Comm/Council  
x Vote Share (+) – – 
–0.066   
(0.546) 
–0.069   
(0.581) 
Ancillary Controls 
     Election Year (+) –2.320   (3.014) 
–2.319   
(3.037) 
–2.333   
(3.021) 
–2.332   
(3.037) 
     Δ State UE Rate Over Year (+) –5.906**   (2.559) 
–5.905**   
(2.583) 
–5.902**   
(2.557) 
–5.901**   
(2.585) 
     State Population (thousands) (+) –0.001***   (0.0002) 
–0.001***   
(0.0002) 
–0.001***   
(0.0002) 
 –0.001***   
(0.0002) 
     Change in Agency (~) 1.003    (8.053) 
1.004    
(8.048) 
1.005    
(8.063) 
1.006    
(8.054) 
     State Legislature Session Length (+) 0.210***   (0.045) 
0.210***   
(0.045) 
0.210***   
(0.044) 
0.210***    
(0.044) 
     State Liberalism (+) 0.001    (0.074) 
0.001    
(0.074) 
0.001    
(0.074) 
0.001    
(0.074) 
     Split Partisan Legislature (-) –3.343   (4.059) 
–3.343   
(4.065) 
–3.318   
(4.048) 
–3.317   
(4.044) 
     Unified Partisan Legislature (-) –0.525   (3.731) 
–0.526   
(3.742) 
–0.528   
(3.738) 
–0.532   
(3.751) 
     Year 2008 (-) –4.358   (4.989) 
–4.360   
(5.068) 
–4.335   
(5.017) 
–4.339   
(5.079) 
     Year 2009 (-) 6.852   (10.203) 
6.850   
(10.314) 
6.860   
(10.229) 
  6.856   
(10.333) 
Constant –16.472
+
   
(12.463) 
–16.525+    
(11.297) 
–16.741+    
(12.351) 
–16.900+    
(11.391) 
N × T (Effective Sample Size) 481 481 481 481 
Overall R2 0.057 0.057 0.057 0.057 
Notes: Dependent variable is defined as: Annual Real State Economic Development Funds Growth. Standard errors 
in parentheses.  *** p ≤ 0.01; ** p  ≤ 0.05; * p ≤ 0.10; +significant at the 0.10 level (one-tailed) 
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Table B.6: Economic Development Allocations in the American States (FY 2001 – FY 2010)  
– Random Effects Models – Progressive Ambition 
 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Governor Solo Appointment  
Authority (+) 
5.758+    
(3.905)   
6.606 
(27.022) 
5.757+    
(3.906) 
6.727 
(27.862) 
Control of Economic Development   
Commission/Council (+) 
1.557     
(4.272) 
1.557 
(4.275) 
2.520 
(37.723) 
2.784 
(39.025 
Previous Electoral Vote Share (+) 0.076 (0.191) 
0.080 
(0.190) 
0.077 
(0.187) 
0.0820 
(0.189) 
Gov Solo Appt x Vote Share (+) – –0.015 (0.487) – 
–0.017 
(0.502) 
Control of Comm/Council  
x Vote Share (+) – – 
–0.017 
(0.654) 
–0.022 
(0.679) 
Ancillary Controls 
     Progressive Ambition 4.767
+ 
(3.604) 
4.774+ 
(3.610) 
4.764+ 
(3.620) 
4.772+    
(3.623) 
     Election Year (+) –3.063 (2.970) 
–3.061 
(2.986) 
–3.066 
(2.972) 
–3.064 
(2.985) 
     State UE Rate (+) –4.897***   (1.567) 
–4.895***   
(1.580) 
–4.896***    
(1.567) 
–4.895***   
(1.580) 
     State Population (thousands) (+) –0.001***   (0.0002) 
–0.001***   
(0.0002) 
–0.001***   
(0.0002) 
–0.001***   
(0.0002) 
     Change in Agency (~) 3.234 (7.759) 
3.232    
(7.788) 
3.235    
(7.770) 
3.233    
(7.796) 
     State Legislature Session Length (+) 0.225***   (0.047) 
0.225***   
(0.047) 
0.225***   
(0.047) 
0.225***   
(0.047) 
     State Liberalism (+) 0.020 (0.077) 
0.020    
(0.077) 
0.020 
(0.077) 
0.020 
(0.077) 
     Split Partisan Legislature (-) –3.048    (4.194) 
–3.048 
(4.198) 
–3.042 
(4.170) 
–3.040 
(4.169) 
     Unified Partisan Legislature (-) –0.774 (3.689) 
–0.780 
(3.711) 
–0.775 
(3.693) 
–0.781 
(3.717) 
     Year 2008 (-) –7.112* (4.205) 
–7.118* 
(4.253) 
–7.106 
(4.218) 
–7.110* 
(4.254) 
     Year 2009 (-) 6.766 (8.621) 
6.759 
(8.697) 
6.770 
(8.655) 
6.763 
(8.720) 
Constant 10.384 (14.618) 
10.164 
(15.509) 
10.312 
(14.107) 
10.041   
(15.151) 
N × T (Effective Sample Size) 481 481 481 481 
Overall R2 0.068 0.068 0.068 0.068 
Notes: Dependent variable is defined as: Annual Real State Economic Development Funds Growth. Standard errors 
in parentheses.  *** p ≤ 0.01; ** p  ≤ 0.05; * p ≤ 0.10; +significant at the 0.10 level (one-tailed) 
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Table B.7: Economic Development Allocations in the American States (FY 2001 – FY 2010)  
– Fixed Effects Models 
 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Governor Solo Appointment 
Authority (+) 
–14.031+ 
(8.946) 
–0.339 
(29.115) 
–13.771+ 
(8.725) 
2.835 
(29.448) 
Control of Economic Development   
Commission/Council (+) 
–5.403 
(15.303) 
–3.884 
(15.698) 
16.290 
(44.220) 
22.612 
(45.608) 
Previous Electoral Vote Share (+) –0.007 (0.245) 
0.051 
(0.284) 
0.021 
(0.254) 
0.097 
(0.297) 
Gov Solo Appt x Vote Share (+) – –0.236 (0.480) – 
–0.285 
(0.486) 
Control of Comm/Council x Vote 
Share (+) – – 
–0.353 
(0.658) 
–0.426 
(0.678) 
Ancillary Controls 
     Election Year (+) –0.294 (3.231) 
–0.250 
(3.240) 
–0.338 
(3.219) 
–0.295 
(3.227) 
     State UE Rate (+) –7.858*** (2.535) 
–7.825*** 
(2.531) 
–7.942*** 
(2.560) 
–7.919*** 
(2.559) 
     State Population (thousands) (+) 0.017***   (0.005) 
0.017*** 
(0.005) 
0.017*** 
(0.005) 
0.017*** 
(0.005) 
     Change in Agency (~) 0.575 (10.133) 
0.598 
(10.088) 
0.582 
(10.157) 
0.611 
(10.104) 
     State Legislature Session  
     Length (+) 
0.341***    
(0.118) 
0.341*** 
(0.118) 
0.340*** 
(0.118) 
0.340*** 
(0.117) 
     State Liberalism (+) 0.172
+ 
(0.132) 
0.176+ 
(0.132) 
0.170 
(0.132) 
0.173+ 
(0.132) 
     Split Partisan Legislature (-) –7.336 (6.132) 
–7.407 
(6.158) 
–7.248 
(6.178) 
–7.316 
(6.215) 
     Unified Partisan Legislature (-) 1.771 (4.598) 
1.806 
(4.588) 
1.680 
(4.624) 
1.703 
(4.612) 
     Year 2008 (-) –10.670** (4.865) 
–10.687** 
(4.893) 
–10.466** 
(4.896) 
–10.445** 
(4.927) 
     Year 2009 (-) 9.920 (11.482) 
9.841 
(11.488) 
10.345 
(11.578) 
10.338 
(11.603) 
Constant –82.299* (43.889) 
–85.330* 
(43.514) 
–83.959* 
(43.842) 
–87.966** 
(43.370) 
N × T (Effective Sample Size) 481 481 481 481 
Overall R2 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 
AIC 5006.527   5008.446 5008.445 5010.330 
BIC 5056.637 5062.732 5062.731 5068.793 
Notes: Dependent variable is defined as: Annual Real State Economic Development Funds Growth. Standard errors 
in parentheses.  *** p ≤ 0.01; ** p  ≤ 0.05; * p ≤ 0.10; +significant at the 0.10 level (one-tailed) 
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Table B.8: Economic Development Allocations in the American States (FY 2001 – FY 2010) 
– Fixed Effects Models – Legislative Incentive 
 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Governor Solo Appointment 
Authority (+) 
–14.091+ 
(9.098) 
–13.263+ 
(8.655) 
–14.295+ 
(9.296) 
–13.036+ 
(8.886) 
Control of Economic Development   
Commission/Council (+) 
–6.830 
(15.693) 
–3.911 
(14.309) 
–6.643 
(15.485) 
–4.170 
(13.985) 
Previous Electoral Vote Share (+) –0.011 (0.248) 
–0.046 
(0.238) 
–0.019 
(0.253) 
–0.042 
(0.242) 
Ancillary Controls 
     State Legislature Session  
     Length (+) 
0.346** 
(0.145) 
0.184+ 
(0.121) 
0.387** 
(0.155) 
0.170+ 
(0.117) 
     Unified Government  (+) –2.823 (8.955) – 
0.312 
(10.373) – 
     Split Partisan Legislature (-) – –21.422
+ 
(12.983) – 
–21.650+ 
(15.142) 
     Unified Partisan Legislature (-) – –5.300 (8.694) – 
–9.829 
(10.049) 
     Election Year (+) –0.551 (3.220) 
–0.516 
(3.110) 
11.331 
(9.612) 
–5.156 
(6.473) 
     Session Length x Unified     
     Government 
–0.010 
(0.140) – 
–0.050 
(0.159) – 
     Session Length x Split Partisan  
     Legislature – 
0.209 
(0.197) – 
0.199 
(0.214) 
     Session Length x Unified Partisan  
     Legislature – 
0.118 
(0.133) – 
0.172 
(0.157) 
     Election Year x Session Length – – –0.177 (0.156) 
0.035 
(0.112) 
     Election Year x Unified  
     Government – – 
–11.556 
(10.476) – 
     Election Year x Split Partisan  
     Legislature – – – 
–3.418 
(12.551) 
     Election Year x Unified Partisan  
     Legislature – – – 
16.770+ 
(11.723) 
     Session Length x Election Year x  
     Unified Government – – 
0.163 
(0.181) – 
     Session Length x Election Year x  
     Split Partisan Leg – – – 
0.103 
(0.184) 
     Session Length x Election Year x  
     Unified Partisan Leg – – – 
–0.217 
(0.210) 
     State UE Rate (+) –7.837*** (2.522) 
–8.286*** 
(2.553) 
–7.938*** 
(2.527) 
–8.403*** 
(2.549) 
     State Population (thousands) (+) 0.017*** (0.005) 
0.015*** 
(0.004) 
0.017*** 
(0.005) 
0.015*** 
(0.004) 
     Change in Agency (~) 1.286 (9.907) 
1.327 
(10.331) 
1.098 
(9.849) 
0.961 
(10.312) 
     State Liberalism (+) 0.173
+ 
(0.133) 
0.179 
(0.140) 
0.170 
(0.133) 
0.175 
(0.140) 
     Year 2008 (-) –10.744** (4.926) 
–10.335** 
(4.866) 
–10.669** 
(5.068) 
–10.064* 
(5.038) 
     Year 2009 (-) 10.062 (11.479) 
12.230 
(11.464) 
10.574 
(11.597) 
12.796 
(11.656) 
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Constant –82.141* (41.416) 
–59.991+ 
(37.835) 
–84.336** 
(41.427) 
–55.584+ 
(38.437) 
N × T (Effective Sample Size) 481 481 481 481 
Overall R2 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.002 
AIC 5007.199 5006.419 5012.703 5015.369 
BIC 5057.309 5064.881 5075.341 5094.711 
Notes: Dependent variable is defined as: Annual Real State Economic Development Funds Per Capita Growth. 
Standard errors in parentheses.  *** p ≤ 0.01; ** p  ≤ 0.05; * p ≤ 0.10; +significant at the 0.10 level (one-tailed) 
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Table B.9: Economic Development Allocations in the American States (FY 2001 – FY 2010) 
– XTFEVD Models – Legislative Incentive 
 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Governor Solo Appointment 
Authority (+) 
7.686 
(6.331) 
6.882 
(6.490) 
7.712 
(6.348) 
7.038 
(6.560) 
Control of Economic Development   
Commission/Council (+) 
4.723 
(7.556) 
5.327 
(7.727) 
4.867 
(7.561) 
5.673 
(7.762 
Previous Electoral Vote Share (+) –0.011 (0.393) 
–0.046 
(0.395) 
–0.019 
(0.396) 
–0.042 
(0.399) 
Ancillary Controls 
     State Legislature Session  
     Length (+) 
0.346** 
(0.154) 
0.184+ 
(0.131) 
0.387** 
(0.167) 
0.170 
(0.138) 
     Unified Government  (+) –2.823 (12.313) – 
0.312 
(13.916) – 
     Split Partisan Legislature (-) – –21.422
+ 
(15.633) – 
–21.650 
(17.618) 
     Unified Partisan Legislature (-) – –5.300 (12.911) – 
–9.829 
(14.667) 
     Election Year (+) –0.551 (5.288) 
–0.516 
(5.289) 
11.331 
(19.832)  
–5.156 
(15.420) 
     Session Length x Unified  
     Government 
–0.010 
(0.157) – 
–0.050 
(0.174) – 
     Session Length x Split Partisan  
     Legislature – 
0.209 
(0.187) – 
0.199 
(0.207) 
     Session Length x Unified Partisan  
     Legislature – 
0.118 
(0.169) – 
0.172 
(0.189) 
     Election Year x Session Length – – –0.177 (0.281) 
0.035 
(0.265) 
     Election Year x Unified  
     Government – – 
–11.556 
(22.329) – 
     Election Year x Split Partisan  
     Legislature – – – 
–3.418 
(25.107) 
     Election Year x Unified Partisan  
     Legislature – – – 
16.770 
(25.233) 
     Session Length x Election Year x  
     Unified Government – – 
0.163 
(0.315) – 
     Session Length x Election Year x  
     Split Partisan Legislature – – – 
0.103 
(0.330) 
     Session Length x Election Year x  
     Unified Partisan Legislature – – – 
–0.217 
(0.387) 
     State UE Rate (+) –7.837*** (2.714) 
–8.286*** 
(2.732) 
–7.938*** 
(2.728) 
–8.403*** 
(2.752) 
     State Population (thousands) (+) –0.001** (0.0005) 
–0.001** 
(0.0005) 
–0.001* 
(0.0005) 
–0.001* 
(0.0005) 
     Change in Agency (~) 1.286 (10.090) 
1.327 
(10.183) 
1.098 
(10.128) 
0.961 
(10.250) 
     State Liberalism (+) 0.173 (0.165) 
0.179 
(0.166) 
0.170 
(0.165) 
0.175 
(0.168) 
     Year 2008 (-) –5.267 (7.408) 
–4.822 
(7.399) 
–5.196 
(7.439) 
–4.633 
(7.447) 
     Year 2009 (-) 16.741
+ 
(12.628) 
18.834+ 
(12.703) 
17.234+ 
(12.706) 
19.279+ 
(12.804) 
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Table B.9 Continued 
Constant 14.910 (30.148) 
26.936 
(30.362) 
12.785 
(30.660) 
28.801 
(30.610) 
N × T (Effective Sample Size) 481 481 481 481 
R2 0.124 0.133 0.125 0.135 
Notes: Dependent variable is defined as: Annual Real State Economic Development Funds Per Capita Growth. 
Standard errors in parentheses.  *** p ≤ 0.01; ** p  ≤ 0.05; * p ≤ 0.10; +significant at the 0.10 level (one-tailed) 
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Table B.10: Economic Development Allocations in the American States (FY 2001 – FY 
2010) – Hybrid Models – Legislative Incentive 
 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Governor Solo Appointment 
Authority  – within (+) 
–10.608 
   (21.571) 
–9.987 
(21.561) 
–10.761 
(21.705) 
–9.720 
(21.784) 
Governor Solo Appointment 
Authority – mean (+) 
7.069+ 
(5.325) 
7.435+ 
(5.346) 
7.364 
(5.884) 
7.012 
(6.192) 
Control of Economic Development   
Commission/Council – within (+) 
–8.985 
(43.613) 
–5.988 
(43.630) 
–8.784 
(43.965) 
–6.272 
(44.223) 
Control of Economic Development   
Commission/Council – mean (+) 
1.662 
(6.252) 
1.580 
(6.258) 
2.036 
(6.768) 
1.916 
(6.915) 
Previous Electoral Vote Share  
– within (+) 
–0.001 
(0.380) 
–0.036 
(0.381) 
–0.009 
(0.384) 
–0.033 
(0.386) 
Previous Electoral Vote Share  
– mean (+) 
0.549 
(0.583) 
0.474 
(0.587) 
0.498 
(0.621) 
0.421 
(0.633) 
Ancillary Controls 
     State Legislature Session Length  
     – within (+) 
0.342** 
(0.149) 
0.178+ 
(0.125) 
0.383** 
(0.162) 
0.164 
(0.134) 
     State Legislature Session Length  
     – mean (+) 
0.181 
(0.191) 
0.002 
(0.198) 
0.249 
(0.395) 
0.102 
(0.268) 
     Unified Government  – within (+) –2.441 (11.726) – 
0.665 
(13.357) – 
     Unified Government – mean (+) 8.688 (16.485) – 
6.276 
(30.338) – 
     Split Partisan Legislature  
     – within (-) – 
–20.810+ 
(14.999) – 
–21.045 
(17.147) 
     Split Partisan Legislature  
     – mean (-) – 
9.185 
(17.190) – 
14.003 
(46.860) 
     Unified Partisan Legislature  
     – within (-) – 
–5.652 
(12.376) – 
–10.152 
(14.204) 
     Unified Partisan Legislature  
     – mean (-) – 
–14.673 
(22.031) – 
–15.256 
(33.590) 
     Election Year – within (+) –0.819 (5.153) 
–0.769 
(5.162) 
11.134 
(19.130) 
–5.514 
(15.082) 
     Election Year – mean (+) –39.236 (33.524) 
–36.987 
(33.335) 
–32.139 
(89.540) 
–8.804 
(65.604) 
     Session Length x Unified   
     Government – within 
–0.014 
(0.152) – 
–0.054 
(0.169) – 
     Session Length x Unified  
     Government – mean 
–0.070 
(0.223) – 
–0.073 
(0.439) – 
     Session Length x Split Partisan  
     Legislature – within – 
0.202 
(0.190) – 
0.190 
(0.209) 
     Session Length x Split Partisan  
     Legislature – mean – 
–0.094 
(0.224) – 
–0.260 
(0.611) 
     Session Length x Unified Partisan  
     Legislature – within – 
0.121 
(0.164) – 
0.177 
(0.184) 
     Session Length x Unified Partisan  
     Legislature – mean – 
0.228 
(0.345) – 
0.275 
(0.516) 
     Election Year x Session Length  
     – within – – 
–0.183 
(0.271) 
0.041 
(0.258) 
     Election Year x Session Length  
     – mean 
– – 
–0.257 
(1.365)    
–0.574 
(0.899) 
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     Election Year x Unified  
     Government – within – – 
–11.607 
(21.618) – 
     Election Year x Unified  
     Government – mean – – 
9.667 
(99.652) – 
     Election Year x Split Partisan  
     Legislature – within – – – 
–3.465 
(24.375) 
     Election Year x Split Partisan  
     Legislature – mean – – – 
–15.525 
(157.889) 
     Election Year x Unified Partisan  
     Legislature – within – – – 
16.914 
(24.565) 
     Election Year x Unified Partisan  
     Legislature – mean – – – 
–5.116 
(103.352) 
     Session Length x Election Year x  
     Unified Government – within – – 
0.171 
(0.304) – 
     Session Length x Election Year x  
     Unified Government – mean – – 
–0.010 
(1.530) – 
     Session Length x Election Year x  
     Split Partisan Legislature – within – – – 
0.110 
(0.319) 
     Session Length x Election Year x  
     Split Partisan Legislature – mean – – – 
0.589 
(2.215) 
     Session Length x Election Year x  
     Unified Partisan Legislature  
     – within 
– – – 
–0.229 
(0.377) 
     Session Length x Election Year x  
     Unified Partisan Legislature  
     – mean 
– – – 
0.041 
(1.581) 
     State UE Rate – within (+)  –7.856*** (2.583) 
–8.298*** 
(2.591) 
–7.961*** 
(2.605) 
–8.419*** 
(2.622) 
     State UE Rate – mean  (+) –2.966 (2.653) 
–2.340 
(2.782) 
–3.125 
(2.834) 
–2.209 
(3.116) 
     State Population (thousands)  
     – within (+) 
0.013 
(0.010) 
0.012 
(0.010)   
0.013 
(0.010) 
0.011 
(0.010) 
     State Population (thousands) 
     – mean  (+) 
–0.001** 
(0.0004) 
–0.001** 
(0.0004) 
–0.001** 
(0.0004) 
–0.001** 
(0.0004) 
     Change in Agency – within (~) 0.616 (9.929) 
0.697 
(9.969) 
0.405 
(9.994) 
0.301 
(10.079) 
     Change in Agency – mean  (~) 16.700 (19.561) 
17.292 
(20.329) 
17.861 
(20.270) 
18.110 
(21.499) 
     State Liberalism – within (+) 0.148 (0.161) 
0.155 
(0.161) 
0.145 
(0.162) 
0.151 
(0.163) 
     State Liberalism – mean  (+) 0.028 (0.132) 
0.018 
(0.134) 
0.026 
(0.135) 
–0.002 
(0.142) 
     Year 2008 – within (-) –14.154* (8.457) 
–13.556+ 
(8.462) 
–14.142* 
(8.528) 
–13.343+ 
(8.572) 
     Year 2008 – mean  (-) 0 0 0 0 
     Year 2009 – within (-) 6.017 (13.316) 
8.403 
(13.369) 
6.480 
(13.430) 
8.930 
(13.532) 
     Year 2009 – mean (-) 0 0 0 0 
Constant 0.625 (2.046) 
0.625 
(2.044) 
0.625 
(2.057) 
0.625 
(2.063) 
Years – within 1.004 (1.152) 
0.946 
(1.152) 
1.018 
(1.160) 
0.958 
(1.166) 
N × T (Effective Sample Size) 481 481 481 481 
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AIC 5052.264 5055.707 5063.802 5074.687 
BIC 5165.013 5185.158 5201.605 5245.898 
Notes: Dependent variable is defined as: Annual Real State Economic Development Funds Per Capita Growth. 
Standard errors in parentheses.  *** p ≤ 0.01; ** p  ≤ 0.05; * p ≤ 0.10; +significant at the 0.10 level (one–tailed) 
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Table B.11: Economic Development Allocations in the American States (FY 2001 – FY 
2010) – Fixed Effects Models  – Institutional Conflict 
 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 
Governor Solo Appointment 
Authority (+) 
–22.973* 
(13.468) 
–13.893+ 
(8.851) 
Control of Economic Development   
Commission/Council (+) 
–3.196 
(15.851) 
–12.784 
(21.135) 
Previous Electoral Vote Share (+) –0.008 (0.245) 
–0.001 
(0.248) 
Ancillary Controls 
     State Legislature Session  
     Length (+) 
0.288** 
(0.136) 
0.331*** 
(0.119) 
     Session Length x Governor  
     Appointment Authority 
0.216 
(0.258) – 
     Session Length x  
     Commission/Council – 
0.210 
(0.372) 
     Split Partisan Legislature (-) –7.643 (6.266) 
–7.394 
(06.040) 
     Unified Partisan Legislature (-) 2.035 (4.650) 
1.736 
(4.612) 
     Election Year (+) –0.019 (3.208) 
–0.213 
(3.206) 
     State UE Rate (+) –7.827*** (2.507) 
–8.012*** 
(2.543) 
     State Population (thousands) (+) 0.017*** (0.005) 
0.017*** 
(0.005) 
     Change in Agency (~) 0.359 (10.022) 
0.650 
(10.163) 
     State Liberalism (+) 0.180
+
  
(0.135) 
0.171+  
(0.130) 
     Year 2008 (-) –10.263** (4.897) 
–10.640** 
(4.871) 
     Year 2009 (-) 9.609 (11.255) 
10.566 
(11.383) 
Constant –79.722* (43.474) 
–80.557*  
(43.597) 
N × T (Effective Sample Size) 481 481 
Overall R2 0.003 0.004   
AIC 5007.267 5008.237 
BIC 5061.554 5062.524 
Notes: Dependent variable is defined as: Annual Real State Economic Development Funds Per Capita Growth. 
Standard errors in parentheses.  *** p ≤ 0.01; ** p  ≤ 0.05; * p ≤ 0.10; +significant at the 0.10 level (one-tailed) 
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Table B.12: Economic Development Allocations in the American States (FY 2001 – FY 
2010) – XTFEVD Models  – Institutional Conflict 
 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 
Governor Solo Appointment 
Authority (+) 
-6.591 
(17.605) 
6.861 
(6.378) 
Control of Economic Development   
Commission/Council (+) 
4.103 
(7.716) 
-7.349 
(30.574) 
Previous Electoral Vote Share (+) -0.008 (0.395) 
-0.001  
(0.396) 
Ancillary Controls 
     State Legislature Session  
     Length (+) 
0.288**  
(0.115) 
0.331*** 
(0.100) 
     Session Length x Governor  
     Appointment Authority 
0.216 
(0.255) – 
     Session Length x  
     Commission/Council – 
0.210 
(0.510) 
     Split Partisan Legislature (-) -7.643 (8.109) 
-7.394 
(8.085) 
     Unified Partisan Legislature (-) 2.035 (6.577) 
1.736 
(6.563) 
     Election Year (+) -0.019 (5.307) 
-0.213 
(5.297) 
     State UE Rate (+) -7.827*** (2.723) 
-8.012*** 
(2.730) 
     State Population (thousands) (+) -0.001* (0.0005) 
-0.001* 
(0.0005) 
     Change in Agency (~) 0.359 (10.187) 
0.650 
(10.149) 
     State Liberalism (+) 0.180 (0.164) 
0.171 
(0.164) 
     Year 2008 (-) -5.234 (7.362) 
-5.396 
(7.376) 
     Year 2009 (-) 15.802 (12.693) 
16.998+ 
(12.675) 
Constant 16.374 (29.761) 
15.000 
(29.527) 
N × T (Effective Sample Size) 481 481 
Overall R2 0.127 0.126 
Notes: Dependent variable is defined as: Annual Real State Economic Development Funds Per Capita Growth. 
Standard errors in parentheses.  *** p ≤ 0.01; ** p  ≤ 0.05; * p ≤ 0.10; +significant at the 0.10 level (one-tailed) 
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Table B.13: Economic Development Allocations in the American States (FY 2001 – FY 
2010) – Hybrid Models  – Institutional Conflict 
 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 
Governor Solo Appointment 
Authority –within (+) 
–19.651 
(23.069) 
–10.519 
(21.579) 
Governor Solo Appointment 
Authority –mean (+) 
11.887 
(12.331) 
7.876+  
(5.333) 
Control of Economic Development   
Commission/Council –within (+) 
–5.298 
(43.587) 
–14.389 
(45.831) 
Control of Economic Development   
Commission/Council –mean (+) 
1.911 
(6.312)  
15.848 
(16.227) 
Previous Electoral Vote Share  
–within (+) 
0.003 
(0.380) 
0.008 
(0.381)   
Previous Electoral Vote Share  
–mean (+) 
0.485 
(0.594) 
0.588 
(0.582) 
Ancillary Controls 
     State Legislature Session Length  
     –within (+) 
0.278*** 
(0.103) 
0.325*** 
(0.093) 
     State Legislature Session Length  
     –mean (+) 
0.131+ 
(0.083) 
0.137* 
(0.077) 
     Session Length x Governor  
     Appointment Authority –within 
0.224 
(0.201) – 
     Session Length x Governor  
     Appointment Authority –mean 
–0.064 
(0.171) – 
     Session Length x  
     Commission/Council –within – 
0.197 
(0.407) 
     Session Length x  
     Commission/Council –mean – 
–0.244 
(0.256) 
     Split Partisan Legislature  
     –within (–)  
–7.500 
(7.537) 
–7.247 
(7.535) 
     Split Partisan Legislature  
     –mean (–) 
3.534 
(8.840) 
3.630 
(8.827) 
     Unified Partisan Legislature  
     –within (–) 
1.924 
(6.190) 
1.626 
(6.188) 
     Unified Partisan Legislature  
     –mean (–) 
–1.265 
(9.027) 
–2.337 
(9.041) 
     Election Year –within (+) –0.290 (5.170) 
–0.479 
(5.168) 
     Election Year –mean (+) –37.061 (33.462) 
–37.606 
(33.321) 
     State UE Rate –within (+) –7.846*** (2.584) 
–8.021*** 
(2.601) 
     State UE Rate –mean (+) –2.829 (2.623) 
–1.998 
(2.755) 
     State Population (thousands)  
     – within (+) 
0.013 
(0.010) 
0.013 
(0.010) 
     State Population (thousands)  
     –mean (+) 
–0.001** 
(0.0004) 
–0.001** 
(0.0004) 
     Change in Agency –within (~)   –0.355 (9.962) 
–0.013 
(9.964)   
     Change in Agency –mean (~) 19.322 (20.138) 
16.115 
(20.378) 
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     State Liberalism –within (+) 0.155 (0.160) 
0.147 
(0.160) 
     State Liberalism –mean (+) 0.028 (0.135) 
0.033 
(0.134) 
     Year 2008 –within (–) –13.801
+ 
(8.451) 
–13.952* 
(8.452) 
     Year 2008 –mean (–) 0 0 
     Year 2009 –within (–) 5.356 (13.309) 
6.574 
(13.380) 
     Year 2009 –mean (–) 0 0 
Constant 0.625 (2.046) 
0.625 
(2.047) 
Years – within 1.048 (1.153) 
0.977 
(1.153) 
N × T (Effective Sample Size) 481 481 
AIC 5054.501 5054.747 
BIC 5175.601 5175.847 
Notes: Dependent variable is defined as: Annual Real State Economic Development Funds Per Capita Growth. 
Standard errors in parentheses.  *** p ≤ 0.01; ** p  ≤ 0.05; * p ≤ 0.10; +significant at the 0.10 level (one-tailed) 
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APPENDIX C 
 
 
Table C.1: Multinomial Probit With Status Quo as the Omitted Category (2000–2010)  
– Retirement Eligibility Indicator 
 
 Retire Defeat 
1A 1B 1C 2A 2B 2C 
Financial Factors 
Real 
Legislative 
Salary (thou) 
0.007***    
(0.001) – 
0.007***      
(0.001) 
–0.004***   
(0.001) – 
–0.007***       
(0.001) 
Pay Difference 
(thou) – 
–0.004***   
(0.001) – – 
0.012***   
(0.001) – 
Real Median 
Household 
Income (thou) 
– – 
0.003**    
(0.001) – – 
0.016***      
(0.001) 
Age Factors 
Retirement 
Eligibility 
0.048+    
(0.032) 
0.049+   
(0.032) 
0.053*   
(0.032) 
0.001 
(0.038) 
0.037   
(0.038) 
0.029   
(0.038) 
Personal Factors 
Party 
Leadership 
0.187***   
(0.048) 
0.194***   
(0.048) 
0.188***      
(0.048) 
–0.294***    
(0.080) 
–0.285***   
(0.080) 
–0.296***      
(0.080) 
Committee 
Leadership  
–0.040*   
(0.023) 
–0.042*   
(0.023) 
–0.037*   
(0.023) 
–0.081***   
(0.027) 
–0.063**   
(0.028) 
–0.065**      
(0.028) 
Member of 
Upper 
Chamber 
–0.089***   
(0.025) 
–0.088***   
(0.025) 
–0.088***      
(0.025) 
–0.197***   
(0.031) 
–0.190***   
(0.031) 
–0.191***      
(0.031) 
Married 0.188***    (0.033) 
0.183***    
(0.033) 
0.191***      
(0.033) 
–0.094**   
(0.037) 
–0.082**     
(0.037) 
–0.075**   
(0.037) 
Female 0.018   (0.027) 
0.030     
(0.027) 
0.014   
(0.027) 
–0.002   
(0.031) 
–0.012   
(0.031) 
–0.025   
(0.031) 
Children –0.302***   (0.027) 
–0.298***   
(0.027) 
–0.304***      
(0.027) 
–0.096***   
(0.034) 
–0.105***   
(0.034) 
–0.113***      
(0.034) 
Age –0.037***   (0.007) 
–0.037***   
(0.007) 
–0.036***      
(0.007) 
–0.001   
(0.008) 
0.001   
(0.008) 
0.001   
(0.008) 
Age2 0.0005***   (0.0001) 
0.0005***   
(0.0001) 
0.0005***      
(0.0001) 
0.0001 +   
(0.0001) 
0.0001   
(0.0001) 
0.0001   
(0.0001) 
Green–Lite 0.651***   (0.057) 
0.566***   
(0.056) 
0.628***      
(0.057) 
–0.003   
(0.074) 
–0.271***   
(0.074) 
–0.120+     
(0.075) 
Gray 0.575***   (0.072) 
0.393***   
(0.069) 
0.541***    
(0.073) 
–0.015   
(0.089) 
–0.481***   
(0.085) 
–0.189**   
(0.090)  
Gold–Lite 0.635***   (0.085) 
0.394***   
(0.078) 
0.606***      
(0.086) 
0.015   
(0.104) 
–0.494***   
(0.095) 
–0.119   
(0.104) 
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Gold 1.130***   (0.095) 
0.883***   
(0.091) 
1.082***      
(0.096) 
0.013   
(0.117) 
–0.642***    
(0.113) 
–0.239**   
(0.119) 
Electoral Factors 
Electoral 
Expectations 
–0.001**   
(0.0005) 
–0.002***   
(0.0004) 
–0.001**   
(0.0005) 
–0.009***   
(0.0005) 
–0.008***   
(0.0005) 
–0.008***      
(0.0005) 
Burnout Factors 
Years in 
Position 
0.024***   
(0.002) 
0.024***   
(0.002) 
0.024***      
(0.002) 
–0.002   
(0.002) 
–0.004*   
(0.002) 
–0.004*   
(0.002) 
Constant –2.528***   (0.214) 
–1.999***   
(0.197) 
–2.624***      
(0.220) 
–1.873***    
(0.254) 
–1.851***   
(0.234) 
–2.492***      
(0.260) 
N = 71,249 
 
 Other Political Other Employment 
3A 3B 3C 4A 4B 4C 
Financial Factors 
Real 
Legislative 
Salary (thou) 
0.003**   
(0.001) – 
0.00002   
(0.001) 
–0.0003   
(0.003) – 
–0.003   
(0.003) 
Pay Difference 
(thou) – 
0.005***   
(0.001) – – 
0.005+   
(0.003) – 
Real Median 
Household 
Income (thou) 
– – 
0.014***      
(0.002) – – 
0.012***   
(0.003) 
Age Factors 
Retirement 
Eligibility 
–0.054   
(0.056) 
–0.040   
(0.056) 
–0.040    
(0.056) 
–0.041   
(0.138) 
–0.033    
(0.138) 
–0.032   
(0.138) 
Personal Factors 
Party 
Leadership 
0.087+   
(0.064) 
0.101+   
(0.064) 
0.089+    
(0.064) 
–0.208   
(0.173) 
–0.202    
(0.173) 
–0.209   
(0.173) 
Committee 
Leadership  
–0.089***   
(0.032) 
–0.080**   
(0.032) 
–0.076**   
(0.032) 
–0.109+   
(0.072) 
–0.103+   
(0.072) 
–0.099+   
(0.073) 
Member of 
Upper 
Chamber 
0.263***   
(0.034) 
0.267***   
(0.034) 
0.267***       
(0.034) 
0.132*   
(0.077) 
0.136*   
(0.077) 
0.138*   
(0.077) 
Married 0.148***   (0.050) 
0.152***   
(0.050) 
0.166***       
(0.050) 
0.076   
(0.106) 
0.080    
(0.106) 
0.093   
(0.107) 
Female –0.005   (0.040) 
–0.004   
(0.041) 
–0.025   
(0.041) 
–0.075   
(0.097) 
–0.077   
(0.097) 
–0.094    
(0.097) 
Children –0.062
+
   
(0.040) 
–0.067*   
(0.040) 
–0.077*   
(0.041) 
–0.128+   
(0.086) 
–0.132+   
(0.086) 
–0.142+   
(0.087) 
Age 0.051***    (0.013) 
0.051***   
(0.013) 
0.052***      
(0.013) 
0.026    
(0.028) 
0.026   
(0.028) 
0.027   
(0.028) 
Age2 –0.001***   (0.0001) 
–0.001***   
(0.0001) 
–0.001***      
(0.0001) 
–0.0005*   
(0.0003) 
–0.0005*   
(0.0003) 
–0.0005    
(0.0003) 
Green–Lite 0.289***   (0.078) 
0.038   
(0.079) 
0.170**   
(0.079) 
0.089   
(0.170) 
–0.047   
(0.174) 
–0.021   
(0.175) 
Gray 0.258***   (0.099) 
–0.204**   
(0.098) 
0.072   
(0.101)  
0.031   
(0.216) 
–0.216   
(0.214) 
–0.134   
(0.221) 
Gold–Lite 0.294**   (0.116) 
–0.244**   
(0.110) 
0.134   
(0.118) 
–0.088   
(0.257) 
–0.367+   
(0.245) 
–0.233   
(0.262) 
Gold 0.260**   (0.133) 
–0.363***   
(0.133) 
 –0.003   
(0.137) 
0.236   
(0.285) 
–0.103   
(0.287) 
–0.003   
(0.295) 
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Electoral Factors 
Electoral 
Expectations 
0.00001 
(0.00001) 
0.00001   
(0.00001) 
0.00001   
(0.00001) 
–7.26E–06   
(0.0001) 
–5.94E–06    
(0.0001) 
–1.80E–06   
(0.0000953) 
Burnout Factors 
Years in 
Position 
0.030***   
(0.003) 
0.029***   
(0.003) 
0.029***      
(0.003) 
0.035***   
(0.006) 
0.034***   
(0.006) 
0.034***        
(0.006) 
Constant –4.191***    (0.341) 
–3.767***   
(0.326) 
–4.654***      
(0.347) 
–3.978***   
(0.733) 
–3.854***   
(0.697) 
–4.370***      
(0.742) 
N = 71,249 
Notes: *** p ≤ 0.01; ** p  ≤ 0.05; * p ≤ 0.10; +significant at the 0.10 level (one–tailed test). 
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Table C.2: Multinomial Probit With Status Quo as the Omitted Category (2000–2010)  
– Conditional Impact of Retirement Eligibility and Salary Indicators 
 
 Retire Defeat 
1A 1B 1C 2A 2B 2C 
Financial Factors 
Real 
Legislative 
Salary (thou) 
0.007***   
(0.001) – 
0.007***   
(0.001) 
–0.004***   
(0.001) – 
–0.007***      
(0.001) 
Pay Difference 
(thou) – 
0.004***   
(0.001) – – 
–0.012***   
(0.001) – 
Real Median 
Household 
Income (thou) 
– – 
0.003**    
(0.001) – – 
0.017***         
(0.001) 
Age Factors 
Retirement 
Eligibility 
0.026   
(0.046) 
0.058+   
(0.036) 
0.149   
(0.120) 
–0.018   
(0.055) 
0.045   
(0.048) 
0.275*   
(0.143) 
Retirement x 
Salary 
0.001   
(0.001) – 
0.001   
(0.001) 
0.001   
(0.001) – 
0.001   
(0.001) 
Retirement x 
Pay Difference – 
0.0006   
(0.001) – – 
0.0004   
(0.001) – 
Retirement x 
Household Inc – – 
–0.003   
(0.002) – – 
–0.005*   
(0.003) 
Personal Factors 
Party 
Leadership 
0.188***   
(0.048) 
0.195***   
(0.048) 
0.189***      
(0.048) 
–0.294***   
(0.080) 
–0.285***   
(0.080) 
–0.296***      
(0.080)  
Committee 
Leadership  
–0.040*   
(0.023) 
–0.042*   
(0.023) 
–0.037+   
(0.023) 
–0.0801***   
(0.027) 
–0.063**   
(0.028) 
–0.066**   
(0.028) 
Member of 
Upper 
Chamber 
–0.089***   
(0.025) 
–0.088***   
(0.025) 
–0.087***         
(0.025) 
–0.197***   
(0.031) 
–0.190***    
(0.031) 
–0.189***       
(0.031) 
Married 0.189***     (0.033) 
0.183***    
(0.033) 
0.192***       
(0.033) 
–0.093**   
(0.037) 
–0.082**   
(0.037) 
–0.076**   
(0.037) 
Female 0.018   (0.027) 
0.029   
(0.027) 
0.014   
(0.027) 
–0.003   
(0.031) 
–0.012   
(0.031) 
–0.026   
(0.031) 
Children –0.302***    (0.027) 
–0.298***   
(0.027) 
–0.304***      
(0.027) 
–0.096***   
(0.034) 
–0.105***   
(0.034) 
–0.112***   
(0.034) 
Age –0.037***   (0.007) 
–0.037***   
(0.007) 
–0.037***      
(0.007) 
–0.001   
(0.008) 
0.001   
(0.008) 
0.001   
(0.008) 
Age2 0.0005***   (0.0001) 
0.0004***   
(0.0001) 
0.0005***      
(0.0001) 
0.0001+   
(0.0001) 
0.0001   
(0.0001) 
0.0001   
(0.0001) 
Green–Lite 0.655***   (0.057) 
0.569***   
(0.057) 
0.635***      
(0.058) 
0.001   
(0.074) 
–0.268***   
(0.075) 
–0.110+   
(0.076) 
Gray 0.582***   (0.073) 
0.399***   
(0.070) 
0.553***      
(0.074) 
–0.009   
(0.090) 
–0.477***   
(0.087) 
–0.175*   
(0.091) 
Gold–Lite 0.643***    (0.086) 
0.400***   
(0.079) 
0.618***      
(0.087) 
0.022   
(0.104) 
–0.491***   
(0.096) 
–0.108   
(0.106) 
Gold 1.134***   (0.095) 
0.886***   
(0.091) 
1.087***      
(0.097) 
0.017     
(0.117) 
–0.640***   
(0.113) 
–0.234*   
(0.120) 
Electoral Factors 
Electoral 
Expectations 
–0.001**   
(0.0005) 
–0.002***   
(0.0004) 
–0.001*   
(0.0005) 
–0.009***   
(0.0005) 
–0.008***   
(0.0005) 
–0.008***      
(0.0005) 
Burnout Factors 
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Years in 
Position 
0.024***   
(0.002) 
0.024***   
(0.002) 
0.024***      
(0.002) 
–0.002   
(0.002) 
–0.004*   
(0.002) 
–0.004*   
(0.002) 
Constant –2.522***   (0.214) 
–2.000***   
(0.197) 
–2.656***         
(0.223) 
–1.870***   
(0.254) 
–1.854***   
(0.234) 
–2.565***      
(0.263) 
N = 71,249 
 
 Other Political Other Employment 
3A 3B 3C 4A 4B 4C 
Financial Factors 
Real 
Legislative 
Salary (thou) 
0.003***   
(0.001) – 
0.0003   
(0.001) 
–0.001   
(0.003) – 
–0.004   
(0.003) 
Pay Difference 
(thou) – 
–0.004***   
(0.001) – – 
–0.005+   
(0.003) – 
Real Median 
Household 
Income (thou) 
– – 
0.014***      
(0.002) – – 
0.013***         
(0.004) 
Age Factors 
Retirement 
Eligibility 
0.087   
(0.084) 
–0.119*   
(0.064) 
0.011   
(0.206) 
–0.324+   
(0.232) 
0.021   
(0.143) 
–0.296   
(0.562) 
Retirement x 
Salary 
–0.004**   
(0.002) – 
–0.005**      
(0.002)  
0.007+   
(0.004) – 
0.007+   
(0.004) 
Retirement x 
Pay Difference – 
–0.005***   
(0.002) – – 
0.006+   
(0.004) – 
Retirement x 
Household Inc – – 
0.002   
(0.004) – – 
–0.0005   
(0.010) 
Personal Factors 
Party 
Leadership 
0.087+    
(0.064) 
0.100+   
(0.064) 
0.088+    
(0.064) 
–0.206   
(0.173) 
–0.200   
(0.173) 
–0.207   
(0.174) 
Committee 
Leadership  
–0.089***   
(0.032) 
–0.079**   
(0.032) 
–0.076**   
(0.032) 
–0.108+   
(0.072) 
–0.103+   
(0.073) 
–0.098+     
(0.073) 
Member of 
Upper 
Chamber 
0.263***    
(0.034) 
0.266***   
(0.034) 
0.267***      
(0.034) 
0.133*   
(0.077) 
0.137*   
(0.077) 
0.139*   
(0.078) 
Married 0.147***   (0.050) 
0.152***   
(0.050) 
0.165***      
(0.050) 
0.078   
(0.106) 
0.082   
(0.107) 
0.096   
(0.107) 
Female –0.003   (0.041) 
–0.003   
(0.041) 
–0.024   
(0.041) 
–0.078   
(0.097) 
–0.079   
(0.097) 
–0.096   
(0.097) 
Children –0.060
+
   
(0.040) 
–0.065+   
(0.041) 
–0.075*   
(0.041) 
–0.132+   
(0.086) 
–0.135+    
(0.086) 
–0.145*   
(0.087) 
Age 0.053***    (0.013) 
0.055***   
(0.013) 
0.056***      
(0.013) 
0.023   
(0.028) 
0.023   
(0.028) 
0.024   
(0.028) 
Age2 –0.001***   (0.0001) 
–0.001***   
(0.0001) 
–0.001***      
(0.0001) 
–0.0004+    
(0.0003) 
–0.0005+   
(0.0003) 
–0.0005*   
(0.0003) 
Green–Lite 0.265***   (0.079) 
0.0005   
(0.081) 
0.138*   
(0.081) 
0.152   
(0.174) 
0.007   
(0.179) 
0.045   
(0.179) 
Gray 0.226**   (0.100) 
–0.249**   
(0.099) 
0.032   
(0.103) 
0.109    
(0.221) 
–0.151   
(0.219) 
–0.054    
(0.226) 
Gold–Lite 0.259**   (0.118) 
–0.288***   
(0.111) 
0.090   
(0.120) 
–0.009   
(0.261) 
–0.307    
(0.249) 
–0.155   
(0.266) 
Gold 0.239*   (0.134) 
–0.390***   
(0.134) 
–0.031   
(0.138) 
0.299   
(0.286) 
–0.056   
(0.289) 
0.059   
(0.297) 
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Electoral Factors 
Electoral 
Expectations 
0.00001   
(0.00001) 
0.00001   
(0.00001) 
0.00001   
(0.00001) 
–6.39E–06     
(0.0001) 
–5.17E –06   
(0.0001) 
–1.18E–06   
(0.0001) 
Burnout Factors 
Years in 
Position 
0.031***   
(0.003) 
0.029***   
(0.003) 
0.030***      
(0.003) 
0.034***   
(0.006) 
0.034***   
(0.006) 
0.033***      
(0.006) 
Constant –4.229***   (0.343) 
–3.803***   
(0.328) 
–4.690***       
(0.350) 
–3.964***     
(0.728) 
–3.843***   
(0.692) 
–4.369***      
(0.738) 
N = 71,249 
Notes: *** p ≤ 0.01; ** p  ≤ 0.05; * p ≤ 0.10; +significant at the 0.10 level (one–tailed test). 
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Table C.3: Probit Models (2000–2010) 
 
 Retire Defeat 
1A 1B 1C 2A 2B 2C 
Financial Factors 
Real Legislative Salary 
(thou) 
0.006***   
(0.001) – 
0.006***      
(0.001) 
–0.004***   
(0.001) – 
–0.006***       
(0.001) 
Pay Difference (thou) – 0.004***   (0.001) – – 
–0.009***   
(0.001) – 
Real Median Household 
Income (thou) – – 
0.00005   
(0.001) – – 
0.011***       
(0.001) 
Personal Factors 
Party Leadership 0.148***   (0.034) 
0.152***   
(0.034) 
0.148***      
(0.034) 
–0.247***    
(0.061) 
–0.241***   
(0.061) 
–0.249***      
(0.061) 
Committee Leadership  –0.019   (0.016) 
–0.022+   
(0.017) 
–0.019   
(0.017) 
–0.050**   
(0.020) 
–0.036*   
(0.020) 
–0.039*    
(0.020) 
Member of Upper 
Chamber 
–0.065***   
(0.018) 
–0.066***   
(0.018) 
–0.065***      
(0.018)  
–0.151***   
(0.023) 
–0.146***   
(0.023) 
–0.147***      
(0.023) 
Married 0.144***   (0.024) 
0.139***   
(0.024) 
0.144***       
(0.024) 
–0.096***   
(0.027) 
–0.087***    
(0.027) 
–0.084***    
(0.027) 
Female 0.016   (0.020) 
0.025+    
(0.020) 
0.016   
(0.020) 
–0.002   
(0.023) 
–0.010   
(0.023) 
–0.018    
(0.023) 
Children –0.215***   (0.020) 
–0.212***   
(0.020) 
–0.215***      
(0.020) 
–0.039+   
(0.025) 
–0.047*    
(0.025) 
–0.051**   
(0.025) 
Age –0.027***   (0.005) 
–0.027***   
(0.005) 
–0.027***      
(0.005) 
0.005   
(0.006) 
0.006   
(0.006) 
0.007   
(0.006)   
Age2 0.0003***   (0.00004) 
0.0003***   
(0.00004) 
0.0003***      
(0.00004) 
0.00003   
(0.00005) 
0.00001   
(0.00005) 
0.00001   
(0.00005) 
Green–Lite 0.469***   (0.041) 
0.437***    
(0.04) 
0.469***      
(0.042) 
–0.078+   
(0.055) 
–0.269***   
(0.055) 
–0.164***      
(0.056) 
Gray 0.422***   (0.053) 
0.343***   
(0.050) 
0.421***      
(0.053) 
–0.078   
(0.066) 
–0.405***   
(0.063) 
–0.204***       
(0.067) 
Gold–Lite 0.460***   (0.062) 
0.344***   
(0.057) 
0.459***      
(0.062) 
–0.060   
(0.077) 
–0.411***   
(0.070) 
–0.156**      
(0.077) 
Gold 0.815***   (0.069) 
0.710***   
(0.066) 
0.815***      
(0.070) 
–0.115+   
(0.086) 
–0.584***   
(0.084) 
–0.302***       
(0.088) 
Electoral Factors 
Electoral Expectations –0.0001   (0.0003) 
–0.0006*   
(0.0003) 
–0.0001   
(0.0003) 
–0.006***   
(0.0004) 
–0.006***   
(0.0004) 
–0.006***      
(0.0004) 
Burnout Factors 
Years in Position 0.017***   (0.001) 
0.0170***   
(0.001) 
0.017***      
(0.001) 
–0.005***    
(0.002) 
–0.007***   
(0.002) 
–0.007***      
(0.002) 
Constant –1.946***   (0.156) 
–1.570***   
(0.144) 
–1.948***         
(0.160) 
–1.429***   
(0.188) 
–1.472***   
(0.173) 
–1.869***      
(0.193) 
N = 71,484 
 
 Other Political Other Employment 
3A 3B 3C 4A 4B 4C 
Financial Factors 
Real Legislative Salary 
(thou) 
0.002*    
(0.001) – 
–0.0005   
(0.001) 
–0.001   
(0.002) – 
–0.003   
(0.002) 
Pay Difference (thou) – –0.003***   (0.001) – – 
–0.003+   
(0.002) – 
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Table C.3 Continued 
Real Median Household 
Income (thou) – – 
0.010***      
(0.001) – – 
0.007***   
(0.003) 
Personal Factors 
Party Leadership 0.065
+
    
(0.048) 
0.074+   
(0.048) 
0.066+   
(0.048) 
–0.177+   
(0.137) 
–0.176+   
(0.137) 
–0.178+   
(0.137) 
Committee Leadership  –0.054*   (0.024) 
–0.048*   
(0.024) 
–0.046*   
(0.024) 
–0.066    
(0.057) 
–0.063   
(0.057) 
–0.061   
(0.057) 
Member of Upper Chamber 0.217***   (0.025) 
0.220***   
(0.025) 
0.221***       
(0.025) 
0.107*   
(0.060) 
0.120*    
(0.060) 
0.112*   
(0.061) 
Married 0.098***   (0.038) 
0.102***   
(0.038) 
0.110***      
(0.038) 
0.037    
(0.083) 
0.041   
(0.083) 
0.048    
(0.084) 
Female –0.003   (0.030) 
–0.003   
(0.030) 
–0.016   
(0.031) 
–0.061    
(0.076) 
–0.063   
(0.076) 
–0.071   
(0.076) 
Children –0.012   (0.030) 
–0.016   
(0.031) 
–0.021   
(0.031) 
–0.061   
(0.068) 
–0.063   
(0.068) 
–0.068   
(0.068) 
Age 0.051***   (0.009) 
0.051***   
(0.009) 
0.051***      
(0.009) 
0.030+   
(0.021) 
0.030+   
(0.021) 
0.030+   
(0.021) 
Age2 –0.001***   (0.0001) 
–0.0007***   
(0.0001) 
–0.001***      
(0.0001) 
–0.0005**   
(0.0002) 
–0.0005**   
(0.0002) 
–0.0005**      
(0.0002) 
Green–Lite 0.156***   (0.058) 
–0.006   
(0.059) 
0.073    
(0.059) 
–0.016   
(0.131) 
–0.077   
(0.135) 
–0.089   
(0.135) 
Gray 0.134*   (0.073) 
–0.163*   
(0.073) 
0.004   
(0.075) 
–0.056    
(0.167) 
–0.162   
(0.168) 
–0.166   
(0.172) 
Gold–Lite 0.152*   (0.086) 
–0.193**   
(0.082) 
0.038   
(0.088) 
–0.164   
(0.199) 
–0.279+   
(0.192) 
–0.263+   
(0.204) 
Gold 0.068   (0.099) 
–0.335***   
(0.100) 
–0.116   
(0.102) 
0.028   
(0.220) 
–0.120   
(0.225) 
–0.129   
(0.229) 
Electoral Factors 
Electoral Expectations 0.00001   (0.00001) 
0.00001   
(0.00001) 
0.00001   
(0.00001) 
0.0000005   
(0.00005) 
0.0000002   
(0.00005) 
1.51E–06   
(0.00005) 
Burnout Factors 
Years in Position 0.021***   (0.002) 
0.020***   
(0.002) 
0.020***      
(0.002) 
0.024***   
(0.004) 
0.023***   
(0.004) 
0.023***      
(0.004) 
Constant –3.327***   (0.253) 
–3.060***   
(0.240) 
–3.615***      
(0.256)  
–3.117***   
(0.554) 
–3.114***    
(0.524) 
–3.328***    
(0.560) 
N = 71,484 
Notes: *** p ≤ 0.01; ** p  ≤ 0.05; * p ≤ 0.10; +significant at the 0.10 level (one–tailed test). 
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Table C.4: Descriptive Statistics of Variables Included in Analysis 
 
Variable Mean Min Max SD 
Legislative Salary 26.311 0 111.685 23.862 
Pay Difference -21.480 -70.396 59.129 23.584 
Party Leadership Positions 0.042 0 1 0.201 
Committee Chairmanships 0.450 0 1 0.497 
Member of Upper Chamber 0.2676183 0 1 0.443 
Married 0.844 0 1 0.363 
Children 0.786 0 1 0.410 
Female 0.229 0 1 0.420   
Age 54.292 19 94 11.544   
Age2 3080.941 361 8836 1257.965 
Green Lite 0.137 0 1 0.343 
Gray 0.448 0 1 0.497 
Gold 0.137 0 1 0.344 
Gold Lite 0.199 0 1 0.399 
Electoral Expectations 79.091 0 100 26.137 
Years in Office 7.748 0 50 6.714 
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Table C.5: GLLAMM Probit Models (2000–2010) 
 
 Retire Defeat 
1A 1B 1C 2A 2B 2C 
Financial Factors 
Real Legislative Salary (thou) 0.004***    (0.001) – 
0.005***      
(0.001) 
–0.004**   
(0.002) – 
–0.005***   
(0.001) 
Pay Difference (thou) – –0.002***   (0.0005) – – 
–0.044***   
(0.002) – 
Real Median Household Income 
(thou) – – 
0.00005   
(0.001)   
0.010***       
(0.001) 
Personal Factors 
Party Leadership 0.090***   (0.026) 
0.110***   
(0.026) 
0.084***   
(0.026) 
–0.286***   
(0.086) 
–0.265***    
(0.081) 
–0.249***   
(0.061) 
Committee Leadership  –0.021
+
   
(0.015) 
–0.001   
(0.015) 
–0.019   
(0.016) 
–0.074***   
(0.020) 
–0.057***   
(0.019) 
–0.064***   
(0.019) 
Member of Upper Chamber –0.124***   (0.017) 
–0.109***    
(0.016) 
–0.113***   
(0.016) 
–0.137***   
(0.024) 
–0.128***   
(0.022) 
–0.145***   
(0.020) 
Married 0.173***    (0.023) 
0.190***   
(0.022) 
0.143***       
(0.021) 
–0.120***   
(0.023) 
–0.132***   
(0.023) 
–0.127***   
(0.021) 
Female 0.026
+
   
(0.017) 
0.024+   
(0.017) 
0.015   
(0.020) 
–0.034+   
(0.021) 
–0.008   
(0.020) 
–0.018    
(0.023) 
Children –0.241***   (0.016) 
–0.261***    
(0.016) 
–0.215***   
(0.020) 
–0.044*   
(0.023) 
–0.032+   
(0.023) 
–0.050**   
(0.025) 
Age –0.006
+
   
(0.004) 
–0.002   
(0.004) 
–0.005   
(0.004) 
0.001  
(0.005) 
–0.002    
(0.005) 
0.007   
(0.006)   
Age2 0.0001***   (0.00004) 
0.0001***   
(0.00004) 
0.0003***   
(0.00004) 
0.0001+   
(0.00004) 
0.0001**    
(0.00004) 
0.00001   
(0.00005) 
Green–Lite 0.500***    (0.037) 
0.163***   
(0.039) 
0.469***      
(0.041) 
–0.089   
(0.170) 
–0.821***    
(0.124) 
–0.092   
(0.156) 
Gray 0.331***   (0.047) 
0.075*   
(0.043) 
0.421***      
(0.052) 
–0.090   
(0.158) 
–1.420***   
(0.136) 
–0.081   
(0.147) 
Gold–Lite 0.567***   (0.059) 
–0.025   
(0.051) 
0.456***      
(0.062) 
–0.154   
(0.183) 
–1.682***   
(0.141) 
–0.134   
(0.173) 
Gold 0.684***   (0.060) 
0.371***   
(0.056) 
0.715***      
(0.070) 
–0.207   
(0.189) 
–2.050***   
(0.155) 
–0.204   
(0.189) 
Electoral Factors 
Electoral Expectations –0.00001   (0.00004) 
0.0005+   
(0.0003) 
–0.0001   
(0.0003) 
–0.008***   
(0.0006) 
–0.009***    
(0.0004) 
–0.005***   
(0.0004) 
Burnout Factors 
Years in Position 0.039***    (0.001) 
0.038***   
(0.001) 
0.034***    
(0.001) 
–0.007***   
(0.002) 
–0.012***   
(0.002) 
–0.007***   
(0.002) 
Constant –2.382***   (0.134) 
–1.845***   
(0.126) 
–1.948***   
(0.160) 
–1.175***   
(0.236) 
–0.566***   
(0.170) 
–1.869***   
(0.193) 
Level 1 Variance 0.049 (0.0002) 
0.049 
(0.0002) 
0.048 
(0.0002) 
0.030 
(0.0001) 
0.030 
(0.0001) 
0.030 
(0.0001) 
Level 2 Variance 0.252 (0.014) 
0.182 
(0.009) 
0.212 
(0.011) 
0.018 
(0.004) 
0.107 
(0.009) 
0.018 
(0.003) 
Level 1 N = 71,484 
Level 2 N = 50 
 
 
Other Political Other Employment 
3A 3B 3C 4A 4B 4C 
Financial Factors 
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Table C.5 Continued 
Real Legislative Salary (thou) –0.003***   (0.001) – 
–0.0004   
(0.001) 
–0.002   
(0.003) – 
–0.003   
(0.002) 
Pay Difference (thou) – –0.021***    (0.001) – – 
–0.005+   
(0.004) – 
Real Median Household Income 
(thou) – – 
0.011***      
(0.001) – – 
0.008***   
(0.004) 
Personal Factors 
Party Leadership –0.055
+
    
(0.039) 
–0.058+   
(0.039) 
–0.050+    
(0.039) 
–0.162+   
(0.129) 
–0.178+   
(0.135) 
–0.179+   
(0.137) 
Committee Leadership  –0.108***   (0.022) 
–0.096***   
(0.021) 
–0.100***   
(0.021) 
–0.070    
(0.062) 
–0.061   
(0.059) 
–0.060   
(0.057) 
Member of Upper Chamber 0.229***   (0.022) 
0.232***   
(0.022) 
0.221***       
(0.024) 
0.111*   
(0.062) 
0.122*    
(0.060) 
0.112*   
(0.063) 
Married 0.114***   (0.034) 
0.134***   
(0.035) 
0.111***      
(0.035) 
0.032    
(0.084) 
0.047   
(0.080) 
0.044    
(0.084) 
Female –0.010   (0.028) 
–0.045+   
(0.029) 
–0.012   
(0.030) 
–0.076    
(0.074) 
–0.073   
(0.081) 
–0.072   
(0.074) 
Children 0.009   (0.026) 
0.014   
(0.026) 
0.007   
(0.025) 
–0.072   
(0.064) 
–0.073   
(0.062) 
–0.069   
(0.068) 
Age 0.070***   (0.010) 
0.075***   
(0.011) 
0.072***   
(0.010) 
0.032+   
(0.017) 
0.024+   
(0.019) 
0.031+   
(0.019) 
Age2 –0.001***   (0.0001) 
–0.001***    
(0.0001) 
–0.001***   
(0.0001) 
–0.0005**   
(0.0002) 
–0.0005**   
(0.0002) 
–0.0005**   
(0.0002) 
Green–Lite –0.138*   (0.071) 
–0.355***   
(0.061) 
–0.144*   
(0.070) 
–0.021   
(0.134) 
–0.061   
(0.126) 
–0.025   
(0.131) 
Gray –0.085    (0.089) 
–0.686***   
(0.074) 
–0.081    
(0.088) 
–0.060    
(0.161) 
–0.162   
(0.154) 
–0.063    
(0.159) 
Gold–Lite –0.361***    (0.108) 
–0.826***   
(0.080) 
–0.359***    
(0.111) 
–0.176   
(0.200) 
–0.249+   
(0.192) 
–0.172   
(0.199) 
Gold –0.268*   (0.148) 
–1.374***   
(0.100) 
–0.257*   
(0.154) 
0.034   
(0.170) 
–0.127   
(0.215) 
0.031   
(0.162) 
Electoral Factors 
Electoral Expectations 0.00001**   (0.000004) 
0.00001*** 
(0.000004) 
0.00001**   
(0.000004) 
0.000001   
(0.00005) 
0.000001   
(0.00005) 
0.000001   
(0.00005) 
Burnout Factors 
Years in Position 0.030***   (0.002) 
0.030***   
(0.002) 
0.029***      
(0.002) 
0.031***   
(0.004) 
0.022***   
(0.004) 
0.027***      
(0.004) 
Constant –3.364***   (0.258) 
–3.449***   
(0.275) 
–3.609***   
(0.254)  
–3.120***   
(0.507) 
–3.002***    
(0.516) 
–3.111***    
(0.504) 
Level 1 Variance 0.017 (0.0001) 
0.017 
(0.0001) 
0.017 
(0.0001) 
0.040 
(0.0001) 
0.040 
(0.0001) 
0.040 
(0.0001) 
Level 2 Variance 0.050 (0.006) 
0.095 
(0.010) 
0.051 
(0.007) 
0.040 
(0.004) 
0.111 
(0.010) 
0.047 
(0.004) 
Level 1 N = 71,484 
Level 2 N = 50 
Notes: *** p ≤ 0.01; ** p  ≤ 0.05; * p ≤ 0.10; +significant at the 0.10 level (one–tailed test). 
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Table C.6: Multinomial Probit With Status Quo as the Omitted Category (2000–2010) 
– Key Indicator Variables Omitted 
 
 Retire Defeat Other Political Other Employment 
Financial Factors 
Green–Lite 0.418***           (0.048) 
0.111*    
(0.063) 
0.194***    
(0.065) 
0.107    
(0.143) 
Gray 0.124***           (0.043) 
0.198***        
(0.054) 
0.070    
(0.057) 
0.056    
(0.123) 
Gold–Lite 0.085*    (0.047) 
0.275***       
(0.058) 
0.067    
(0.064) 
–0.058     
(0.143) 
Gold 0.495***           (0.051) 
0.310***       
(0.063) 
0.015     
(0.078) 
0.271*     
(0.156) 
Personal Factors 
Party Leadership 0.201***              (0.047) 
–0.300***          
(0.080) 
0.094+    
(0.064) 
–0.207    
(0.172) 
Committee Leadership  –0.034
+
    
(0.023) 
–0.083***          
(0.027) 
–0.087***   
(0.032) 
–0.109+     
(0.072) 
Member of Upper Chamber –0.083***       (0.025) 
–0.198***          
(0.031) 
0.265***    
(0.034) 
0.133*    
(0.077) 
Married 0.189***      (0.033) 
–0.093**   
(0.037) 
0.148***      
(0.050) 
0.076 
(0.106) 
Female 0.027     (0.027) 
–0.006    
(0.031) 
–0.001    
(0.040) 
–0.074 
(0.097) 
Children –0.303***      (0.027) 
–0.095***   
(0.034) 
  –0.063+    
(0.040) 
–0.129+ 
(0.086) 
Age  –0.037***         (0.007) 
–0.001    
(0.008) 
0.055***    
(0.012) 
0.029 
(0.027) 
Age2 0.0005***         (0.0001) 
0.0001*   
(0.0001) 
–0.001***      
(0.0001) 
–0.0005**   
(0.0003) 
Electoral Factors 
Electoral Expectations –0.001***             (0.0004) 
–0.008***   
(0.0005) 
0.00001   
(0.00001) 
–6.01E–06   
(0.0001) 
Burnout Factors 
Years in Position 0.024***            (0.002) 
–0.002    
(0.002) 
0.030***         
(0.002) 
0.035***   
(0.006) 
Constant –1.857***            (0.195) 
–2.187***   
(0.231) 
  –4.001***          
(0.314) 
–4.078***   
(0.664) 
N = 71,249 
Notes: *** p ≤ 0.01; ** p  ≤ 0.05; * p ≤ 0.10; +significant at the 0.10 level (one–tailed test). 
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Table C.7: Multinomial Probit With Status Quo as the Omitted Category (2000–2010)  
– Amateur Legislatures Only 
 
 Retire Defeat 
1A 1B 1C 2A 2B 2C 
Financial Factors 
Real 
Legislative 
Salary (thou) 
–0.032***   
(0.004) – 
–0.027***       
(0.004) 
–0.010**   
(0.004) – 
–0.001   
(0.005) 
Pay Difference 
(thou) – 
–0.018***   
(0.002) – – 
–0.015***   
(0.002) – 
Real Median 
Household 
Income (thou) 
– – 
0.010***      
(0.002) – – 
0.015***   
(0.002) 
Professionalism Factors 
Session Length 0.0002   (0.0005) 
0.00003   
(0.0005) 
0.0001   
(0.0005 )  
0.001*   
(0.0005) 
0.001***   
(0.0005) 
0.001   
(0.0005) 
Expenditures 
Per Legislator 
–0.0003***   
(0.0001) 
–0.0003***   
(0.0001) 
–0.0003***      
(0.0001) 
0.0001    
(0.0001) 
0.0001+   
(0.0001) 
0.0001   
(0.0001) 
Personal Factors 
Party 
Leadership 
0.260***   
(0.085) 
0.267***   
(0.085) 
0.260***      
(0.085) 
–0.237*   
(0.131) 
–0.246*   
(0.131) 
–0.238*   
(0.131) 
Committee 
Leadership  
–0.072*   
(0.043) 
–0.046   
(0.043) 
–0.061+   
(0.043) 
–0.186***    
(0.050) 
–0.167***   
(0.050) 
–0.173***   
(0.050) 
Member of 
Upper 
Chamber 
–0.007   
(0.046) 
0.016   
(0.046) 
0.004   
(0.046) 
–0.142***   
(0.055) 
–0.121**    
(0.055) 
–0.128**   
(0.055) 
Married 0.218***   (0.059) 
0.230***   
(0.059) 
0.226***      
(0.059) 
–0.134**   
(0.062) 
–0.114*   
(0.062) 
–0.122**   
(0.062) 
Female 0.053   (0.046) 
0.037   
(0.047) 
0.042   
(0.047) 
–0.041   
(0.052) 
–0.067+   
(0.052) 
–0.056    
(0.052) 
Children –0.234***   (0.048) 
–0.283***   
(0.048) 
–0.261***      
(0.048) 
0.008    
(0.057) 
–0.005   
(0.057) 
–0.028   
(0.058) 
Age –0.055***   (0.012) 
–0.051***   
(0.012) 
–0.053***       
(0.012) 
–0.026**   
(0.013) 
–0.022*   
(0.013) 
–0.023*   
(0.013) 
Age2 0.001***   (0.0001) 
0.0006***    
(0.0001) 
0.0006***       
(0.0001) 
0.0003***    
(0.0001) 
0.0003***   
(0.0001) 
0.0003***      
(0.0001) 
Electoral Factors 
Electoral 
Expectations 
–0.002***    
(0.001) 
–0.001   
(0.0008) 
–0.001*   
(0.001) 
–0.006***   
(0.001) 
–0.005***   
(0.001) 
–0.005***      
(0.001) 
Burnout Factors 
Years in 
Position 
0.018***   
(0.003) 
0.016***   
(0.003) 
0.017***      
(0.003) 
–0.006***   
(0.001) 
–0.012***   
(0.004) 
–0.013***      
(0.004) 
Constant –0.773**   (0.328) 
–1.862***   
(0.349) 
–1.324***      
(0.350) 
–1.337***   
(0.361) 
–2.251***   
(0.384) 
–2.196***      
(0.387) 
N = 21,031 
 
 Other Political Other Employment 
3A 3B 3C 4A 4B 4C 
Financial Factors 
Real 
Legislative 
Salary (thou) 
0.008   
(0.006) – 
0.016**   
(0.006) 
–0.015   
(0.014) – 
–0.008   
(0.015) 
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Table C.7 Continued 
Pay Difference 
(thou) – 
–0.011***   
(0.003) – – 
–0.020***   
(0.007) – 
       
Real Median 
Household 
Income (thou) 
– – 
0.022***   
(0.003) – – 
0.024***      
(0.008) 
Professionalism Factors 
Session Length –0.001
+
   
(0.001) 
–0.0003   
(0.0008) 
–0.001+   
(0.001) 
–0.001   
(0.002) 
–0.0005   
(0.002) 
–0.001   
(0.002) 
Expenditures 
Per Legislator 
–0.0001   
(0.0001) 
–0.0001   
(0.0001) 
–0.0001   
(0.0001) 
–0.0001   
(0.0003) 
–0.0001    
(0.0003) 
–0.0001   
(0.0003) 
Personal Factors 
Party 
Leadership 
0.143   
(0.118) 
0.117   
(0.118) 
0.140   
(0.119) 
–0.398   
(0.400) 
–0.411   
(0.401) 
–0.399   
(0.402) 
Committee 
Leadership  
0.003   
(0.065) 
0.006   
(0.065) 
0.019   
(0.066) 
–0.150   
(0.150) 
–0.135   
(0.150) 
–0.129   
(0.151) 
Member of 
Upper 
Chamber 
0.309***   
(0.066) 
0.320***   
(0.067) 
0.326***   
(0.067) 
–0.014   
(0.161) 
0.010   
(0.162) 
0.013   
(0.163) 
Married 0.143
+
   
(0.102) 
0.162+   
(0.102) 
0.158+    
(0.103) 
–0.005   
(0.205) 
0.007   
(0.205) 
0.008    
(0.207) 
Female –0.070   (0.081) 
–0.105+   
(0.082) 
–0.095   
(0.082) 
0.063    
(0.171) 
0.040   
(0.172) 
0.039   
(0.173) 
Children –0.003   (0.079) 
0.010   
(0.078) 
–0.052   
(0.080) 
–0.001   
(0.168) 
–0.021   
(0.168) 
–0.053   
(0.171) 
Age 0.039*   (0.023) 
0.041*    
(0.023) 
0.043*    
(0.023) 
0.064    
(0.060) 
0.067   
(0.060) 
0.071   
(0.061) 
Age2 –0.001***    (0.0002) 
–0.001***   
(0.0002) 
–0.001***      
(0.0002) 
–0.001+    
(0.001) 
–0.001*   
(0.001) 
–0.001*   
(0.001) 
Electoral Factors 
Electoral 
Expectations 
–0.0002   
(0.001) 
0.001   
(0.001) 
0.001   
(0.001)  
0.006**   
(0.003) 
0.007**   
(0.003) 
0.007**   
(0.003) 
Burnout Factors 
Years in 
Position 
0.033***   
(0.005) 
0.034***   
(0.005) 
0.031***        
(0.005) 
0.028**    
(0.013) 
0.028**   
(0.013) 
0.026*   
(0.013) 
Constant –3.414***   (0.594) 
–4.015***     
(0.618) 
–4.637***     
(0.629) 
–4.550***   
(1.409) 
–5.690***    
(1.489) 
–5.984***   
(1.510) 
N = 21,031 
Notes: *** p ≤ 0.01; ** p  ≤ 0.05; * p ≤ 0.10; +significant at the 0.10 level (one–tailed test). 
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Table C.8: Multinomial Probit With Status Quo as the Omitted Category (2000–2010)  
– Hybrid Legislatures Only 
 
 Retire Defeat 
1A 1B 1C 2A 2B 2C 
Financial Factors 
Real 
Legislative 
Salary (thou) 
0.008***   
(0.001) – 
0.009***      
(0.002) 
–0.008***   
(0.002) – 
–0.019***      
(0.002) 
Pay Difference 
(thou) – 
0.009***   
(0.002) – – 
–0.023***      
(0.002) – 
Real Median 
Household 
Income (thou) 
– – 
–0.001   
(0.002) – – 
0.022***      
(0.002) 
Professionalism Factors 
Session Length 0.003***   (0.0004) 
0.003***      
(0.0004) 
0.003***      
(0.0004) 
0.001***   
(0.0005) 
0.002***      
(0.0005) 
0.002***      
(0.0005) 
Expenditures 
Per Legislator 
–0.0004***   
(0.0001) 
–0.0004***      
(0.0001) 
–0.0004***      
(0.0001) 
–6.02E–06   
(0.0001) 
–0.0001*   
(0.0001) 
–0.0001*   
(0.0001) 
Personal Factors 
Party 
Leadership 
0.036   
(0.075) 
0.042     
(0.075) 
0.037   
(0.075) 
–0.453***   
(0.132) 
–0.434***         
(0.133) 
–0.444***      
(0.133) 
Committee 
Leadership  
–0.017   
(0.035) 
–0.023   
(0.035) 
–0.016   
(0.035) 
–0.048   
(0.041) 
–0.022   
(0.041) 
–0.018   
(0.041) 
Member of 
Upper 
Chamber 
–0.090**   
(0.038) 
–0.086**   
(0.038) 
–0.089**   
(0.038) 
–0.214***   
(0.046) 
–0.225***      
(0.046) 
–0.226***      
(0.046) 
Married 0.245***    (0.053) 
0.231***         
(0.053) 
0.241***         
(0.053)  
–0.065   
(0.057) 
–0.048   
(0.057) 
–0.038   
(0.057) 
Female –0.0002   (0.043) 
0.020   
(0.043) 
0.001   
(0.043) 
–0.025   
(0.048) 
–0.035    
(0.048) 
–0.046    
(0.049) 
Children –0.358***   (0.042) 
–0.349***         
(0.042) 
–0.353***         
(0.042) 
–0.182***     
(0.051) 
–0.208***         
(0.052) 
–0.224***         
(0.052) 
Age –0.038***   (0.011) 
–0.038***            
(0.011) 
–0.038***            
(0.011) 
0.013    
(0.013) 
0.014   
(0.014) 
0.015   
(0.014) 
Age2 0.0005***   (0.0001) 
0.0005***            
(0.0001) 
0.0005***            
(0.0001) 
–8.60E–06   
(0.0001) 
–0.00001   
(0.0001) 
 –0.00002    
(0.0001) 
Electoral Factors 
Electoral 
Expectations 
0.002***   
(0.001) 
0.001*   
(0.001) 
0.002***               
(0.001) 
–0.011***   
(0.001) 
–0.011***            
(0.001) 
–0.010***            
(0.001) 
Burnout Factors 
Years in 
Position 
0.029***   
(0.002) 
0.030***                
(0.002) 
0.029***               
(0.002) 
0.001   
(0.003) 
–0.003   
(0.003) 
–0.003   
(0.003) 
Constant –2.269***   (0.317) 
–1.807***               
(0.314) 
–2.229***               
(0.327) 
–2.184***   
(0.376) 
–2.961***      
(0.378) 
–3.061***      
(0.389) 
N = 31,796 
 
 Other Political Other Employment 
3A 3B 3C 4A 4B 4C 
Financial Factors 
Real 
Legislative 
Salary (thou) 
0.003+   
(0.002) – 
–0.002   
(0.002) 
0.002   
(0.005) – 
–0.002   
(0.005) 
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Table C.8 Continued 
Pay Difference 
(thou) – 
–0.006**   
(0.002) – – 
0.0003   
(0.005) – 
Real Median 
Household 
Income (thou) 
– – 
0.012***   
(0.002) – – 
0.010*   
(0.005) 
Professionalism Factors 
Session Length 0.002***    (0.001) 
0.002***       
(0.0006) 
0.002***       
(0.001) 
0.003**   
(0.001) 
0.003**      
(0.001) 
0.003**   
(0.001) 
Expenditures 
Per Legislator 
–0.00003   
(0.0001) 
–0.0001   
(0.0001) 
–0.0001+   
(0.0001) 
–9.21E–06   
(0.0002) 
–0.00001   
(0.0002) 
–0.0001   
(0.0002) 
Personal Factors 
Party 
Leadership 
0.008   
(0.099) 
0.023   
(0.099) 
0.009   
(0.099)  
–0.219   
(0.251) 
–0.215    
(0.251) 
–0.217   
(0.251) 
Committee 
Leadership  
–0.135***   
(0.048) 
–0.129***      
(0.048) 
–0.121**    
(0.048) 
–0.032   
(0.105) 
–0.031   
(0.105) 
–0.021   
(0.106) 
Member of 
Upper 
Chamber 
0.222***   
(0.050) 
0.219***         
(0.050) 
0.218***      
(0.050) 
0.107   
(0.111) 
0.107   
(0.112) 
0.105   
(0.112) 
Married 0.180**    (0.075) 
0.183**       
(0.075) 
0.197***      
(0.075) 
0.095   
(0.162) 
0.093   
(0.162) 
0.108   
(0.162) 
Female –0.020    (0.060) 
–0.011   
(0.060) 
–0.032   
(0.060) 
–0.275*   
(0.160) 
–0.271*   
(0.160) 
–0.286*   
(0.160) 
Children –0.143**   (0.060) 
–0.156***      
(0.060) 
–0.163***      
(0.061) 
–0.178+   
(0.129) 
–0.180+   
(0.129) 
–0.191+   
(0.129) 
Age 0.064***   (0.018) 
0.064***       
(0.018) 
0.064***      
(0.018) 
0.075*   
(0.044) 
0.076*   
(0.044) 
0.075*   
(0.044) 
Age2 –0.001***   (0.0002) 
–0.001***      
(0.0002) 
–0.001***      
(0.0002) 
–0.001**   
(0.0004) 
–0.001**      
(0.0004) 
–0.001**      
(0.0004) 
Electoral Factors 
Electoral 
Expectations 
0.00002   
(0.001) 
–0.0005   
(0.001) 
0.001   
(0.001) 
–0.0003    
(0.002) 
–0.0005   
(0.002) 
0.0003   
(0.002) 
Burnout Factors 
Years in 
Position 
0.031***   
(0.004) 
0.029***      
(0.004) 
0.029***      
(0.004) 
0.031***   
(0.009) 
0.031***      
(0.009) 
0.030***      
(0.009) 
Constant –4.441***    (0.481) 
–4.459***      
(0.477) 
–4.892***      
(0.491) 
–5.491***   
(1.111) 
–5.434***      
(1.100) 
–5.842***      
(1.128) 
N = 31,796 
Notes: *** p ≤ 0.01; ** p  ≤ 0.05; * p ≤ 0.10; +significant at the 0.10 level (one–tailed test). 
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Table C.9: Multinomial Probit With Status Quo as the Omitted Category (2000–2010)  
– Professional Legislatures Only 
 
 Retire Defeat 
1A 1B 1C 2A 2B 2C 
Financial Factors 
Real 
Legislative 
Salary (thou) 
–0.003*    
(0.001) – 
–0.003*   
(0.001) 
0.0001    
(0.002) – 
0.001   
(0.002) 
Pay Difference 
(thou) – 
–0.004***      
(0.001) – – 
–0.006***     
(0.002) – 
Real Median 
Household 
Income (thou) 
– – 
0.009***   
(0.003) – – 
0.028***         
(0.003) 
Professionalism Factors 
Session Length –0.001***    (0.0002) 
–0.001***      
(0.0002) 
–0.001***      
(0.0002) 
–0.001***      
(0.0003) 
–0.0005**    
(0.0003) 
–0.001***     
(0.0003) 
Expenditures 
Per Legislator 
0.0001***      
(0.00002) 
0.0001***      
(0.00002) 
0.0001***   
(0.00002) 
7.82E–06    
(0.00003) 
0.0001**    
(0.00003) 
–6.85E–06   
(0.00003) 
Personal Factors 
Party 
Leadership 
0.344***         
(0.098) 
0.341***          
(0.098) 
0.340***          
(0.098) 
–0.167    
(0.182) 
–0.174    
(0.183) 
  –0.185   
(0.185) 
Committee 
Leadership  
0.037    
(0.048) 
0.038     
(0.048) 
0.032   
(0.049) 
–0.123*    
(0.067) 
–0.111*    
(0.067) 
–0.142**   
(0.068) 
Member of 
Upper 
Chamber 
–0.235***          
(0.056) 
–0.236***          
(0.056) 
–0.236***          
(0.056) 
–0.334***         
(0.084) 
–0.336***         
(0.084) 
–0.329***         
(0.085) 
Married 0.148**    (0.070) 
0.148**    
(0.070) 
0.149**   
(0.071) 
–0.134+    
(0.093) 
–0.133+     
(0.093) 
–0.140+   
(0.094) 
Female –0.015    (0.059) 
–0.016    
(0.059) 
–0.016   
(0.059) 
0.141*    
(0.077) 
0.138*    
(0.077) 
0.143*   
(0.077) 
Children –0.243***          (0.063) 
–0.240***          
(0.063) 
–0.239***          
(0.063) 
0.108    
(0.094) 
0.118    
(0.094) 
0.142+   
(0.096) 
Age –0.003    (0.016) 
–0.003    
(0.016) 
–0.004   
(0.016) 
0.020    
(0.023) 
0.020    
(0.023) 
0.018   
(0.023) 
Age2 0.0002    (0.0001) 
0.0002    
(0.0001) 
0.0002   
(0.0001) 
–0.0001    
(0.0002) 
–0.0001    
(0.0002) 
–0.0001   
(0.0002) 
Electoral Factors 
Electoral 
Expectations 
–0.006***             
(0.001) 
–0.006***             
(0.001) 
–0.006***             
(0.001) 
–0.012***             
(0.002) 
–0.012***            
(0.002) 
–0.012***             
(0.002) 
Burnout Factors 
Years in 
Position 
0.033***             
(0.004) 
0.033***             
(0.004) 
0.033***       
(0.004) 
0.021***             
(0.005) 
0.022***             
(0.005) 
0.021***             
(0.005) 
Constant –2.045***             (0.456) 
–2.188***    
(0.455) 
–2.425***       
(0.472) 
–2.400***             
(0.621) 
–2.489***             
(0.621) 
–3.711***             
(0.652) 
N = 14,702 
 
 Other Political Other Employment 
3A 3B 3C 4A 4B 4C 
Financial Factors 
Real 
Legislative 
Salary (thou) 
–0.011***    
(0.002) – 
–0.010***      
(0.002) 
–0.008+    
(0.005) – 
–0.008+   
(0.005) 
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Table C.9 Continued 
Pay Difference 
(thou) – 
–0.012***      
(0.002) – – 
–0.008*    
(0.005) – 
Real Median 
Household 
Income (thou) 
– – 
0.018***      
(0.003) – – 
0.009   
(0.009) 
Professionalism Factors 
Session Length 0.0004
+
    
(0.0003) 
0.0004*    
(0.0002) 
0.0002   
(0.0003) 
0.0001    
(0.0006) 
0.0001    
(0.0005) 
0.00003   
(0.0006) 
Expenditures 
Per Legislator 
0.0002***    
(0.00003) 
0.0002***         
(0.00003) 
0.0002***         
(0.00003) 
–0.00002    
(0.0001) 
–0.00001    
(0.0001) 
–0.00002   
(0.0001) 
Personal Factors 
Party 
Leadership 
0.052    
(0.137) 
0.041     
(0.137) 
0.046   
(0.137) 
–0.124    
(0.325) 
–0.129    
(0.326) 
–0.130    
(0.326) 
Committee 
Leadership  
–0.037    
(0.066) 
–0.036    
(0.067) 
–0.048   
(0.067) 
–0.207+    
(0.151) 
–0.206+    
(0.151) 
–0.212+   
(0.151) 
Member of 
Upper 
Chamber 
0.243***       
(0.071) 
0.242***    
(0.072) 
0.245***       
(0.072) 
0.260+    
(0.158) 
0.260+    
(0.158) 
0.261*   
(0.159) 
Married 0.117     (0.098) 
0.118    
(0.098) 
0.120   
(0.098)  
0.094    
(0.216) 
0.095    
(0.216) 
0.099   
(0.217) 
Female 0.086    (0.082) 
0.084    
(0.083) 
0.085   
(0.083) 
–0.040    
(0.206) 
–0.041    
(0.206) 
–0.041   
(0.206) 
Children 0.050    (0.088) 
0.061    
(0.089) 
0.064   
(0.089) 
–0.111    
(0.187) 
–0.108    
(0.187) 
–0.106   
(0.187) 
Age 0.080***          (0.027) 
0.078***         
(0.027) 
0.078***         
(0.027) 
–0.003    
(0.049) 
–0.004    
(0.049) 
–0.004   
(0.049) 
Age2 –0.001***          (0.0003) 
–0.001***         
(0.0003) 
–0.001***         
(0.0003) 
–0.0001    
(0.0005) 
–0.0001    
(0.0005) 
–0.0001    
(0.0005) 
Electoral Factors 
Electoral 
Expectations 
0.00001    
(0.00002) 
0.00001    
(0.00002) 
0.00001   
(0.00001) 
–0.002    
(0.004) 
–0.002    
(0.004) 
–0.002    
(0.004) 
Burnout Factors 
Years in 
Position 
0.040***             
(0.005) 
0.040***             
(0.005) 
0.040***             
(0.005) 
0.050***                
(0.011) 
0.050***    
(0.011) 
0.050***       
(0.011) 
Constant –4.484***             (0.685) 
–4.995***             
(0.690) 
–5.281***             
(0.707) 
–3.006**   
(1.325) 
–3.367**    
(1.321) 
–3.435**       
(1.382) 
N = 14,702 
Notes: *** p ≤ 0.01; ** p  ≤ 0.05; * p ≤ 0.10; +significant at the 0.10 level (one–tailed test). 
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Table C.10: Multinomial Probit With Status Quo as the Omitted Category (2000–2010) 
– Conditional Impact of Legislative Salary and Session Length 
 
 Retire Defeat Other Political Other Employment 
Financial and Professionalism Factors 
Real Legislative Salary (thou) 0.002**    (0.001) 
–0.002+   
( 0.001) 
–0.0002   
(0.001) 
–0.0001    
(0.003) 
Session Length –0.001**   (0.0003) 
0.001***    
(0.0004) 
0.001+     
(0.0005) 
0.008    
(0.001) 
Legislative Salary x Session  
     Length 
–4.59E–07   
(4.99E–06) 
–0.00002***   
(6.11E–06) 
–0.00001+    
(7.16E–06) 
–6.04E–06   
(0.00002) 
Expenditures Per Legislator 0.00005**   (0.00002) 
0.0001***   
(0.00002) 
0.0001***   
(0.00003) 
–0.00003   
(0.0001) 
Personal Factors 
Party Leadership 0.226***   (0.048) 
–0.312***   
(0.082) 
0.077    
(0.066) 
–0.206 
(0.174) 
Committee Leadership  –0.029 (0.023) 
–0.110***   
(0.028) 
–0.084**    
(0.033) 
–0.113+    
(0.073) 
Member of Upper Chamber –0.107***   (0.026) 
–0.202***   
(0.032) 
0.253***    
(0.035) 
0.122+     
(0.078) 
Married 0.190***   (0.034) 
–0.098***   
(0.038) 
0.141***    
(0.051) 
0.055    
(0.107) 
Female 0.018 (0.027) 
–0.010    
(0.032) 
–0.009 
(0.041) 
–0.102     
(0.100) 
Children –0.316***   (0.0289 
–0.075**   
(0.035) 
–0.060+    
(0.042) 
–0.118+    
(0.088) 
Age –0.039***   (0.007) 
–0.001    
(0.008) 
0.057***    
(0.012) 
0.036+    
(0.027) 
Age2 0.0005***   (0.0001) 
0.0001+   
(0.0001) 
–0.001***   
(0.0001) 
–0.0006**   
(0.0003) 
Electoral Factors 
Electoral Expectations –0.003***   (0.0004) 
–0.009***   
(0.0005) 
0.00001   
(0.00001) 
–0.00001   
(0.0002) 
Burnout Factors 
Years in Position 0.021***   (0.002) 
–0.001    
(0.002) 
0.031***   
(0.003) 
0.035***   
(0.006) 
Constant –1.503***   (0.197) 
–1.992***   
(0.232) 
–4.110***   
(0.323) 
–4.223***    
(0.686) 
N = 67, 529  
Notes: *** p ≤ 0.01; ** p  ≤ 0.05; * p ≤ 0.10; +significant at the 0.10 level (one–tailed test). 
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Table C.11: Multinomial Probit With Status Quo as the Omitted Category (2000–2010) 
– Earning Potential Indicator (Only J.D.’s and MBA’s) 
 
 Retire Defeat 
1A 1B 1C 2A 2B 2C 
Financial Factors 
Real 
Legislative 
Salary (thou) 
0.007***   
(0.001) – 
0.007***         
(0.001) 
–0.004***   
(0.001) – 
–0.007***         
(0.001) 
Pay Difference 
(thou) – 
0.004***      
(0.00) – – 
–0.012***      
(0.001) – 
Real Median 
Household 
Income (thou) 
– – 
0.003***         
(0.001) – – 
0.016***         
(0.001) 
Earning 
Potential 
–0.006   
(0.047) 
–0.012   
(0.047) 
–0.004   
(0.047) 
–0.081+   
(0.058) 
–0.079+   
(0.058) 
–0.073   
(0.058) 
Personal Factors 
Party 
Leadership 
0.197***   
(0.049) 
0.205***        
(0.049) 
0.198***           
(0.049) 
–0.294***         
(0.082) 
–0.284***   
(0.082) 
–0.296***      
(0.082) 
Committee 
Leadership  
–0.035+   
(0.023) 
–0.036+   
(0.023) 
–0.032+   
(0.023) 
–0.080***      
(0.028) 
–0.062**   
(0.028) 
–0.064**   
(0.028) 
Member of 
Upper 
Chamber 
–0.089***   
(0.026) 
–0.088***           
(0.026) 
–0.087***                 
(0.026) 
–0.205***         
(0.032) 
–0.199***   
(0.032) 
–0.200***      
(0.032)   
Married 0.175***   (0.034) 
0.169***              
(0.034) 
0.178***                 
(0.034) 
–0.092**   
(0.038) 
–0.080**   
(0.038) 
–0.072*   
(0.038) 
Female 0.010   (0.028) 
0.021   
(0.028) 
0.005   
(0.028) 
0.003   
(0.032) 
–0.007   
(0.032) 
–0.021   
(0.032) 
Children –0.296***      (0.028) 
–0.293***              
(0.028) 
–0.299***                 
(0.028) 
–0.084**   
(0.035) 
–0.094***   
(0.035) 
–0.102***      
(0.035) 
Age –0.039***   (0.007) 
–0.039***                 
(0.007) 
–0.038***                    
(0.007) 
–0.0004   
(0.008) 
0.001   
(0.008) 
0.002    
(0.008) 
Age2 0.0005***   (0.0001) 
0.0005***                 
(0.0001) 
0.0005***                    
(0.0001) 
0.0001+   
(0.0001) 
0.0001    
(0.0001) 
0.0001   
(0.0001) 
Green–Lite 0.636***        (0.058) 
0.547***                    
(0.058) 
0.611***                        
(0.059) 
–0.018   
(0.075) 
–0.289***      
(0.076) 
–0.140*   
(0.076) 
Gray 0.553***      (0.074) 
0.364***                    
(0.071) 
0.515***                       
(0.075) 
–0.028    
(0.091) 
–0.495***      
(0.087) 
–0.205**   
(0.092) 
Gold–Lite 0.605 ***     (0.088) 
0.358***                    
(0.080) 
0.573***                       
(0.088) 
–0.004   
(0.106) 
–0.516***      
(0.097) 
–0.141+   
(0.107) 
Gold 1.089***       (0.097) 
0.833***                    
(0.093) 
1.034***       
(0.099) 
0.008   
(0.119) 
–0.658***      
(0.115) 
–0.256**   
(0.122) 
Electoral Factors 
Electoral 
Expectations 
–0.001**   
(0.0005) 
–0.002***                    
(0.0005)  
–0.001**    
(0.0005) 
–0.009***   
(0.0005) 
–0.008***      
(0.0005) 
–0.007***      
(0.0005) 
Burnout Factors 
Years in 
Position 
0.024***   
(0.002) 
0.024***                    
(0.002) 
0.024***                       
(0.002) 
–0.002   
(0.002) 
–0.004*   
(0.002) 
–0.004*  
(0.002) 
Constant –2.467***      (0.220) 
–1.944***         
(0.202) 
–2.575***                       
(0.226) 
–1.886***   
(0.260) 
–1.865***      
(0.240) 
–2.520***      
(0.267) 
N = 67,811 
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Table C.11 Continued 
Financial Factors 
Real 
Legislative 
Salary (thou) 
0.003**   
(0.001) – 
–0.0003   
(0.001) 
–0.0007  
(0.003) – 
–0.004   
(0.003) 
Pay Difference 
(thou) – 
–0.005***   
(0.001) – – 
–0.005*   
(0.003) – 
Real Median 
Household 
Income (thou) 
– – 
0.015***   
(0.002) – – 
0.013***   
(0.004) 
Earning 
Potential 
–0.044   
(0.070) 
–0.050   
(0.070) 
–0.042   
(0.070) 
–0.201   
(0.181) 
–0.202   
(0.181) 
–0.195    
(0.181) 
Personal Factors 
Party 
Leadership 
0.097+   
(0.066) 
0.112*   
(0.066) 
0.100+    
(0.066) 
–0.277+    
(0.187) 
–0.272+   
(0.187) 
–0.279+   
(0.187) 
Committee 
Leadership  
–0.102***   
(0.033) 
–0.092***   
(0.033) 
–0.088***      
(0.033) 
–0.106+    
(0.074) 
–0.100+    
(0.074) 
–0.096+   
(0.074) 
Member of 
Upper 
Chamber 
0.267***   
(0.035) 
0.270***       
(0.035) 
  0.271***       
(0.035) 
0.141*   
(0.078) 
0.145*   
(0.079) 
0.147*   
(0.079) 
Married 0.154***   (0.051) 
0.158***      
(0.051) 
0.174***       
(0.051) 
0.058   
(0.107) 
0.063   
(0.107)  
0.077   
(0.108) 
Female 0.002   (0.041) 
0.001   
(0.041) 
–0.021   
(0.041) 
–0.064    
(0.098) 
–0.067   
(0.098) 
–0.084   
(0.098) 
Children –0.071*   (0.041) 
–0.076*   
(0.041) 
–0.088**   
(0.042) 
–0.123+   
(0.088) 
–0.127+    
(0.088) 
–0.137+   
(0.088) 
Age 0.056***   (0.012) 
0.056***         
(0.012) 
0.058***         
(0.013) 
0.026   
(0.027) 
0.025   
(0.027) 
0.026   
(0.027) 
Age2 –0.001***      (0.0001) 
–0.001***         
(0.0001) 
–0.001***         
(0.0001) 
–0.0005*   
(0.0003) 
–0.0005*   
(0.0003) 
–0.0005*   
(0.0003) 
Green–Lite 0.279***   (0.079) 
0.009   
(0.081) 
0.151*   
(0.081) 
0.117   
(0.173) 
–0.026   
(0.177) 
0.002   
(0.177) 
Gray 0.250**   (0.100) 
–0.244**   
(0.099) 
0.051   
(0.103) 
0.037   
(0.220) 
–0.219   
(0.218) 
–0.134   
(0.225) 
Gold–Lite 0.279**   (0.118) 
–0.296***      
(0.112) 
0.106   
(0.120) 
–0.091   
(0.262) 
–0.380+    
(0.249) 
–0.243   
(0.266) 
Gold 0.269**   (0.135) 
  –0.401***   
(0.135) 
–0.016   
(0.139) 
0.260   
(0.287) 
–0.094   
(0.290) 
0.009   
(0.298) 
Electoral Factors 
Electoral 
Expectations 
0.00001   
(0.00001) 
0.00001   
(0.00001) 
0.00001   
(0.00001) 
–7.23E–06   
(0.0001) 
–5.56E–06   
(0.0001) 
–1.60E–06   
(0.0001) 
Burnout Factors 
Years in 
Position 
0.030***   
(0.003) 
0.028***         
(0.003)  
0.029***         
(0.003) 
0.036***   
(0.006) 
0.035***           
(0.006) 
0.035***   
(0.006) 
Constant –4.299***      (0.343) 
–3.849***         
(0.326) 
–4.786***         
(0.349) 
–3.933***        
(0.715) 
–3.815***           
(0.675) 
–4.336***           
(0.723) 
N = 67,811 
Notes: *** p ≤ 0.01; ** p  ≤ 0.05; * p ≤ 0.10; +significant at the 0.10 level (one–tailed test). 
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Table C.12: Multinomial Probit With Status Quo as the Omitted Category (2000–2010) 
– Conditional Impact of Earning Potential and Legislative Salary 
 
 Retire Defeat Other Political Other Employment 
Financial Factors 
Real Legislative Salary (thou) 0.007***   (0.001) 
–0.003***   
(0.001) 
0.003**    
(0.001) 
–0.0001    
(0.003) 
Earning Potential –0.053 (0.057) 
0.014    
(0.065) 
–0.036     
(0.087) 
0.251+    
(0.164) 
Legislative Salary x Earning  
     Potential 
0.0005    
(0.0015) 
–0.002    
(0.002) 
–0.001    
(0.002) 
–0.004    
(0.005) 
Personal Factors 
Party Leadership 0.200***   (0.049) 
–0.294***   
(0.082) 
0.103+    
(0.066) 
–0.279+    
(0.187) 
Committee Leadership  –0.034
+
    
(0.023) 
–0.080***   
(0.028) 
–0.102***   
(0.033) 
–0.108+    
(0.074) 
Member of Upper Chamber –0.087***   (0.026) 
–0.205***   
(0.032) 
0.267***    
(0.035) 
0.142*    
(0.078) 
Married 0.172***   (0.034) 
–0.089**   
(0.038) 
0.160***    
(0.051) 
0.063    
(0.107) 
Female 0.010   (0.028) 
0.004    
(0.032) 
0.002    
(0.041) 
–0.062 
(0.098) 
Children –0.295***   (0.028) 
–0.084**   
(0.035) 
–0.074*    
(0.041) 
–0.122+   
(0.088) 
Age –0.039***   (0.007) 
0.0001   
(0.008) 
0.056***    
(0.012) 
0.027 
(0.027) 
Age2 0.0005***   (0.0001) 
0.0001+   
(0.0001) 
–0.0007*** 
(0.0001) 
–0.0005*   
(0.0003) 
Green–Lite 0.638***      (0.0584) 
–0.018   
(0.075) 
0.272***    
(0.079) 
0.124 
(0.173) 
Gray 0.555***   (0.074) 
–0.025    
(0.091) 
0.241**    
(0.101) 
0.047 
(0.220) 
Gold–Lite 0.606***   (0.088) 
–0.0004    
(0.106) 
0.261**    
(0.119) 
–0.080 
(0.262) 
Gold 1.089***   (0.098) 
0.012 
(0.119) 
0.251*    
(0.135) 
0.276 
(0.287) 
Electoral Factors 
Electoral Expectations –0.001**   (0.0005) 
–0.008***   
(0.0005) 
0.00001   
(0.00001) 
–6.34E–06   
(0.0001) 
Burnout Factors 
Years in Position 0.024***    (0.002) 
–0.002    
(0.002) 
0.030***    
(0.003) 
0.036***   
(0.006) 
Constant –2.462***    (0.220) 
–1.911***   
(0.260) 
–4.279***     
(0.344) 
–4.018***   
(0.717) 
N = 67,631  
Notes: *** p ≤ 0.01; ** p  ≤ 0.05; * p ≤ 0.10; +significant at the 0.10 level (one–tailed test). 
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